My most recent Copeland attempt ...
Each voter designates a candidate on her ballot B as "The One To Beat For
My Point." (TOTBFMP)
Lacking a Condorcet Winner, elect the candidate that, on the most ballots,
pairwise defeats the TOTBFMP designated candidate.
In other words, for each ballot B let T(B) be the candidate designated
TOTBFMP on ballot B.
Elect argmax N(X), where N(X) is the number of ballots in the set
{B| X pairwise defeats T(B)}.
So ordinary clone infested Copeland elects the candidate that pairwise
defeats the most other candidates, while this version elects the candidate
that fulfills the defeat requests of the most voters.
On 12.05.2022 08:36, Forest Simmons wrote:
My most recent Copeland attempt ...
Each voter designates a candidate on her ballot B as "The One To Beat
For My Point." (TOTBFMP)
Lacking a Condorcet Winner, elect the candidate that, on the most
ballots, pairwise defeats the TOTBFMP designated candidate.
In other words, for each ballot B let T(B) be the candidate designated
TOTBFMP on ballot B.
Elect argmax N(X), where N(X) is the number of ballots in the set
{B| X pairwise defeats T(B)}.
So ordinary clone infested Copeland elects the candidate that pairwise
defeats the most other candidates, while this version elects the
candidate that fulfills the defeat requests of the most voters.
I would guess that it fails Smith and Landau, both of which ordinary
Copeland passes.
Suppose we didn't have the Condorcet provision, i.e. that the argmax
winner is automatically elected without a check for a CW first. Then I
think something like the usual LCR example could elect either L or R if
the L and R voters designate C to be TOTBFMP.
The Condorcet provision fixes that problem, but I would think that by
cloning C into enough candidates to make a top cycle of C clones, you
could make the method elect L or R instead.
So its main advantage would be (if I'm right) that for a
clone-independent method, it's fairly easy to describe.
Or I could be mistaken, of course :-)
-km