RB
robert bristow-johnson
Mon, May 13, 2024 2:02 AM
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I don't know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be unranked unless Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot, and then I would have to rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.> Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat HareSorry. No nothing from me. You guys know I'm pretty simplistic. My principles:1. Equally-valued votes. One-Person-One-Vote. Equality under the law. That means Majority Rule. (If any minority gets to rule, that means their votes counted more, per vote, than then individual votes from voters in the majority that doesn't rule. That has to be considered a "Bad Thing".)(1a. Process transparency. That means not giving up having Precinct Summability.)2. That means if more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candid
ate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected. If we can, at all, avoid it. That means Condorcet.3. Which Condorcet-consistent method to pick is whatever best finds its way to legislation. That means the method, spelled out in words, needs to be meaningful and concise and reflect principles widely accepted by the public and legislators.So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be Condorcet-TTR (top-two-runoff) to give the Hare IRV advocates a fig leaf to cover their shame with. Also N^2 summable. I dunno.------ Original message------From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm Date: Sun, May 12, 2024 17:42To: robert bristow-johnson;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;Cc: Subject:Re: [EM] POLL: New deadline: 2024-05-16 05:15:00 UTCOn 2024-05-12 18:24, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
We need not resubmit our vote, right?
The last ballot you submitted is what counts, so you don't need to
resubmit unless you want to make a change to it.
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? The methods are
Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare.
I haven't seen posted here more than a couple other ballots. How many
have voted?
By my count, in reverse order of submission, there's:
Richard Fobes ("Poll, final ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy")
You ("POLL: Approaching deadline: 2024-05-11 05:15:00 UTC")
Me ("Poll ballot")
fdpk69p6uq ("POLL: References (was: Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)")
Joshua Boehme ("My Preliminary Ballot for the Voting Systems Poll")
Chris Benham ("Poll ballot revision, Wednesday 24 April")
Mike Ossipoff ("Revised ballot, Wednesday, April 17th")
I also am skeptical about the usefulness of the results (I presume a
pairwise preference matrix and approval tallies) but will be interested
anyway.
All the more reason for lurkers out there - or frequent posters for that
matter - to vote :-)
-km
>Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I don't know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be unranked unless Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot, and then I would have to rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.> Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat HareSorry. No nothing from me. You guys know I'm pretty simplistic. My principles:1. Equally-valued votes. One-Person-One-Vote. Equality under the law. That means Majority Rule. (If any minority gets to rule, that means their votes counted more, per vote, than then individual votes from voters in the majority that doesn't rule. That has to be considered a "Bad Thing".)(1a. Process transparency. That means not giving up having Precinct Summability.)2. That means if more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candid
ate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected. If we can, at all, avoid it. That means Condorcet.3. Which Condorcet-consistent method to pick is whatever best finds its way to legislation. That means the method, spelled out in words, needs to be meaningful and concise and reflect principles widely accepted by the public and legislators.So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be Condorcet-TTR (top-two-runoff) to give the Hare IRV advocates a fig leaf to cover their shame with. Also N^2 summable. I dunno.------ Original message------From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm Date: Sun, May 12, 2024 17:42To: robert bristow-johnson;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;Cc: Subject:Re: [EM] POLL: New deadline: 2024-05-16 05:15:00 UTCOn 2024-05-12 18:24, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>
> We need not resubmit our vote, right?
The last ballot you submitted is what counts, so you don't need to
resubmit unless you want to make a change to it.
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? The methods are
Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare.
> I haven't seen posted here more than a couple other ballots. How many
> have voted?
By my count, in reverse order of submission, there's:
Richard Fobes ("Poll, final ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy")
You ("POLL: Approaching deadline: 2024-05-11 05:15:00 UTC")
Me ("Poll ballot")
fdpk69p6uq ("POLL: References (was: Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)")
Joshua Boehme ("My Preliminary Ballot for the Voting Systems Poll")
Chris Benham ("Poll ballot revision, Wednesday 24 April")
Mike Ossipoff ("Revised ballot, Wednesday, April 17th")
> I also am skeptical about the usefulness of the results (I presume a
> pairwise preference matrix and approval tallies) but will be interested
> anyway.
All the more reason for lurkers out there - or frequent posters for that
matter - to vote :-)
-km
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Mon, May 13, 2024 2:47 AM
rb-j: does strategy play into this? If there's a method that's
Condorcet-consistent under sincere voting, but will frequently elect the
Condorcet loser in the presence of strategic voting, is that a good method?
On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 7:05 PM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your ballot.
Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else?
Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I don't
know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be unranked unless
Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot, and then I would have to
rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.
Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare
S orry. No nothing from me. You guys know I'm pretty simplistic. My
principles:
- Equally-valued votes. One-Person-One-Vote. Equality under the law.
That means Majority Rule. (If any minority gets to rule, that means their
votes counted more, per vote, than then individual votes from voters in the
majority that doesn't rule. That has to be considered a "Bad Thing".)
(1a. Process transparency. That means not giving up having Precinct
Summability.)
-
That means if more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to
Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the c
ontrary, then Candidate B is not elected. If we can, at all, avoid it.
That means Condorcet.
-
Which Condorcet-consistent method to pick is whatever best finds its
way to legislation. That means the method, spelled out in words, needs to
be meaningful and concise and reflect principles widely accepted by the
public and legislators.
So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency
method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be Condorcet-TTR (top-two-runoff)
to give the Hare IRV advocates a fig leaf to cover their shame with. Also
N^2 summable. I dunno.
------ O riginal message------
*From: *Kristofer Munsterhjelm
*Date: *Sun, May 12, 2024 17:42
*To: *robert bristow-johnson;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;
*Cc: *
*Subject:*Re: [EM] POLL: New deadline: 2024-05-16 05:15:00 UTC
On 2024-05-12 18:24, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
We need not resubmit our vote, right?
The last ballot you submitted is what counts, so you don't need to
resubmit unless you want to make a change to it.
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? The methods are
Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare.
I haven't seen posted here more than a couple other ballots. How many
have voted?
By my count, in reverse order of submission, there's:
Richard Fobes ("Poll, final ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy")
You ("POLL: Approaching deadline: 2024-05-11 05:15:00 UTC")
Me ("Poll ballot")
fdpk69p6uq ("POLL: References (was: Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)")
Joshua Boehme ("My Preliminary Ballot for the Voting Systems Poll")
Chris Benham ("Poll ballot revision, Wednesday 24 April")
Mike Ossipoff ("Revised ballot, Wednesday, April 17th")
I also am skeptical about the usefulness of the results (I presume a
pairwise preference matrix and approval tallies) but will be interested
anyway.
All the more reason for lurkers out there - or frequent posters for that
matter - to vote :-)
-km
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
rb-j: does strategy play into this? If there's a method that's
Condorcet-consistent under sincere voting, but will frequently elect the
Condorcet loser in the presence of strategic voting, is that a good method?
On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 7:05 PM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
> >Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your ballot.
> Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else?
>
> Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I don't
> know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be unranked unless
> Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot, and then I would have to
> rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.
>
> > Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare
>
> S orry. No nothing from me. You guys know I'm pretty simplistic. My
> principles:
>
> 1. Equally-valued votes. One-Person-One-Vote. Equality under the law.
> That means Majority Rule. (If any minority gets to rule, that means their
> votes counted more, per vote, than then individual votes from voters in the
> majority that doesn't rule. That has to be considered a "Bad Thing".)
>
> (1a. Process transparency. That means not giving up having Precinct
> Summability.)
>
> 2. That means if more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to
> Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the c
> ontrary, then Candidate B is not elected. If we can, at all, avoid it.
> That means Condorcet.
>
> 3. Which Condorcet-consistent method to pick is whatever best finds its
> way to legislation. That means the method, spelled out in words, needs to
> be meaningful and concise and reflect principles widely accepted by the
> public and legislators.
>
> So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency
> method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be Condorcet-TTR (top-two-runoff)
> to give the Hare IRV advocates a fig leaf to cover their shame with. Also
> N^2 summable. I dunno.
>
> ------ O riginal message------
> *From: *Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> *Date: *Sun, May 12, 2024 17:42
> *To: *robert bristow-johnson;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;
> *Cc: *
> *Subject:*Re: [EM] POLL: New deadline: 2024-05-16 05:15:00 UTC
>
> On 2024-05-12 18:24, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> >
> >
> > We need not resubmit our vote, right?
>
> The last ballot you submitted is what counts, so you don't need to
> resubmit unless you want to make a change to it.
>
> Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
> ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? The methods are
> Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare.
>
> > I haven't seen posted here more than a couple other ballots. How many
> > have voted?
>
> By my count, in reverse order of submission, there's:
>
> Richard Fobes ("Poll, final ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy")
> You ("POLL: Approaching deadline: 2024-05-11 05:15:00 UTC")
> Me ("Poll ballot")
> fdpk69p6uq ("POLL: References (was: Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)")
> Joshua Boehme ("My Preliminary Ballot for the Voting Systems Poll")
> Chris Benham ("Poll ballot revision, Wednesday 24 April")
> Mike Ossipoff ("Revised ballot, Wednesday, April 17th")
>
> > I also am skeptical about the usefulness of the results (I presume a
> > pairwise preference matrix and approval tallies) but will be interested
> > anyway.
>
> All the more reason for lurkers out there - or frequent posters for that
> matter - to vote :-)
>
> -km
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Mon, May 13, 2024 3:26 PM
On 2024-05-13 04:02, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else?
Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I don't
know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be unranked unless
Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot, and then I would have
to rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.
No problem :-) I was just wondering if you had missed them.
So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency
method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be Condorcet-TTR
(top-two-runoff) to give the Hare IRV advocates a fig leaf to cover
their shame with. Also N^2 summable. I dunno.
I would suggest my fpA - max fpC as an outright improvement over
Condorcet-TTR (it's monotone, similar if not better strategy resistance,
n^2 summable)... but for one thing: the strange scoring function that
seems to come out of nowhere with no intuitive explanation. It's really
a shame.
-km
On 2024-05-13 04:02, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
> >Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
> ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else?
>
> Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I don't
> know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be unranked unless
> Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot, and then I would have
> to rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.
No problem :-) I was just wondering if you had missed them.
> So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency
> method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be Condorcet-TTR
> (top-two-runoff) to give the Hare IRV advocates a fig leaf to cover
> their shame with. Also N^2 summable. I dunno.
I would suggest my fpA - max fpC as an outright improvement over
Condorcet-TTR (it's monotone, similar if not better strategy resistance,
n^2 summable)... but for one thing: the strange scoring function that
seems to come out of nowhere with no intuitive explanation. It's really
a shame.
-km
CB
Chris Benham
Wed, May 15, 2024 10:43 AM
So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the
contingency method.
That method is a big open invitation for the supporters of the
Plurality (aka FPP) winner to engage in easy Burial strategy. Say
sincere is
46 A
44 B
10 C>B
B is the Condorcet winner. B>A 54-46 and B>C 44-10.
What can the A supporters do about that?
46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
44 B
10 C>B
They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A
54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists
easily steal the election. In this example that is also true of Margins
and the dinky Bottom-Two Runoff "IRV" method you like.
A much better Condorcet method is Smith//Approval (implicit) which here
gives the strategists a backfire by electing C. Winning Votes is also
better and does the same thing. So does Smith//DAC.
Condorcet//Approval (implicit) wasn't nominated in the poll but is the
same thing as Smith//Approval (implicit) when there are no more than 3
candidates and is also much better.
Among Condorcet methods, Benham and Woodall both continue to elect B in
the second example because they meet Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third.
Similar and also much better is Condorcet//Hare.
Among non Condorcet methods, I would vastly prefer plain Hare and
Double Defeat, Hare. Plain Approval would at least be vastly better
bang-for-buck.
Chris B.
On 13/05/2024 11:32 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
-
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on
your ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else?
-
Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I
don't know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be
unranked unless Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot,
and then I would have to rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.
-
Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare
-
S orry. No nothing from me. You guys know I'm pretty
simplistic. My principles:
-
- Equally-valued votes. One-Person-One-Vote. Equality under the
law. That means Majority Rule. (If any minority gets to rule,
that means their votes counted more, per vote, than then
individual votes from voters in the majority that doesn't rule.
That has to be considered a "Bad Thing".)
-
(1a. Process transparency. That means not giving up having
Precinct Summability.)
-
- That means if more voters mark their ballots preferring
Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of voters marking their
ballots to the c ontrary, then Candidate B is not elected. If we
can, at all, avoid it. That means Condorcet.
-
- Which Condorcet-consistent method to pick is whatever best
finds its way to legislation. That means the method, spelled out
in words, needs to be meaningful and concise and reflect
principles widely accepted by the public and legislators.
-
So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the
contingency method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be
Condorcet-TTR (top-two-runoff) to give the Hare IRV advocates a
fig leaf to cover their shame with. Also N^2 summable. I dunno.
------ O riginal message------
*From: *Kristofer Munsterhjelm
*Date: *Sun, May 12, 2024 17:42
*To: *robert bristow-johnson;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;
*Cc: *
*Subject:*Re: [EM] POLL: New deadline: 2024-05-16 05 <tel:2024-05-16
05>:15:00 UTC
On2024-05-12 18 <tel:2024-05-12 18>:24, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
We need not resubmit our vote, right?
The last ballot you submitted is what counts, so you don't need to
resubmit unless you want to make a change to it.
Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? The methods are
Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare.
I haven't seen posted here more than a couple other ballots. How many
have voted?
By my count, in reverse order of submission, there's:
Richard Fobes ("Poll, final ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy")
You ("POLL: Approaching deadline:2024-05-11 05 <tel:2024-05-11 05>:15:00 UTC")
Me ("Poll ballot")
fdpk69p6uq ("POLL: References (was: Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)")
Joshua Boehme ("My Preliminary Ballot for the Voting Systems Poll")
Chris Benham ("Poll ballot revision, Wednesday 24 April")
Mike Ossipoff ("Revised ballot, Wednesday, April 17th")
I also am skeptical about the usefulness of the results (I presume a
pairwise preference matrix and approval tallies) but will be interested
anyway.
All the more reason for lurkers out there - or frequent posters for that
matter - to vote :-)
-km
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Robert,
> So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the
> contingency method.
That method is a big open invitation for the supporters of the
Plurality (aka FPP) winner to engage in easy Burial strategy. Say
sincere is
46 A
44 B
10 C>B
B is the Condorcet winner. B>A 54-46 and B>C 44-10.
What can the A supporters do about that?
46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
44 B
10 C>B
They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A
54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists
easily steal the election. In this example that is also true of Margins
and the dinky Bottom-Two Runoff "IRV" method you like.
A much better Condorcet method is Smith//Approval (implicit) which here
gives the strategists a backfire by electing C. Winning Votes is also
better and does the same thing. So does Smith//DAC.
Condorcet//Approval (implicit) wasn't nominated in the poll but is the
same thing as Smith//Approval (implicit) when there are no more than 3
candidates and is also much better.
Among Condorcet methods, Benham and Woodall both continue to elect B in
the second example because they meet Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third.
Similar and also much better is Condorcet//Hare.
Among non Condorcet methods, I would vastly prefer plain Hare and
Double Defeat, Hare. Plain Approval would at least be vastly better
bang-for-buck.
Chris B.
On 13/05/2024 11:32 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
> 1. >Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on
> your ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else?
> 2.
>
> 3. Just like in other elections I refuse to weigh in on candidates I
> don't know about. And on a ranked ballot they would likely be
> unranked unless Hitler or Satan or Donald Trump was on the ballot,
> and then I would have to rank these unfamiliar candidates higher.
> 4.
>
> 5. > Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare
> 6.
>
> 7. S orry. No nothing from me. You guys know I'm pretty
> simplistic. My principles:
> 8.
>
> 9. 1. Equally-valued votes. One-Person-One-Vote. Equality under the
> law. That means Majority Rule. (If any minority gets to rule,
> that means their votes counted more, per vote, than then
> individual votes from voters in the majority that doesn't rule.
> That has to be considered a "Bad Thing".)
>10.
>
> 11. (1a. Process transparency. That means not giving up having
> Precinct Summability.)
>12.
>
> 13. 2. That means if more voters mark their ballots preferring
> Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of voters marking their
> ballots to the c ontrary, then Candidate B is not elected. If we
> can, at all, avoid it. That means Condorcet.
>14.
>
> 15. 3. Which Condorcet-consistent method to pick is whatever best
> finds its way to legislation. That means the method, spelled out
> in words, needs to be meaningful and concise and reflect
> principles widely accepted by the public and legislators.
>16.
>
> 17. So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the
> contingency method. N^2 summable. Maybe it should be
> Condorcet-TTR (top-two-runoff) to give the Hare IRV advocates a
> fig leaf to cover their shame with. Also N^2 summable. I dunno.
>
>
> ------ O riginal message------
> *From: *Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> *Date: *Sun, May 12, 2024 17:42
> *To: *robert bristow-johnson;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;
> *Cc: *
> *Subject:*Re: [EM] POLL: New deadline: 2024-05-16 05 <tel:2024-05-16
> 05>:15:00 UTC
>
> On2024-05-12 18 <tel:2024-05-12 18>:24, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> >
> >
> > We need not resubmit our vote, right?
>
> The last ballot you submitted is what counts, so you don't need to
> resubmit unless you want to make a change to it.
>
> Though speaking of: you left out some (non-Condorcet) methods on your
> ballot. Do you want them ranked last, or somewhere else? The methods are
> Approval plus manual runoff, MJ, RCIPE, and Double Defeat Hare.
>
> > I haven't seen posted here more than a couple other ballots. How many
> > have voted?
>
> By my count, in reverse order of submission, there's:
>
> Richard Fobes ("Poll, final ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy")
> You ("POLL: Approaching deadline:2024-05-11 05 <tel:2024-05-11 05>:15:00 UTC")
> Me ("Poll ballot")
> fdpk69p6uq ("POLL: References (was: Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)")
> Joshua Boehme ("My Preliminary Ballot for the Voting Systems Poll")
> Chris Benham ("Poll ballot revision, Wednesday 24 April")
> Mike Ossipoff ("Revised ballot, Wednesday, April 17th")
>
> > I also am skeptical about the usefulness of the results (I presume a
> > pairwise preference matrix and approval tallies) but will be interested
> > anyway.
>
> All the more reason for lurkers out there - or frequent posters for that
> matter - to vote :-)
>
> -km
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Thu, May 16, 2024 12:30 AM
So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency method.
That method is a big open invitation for the supporters of the Plurality (aka FPP) winner to engage in easy Burial strategy. Say sincere is
46 A
44 B
10 C>B
B is the Condorcet winner. B>A 54-46 and B>C 44-10.
What can the A supporters do about that?
46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
44 B
10 C>B
They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A 54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists easily steal the election.
If it's not that close, how is it "easy"? And what about the risk of backfiring?
I know that the Alaska 2022 (August) race is good example, Peltola wins with IRV and FPTP. Begich is the CW. If it were Condorcet/Plurality (or Bottom-Two Runoff, which also elects the Plurality winner, at least in the situation of only 3 significant candidates), I understand that if Peltola voters anticipating that Peltola might be the Plurality winner but Begich would win Condorcet, they might bury Begich and bullet vote Peltola. But a lot of voters would have to do that, and it may be against their true desires, which is to make sure that Palin does not win. They risk Palin winning if they bullet vote Peltola.
In this example that is also true of Margins and the dinky Bottom-Two Runoff "IRV" method you like.
I like "dinky" if that description means "concise". Benham's method, when encoded in legislative language is not dinky enough. BTR only requires one simple runoff in each IRV round. Your method essentially requires doing the straight-ahead Condorcet tabulation for each round. I just cannot imagine legislators choosing that over the dinky BTR.
Chris, would you recommend changing to Condorcet/TTR? I'm pretty much agnostic about that.
But here's what I want (because my interest is legislation for elections for public office in government):
-
I want everyone, legislators and the public, to understand the method and how the legal language directly describes the method. If the legislative language is convoluted, it will most certainly be rejected by both legislators and the public.
-
I want everyone to understand the purpose of the legislative change; Why are we changing from FPTP to RCV? What is it that we're trying to gain or to fix by changing? That reason needs to be concise, well-understood, and compelling. Straight-ahead Condorcet simply spells out application of the Condorcet criterion to the tabulation of the vote. It's simply:
"If more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected."
At least if we can, at all, avoid it.
I don't want to sell these policy makers on that simple principle and then try to convince them that some language that is far nastier than IRV is necessary to implement it. They will reject it. They might think that I am obfuscating some trick in the language. Benham isn't as opaque as Schulze, but it's not as transparent as BTR or straight-ahead Condorcet (which, of course, needs a completion method).
A much better Condorcet method is Smith//Approval (implicit) which here gives the strategists a backfire by electing C. Winning Votes is also better and does the same thing. So does Smith//DAC.
Condorcet//Approval (implicit) wasn't nominated in the poll but is the same thing as Smith//Approval (implicit) when there are no more than 3 candidates and is also much better.
