---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> Date: Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 13:21 Subject: Re: [EM] Is autodeterrence bad? (+STAR fails hyperchicken catastrophically) To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> I meant the Voting Theory Forum. On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 13:13 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > That post is thoroughly bizarre: > > Autodeterence is defined as a property for Condorcet methods, & Closed > thinks he’s somehow discrediting it by telling about a STAR situation. > > We’re getting leakage & spillover from the Voting Science Forum. > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 11:09 Closed Limelike Curves < > closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote: > >> I think the EM mailing list made a wrong turn a while back in >> misunderstanding "autodeterrence" as a positive attribute of a voting >> system, which discourages burial. I'd like to put forth an argument (which >> I'm still somewhat hesitant about) that it's a very *bad* property. >> Given the chance, political machines are likely to reach out and grab this >> third rail as hard as they can, even if it's terrible for their >> constituents, because it maximizes their chances of election. >> >> Start with a 2.5-candidate race between Gore, Bush, and a Nazi (who has a >> small, but slightly above zero, level of support). Gore doesn't know >> whether he or Bush is more popular in a runoff, but he's certain he and >> Bush will make it to the runoff with honest voting. However, he realizes he >> can use the Nazi as a bludgeon to increase his chances of winning. He tells >> his supporters to cast votes as follows: >> Gore – 5/5 >> Bush – 0/5 >> Nazi – 4/5 >> >> Gore's hope is that the Nazi is polarizing enough to defeat Bush for >> second place with Gore's support (at which point he's a weak candidate in >> the runoff). Risky? Yes. But it's still plausibly strategic if you think >> Bush will back down. >> >> But if Bush's faction thinks the same thing, the Nazi ends up winning. >> >> STAR punishes burial by blowing up the country, creating an extremely >> high-stakes game of chicken (hyperchicken?). This game has a mixed Nash >> equilibrium that involves blowing up the country with some small (but >> positive) probability. The issue isn't that burial is incentivized; it's >> that it *can* work, but when it fails, it's so strongly *dis*incentivized >> that it can be catastrophic. >> >> This can be especially bad since incentives are even stronger for >> candidates and campaigns. Campaigns coordinate strategy; voters take cues >> from campaigns and political elites (which is why the two major-party >> nominees are always the top-2 winners). >> >> The strategy above would be bad for society, and ambiguous for individual >> voters (it could elect either Gore or a Nazi). On the other hand, *great* for >> Gore's probability of winning, if Gore >> >> Empirically, this kind of turkey-raising happens all the time. Adam >> Schiff spent millions trying to boost the Republican in California over >> Katie Porter. The DNC keeps intervening in Republican primaries to help >> nominate extremists. They keep doing this because they think it's good for >> their own personal chances of winning the election, not because they think >> it's good for the country overall. And generally, they're right—even though >> it risks electing Nazis, it probably helps Democrats win a few more seats. >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >