Yes, I guess Chris is right. I'd like for there to be some reason why the scenario wouldn't happen, but there's no guarantee about how the electorate feel about my Favorite, Compromise, & Worst. So I don't suppose that there could be a guarantee that the FBC failure-scenario can't happen. Simpson is still a very good method, like MAM without chicken-dilemma. But, especially for current conditions, I want FBC. Simpson's big advantage, to me, was that I regarded it as like Plain MMPO, without Kevin's bad-example. But evidently that combination can't be achieved. Well, admit that I'm that example, Plain MMPO does something ridiculous. But isn't the bad-example ridiculously implausible? I told why, in the example MMPO doesn't significantly wrong anyone. I suggest that what MMPO does, in that most implausible example, is a ridiculously unimportant price for MMPO's valuable set of properties. I suggest that MMPO is the only pairwise-count method to propose. I suggest that Bucklin & MMPO are the only ranking methods to propose. Michael Ossipoff On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly > don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much > to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin > Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe > Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob > Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve > Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane > Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James > Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, > Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, > Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James > Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. > > > If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the whole > thing! > > When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, > among them ... > (1) lack of information > (2) too much disinformation > (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters > (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support > > To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is > > 40 A=B>D(90%) > 35 B=C>D(90%) > 25 A=C>D(90%) > > then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval > winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. > > I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three > neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed > sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated > surface water) > > Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and C) > are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the segments > connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the > midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. > > As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, for > a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot by > the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many > candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of > approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that > decision. > > Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. > > In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: > > D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) > > > In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons doesn't > choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, especially > if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference ballots, > which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. > > Thanks, > > Forest > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily inhibit >> people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >> >> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would be >> better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are Inferred. >> >> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >> >> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after me. >> Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >> variations. >> >> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >> >> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >> name by which to refer to it. >> >> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an approval >> to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) pairwise-beats B, >> and so A wins & the defection fails. >> >> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >> & wins the runoff. >> >> Burial of the CWs?: >> >> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank the >> buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >> >> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >> universal requirement. >> >> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >> >> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >> finalist-choosing counts. >> >> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >> MMPO. >> >> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, the >> CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >> >> So Simmons has wv strategy. >> >> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >> fiasco, which goes with it. >> >> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >> classes of methods. >> >> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >> >> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & B >> pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> >>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, and >>> Michael Ossipoff. >>> >>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>> >>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>> >>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>> >>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method that >>> doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or rated at >>> the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that does reduce >>> to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>> >>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to vote >>> at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or an >>> approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>> for the other base method. >>> >>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>> >>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>> >>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>> contemplated public applications). >>> >>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>> >>> Thanks Again, >>> >>> Forest >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need only >>>> be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they turn >>>> out to be. >>>> >>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>> >>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>> to the initial proposal: >>>> >>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>> >>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>> which they're based. >>>> >>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>> >>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>> >>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>> >>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>> voting errors. >>>> >>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Kristofer, >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>> >>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>> >>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>> >>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>> >>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>> >>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>> second set).] >>>>> >>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of them >>>>> are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>> >>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>> >>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>> >>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>> approval). >>>>> >>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>> >>>>> 40 C >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B >>>>> >>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>> >>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>> >>>>> 40 C >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B>A >>>>> >>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>> the sincere set. >>>>> >>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>> >>>>> 40 C>B >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B>C >>>>> >>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction attempt >>>>> to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by the C >>>>> faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>> >>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>> >>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all of >>>>> the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>> >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> >>>>> Forest >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>> formalization. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of the >>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when only >>>>>> top >>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>> allow >>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this category >>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>> style >>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to be >>>>>> an >>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>> like to >>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info case. >>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>> >>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>> do so. >>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>> burden) >>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, if >>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>> that >>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>> >>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with two >>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>> >>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>> voters >>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>> >>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the way >>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>> votes >>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to pass >>>>>> the >>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>> >>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>> (like >>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have it >>>>>> all. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >

Skip half a page to *** On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > This is just a brief partial reply, addressing one topic. > > Approval strategy is more important & interesting than most people think, > including most who discuss voting system. > > ...partly because, as I said, improvements in Approval are largely, if not > entirely, illusory. > > So I'm interested in discussion of Approval strategy, & different views of > it. > > Let me make a few comments on the example: > > 1. None of those voters should approve or give Score points to their last > choice (D). > ****But D is not truncated on any of the ballots, while A, B, and C are truncated. I guess I should have put ">>" symbols to indicate truncation: 40 A=B>D(90%)>>C 35 B=C>D(90%)>>A 25 A=C>D(90%)>>B Also, if you consult the context of the example, you will see that just a slight movement of A, B, and C further from the center of the triangle (D) converts the preference profile to 40 D>A=B(90%)>>C 35 D>B=C(90%)>>A 25 D>A=C(90%)>>B which converts D from the Condorcet Loser to the CWs. Forest > 2. If they all vote as I suggest, and approve (only) their top-set, then > of course it's inevitable that the winner will be the candidate regarded as > top-set by the most voters. A social optimization achieved by people voting > purely strategically. > > Each voter is voting to maximize hir Pt, Probability of electing from hir > top-set. > > B wins then. > > 3. Based on the sincere preferences, there's no CWs, and so CWs-protective > strategy doesn't apply. > > Even if there were one, approving down to it, if it's in your bottom-set, > would be suboptimal, and un-tempting. > > If the CWs is in your top-set, then should you refuse to Approval anyone > you like less, &, in particular, should you plump if that CWs is your > favorite? > > No. As an individual strategy, it's best to approve your entire top-set, > to maximize Pt. > > ...even though you might be tempted to choose among your top-set. > > But, as a _group_ strategy, that might not be so. Say you aren't > majority-favored (MF), and maybe aren't in a mutual-majority (MM) at all. > > Then (I'm assuming a 1D political spectrum) the CWs isn't your favorite, > and hir voters prefer someone you like less than hir to those you like more > than hir. > > Say that the CWs is at the far edge of your top-set. > > You'd like hir voters to plump, just as you'd like other voters on your > side of hir to not approve past hir. > > But then you're asking them to vote suboptimally, if your request > contradicts my top-set voting advice. > > But maybe it would be best, for the group (the voters on your side of the > CWs) as a whole, to have such an agreement. > > Besides, though individually suboptimal, if the CWs's voters plump, they > get something for it, because they're helping their favorite against > their other top-set candidates. > > Suboptimal, but not without some potential reward. > > Part 2 will follow. > > Michael Ossipoff > On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > >> Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly >> don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much >> to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin >> Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe >> Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob >> Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve >> Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane >> Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James >> Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, >> Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, >> Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James >> Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. >> >> >> If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the whole >> thing! >> >> When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, >> among them ... >> (1) lack of information >> (2) too much disinformation >> (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters >> (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support >> >> To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is >> >> 40 A=B>D(90%) >> 35 B=C>D(90%) >> 25 A=C>D(90%) >> >> then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval >> winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. >> >> I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three >> neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed >> sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated >> surface water) >> >> Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and >> C) are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the >> segments connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the >> midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. >> >> As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, >> for a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot >> by the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many >> candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of >> approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that >> decision. >> >> Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. >> >> In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: >> >> D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) >> >> >> In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons doesn't >> choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, especially >> if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference ballots, >> which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Forest >> >> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com >> > wrote: >> >>> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily inhibit >>> people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >>> >>> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would >>> be better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are >>> Inferred. >>> >>> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >>> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >>> >>> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after >>> me. Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >>> variations. >>> >>> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >>> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >>> >>> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >>> name by which to refer to it. >>> >>> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an >>> approval to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) >>> pairwise-beats B, and so A wins & the defection fails. >>> >>> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >>> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >>> & wins the runoff. >>> >>> Burial of the CWs?: >>> >>> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank the >>> buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >>> >>> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >>> universal requirement. >>> >>> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >>> >>> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >>> finalist-choosing counts. >>> >>> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >>> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >>> MMPO. >>> >>> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, the >>> CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >>> >>> So Simmons has wv strategy. >>> >>> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >>> fiasco, which goes with it. >>> >>> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >>> classes of methods. >>> >>> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >>> >>> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & B >>> pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>> >>>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, >>>> and Michael Ossipoff. >>>> >>>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>>> >>>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>>> >>>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>>> >>>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method that >>>> doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or rated at >>>> the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that does reduce >>>> to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>>> >>>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to >>>> vote at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or >>>> an approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>>> for the other base method. >>>> >>>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>>> >>>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>>> >>>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>>> contemplated public applications). >>>> >>>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>>> >>>> Thanks Again, >>>> >>>> Forest >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need only >>>>> be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they turn >>>>> out to be. >>>>> >>>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>>> >>>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>>> to the initial proposal: >>>>> >>>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>>> >>>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>>> which