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Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems (Juho Laatu)

FS
Forest Simmons
Wed, Jan 29, 2020 11:05 PM

Juho,

I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your point
of view on this topic.

Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that
majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among the
voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a Condorcet
completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference
order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic for
coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid basis in
itself for choosing between methods.

Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that
Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to
many applications the method must take into account preference intensities,
which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval
cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200

From: Juho Laatu juho.laatu@gmail.com
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems
Message-ID: 3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com
Content-Type: text/plain;      charset=us-ascii

My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain
majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a
natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting
related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. Majorities are meaningful also in
cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they
agree to do so.

BR, Juho


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Juho, I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your point of view on this topic. Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among the voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a Condorcet completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid basis in itself for choosing between methods. Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way. These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to many applications the method must take into account preference intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots. Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200 > From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com> > To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems > Message-ID: <3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain > majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a > natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting > related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. Majorities are meaningful also in > cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they > agree to do so. > > BR, Juho > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Subject: Digest Footer > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > > ------------------------------ > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 187, Issue 31 > ************************************************* >
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Wed, Jan 29, 2020 11:39 PM

On January 29, 2020 6:05 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

Juho,

I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your point of view on this topic.

Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among the voters or from insincere voting,

i don't assume that.  i believe that it is possible that sincere voting can possibly result in a Condorcet cycle.  but i think it will be extremely rare in governmental elections.  because i believe that normally a relatively small portion of voters for Nader will choose Bush as their second choice over Gore.

so that the purpose of a Condorcet completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference order.

the real purpose is this: to unambiguously establish in law what will happen if there is no Condorcet winner.  so that if such happens, everybody knows what the rules are and any squabbling should be resolved quickly by election officials and not need a judge in a court of law.

It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid basis in itself for choosing between methods.

but many decent methods (Tideman, Schulze, even STV-BTR) don't need a completion method.  they have a consistent method that results in a winner assuming there are no tied vote counts in any intermediate runoffs.

Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.

a question: if there is a CW and assuming sincere ranking by every voter, is not the CW always the utility winner?  (or are you assuming varying "preference intensity" here?)

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to many applications the method must take into account preference intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

but that is inconsistent with "One Person, One Vote".  even if i really prefer my candidate a lot and you prefer your candidate only a little, you vote counts no less (nor more) than my vote.  this is, in governmental elections, fundamental.

and, of course, in score voting voters are asked to make a tactical decision about how much to score their second choice and, perhaps, their third choice.  voters are not Olympic figure skating judges.  they should not have to be burdened with this judgement.

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200
From: Juho Laatu juho.laatu@gmail.com
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems
Message-ID: 3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems.

it's a quite elegant way to put it and i might appropriate this and make use of it in my discussions here in Vermont.  shall i credit you, Juho?

Majorities are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they agree to do so.

well, that's true for each majority involving the CW.  isn't that what the CW is?  for pairs of candidates where neither is the CW, those majorities should not win the election, because if any does, there is another majority that is losing.  assuming there is a CW and assuming all votes are sincere, then there is only one consistent majority winner.

--

r b-j                  rbj@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

> On January 29, 2020 6:05 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > > > Juho, > > I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your point of view on this topic. > > Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among the voters or from insincere voting, i don't assume that. i believe that it is possible that sincere voting can possibly result in a Condorcet cycle. but i think it will be extremely rare in governmental elections. because i believe that normally a relatively small portion of voters for Nader will choose Bush as their second choice over Gore. > so that the purpose of a Condorcet completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference order. the *real* purpose is this: to unambiguously establish in law what will happen if there is no Condorcet winner. so that if such happens, everybody knows what the rules are and any squabbling should be resolved quickly by election officials and not need a judge in a court of law. > It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid basis in itself for choosing between methods. > but many decent methods (Tideman, Schulze, even STV-BTR) don't need a completion method. they have a consistent method that results in a winner assuming there are no tied vote counts in any intermediate runoffs. > Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way. > a question: if there is a CW *and* assuming sincere ranking by every voter, is not the CW **always** the utility winner? (or are you assuming varying "preference intensity" here?) > These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to many applications the method must take into account preference intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots. but that is inconsistent with "One Person, One Vote". even if i **really** prefer my candidate a lot and you prefer your candidate only a little, you vote counts no less (nor more) than my vote. this is, in governmental elections, fundamental. and, of course, in score voting voters are asked to make a tactical decision about how much to score their second choice and, perhaps, their third choice. voters are not Olympic figure skating judges. they should not have to be burdened with this judgement. > > > > > > Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200 > > From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com> > > To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > > Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems > > Message-ID: <3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > > My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. it's a quite elegant way to put it and i might appropriate this and make use of it in my discussions here in Vermont. shall i credit you, Juho? > Majorities are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they agree to do so. well, that's true for each majority involving the CW. isn't that what the CW is? for pairs of candidates where neither is the CW, those majorities should not win the election, because if any does, there is another majority that is losing. assuming there is a CW and assuming all votes are sincere, then there is only one consistent majority winner. -- r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
C
C.Benham
Thu, Jan 30, 2020 7:15 AM

Forest,

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative
to many applications the method must take into account preference
intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on
rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

Is electing the CW (based on sincere full ranking) in your view always
the "optimal result"?

Say the sincere ratings scores are

49  A99 >   C1 >  B0
03  C99 >   A98 > B0
48  B99 >  C2 > A1

If  we don't like the idea of electing  "utility loser" CWs, why even
collect the information telling us they exist?  I don't understand why
the quite simple Smith//Approval(ranked above bottom) doesn't
have some traction.  Under that method these voters would presumably
just vote:

49  A
03  C>A
48  B

A is the voted CW and the "utility winner".  No problem.

Chris Benham

On 30/01/2020 9:35 am, Forest Simmons wrote:

Juho,

I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your
point of view on this topic.

Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that
majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among
the voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a
Condorcet completion method is to find the most likely "true" social
preference order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as
a heuristic for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is
not a solid basis in itself for choosing between methods.

Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and
that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative
to many applications the method must take into account preference
intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on
rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

 Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200
 From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>>
 To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com
 <mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com>>
 Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems
 Message-ID: <3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com
 <mailto:3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com>>
 Content-Type: text/plain;       charset=us-ascii

 My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain
 majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to
 me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering
 and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. Majorities
 are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority
 can win the election if they agree to do so.

 BR, Juho





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Forest, > These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative > to many applications the method must take into account preference > intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on > rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots. Is electing the CW (based on sincere full ranking) in your view always the "optimal result"? Say the sincere ratings scores are 49  A99 >   C1 >  B0 03  C99 >   A98 > B0 48  B99 >  C2 > A1 If  we don't like the idea of electing  "utility loser" CWs, why even collect the information telling us they exist?  I don't understand why the quite simple Smith//Approval(ranked above bottom) doesn't have some traction.  Under that method these voters would presumably just vote: 49  A 03  C>A 48  B A is the voted CW and the "utility winner".  No problem. Chris Benham On 30/01/2020 9:35 am, Forest Simmons wrote: > Juho, > > I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your > point of view on this topic. > > Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that > majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among > the voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a > Condorcet completion method is to find the most likely "true" social > preference order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as > a heuristic for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is > not a solid basis in itself for choosing between methods. > > Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and > that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way. > > These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative > to many applications the method must take into account preference > intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on > rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots. > > > Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200 > From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> > To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com > <mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com>> > Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems > Message-ID: <3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com > <mailto:3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com>> > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset=us-ascii > > My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain > majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to > me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering > and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. Majorities > are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority > can win the election if they agree to do so. > > BR, Juho > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Subject: Digest Footer > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com > <mailto:Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com> > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > > ------------------------------ > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 187, Issue 31 > ************************************************* > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Thu, Jan 30, 2020 1:11 PM

On 30/01/2020 00.05, Forest Simmons wrote:

Juho,

I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your
point of view on this topic.

Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that
majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among
the voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a Condorcet
completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference
order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic
for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid
basis in itself for choosing between methods.

Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that
Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to
many applications the method must take into account preference
intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on
rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

Although I'm more of a Condorcetist myself, here's a thought.

As I said earlier on the list, if honesty consists of you normalizing
the worst candidate to 0 and the best candidate to 1, and then giving
every candidate in between a rating according to lottery equivalence
(and you're risk-neutral), then there is one and only one honest rated
ballot. Call that a semi-cardinal ballot.

For semi-cardinal ballots, IIA reappears (since you get majority rule
with two candidates), but that there is only one honest ballot should
make the externalization/manual DSV complaints go away to quite some degree.

How well can we do with such ballots? What kind of strategy resistance
and utility performance can a semi-cardinal method attain? It seems like
there's a strong limit to how well a method can deal with strategic
exaggeration, in particular, but it might still be interesting to look into.

(Of course, there's also the problem that ordinary voters would probably
not take the effort of being honest in the definition above. But I can't
see any other way of reducing the honesty ambiguity short of going
directly to rankings.)

On 30/01/2020 00.05, Forest Simmons wrote: > Juho, > > I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your > point of view on this topic. > > Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that > majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among > the voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a Condorcet > completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference > order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic > for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid > basis in itself for choosing between methods. > > Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that > Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way. > > These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to > many applications the method must take into account preference > intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on > rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots. Although I'm more of a Condorcetist myself, here's a thought. As I said earlier on the list, if honesty consists of you normalizing the worst candidate to 0 and the best candidate to 1, and then giving every candidate in between a rating according to lottery equivalence (and you're risk-neutral), then there is one and only one honest rated ballot. Call that a semi-cardinal ballot. For semi-cardinal ballots, IIA reappears (since you get majority rule with two candidates), but that there is only one honest ballot should make the externalization/manual DSV complaints go away to quite some degree. How well can we do with such ballots? What kind of strategy resistance and utility performance can a semi-cardinal method attain? It seems like there's a strong limit to how well a method can deal with strategic exaggeration, in particular, but it might still be interesting to look into. (Of course, there's also the problem that ordinary voters would probably not take the effort of being honest in the definition above. But I can't see any other way of reducing the honesty ambiguity short of going directly to rankings.)
JL
Juho Laatu
Thu, Feb 6, 2020 3:08 PM

On 30. Jan 2020, at 1.39, robert bristow-johnson rbj@audioimagination.com wrote:

On January 29, 2020 6:05 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.

a question: if there is a CW and assuming sincere ranking by every voter, is not the CW always the utility winner?  (or are you assuming varying "preference intensity" here?)

All combinations are possible, as Forest says. If votes are 2: A=2 B=1, 1: B=10 A=1, A is the CW, but B is the UW. And even if we expect voters to normalise their votes (= use both max and min ratings), we can (add two candidates to the votes and) have something like 1: C=10 A=2 B=1 D=0, 1: D=10 A=2 B=1 C=0, 1: B=10 A=1 C=0 D=0, where A is still the CW, and B is still the UW.

Of course it is quite typical that the CW is also the UW.

In competitive elections one may assume that rankings are typically more sincere than ratings.

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to many applications the method must take into account preference intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

but that is inconsistent with "One Person, One Vote".  even if i really prefer my candidate a lot and you prefer your candidate only a little, you vote counts no less (nor more) than my vote.  this is, in governmental elections, fundamental.

and, of course, in score voting voters are asked to make a tactical decision about how much to score their second choice and, perhaps, their third choice.  voters are not Olympic figure skating judges.  they should not have to be burdened with this judgement.

I think "one person one vote" is ok in the proposed system. Everything fine as long as all votes look the same and have the same influence.

I note that one can arrange the cutoffs also in ranking style. I mean that the cutoff can be treated just as one of the ranked candidates, and such cutoffs (one or more) could give us additional information on "preference intensities". One could for example have a vote A > B > preferred_limit > C > D > acceptable_limit > E > F. If acceptable_limit "wins" the (purely ranked) election, maybe the election would be declared void or something. The rules could be also such that handling of "real candidates" and "cutoff candidates" would be somewhat different, e.g. so that losing to some cutoff would lead to some conclusions, without even considering possible cycles including that cutoff. (ffs, no good concrete proposals available from me)

From: Juho Laatu juho.laatu@gmail.com

My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems.

it's a quite elegant way to put it and i might appropriate this and make use of it in my discussions here in Vermont.  shall i credit you, Juho?

The definitions and discussions have probably gone in cycles since Llull, Condorcet and Arrow, so I guess there is no need to put any special weight on who used what words this time.

Majorities are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they agree to do so.

well, that's true for each majority involving the CW.  isn't that what the CW is?

Yes, there is no majority supporting any other candidate over the CW.

Juho

> On 30. Jan 2020, at 1.39, robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote: >> On January 29, 2020 6:05 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way. >> > > a question: if there is a CW *and* assuming sincere ranking by every voter, is not the CW **always** the utility winner? (or are you assuming varying "preference intensity" here?) All combinations are possible, as Forest says. If votes are 2: A=2 B=1, 1: B=10 A=1, A is the CW, but B is the UW. And even if we expect voters to normalise their votes (= use both max and min ratings), we can (add two candidates to the votes and) have something like 1: C=10 A=2 B=1 D=0, 1: D=10 A=2 B=1 C=0, 1: B=10 A=1 C=0 D=0, where A is still the CW, and B is still the UW. Of course it is quite typical that the CW is also the UW. In competitive elections one may assume that rankings are typically more sincere than ratings. > >> These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to many applications the method must take into account preference intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots. > > but that is inconsistent with "One Person, One Vote". even if i **really** prefer my candidate a lot and you prefer your candidate only a little, you vote counts no less (nor more) than my vote. this is, in governmental elections, fundamental. > > and, of course, in score voting voters are asked to make a tactical decision about how much to score their second choice and, perhaps, their third choice. voters are not Olympic figure skating judges. they should not have to be burdened with this judgement. I think "one person one vote" is ok in the proposed system. Everything fine as long as all votes look the same and have the same influence. I note that one can arrange the cutoffs also in ranking style. I mean that the cutoff can be treated just as one of the ranked candidates, and such cutoffs (one or more) could give us additional information on "preference intensities". One could for example have a vote A > B > preferred_limit > C > D > acceptable_limit > E > F. If acceptable_limit "wins" the (purely ranked) election, maybe the election would be declared void or something. The rules could be also such that handling of "real candidates" and "cutoff candidates" would be somewhat different, e.g. so that losing to some cutoff would lead to some conclusions, without even considering possible cycles including that cutoff. (ffs, no good concrete proposals available from me) >>> From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com> >>> My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. > > it's a quite elegant way to put it and i might appropriate this and make use of it in my discussions here in Vermont. shall i credit you, Juho? The definitions and discussions have probably gone in cycles since Llull, Condorcet and Arrow, so I guess there is no need to put any special weight on who used what words this time. >> Majorities are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they agree to do so. > > well, that's true for each majority involving the CW. isn't that what the CW is? Yes, there is no majority supporting any other candidate over the CW. Juho