How about this method for electing a candidate to a position ... All candidates and other voters take an extensive multiple choice test. Let p(i, j) be the number of questions that voter i and voter j answered the same. For each candidate j let f(j) be the sum over i of p(i, j). Elect argmax f(j) For an election where the alternatives are not voters use this method to elect a candidate voter (a voter willing to take the responsibility) whose responsibility is to pick the winning alternative.

On 05/02/2021 21.26, Forest Simmons wrote: > How about this method for electing a candidate to a position ... > > All candidates and other voters take an extensive multiple choice test. > > Let p(i, j) be the number of questions that voter i and voter j answered > the same. > > For each candidate j let f(j) be the sum over i  > of p(i, j). > > Elect argmax f(j) > > For an election where the alternatives are not voters use this method to > elect a candidate voter (a voter willing to take the responsibility) > whose responsibility is to pick the winning alternative. This would elect a candidate who's most similar to the voters; it'd as such be more analogous to sortition (Aristotelean democracy) than ordinary elections (aristocracy). The aristocratic analog would be to have each candidate take a number of skills tests (IQ, physical performance, etc), and then the voters would fill in their relative preferences for the different types of skill. The candidate with the maximum weighted score wins. In either the democratic or the aristocratic type of election, the tests would have to be strictly supervised so that the candidates (or voters) can't cheat. Otherwise, it would be tempting for the candidates to maximize their scores in an aristocratic election and to try to appear more like the median voter than they really are in a democratic election.

Great comments, and even the democratic questionaire should have the voters weigh in (cumulatively or fractionally) on the relative importance of the respective questions so that clone questions (different versions of the same question in disguise) do not have disproportionate influence. On Saturday, February 13, 2021, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > On 05/02/2021 21.26, Forest Simmons wrote: > > How about this method for electing a candidate to a position ... > > > > All candidates and other voters take an extensive multiple choice test. > > > > Let p(i, j) be the number of questions that voter i and voter j answered > > the same. > > > > For each candidate j let f(j) be the sum over i > > of p(i, j). > > > > Elect argmax f(j) > > > > For an election where the alternatives are not voters use this method to > > elect a candidate voter (a voter willing to take the responsibility) > > whose responsibility is to pick the winning alternative. > > This would elect a candidate who's most similar to the voters; it'd as > such be more analogous to sortition (Aristotelean democracy) than > ordinary elections (aristocracy). > > The aristocratic analog would be to have each candidate take a number of > skills tests (IQ, physical performance, etc), and then the voters would > fill in their relative preferences for the different types of skill. The > candidate with the maximum weighted score wins. > > In either the democratic or the aristocratic type of election, the tests > would have to be strictly supervised so that the candidates (or voters) > can't cheat. Otherwise, it would be tempting for the candidates to > maximize their scores in an aristocratic election and to try to appear > more like the median voter than they really are in a democratic election. >