Among Condorcet methods, Benham and Woodall both continue to elect B in the second example because they meet Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third. Similar and also much better is Condorcet//Hare.
I'll connect you to a couple Vermont legislators that are sympathetic to Condorcet. Let's see how you explain this to them.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
> On 05/15/2024 6:43 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> Robert,
>
>
> > So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency method.
>
> That method is a big open invitation for the supporters of the Plurality (aka FPP) winner to engage in easy Burial strategy. Say sincere is
>
> 46 A
> 44 B
> 10 C>B
>
> B is the Condorcet winner. B>A 54-46 and B>C 44-10.
>
> What can the A supporters do about that?
>
> 46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
> 44 B
> 10 C>B
>
> They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A 54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
>
> According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists easily steal the election.
If it's not that close, how is it "easy"? And what about the risk of backfiring?
I know that the Alaska 2022 (August) race is good example, Peltola wins with IRV and FPTP. Begich is the CW. If it were Condorcet/Plurality (or Bottom-Two Runoff, which also elects the Plurality winner, at least in the situation of only 3 significant candidates), I understand that if Peltola voters anticipating that Peltola might be the Plurality winner but Begich would win Condorcet, they might bury Begich and bullet vote Peltola. But a lot of voters would have to do that, *and* it may be against their true desires, which is to make sure that Palin does not win. They risk Palin winning if they bullet vote Peltola.
> In this example that is also true of Margins and the dinky Bottom-Two Runoff "IRV" method you like.
>
I like "dinky" if that description means "concise". Benham's method, when encoded in legislative language is not dinky enough. BTR only requires one simple runoff in each IRV round. Your method essentially requires doing the straight-ahead Condorcet tabulation for each round. I just cannot imagine legislators choosing that over the dinky BTR.
Chris, would you recommend changing to Condorcet/TTR? I'm pretty much agnostic about that.
But here's what I want (because my interest is *legislation* for elections for public office in government):
1. I want everyone, legislators and the public, to understand the method and how the legal language directly describes the method. If the legislative language is convoluted, it will most certainly be rejected by both legislators and the public.
2. I want everyone to understand the *purpose* of the legislative change; Why are we changing from FPTP to RCV? What is it that we're trying to gain or to fix by changing? That reason needs to be concise, well-understood, and compelling. Straight-ahead Condorcet simply spells out application of the Condorcet criterion to the tabulation of the vote. It's simply:
"If more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected."
At least if we can, at all, avoid it.
I don't want to sell these policy makers on that simple principle and then try to convince them that some language that is far nastier than IRV is necessary to implement it. They will reject it. They might think that I am obfuscating some trick in the language. Benham isn't as opaque as Schulze, but it's not as transparent as BTR or straight-ahead Condorcet (which, of course, needs a completion method).
> A much better Condorcet method is Smith//Approval (implicit) which here gives the strategists a backfire by electing C. Winning Votes is also better and does the same thing. So does Smith//DAC.
>
> Condorcet//Approval (implicit) wasn't nominated in the poll but is the same thing as Smith//Approval (implicit) when there are no more than 3 candidates and is also much better.
>
> Among Condorcet methods, Benham and Woodall both continue to elect B in the second example because they meet Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third. Similar and also much better is Condorcet//Hare.
>
I'll connect you to a couple Vermont legislators that are sympathetic to Condorcet. Let's see how you explain this to them.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
CB
Chris Benham
Sat, May 18, 2024 4:43 PM
46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
44 B
10 C>B
They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A 54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists easily steal the election.
If it's not that close, how is it "easy"? And what about the risk of backfiring?
Say A is a Center-Right and B is Center-Left. C is Far-Left and this
is the first post-FPP election. The C party thinks "Great, now we can
run without helping to elect our greater-evil A!"
The B voters likely (at least weakly) sincerely prefer A to C. Are they
going to think "Those C supporters are probably going to vote C>B , so
we should show our gratitude by voting B>C" ??
I would guess not. But if they do then yes the A voters' Burial strategy
will backfire by C becoming the voted Condorcet winner.
I like "dinky" if that description means "concise".
No. I gather it can be a kind of compliment in British English, but I
meant that it is small and silly. No-one ever suggested that there is
anything much good about it apart from the fact that it is a Condorcet
method. It was conceived as something hopefully saleable to people who
like the idea of one-at-a-time excluding weak candidates and for that
reason think they like IRV.
Chris, would you recommend changing to Condorcet/TTR?
No. I would recommend Condorcet//Approval (explicit): Voters rank
the candidates they approve, equal-ranking allowed. A voted CW wins. If
there isn't one then the most approved candidate wins.
No-one nominated that in the poll. It is similar to Smith//Approval
(explicit).
I'll connect you to a couple Vermont legislators that are sympathetic to Condorcet. Let's see how you explain this to them.
Thanks. I'm happy to try. :)
Chris B.
On 16/05/2024 10:00 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency method.
That method is a big open invitation for the supporters of the Plurality (aka FPP) winner to engage in easy Burial strategy. Say sincere is
46 A
44 B
10 C>B
B is the Condorcet winner. B>A 54-46 and B>C 44-10.
What can the A supporters do about that?
46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
44 B
10 C>B
They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A 54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists easily steal the election.
If it's not that close, how is it "easy"? And what about the risk of backfiring?
I know that the Alaska 2022 (August) race is good example, Peltola wins with IRV and FPTP. Begich is the CW. If it were Condorcet/Plurality (or Bottom-Two Runoff, which also elects the Plurality winner, at least in the situation of only 3 significant candidates), I understand that if Peltola voters anticipating that Peltola might be the Plurality winner but Begich would win Condorcet, they might bury Begich and bullet vote Peltola. But a lot of voters would have to do that, and it may be against their true desires, which is to make sure that Palin does not win. They risk Palin winning if they bullet vote Peltola.
In this example that is also true of Margins and the dinky Bottom-Two Runoff "IRV" method you like.
I like "dinky" if that description means "concise". Benham's method, when encoded in legislative language is not dinky enough. BTR only requires one simple runoff in each IRV round. Your method essentially requires doing the straight-ahead Condorcet tabulation for each round. I just cannot imagine legislators choosing that over the dinky BTR.
Chris, would you recommend changing to Condorcet/TTR? I'm pretty much agnostic about that.
But here's what I want (because my interest is legislation for elections for public office in government):
-
I want everyone, legislators and the public, to understand the method and how the legal language directly describes the method. If the legislative language is convoluted, it will most certainly be rejected by both legislators and the public.
-
I want everyone to understand the purpose of the legislative change; Why are we changing from FPTP to RCV? What is it that we're trying to gain or to fix by changing? That reason needs to be concise, well-understood, and compelling. Straight-ahead Condorcet simply spells out application of the Condorcet criterion to the tabulation of the vote. It's simply:
"If more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected."
At least if we can, at all, avoid it.
I don't want to sell these policy makers on that simple principle and then try to convince them that some language that is far nastier than IRV is necessary to implement it. They will reject it. They might think that I am obfuscating some trick in the language. Benham isn't as opaque as Schulze, but it's not as transparent as BTR or straight-ahead Condorcet (which, of course, needs a completion method).
A much better Condorcet method is Smith//Approval (implicit) which here gives the strategists a backfire by electing C. Winning Votes is also better and does the same thing. So does Smith//DAC.
Condorcet//Approval (implicit) wasn't nominated in the poll but is the same thing as Smith//Approval (implicit) when there are no more than 3 candidates and is also much better.
Among Condorcet methods, Benham and Woodall both continue to elect B in the second example because they meet Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third. Similar and also much better is Condorcet//Hare.
I'll connect you to a couple Vermont legislators that are sympathetic to Condorcet. Let's see how you explain this to them.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Robert,
> 46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
> 44 B
> 10 C>B
>
> They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A 54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
>
> According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists easily steal the election.
> If it's not that close, how is it "easy"? And what about the risk of backfiring?
Say A is a Center-Right and B is Center-Left. C is Far-Left and this
is the first post-FPP election. The C party thinks "Great, now we can
run without helping to elect our greater-evil A!"
The B voters likely (at least weakly) sincerely prefer A to C. Are they
going to think "Those C supporters are probably going to vote C>B , so
we should show our gratitude by voting B>C" ??
I would guess not. But if they do then yes the A voters' Burial strategy
will backfire by C becoming the voted Condorcet winner.
> I like "dinky" if that description means "concise".
