Omegatron, Michael: I understand the importance of consensus and neutral point-of-view, and I'll do my best to keep those in mind. That said, some Wikipedia articles *need* to be rewritten almost from scratch. I recommend taking a quick look at the Instant-Runoff Voting Wikipedia page, which includes substantial edits from a certain unknown anonymous user by the name of [[User:RRichie]]. 🤔 As well as a very interesting banner near the top. Notable contributions include: > Proponents of IRV claim that IRV eliminates the spoiler effect,[1][2][3] > [4] since IRV makes it safe to vote honestly for marginal parties: Under > a plurality method, voters who sympathize most strongly with a marginal > candidate are strongly encouraged to instead vote for a more popular > candidate who shares some of the same principles, since that candidate has > a much greater chance of being elected and a vote for the marginal > candidate will not result in the marginal candidate's election. An IRV > method reduces this problem, since the voter can rank the marginal > candidate first and the mainstream candidate second; in the likely event > that the fringe candidate is eliminated, the vote is not wasted but is > transferred to the second preference. > The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem demonstrates that no (deterministic, > non-dictatorial) voting method using only the preference rankings of the > voters can be entirely immune from tactical voting. This implies that IRV > is susceptible to tactical voting in some circumstances. > Research concludes that IRV is one of the voting methods least vulnerable > to tactical voting, with theorist Nicolaus Tideman noting that, > "alternative voting is quite resistant to strategy",[citation needed] and > Australian political analyst Antony Green dismissing suggestions of > tactical voting. > The 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont, provides an example in > which strategy theoretically could have worked but would have been unlikely > in practice. In that election, most supporters of the candidate who lost in > the final round (a Republican who led in first choices) preferred the > Condorcet winner, a Democrat, to the IRV winner, the Progressive Party > nominee. If 371 (24.7%) out of the 1,510 backers of the Republican > candidate (who also preferred the Democrat over the Progressive candidate > for mayor) had insincerely raised the Democrat from their second choice to > their first (not changing their rankings relative to their least favorite > candidate, the Progressive), the Democrat would then have advanced to the > final round (instead of their favorite), defeated any opponent, and > proceeded to win the IRV election.[citation needed] This is an example of > potential voter regret in that these voters who sincerely ranked their > favorite candidate as first, find out after the fact that they caused the > election of their least favorite candidate, which can lead to the voting > tactic of compromising. On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 6:58 PM Closed Limelike Curves < closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote: > Omegatron, Michael: > > I understand the importance of consensus and neutral point-of-view, and > I'll do my best to keep those in mind. > > That said, some Wikipedia articles deserve to be rewritten from scratch. I > recommend taking a quick look at the Instant-Runoff Voting Wikipedia page, > which includes substantial edits from a certain unknown anonymous user by > the name of [[User:RRichie]]. 🤔 > [image: image.png] > [image: image.png] > [image: image.png] > > > On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 9:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm < > km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > >> On 2024-05-06 21:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >> > It is my opinion that "Plurality" and "First-Past-The-Post" are >> synonymous. >> > >> > But looking at your Wiki page, I am concerned in how you would ever >> > know for certain an election is spoiled with FPTP. I mean, like Florida >> > 2000, perhaps the Ralph Nader voters would have split even up between >> > George W Bush and Al Gore. Not likely, but we don't know without the >> > ranked ballot. >> >> I suppose we could use polls to argue that the possibility exists, if >> those polls ask for pairwise or ranked/rated preference information. It >> would depend on the accuracy of the poll, e.g. if it asks both "Who >> would you vote for in the election" and "out of X and Y, who would you >> rather see win", and the former matches the actual outcome, then that >> would suggest the latter is accurate too. >> >> It won't be ironclad, of course. But without the ballots, nothing is :-) >> >> -km >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >