CB
Chris Benham
Mon, Apr 22, 2024 4:23 PM
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over
incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
giving them names? ...
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to avoid it.
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls "overvotes."
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
strategy.
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures, you
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we can
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Richard,
> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
> single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
> > giving them names? ...
>
> Time and money.
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> plurality is unnecessary.
>
> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over
incentive.
> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
> > strategy.
>
> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> a "complex procedure":
>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> When shared preference levels are encountered,
> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
> // decimal portions. For example, during a
> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
> // will transfer to candidate 2.
> //
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent one.
Chris B.
*Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
------------------------------------------------------------------------
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> ...
> ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
> giving them names? ...
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
>> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to avoid it.
> The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls "overvotes."
>> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
> Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
> strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures, you
> don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we can
> somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
RT
Richard, the VoteFair guy
Wed, Apr 24, 2024 6:34 PM
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over
incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
giving them names? ...
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to avoid it.
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls "overvotes."
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
strategy.
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures, you
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we can
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
> ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
> way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
> the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
candidate.
> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
> seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
> But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
>>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> from giving them names? ...
>> Time and money.
> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
> mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
> just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
> somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> Richard,
>
>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>> single-winner score voting.
> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
> attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>
>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
>> > giving them names? ...
>>
>> Time and money.
> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
> or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
> just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>
>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>> plurality is unnecessary.
>>
>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>
> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>
> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over
> incentive.
>
>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
>> > strategy.
>>
>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>
> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
> ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
> way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
> the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>
>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
>> a "complex procedure":
>>
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>> //
>
> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
> seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>
> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
> referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
>
> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
> by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
> of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for
> this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
> eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
> easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
> ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones
> they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
> (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
> in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>
> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
> you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
> equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
> would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
> advocate allowing it for those methods.
>
>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
> IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
> just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
> definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>
> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent one.
>
> Chris B.
>
> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E>
> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> > ...
> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>
> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>
> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
> > giving them names? ...
>
> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> election-method reform.
>
> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to avoid it.
> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> > FPP. ...
>
> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> plurality is unnecessary.
>
> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>
> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls "overvotes."
> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
> > strategy.
>
> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>
> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> a "complex procedure":
>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>
> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures, you
> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we can
> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>
> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>
> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>
> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
CB
Chris Benham
Wed, Apr 24, 2024 8:46 PM
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
bang-for-buck champion in any case.
IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
*1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
(aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
coined.
Chris B.
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
here as I'd like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from
> giving them names? ...
Time and money.
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
Push-over incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
point.
> Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
Push-over
> strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
"center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> ...
> ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
you from
> giving them names? ...
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
>> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
avoid it.
> The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
"overvotes."
>> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
point.
> Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
Push-over
> strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
failures, you
> don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
we can
> somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
that
> we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
Richard,
> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>
> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> choice columns as candidates.
With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
bang-for-buck champion in any case.
> IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
> marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
*1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
(aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
coined.
Chris B.
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> recent one.
>
> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
> designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
> well-designed car.
>
> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
> assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
> popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
>
>
> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
> benign
> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>
> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>
> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
> per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
> and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>
> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> choice columns as candidates.
>
> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
> most-disliked candidate.
>
>
> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> this
> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> > that sum to 1.
>
> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
> work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>
> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>
> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>
> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
> same four candidates highest. Etc.
>
>
> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >>> from giving them names? ...
>
> >> Time and money.
>
> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>
> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
> projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
> here as I'd like.
>
>
> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> Richard,
>>
>>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>> single-winner score voting.
>> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
>> an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>
>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> from
>>> > giving them names? ...
>>>
>>> Time and money.
>> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>> media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>> talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>> discussion here.
>>
>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>
>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>
>> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
>> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
>> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>>
>> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>> Push-over incentive.
>>
>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>> point.
>>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>> Push-over
>>> > strategy.
>>>
>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>
>> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>> strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>> relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
>> the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
>> counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
>> stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
>> the others.
>>
>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>>> not
>>> a "complex procedure":
>>>
>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>
>>> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>> //
>>
>> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>> this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>> fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>> someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>
>> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
>> I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>> describing it.
>>
>> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
>> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>> candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>> third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>> fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
>> next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>> strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>> candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
>> whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
>> the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
>> whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
>> course nothing to B.)
>>
>> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>> think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>> above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
>> think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
>> I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>
>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>> fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>> "center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
>> What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>
>> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>> car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>> on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>> recent one.
>>
>> Chris B.
>>
>> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E>
>> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>
>> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>> > ...
>> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>
>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
>> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>
>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>> you from
>> > giving them names? ...
>>
>> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
>> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>> election-method reform.
>>
>> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
>> avoid it.
>> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
>> > FPP. ...
>>
>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>> plurality is unnecessary.
>>
>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>
>> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>> "overvotes."
>> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>> point.
>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>> Push-over
>> > strategy.
>>
>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>
>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
>> a "complex procedure":
>>
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>
>>
>> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>> failures, you
>> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
>> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
>> we can
>> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>> that
>> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>
>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>
>> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
>> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>
>> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>>
>> Richard Fobes
>> The VoteFair guy
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>> list info
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
RT
Richard, the VoteFair guy
Thu, Apr 25, 2024 4:08 AM
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
voters there numerate?
Numerate? Probably some aren't.
Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
(And wouldn't that use less paper?)
Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
are counted).
I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
time to explain.
... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion ...
... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
... Condorcet criterion ...
... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
meaningless to voters.
What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
answer.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
bang-for-buck champion in any case.
IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
*1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
(aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
coined.
Chris B.
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
here as I'd like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from
> giving them names? ...
Time and money.
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
Push-over incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
point.
> Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
Push-over
> strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
"center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> ...
> ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
you from
> giving them names? ...
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
>> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
avoid it.
> The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
"overvotes."
>> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
point.
> Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
Push-over
> strategy.
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
failures, you
> don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
we can
> somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
that
> we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
> voters there numerate?
Numerate? Probably some aren't.
Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
> (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
are counted).
I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
time to explain.
> ... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
> ... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
> Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> criterion ...
> ... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
> ... Condorcet criterion ...
> ... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
meaningless to voters.
What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
answer.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> Richard,
>
>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>
>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
> So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
> numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
>
>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>> choice columns as candidates.
>
> With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
> Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
> equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
> bang-for-buck champion in any case.
>
>> IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
>> marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
>
> Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
> motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
> Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
>
> *1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
> doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
> weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
> (aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
> favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
> simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
>
> So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
> better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
>
> 2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
> is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
> maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
> Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
> fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
> without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
>
> So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
> designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
> any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
> For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
> fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
> my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
> some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
>
> Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
> Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
> Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
> coined.
>
> Chris B.
>
>
>
> On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>
>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>> recent one.
>>
>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>> designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
>> well-designed car.
>>
>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>> assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>> popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>
>>
>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>> benign
>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>
>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>
>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>
>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>> per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>> and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>
>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>> choice columns as candidates.
>>
>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>> most-disliked candidate.
>>
>>
>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>> this
>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>> > that sum to 1.
>>
>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>> work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>
>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>
>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>
>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>> same four candidates highest. Etc.
>>
>>
>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>
>> >> Time and money.
>>
>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>
>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>> projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
>> here as I'd like.
>>
>>
>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
>>
>> Richard Fobes
>> The VoteFair guy
>>
>>
>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> Richard,
>>>
>>>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>> single-winner score voting.
>>> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
>>> an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>
>>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>>> from
>>>> > giving them names? ...
>>>>
>>>> Time and money.
>>> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>> media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>>> talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>>> discussion here.
>>>
>>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>
>>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>
>>> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
>>> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
>>> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>>>
>>> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>> Push-over incentive.
>>>
>>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>>> point.
>>>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>> Push-over
>>>> > strategy.
>>>>
>>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>
>>> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>> strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>> relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
>>> the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
>>> counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
>>> stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
>>> the others.
>>>
>>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>>>> not
>>>> a "complex procedure":
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>> //
>>>
>>> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>> this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>> fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>> someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>
>>> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
>>> I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>> describing it.
>>>
>>> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
>>> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>> candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>> third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>> fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
>>> next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>> strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>> candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
>>> whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
>>> the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
>>> whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
>>> course nothing to B.)
>>>
>>> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>> think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>> above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
>>> think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
>>> I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>
>>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>>>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>> fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>> "center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
>>> What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>
>>> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>> car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>> on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>> recent one.
>>>
>>> Chris B.
>>>
>>> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E>
>>> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>
>>> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>> > ...
>>> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>
>>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
>>> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>
>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>> you from
>>> > giving them names? ...
>>>
>>> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
>>> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>> election-method reform.
>>>
>>> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
>>> avoid it.
>>> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
>>> > FPP. ...
>>>
>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>
>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>
>>> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>> "overvotes."
>>> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>> point.
>>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>> Push-over
>>> > strategy.
>>>
>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>
>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
>>> a "complex procedure":
>>>
>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>
>>> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>>> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>> failures, you
>>> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
>>> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
>>> we can
>>> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>> that
>>> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>
>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>
>>> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
>>> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>
>>> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>>> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>>>
>>> Richard Fobes
>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>> list info
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Thu, Apr 25, 2024 4:17 AM
This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame FairVote
and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet criterion (in
favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
Do they? (EVC/STAR, that is.) IME people selling STAR are almost completely
focused on the high Condorcet and Social Utility Efficiency in simulations
(since it's supposed to be a Condorcet/utilitarian compromise). Unless
you're talking about the pass/fail version of the criterion.
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 9:08 PM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
voters there numerate?
Numerate? Probably some aren't.
Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
(And wouldn't that use less paper?)
Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
are counted).
I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
time to explain.
... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion ...
... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
... Condorcet criterion ...
... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
meaningless to voters.
What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
answer.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
bang-for-buck champion in any case.
IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
*1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
(aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
- The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
coined.
Chris B.
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
here as I'd like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
Push-over incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
not
a "complex procedure":
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
"center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
*This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame FairVote
and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet criterion (in
favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).*
Do they? (EVC/STAR, that is.) IME people selling STAR are almost completely
focused on the high Condorcet and Social Utility Efficiency in simulations
(since it's supposed to be a Condorcet/utilitarian compromise). Unless
you're talking about the pass/fail version of the criterion.
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 9:08 PM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
> > voters there numerate?
>
> Numerate? Probably some aren't.
>
> Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
>
> Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
> isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
>
> > (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
>
> Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
> to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
> are counted).
>
> I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
> THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
> time to explain.
>
>
> > ... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
> > ... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> > criterion ...
> > ... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
> > ... Condorcet criterion ...
> > ... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
>
> Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
> meaningless to voters.
>
> What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
> should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
>
> HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
> sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
>
> I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
> pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
>
> This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
> best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
> FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
> criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
>
> BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
> I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
> misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
> importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
>
>
> Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
> answer.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> > Richard,
> >
> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> >> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
> >>
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> >
> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
> > numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
> >
> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> >> choice columns as candidates.
> >
> > With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
> > Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
> > equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
> > bang-for-buck champion in any case.
> >
> >> IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
> >> marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
> >
> > Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
> > motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
> > Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
> >
> > *1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
> > doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
> > weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
> > (aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
> > favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
> > simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
> >
> > So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
> > better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
> >
> > 2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
> > is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
> > maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> > criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
> > fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
> > without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
> >
> > So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
> > designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
> > any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
> > For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
> > fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
> > my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
> > some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
> >
> > Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
> > Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
> > Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
> > coined.
> >
> > Chris B.
> >
> >
> >
> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>
> >> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> >> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> >> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> >> recent one.
> >>
> >> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
> >> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
> >> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
> >> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
> >> designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
> >> well-designed car.
> >>
> >> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
> >> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
> >> assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
> >> popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
> >>
> >>
> >> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
> strict
> >> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
> >> benign
> >> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> >> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> >> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
> ranking
> >> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
> >>
> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> >> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
> >>
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> >>
> >> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
> >> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
> >> per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
> >> and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
> >>
> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> >> choice columns as candidates.
> >>
> >> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
> >> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
> >> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
> >> most-disliked candidate.
> >>
> >>
> >> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> >> this
> >> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> >> > that sum to 1.
> >>
> >> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
> >> work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
> >> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
> >>
> >> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> >> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >>
> >> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
> >> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
> >> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
> >>
> >> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
> >> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
> >> same four candidates highest. Etc.
> >>
> >>
> >> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >> >>> from giving them names? ...
> >>
> >> >> Time and money.
> >>
> >> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
> >> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
> >> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
> >> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
> >>
> >> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
> >> projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
> >> here as I'd like.
> >>
> >>
> >> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
> >> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
> clearly!
> >>
> >> Richard Fobes
> >> The VoteFair guy
> >>
> >>
> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>> Richard,
> >>>
> >>>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
> >>>> single-winner score voting.
> >>> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
> >>> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
> >>> an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
> >>> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
> >>>
> >>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >>>> from
> >>>> > giving them names? ...
> >>>>
> >>>> Time and money.
> >>> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
> >>> media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
> >>> talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
> >>> discussion here.
> >>>
> >>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> >>>> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>>>
> >>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >>>
> >>> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
> >>> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
> >>> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
> >>>
> >>> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
> >>> Push-over incentive.
> >>>
> >>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >>>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> >>>> point.
> >>>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >>>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> >>>> Push-over
> >>>> > strategy.
> >>>>
> >>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> >>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>>>
> >>> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
> >>> strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
> >>> relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
> >>> the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
> >>> counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
> >>> stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
> >>> the others.
> >>>
> >>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
> >>>> not
> >>>> a "complex procedure":
> >>>>
> >>>>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >>>> When shared preference levels are encountered,
> >>>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
> >>>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
> >>>> // decimal portions. For example, during a
> >>>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
> >>>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
> >>>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
> >>>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
> >>>> // will transfer to candidate 2.
> >>>> //
> >>>
> >>> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> >>> this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
> >>> fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
> >>> someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >>>
> >>> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
> >>> I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
> >>> describing it.
> >>>
> >>> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
> >>> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
> >>> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
> >>> candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
> >>> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
> >>> third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
> >>> fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
> >>> next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
> >>> strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
> >>> candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
> >>> whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
> >>> the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
> >>> whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
> >>> course nothing to B.)
> >>>
> >>> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
> >>> think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
> >>> above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
> >>> think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
> >>> I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
> >>>
> >>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> >>>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> >>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >>> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
> >>> fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
> >>> "center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
> >>> What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
> >>>
> >>> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
> >>> car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
> >>> on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> >>> recent one.
> >>>
> >>> Chris B.
> >>>
> >>> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
> >>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
> 40votefair.org%3E>
> >>> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>
> >>> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>>
> >>> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> >>> > ...
> >>> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> >>> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> >>>
> >>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> >>> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
> >>> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> >>>
> >>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> >>> you from
> >>> > giving them names? ...
> >>>
> >>> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> >>> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> >>> election-method reform.
> >>>
> >>> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> >>> avoid it.
> >>> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> >>> > FPP. ...
> >>>
> >>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> >>> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>>
> >>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >>>
> >>> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> >>> "overvotes."
> >>> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> >>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> >>> point.
> >>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> >>> Push-over
> >>> > strategy.
> >>>
> >>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> >>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>>
> >>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> >>> a "complex procedure":
> >>>
> >>>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >>>
> >>> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> >>> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> >>> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> >>> failures, you
> >>> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
> "Let's
> >>> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> >>> we can
> >>> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> >>> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
> >>> that
> >>> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> >>>
> >>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> >>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> >>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >>>
> >>> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
> >>> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
> >>>
> >>> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
> >>> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
> >>>
> >>> Richard Fobes
> >>> The VoteFair guy
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
> >>> list info
> >> ----
> >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> >> info
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Apr 25, 2024 5:59 AM
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
voters there numerate?
Numerate? Probably some aren't.
Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
I believe that the current idea is to use reliable machine-reading of the
handwritten numbers.
(And wouldn't that use less paper?)
Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
are counted).
You forgot to tell why you think so.
I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
time to explain.
How regrettable that you don’t have time to explain any valid reason why
written numbers won’t work in the United States.
I wasn’t going to start commenting on statements yet, but this time I
couldn’t resist saying something.
... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion ...
... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
... Condorcet criterion ...
... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
meaningless to voters.
What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
answer.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
bang-for-buck champion in any case.
IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
*1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
(aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
- The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
coined.
Chris B.
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
here as I'd like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
Push-over incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
not
a "complex procedure":
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
"center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 21:08 Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
> > voters there numerate?
>
> Numerate? Probably some aren't.
>
> Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
>
> Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
> isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
>
I believe that the current idea is to use reliable machine-reading of the
handwritten numbers.
>
> > (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
>
> Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
> to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
> are counted).
>
You forgot to tell why you think so.
> I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
> THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
> time to explain.
How regrettable that you don’t have time to explain any valid reason why
written numbers won’t work in the United States.
I wasn’t going to start commenting on statements yet, but this time I
couldn’t resist saying something.
>
>
>
> > ... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
> > ... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> > criterion ...
> > ... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
> > ... Condorcet criterion ...
> > ... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
>
> Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
> meaningless to voters.
>
> What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
> should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
>
> HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
> sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
>
> I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
> pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
>
> This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
> best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
> FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
> criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
>
> BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
> I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
> misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
> importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
>
>
> Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
> answer.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> > Richard,
> >
> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> >> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
> >>
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> >
> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
> > numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
> >
> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> >> choice columns as candidates.
> >
> > With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
> > Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
> > equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
> > bang-for-buck champion in any case.
> >
> >> IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
> >> marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
> >
> > Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
> > motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
> > Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
> >
> > *1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
> > doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
> > weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
> > (aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
> > favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
> > simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
> >
> > So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
> > better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
> >
> > 2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
> > is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
> > maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> > criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
> > fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
> > without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
> >
> > So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
> > designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
> > any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
> > For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
> > fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
> > my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
> > some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
> >
> > Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
> > Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
> > Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
> > coined.
> >
> > Chris B.
> >
> >
> >
> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>
> >> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> >> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> >> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> >> recent one.
> >>
> >> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
> >> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
> >> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
> >> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
> >> designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
> >> well-designed car.
> >>
> >> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
> >> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
> >> assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
> >> popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
> >>
> >>
> >> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
> strict
> >> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
> >> benign
> >> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> >> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> >> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
> ranking
> >> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
> >>
> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> >> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
> >>
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> >>
> >> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
> >> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
> >> per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
> >> and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
> >>
> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> >> choice columns as candidates.
> >>
> >> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
> >> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
> >> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
> >> most-disliked candidate.
> >>
> >>
> >> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> >> this
> >> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> >> > that sum to 1.
> >>
> >> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
> >> work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
> >> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
> >>
> >> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> >> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >>
> >> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
> >> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
> >> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
> >>
> >> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
> >> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
> >> same four candidates highest. Etc.
> >>
> >>
> >> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >> >>> from giving them names? ...
> >>
> >> >> Time and money.
> >>
> >> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
> >> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
> >> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
> >> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
> >>
> >> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
> >> projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
> >> here as I'd like.
> >>
> >>
> >> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
> >> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
> clearly!
> >>
> >> Richard Fobes
> >> The VoteFair guy
> >>
> >>
> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>> Richard,
> >>>
> >>>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
> >>>> single-winner score voting.
> >>> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
> >>> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
> >>> an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
> >>> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
> >>>
> >>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >>>> from
> >>>> > giving them names? ...
> >>>>
> >>>> Time and money.
> >>> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
> >>> media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
> >>> talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
> >>> discussion here.
> >>>
> >>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> >>>> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>>>
> >>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >>>
> >>> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
> >>> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
> >>> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
> >>>
> >>> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
> >>> Push-over incentive.
> >>>
> >>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >>>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> >>>> point.
> >>>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >>>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> >>>> Push-over
> >>>> > strategy.
> >>>>
> >>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> >>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>>>
> >>> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
> >>> strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
> >>> relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
> >>> the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
> >>> counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
> >>> stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
> >>> the others.
> >>>
> >>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
> >>>> not
> >>>> a "complex procedure":
> >>>>
> >>>>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >>>> When shared preference levels are encountered,
> >>>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
> >>>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
> >>>> // decimal portions. For example, during a
> >>>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
> >>>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
> >>>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
> >>>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
> >>>> // will transfer to candidate 2.
> >>>> //
> >>>
> >>> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> >>> this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
> >>> fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
> >>> someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >>>
> >>> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
> >>> I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
> >>> describing it.
> >>>
> >>> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
> >>> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
> >>> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
> >>> candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
> >>> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
> >>> third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
> >>> fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
> >>> next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
> >>> strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
> >>> candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
> >>> whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
> >>> the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
> >>> whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
> >>> course nothing to B.)
> >>>
> >>> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
> >>> think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
> >>> above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
> >>> think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
> >>> I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
> >>>
> >>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> >>>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> >>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >>> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
> >>> fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
> >>> "center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
> >>> What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
> >>>
> >>> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
> >>> car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
> >>> on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> >>> recent one.
> >>>
> >>> Chris B.
> >>>
> >>> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
> >>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
> 40votefair.org%3E>
> >>> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>
> >>> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>>
> >>> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> >>> > ...
> >>> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> >>> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> >>>
> >>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> >>> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
> >>> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> >>>
> >>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> >>> you from
> >>> > giving them names? ...
> >>>
> >>> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> >>> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> >>> election-method reform.
> >>>
> >>> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> >>> avoid it.
> >>> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> >>> > FPP. ...
> >>>
> >>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> >>> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>>
> >>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >>>
> >>> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> >>> "overvotes."
> >>> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> >>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> >>> point.
> >>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> >>> Push-over
> >>> > strategy.
> >>>
> >>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> >>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>>
> >>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> >>> a "complex procedure":
> >>>
> >>>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >>>
> >>> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> >>> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> >>> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> >>> failures, you
> >>> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
> "Let's
> >>> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> >>> we can
> >>> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> >>> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
> >>> that
> >>> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> >>>
> >>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> >>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> >>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >>>
> >>> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
> >>> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
> >>>
> >>> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
> >>> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
> >>>
> >>> Richard Fobes
> >>> The VoteFair guy
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
> >>> list info
> >> ----
> >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> >> info
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Apr 25, 2024 5:05 PM
Of course many or most jurisdictions here use the old system of punched or
inked bubbles, & so, arguably, it would cost more to install the scanning
equipment for reading handwritten numbers.
But of course ranked-balloting machine-read requires new ballot-reading
equipment anyway, & so it isn’t obvious that the number-scanning would
cost more.
In any case, “cost more” & “ wouldn’t work” aren’t the same thing.
Unlimited rankings with the the bubble-lines would make big square ballots
whose size could get unreasonable.
Someone said that most rank-balloting implementations here only allow a few
rank-positions. If only 3 rank-positions are allowed, then it would be
conceivably possible to not need any new balloting-equipment—Just have a
separate line & bubble for each rank-position for each candidate.
Of course, unlike with Approval, there’s no way around rank-methods’ need
for new software.
Of course more ballot-cards would then be needed, if a separate line is
used for each rank-position for each candidate.
Another benefit of the short rankings would be less count-computation.
..& then, autodeterence with full rankings would be less needed, & so
there’d be less reason to not use Smith//Approval(implicit) or
CW,Approval((implicit), where we should only rank what we like. …for an
easy obvious motivation & explanation, & choosing by likedness.
In a STAR poll, CW,Approval(implicit) beat the other Condorcet versions.
But of course, allowing long rankings allows the more deluxe Condorcet
methods to bring their benefits.
(I only propose Condorcet for jurisdictions where people insist on
rankings, & for certain polls, such as the current one here.)
Condorcet easily allows equal-ranking with no problem, & proposal of
forbidding equal-ranking in Condorcet is nearly unheard-of.
What if someone ranks a candidate at two or three rank-positions? No
problem. Determine the arithmetical mean of those rank-position numbers, &
round off to the nearest integer.
What if that arithmetical mean ends with “.5” ?
No problem. Then use the geometric mean. Geometric mean will be lower than
arithmetical mean, so it just then amounts to rounding the rank-position
number down.
(…lower rank-number = higher ranking)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 22:59 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
voters there numerate?
Numerate? Probably some aren't.
Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English
language!
Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
I believe that the current idea is to use reliable machine-reading of the
handwritten numbers.
(And wouldn't that use less paper?)
Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
are counted).
You forgot to tell why you think so.
I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
time to explain.
How regrettable that you don’t have time to explain any valid reason why
written numbers won’t work in the United States.
I wasn’t going to start commenting on statements yet, but this time I
couldn’t resist saying something.
... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion ...
... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
... Condorcet criterion ...
... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
meaningless to voters.
What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
answer.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
bang-for-buck champion in any case.
IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
*1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes
(aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy
simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of
So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
- The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than
maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good
For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now
some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and
Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
coined.
Chris B.
On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
here as I'd like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
Push-over incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
not
a "complex procedure":
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
"center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
Of course many or most jurisdictions here use the old system of punched or
inked bubbles, & so, arguably, it would cost more to install the scanning
equipment for reading handwritten numbers.
But of course ranked-balloting machine-read requires new ballot-reading
equipment anyway, & so it isn’t obvious that the number-scanning would
cost more.
In any case, “cost more” & “ wouldn’t work” aren’t the same thing.
Unlimited rankings with the the bubble-lines would make big square ballots
whose size could get unreasonable.
Someone said that most rank-balloting implementations here only allow a few
rank-positions. If only 3 rank-positions are allowed, then it would be
conceivably possible to not need any new balloting-equipment—Just have a
separate line & bubble for each rank-position for each candidate.
Of course, unlike with Approval, there’s no way around rank-methods’ need
for new software.
Of course more ballot-cards would then be needed, if a separate line is
used for each rank-position for each candidate.
Another benefit of the short rankings would be less count-computation.
..& then, autodeterence with full rankings would be less needed, & so
there’d be less reason to not use Smith//Approval(implicit) or
CW,Approval((implicit), where we should only rank what we like. …for an
easy obvious motivation & explanation, & choosing by likedness.
In a STAR poll, CW,Approval(implicit) beat the other Condorcet versions.
But of course, allowing long rankings allows the more deluxe Condorcet
methods to bring their benefits.
(I only propose Condorcet for jurisdictions where people insist on
rankings, & for certain polls, such as the current one here.)
Condorcet easily allows equal-ranking with no problem, & proposal of
forbidding equal-ranking in Condorcet is nearly unheard-of.
What if someone ranks a candidate at two or three rank-positions? No
problem. Determine the arithmetical mean of those rank-position numbers, &
round off to the nearest integer.
What if that arithmetical mean ends with “.5” ?
No problem. Then use the geometric mean. Geometric mean will be lower than
arithmetical mean, so it just then amounts to rounding the rank-position
number down.
(…lower rank-number = higher ranking)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 22:59 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 21:08 Richard, the VoteFair guy <
> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>
>> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>
>> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
>> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>
>> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the
>> > voters there numerate?
>>
>> Numerate? Probably some aren't.
>>
>> Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English
>> language!
>>
>> Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine. And fast. There
>> isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
>>
>
>
> I believe that the current idea is to use reliable machine-reading of the
> handwritten numbers.
>
>>
>> > (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
>>
>> Of course. But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
>> to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
>> are counted).
>>
>
> You forgot to tell why you think so.
>
>
>
>> I've heard Australians suggest boxes before. THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
>> THE UNITED STATES! For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
>> time to explain.
>
>
> How regrettable that you don’t have time to explain any valid reason why
> written numbers won’t work in the United States.
>
> I wasn’t going to start commenting on statements yet, but this time I
> couldn’t resist saying something.
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > ... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
>> > ... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
>> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
>> > criterion ...
>> > ... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
>> > ... Condorcet criterion ...
>> > ... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
>>
>> Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
>> meaningless to voters.
>>
>> What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
>> should have won. Yes, that's subjective.
>>
>> HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
>> sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
>>
>> I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
>> pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
>>
>> This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
>> best kind of "majority" support the winner needs. You can blame
>> FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
>> criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
>>
>> BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win. And
>> I reserve the right to claim that in the future. But while I'm fighting
>> misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
>> importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
>>
>>
>> Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
>> answer.
>>
>> Richard Fobes
>> The VoteFair guy
>>
>>
>> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> > Richard,
>> >
>> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>> >> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>> >>
>> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>> >
>> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes? Aren't the voters there
>> > numerate? (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
>> >
>> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>> >> choice columns as candidates.
>> >
>> > With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
>> > Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
>> > equal-ranking allowed. That might be my high Social Utility
>> > bang-for-buck champion in any case.
>> >
>> >> IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
>> >> marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
>> >
>> > Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
>> > motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
>> > Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
>> >
>> > *1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
>> > doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
>> > weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes
>> mono-raise
>> > (aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
>> > favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy
>> and
>> > simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of
>> Condorcet.
>> >
>> > So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
>> > better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
>> >
>> > 2. The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
>> > is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than
>> X's
>> > maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
>> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
>> > criterion. In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
>> > fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition. I will fix that
>> > without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
>> >
>> > So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
>> > designed method and not "flawed". Any modification of my algorithm or
>> > any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good
>> properties.
>> > For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
>> > fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top. If you don't share
>> > my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now
>> have
>> > some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
>> >
>> > Guess which one I think is correct. "Dominant Candidate" and
>> "Dominant
>> > Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
>> > Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
>> > coined.
>> >
>> > Chris B.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
>> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>> car
>> >> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>> >> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>> >> recent one.
>> >>
>> >> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>> >> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>> >> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>> >> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>> >> designed body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
>> >> well-designed car.
>> >>
>> >> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>> >> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>> >> assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>> >> popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>> strict
>> >> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>> >> benign
>> >> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>> >> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>> >> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>> ranking
>> >> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>> >>
>> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>> >> in a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>> >>
>> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>> >>
>> >> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>> >> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>> >> per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>> >> and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>> >>
>> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>> >> choice columns as candidates.
>> >>
>> >> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>> >> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
>> >> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>> >> most-disliked candidate.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>> >> this
>> >> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>> >> > that sum to 1.
>> >>
>> >> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>> >> work fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>> >> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>> >>
>> >> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>> >> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>> >>
>> >> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>> >> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>> >> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>> >>
>> >> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>> >> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>> >> same four candidates highest. Etc.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>> >> >>> from giving them names? ...
>> >>
>> >> >> Time and money.
>> >>
>> >> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>> >> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>> >> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>> >> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>> >>
>> >> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>> >> projects. That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
>> >> here as I'd like.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>> >> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>> clearly!
>> >>
>> >> Richard Fobes
>> >> The VoteFair guy
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> >>> Richard,
>> >>>
>> >>>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>> >>>> single-winner score voting.
>> >>> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>> >>> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
>> >>> an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>> >>> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>> >>>
>> >>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>> >>>> from
>> >>>> > giving them names? ...
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Time and money.
>> >>> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>> >>> media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>> >>> talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>> >>> discussion here.
>> >>>
>> >>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>> >>>> plurality is unnecessary.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> >>>
>> >>> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
>> >>> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
>> >>> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>> >>>
>> >>> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>> >>> Push-over incentive.
>> >>>
>> >>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>> >>>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>> >>>> point.
>> >>>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>> >>>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>> >>>> Push-over
>> >>>> > strategy.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>> Gollum,
>> >>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>> >>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>> >>>>
>> >>> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>> >>> strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>> >>> relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
>> >>> the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
>> >>> counted, and binned as "informal". Normally there should be nothing
>> >>> stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
>> >>> the others.
>> >>>
>> >>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>> >>>> not
>> >>>> a "complex procedure":
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> >>>> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>> >>>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>> >>>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>> >>>> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>> >>>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>> >>>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>> >>>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>> >>>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>> >>>> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>> >>>> //
>> >>>
>> >>> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>> >>> this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>> >>> fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>> >>> someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>> >>>
>> >>> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
>> >>> I referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>> >>> describing it.
>> >>>
>> >>> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
>> >>> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>> >>> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>> >>> candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>> >>> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>> >>> third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>> >>> fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
>> >>> next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>> >>> strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>> >>> candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
>> >>> whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
>> >>> the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
>> >>> whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
>> >>> course nothing to B.)
>> >>>
>> >>> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>> >>> think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>> >>> above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
>> >>> think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
>> >>> I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
>> >>>
>> >>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>> were
>> >>>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>> >>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>> >>> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>> >>> fail IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>> >>> "center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
>> >>> What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>> >>>
>> >>> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>> >>> car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>> >>> on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>> >>> recent one.
>> >>>
>> >>> Chris B.
>> >>>
>> >>> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>> >>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>> >>> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>>
>> >>> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>> >>> > ...
>> >>> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>> >>> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>> >>>
>> >>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>> >>> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
>> >>> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>> >>>
>> >>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>> >>> you from
>> >>> > giving them names? ...
>> >>>
>> >>> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
>> >>> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>> >>> election-method reform.
>> >>>
>> >>> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
>> >>> avoid it.
>> >>> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
>> with
>> >>> > FPP. ...
>> >>>
>> >>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>> >>> plurality is unnecessary.
>> >>>
>> >>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> >>>
>> >>> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>> >>> "overvotes."
>> >>> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>> >>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>> >>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>> >>> point.
>> >>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>> >>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>> >>> Push-over
>> >>> > strategy.
>> >>>
>> >>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>> >>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>> >>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>> >>>
>> >>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>> not
>> >>> a "complex procedure":
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> >>>
>> >>> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>> >>> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>> >>> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>> >>> failures, you
>> >>> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>> "Let's
>> >>> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
>> >>> we can
>> >>> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>> >>> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>> >>> that
>> >>> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>> >>>
>> >>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>> >>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>> >>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>> >>>
>> >>> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>> convoluted
>> >>> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>> >>>
>> >>> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>> >>> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>> >>>
>> >>> Richard Fobes
>> >>> The VoteFair guy
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> ----
>> >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>> >>> list info
>> >> ----
>> >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>> list
>> >> info
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Thu, Apr 25, 2024 7:16 PM
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you use
more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over
incentive.
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>
> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you use
more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> recent one.
>
> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
>
> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>
>
> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>
> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>
> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>
> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> choice columns as candidates.
>
> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
> candidate.
>
>
> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> > that sum to 1.
>
> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>
> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>
> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>
> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
> four candidates highest. Etc.
>
>
> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >>> from giving them names? ...
>
> >> Time and money.
>
> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>
> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
> like.
>
>
> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> > Richard,
> >
> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
> >> single-winner score voting.
> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
> >
> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> from
> >> > giving them names? ...
> >>
> >> Time and money.
> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
> >
> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> >> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>
> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >
> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
> >
> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over
> > incentive.
> >
> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> point.
> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> Push-over
> >> > strategy.
> >>
> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>
> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
> >
> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> >> a "complex procedure":
> >>
> >>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
> >> //
> >
> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >
> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
> >
> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for
> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones
> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
> >
> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
> >
> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
> >
> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
> one.
> >
> > Chris B.
> >
> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
> 40votefair.org%3E>
> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >
> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> > > ...
> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> >
> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> >
> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> from
> > > giving them names? ...
> >
> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> > election-method reform.
> >
> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> avoid it.
> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> > > FPP. ...
> >
> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> > plurality is unnecessary.
> >
> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >
> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> "overvotes."
> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> point.
> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> Push-over
> > > strategy.
> >
> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >
> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> > a "complex procedure":
> >
> >
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >
> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
> you
> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
> can
> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
> that
> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> >
> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >
> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
> >
> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
> >
> > Richard Fobes
> > The VoteFair guy
> >
> >
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 6:17 PM
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you use
more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
a "complex procedure":
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
>
> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>
>
> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>> choice columns as candidates.
>
>
> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you use
> more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
> scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
> k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
> quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
> options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
> to 18 (!) candidates.
>
> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>
>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>
>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>> recent one.
>>
>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
>>
>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>
>>
>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>> benign
>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>
>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>
>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>
>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>
>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>> choice columns as candidates.
>>
>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
>> candidate.
>>
>>
>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>> this
>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>> > that sum to 1.
>>
>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>
>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>
>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>
>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>
>>
>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>
>> >> Time and money.
>>
>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>
>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
>> like.
>>
>>
>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
>>
>> Richard Fobes
>> The VoteFair guy
>>
>>
>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> > Richard,
>> >
>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>> >> single-winner score voting.
>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>> >
>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>> from
>> >> > giving them names? ...
>> >>
>> >> Time and money.
>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media
>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about
>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>> >
>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>> >>
>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> >
>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>> >
>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>> Push-over
>> > incentive.
>> >
>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>> point.
>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>> Push-over
>> >> > strategy.
>> >>
>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>> >>
>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>> benign
>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>> >
>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>> not
>> >> a "complex procedure":
>> >>
>> >>
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>> >> //
>> >
>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>> this
>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>> votes
>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>> >
>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I
>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.
>> >
>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine
>> for
>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising
>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
>> ones
>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher
>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>> >
>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think
>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>> >
>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>> >
>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
>> one.
>> >
>> > Chris B.
>> >
>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>> >
>> >
>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >
>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> >
>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>> > > ...
>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>> >
>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>> >
>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>> from
>> > > giving them names? ...
>> >
>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>> > election-method reform.
>> >
>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
>> avoid it.
>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
>> > > FPP. ...
>> >
>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>> >
>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>> >
>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>> "overvotes."
>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>> point.
>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>> Push-over
>> > > strategy.
>> >
>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>> >
>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
>> > a "complex procedure":
>> >
>> >
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>> >
>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
>> you
>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
>> can
>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>> that
>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>> >
>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>> >
>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>> >
>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>> >
>> > Richard Fobes
>> > The VoteFair guy
>> >
>> >
>> > ----
>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 6:19 PM
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you
use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1.
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
FPP. ...
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
No favorite betrayal.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>
>>
>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>
>>
>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>
>>
>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you
>> use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
>> scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
>> k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
>> quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
>> options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
>> to 18 (!) candidates.
>>
>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>
>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>> recent one.
>>>
>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed
>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
>>>
>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming
>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>
>>>
>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>> strict
>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>> benign
>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>> ranking
>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>
>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>
>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>
>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per
>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>
>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>
>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
>>> candidate.
>>>
>>>
>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>> this
>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>
>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>
>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>
>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>
>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same
>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>
>>>
>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>
>>> >> Time and money.
>>>
>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>
>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects.
>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
>>> like.
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
>>>
>>> Richard Fobes
>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> > Richard,
>>> >
>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>> >
>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> from
>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>> >>
>>> >> Time and money.
>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>> media
>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
>>> about
>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>> >
>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>> >>
>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>> >
>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>>> >
>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>> Push-over
>>> > incentive.
>>> >
>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>> point.
>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>> Push-over
>>> >> > strategy.
>>> >>
>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>> >>
>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>> strict
>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>> benign
>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>> ranking
>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>> >
>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>>> not
>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>> >> //
>>> >
>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>> this
>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>> votes
>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>> >
>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
>>> I
>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing
>>> it.
>>> >
>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine
>>> for
>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>> strategising
>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
>>> ones
>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>> higher
>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>> >
>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>> think
>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>> >
>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze"
>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>> >
>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
>>> one.
>>> >
>>> > Chris B.
>>> >
>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>> > > ...
>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>> >
>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>> >
>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> from
>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>> >
>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>> > election-method reform.
>>> >
>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
>>> avoid it.
>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
>>> > > FPP. ...
>>> >
>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>> >
>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>> >
>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>> "overvotes."
>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>> point.
>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>> Push-over
>>> > > strategy.
>>> >
>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>> >
>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
>>> not
>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>> >
>>> >
>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>> >
>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
>>> you
>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>> "Let's
>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
>>> can
>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>> that
>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>> >
>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>> >
>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>> >
>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>>> >
>>> > Richard Fobes
>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ----
>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>> list info
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