No. I gather it can be a kind of compliment in British English, but I
meant that it is small and silly. No-one ever suggested that there is
anything much good about it apart from the fact that it is a Condorcet
method. It was conceived as something hopefully saleable to people who
like the idea of one-at-a-time excluding weak candidates and for that
reason think they like IRV.
> Chris, would you recommend changing to Condorcet/TTR?
No. I would recommend Condorcet//Approval (explicit): *Voters rank
the candidates they approve, equal-ranking allowed. A voted CW wins. If
there isn't one then the most approved candidate wins.*
No-one nominated that in the poll. It is similar to Smith//Approval
(explicit).
> I'll connect you to a couple Vermont legislators that are sympathetic to Condorcet. Let's see how you explain this to them.
Thanks. I'm happy to try. :)
Chris B.
On 16/05/2024 10:00 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>> On 05/15/2024 6:43 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Robert,
>>
>>
>>> So my fav is straight-ahead Condorcet with Plurality as the contingency method.
>> That method is a big open invitation for the supporters of the Plurality (aka FPP) winner to engage in easy Burial strategy. Say sincere is
>>
>> 46 A
>> 44 B
>> 10 C>B
>>
>> B is the Condorcet winner. B>A 54-46 and B>C 44-10.
>>
>> What can the A supporters do about that?
>>
>> 46 A>C (sincere is A or A>B)
>> 44 B
>> 10 C>B
>>
>> They have given B a pairwise defeat so now there is a cycle. B>A 54-46, A>C 46-10, C>B 56-44.
>>
>> According to your preferred Condorcet//FPP method the strategists easily steal the election.
> If it's not that close, how is it "easy"? And what about the risk of backfiring?
>
> I know that the Alaska 2022 (August) race is good example, Peltola wins with IRV and FPTP. Begich is the CW. If it were Condorcet/Plurality (or Bottom-Two Runoff, which also elects the Plurality winner, at least in the situation of only 3 significant candidates), I understand that if Peltola voters anticipating that Peltola might be the Plurality winner but Begich would win Condorcet, they might bury Begich and bullet vote Peltola. But a lot of voters would have to do that, *and* it may be against their true desires, which is to make sure that Palin does not win. They risk Palin winning if they bullet vote Peltola.
>
>> In this example that is also true of Margins and the dinky Bottom-Two Runoff "IRV" method you like.
>>
> I like "dinky" if that description means "concise". Benham's method, when encoded in legislative language is not dinky enough. BTR only requires one simple runoff in each IRV round. Your method essentially requires doing the straight-ahead Condorcet tabulation for each round. I just cannot imagine legislators choosing that over the dinky BTR.
>
> Chris, would you recommend changing to Condorcet/TTR? I'm pretty much agnostic about that.
>
> But here's what I want (because my interest is *legislation* for elections for public office in government):
>
> 1. I want everyone, legislators and the public, to understand the method and how the legal language directly describes the method. If the legislative language is convoluted, it will most certainly be rejected by both legislators and the public.
>
> 2. I want everyone to understand the *purpose* of the legislative change; Why are we changing from FPTP to RCV? What is it that we're trying to gain or to fix by changing? That reason needs to be concise, well-understood, and compelling. Straight-ahead Condorcet simply spells out application of the Condorcet criterion to the tabulation of the vote. It's simply:
>
> "If more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected."
>
> At least if we can, at all, avoid it.
>
> I don't want to sell these policy makers on that simple principle and then try to convince them that some language that is far nastier than IRV is necessary to implement it. They will reject it. They might think that I am obfuscating some trick in the language. Benham isn't as opaque as Schulze, but it's not as transparent as BTR or straight-ahead Condorcet (which, of course, needs a completion method).
>
>
>> A much better Condorcet method is Smith//Approval (implicit) which here gives the strategists a backfire by electing C. Winning Votes is also better and does the same thing. So does Smith//DAC.
>>
>> Condorcet//Approval (implicit) wasn't nominated in the poll but is the same thing as Smith//Approval (implicit) when there are no more than 3 candidates and is also much better.
>>
>> Among Condorcet methods, Benham and Woodall both continue to elect B in the second example because they meet Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third. Similar and also much better is Condorcet//Hare.
>>
> I'll connect you to a couple Vermont legislators that are sympathetic to Condorcet. Let's see how you explain this to them.
>
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info