they're based. >>>>> >>>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>>> >>>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>>> >>>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>>> >>>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>>> voting errors. >>>>> >>>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>>> >>>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Kristofer, >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>>> >>>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>>> >>>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>>> >>>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>>> >>>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>>> second set).] >>>>>> >>>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of >>>>>> them are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>>> >>>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>>> >>>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>>> approval). >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>>> >>>>>> 40 C >>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>> 28 B >>>>>> >>>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>>> >>>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>>> >>>>>> 40 C >>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>> 28 B>A >>>>>> >>>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>>> the sincere set. >>>>>> >>>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>>> >>>>>> 40 C>B >>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>> 28 B>C >>>>>> >>>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction attempt >>>>>> to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by the C >>>>>> faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>>> >>>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>>> >>>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all >>>>>> of the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>>> >>>>>> What do you think? >>>>>> >>>>>> Forest >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>>> formalization. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when >>>>>>> only top >>>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>>> allow >>>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this >>>>>>> category >>>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>>> style >>>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to be >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>>> like to >>>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info >>>>>>> case. >>>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>>> do so. >>>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>>> burden) >>>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, if >>>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>>> voters >>>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the >>>>>>> way >>>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>>> votes >>>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to pass >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>>> (like >>>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have >>>>>>> it all. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>

This is the third of three parts of this reply: I don't have any particular justification for my suggestion that, when there's no top-set, the approval-cutoff be at the midrange of the candidates' merit (not counting unwinnable undesirables). The midrange just definitely makes more sense than the mean. So your suggestion for when there's no top-set might very well be better. I must admit that I don't know what advice should be given if there's no top-set. There's no justification for my midrange suggestion, other than that I claim it's better than the mean. I'm interested in this problem--Approval cutoff when there's no top-set--& so I'm interested in anything that can be said for you suggestion. ...what suggested it, etc. I'm referring to: INT((sum/max)) candidates approved. Michael Ossipoff On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly > don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much > to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin > Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe > Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob > Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve > Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane > Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James > Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, > Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, > Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James > Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. > > > If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the whole > thing! > > When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, > among them ... > (1) lack of information > (2) too much disinformation > (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters > (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support > > To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is > > 40 A=B>D(90%) > 35 B=C>D(90%) > 25 A=C>D(90%) > > then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval > winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. > > I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three > neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed > sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated > surface water) > > Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and C) > are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the segments > connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the > midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. > > As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, for > a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot by > the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many > candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of > approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that > decision. > > Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. > > In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: > > D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) > > > In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons doesn't > choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, especially > if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference ballots, > which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. > > Thanks, > > Forest > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily inhibit >> people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >> >> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would be >> better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are Inferred. >> >> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >> >> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after me. >> Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >> variations. >> >> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >> >> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >> name by which to refer to it. >> >> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an approval >> to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) pairwise-beats B, >> and so A wins & the defection fails. >> >> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >> & wins the runoff. >> >> Burial of the CWs?: >> >> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank the >> buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >> >> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >> universal requirement. >> >> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >> >> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >> finalist-choosing counts. >> >> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >> MMPO. >> >> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, the >> CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >> >> So Simmons has wv strategy. >> >> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >> fiasco, which goes with it. >> >> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >> classes of methods. >> >> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >> >> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & B >> pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> >>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, and >>> Michael Ossipoff. >>> >>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>> >>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>> >>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>> >>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method that >>> doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or rated at >>> the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that does reduce >>> to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>> >>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to vote >>> at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or an >>> approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>> for the other base method. >>> >>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>> >>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>> >>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>> contemplated public applications). >>> >>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>> >>> Thanks Again, >>> >>> Forest >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need only >>>> be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they turn >>>> out to be. >>>> >>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>> >>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>> to the initial proposal: >>>> >>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>> >>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>> which they're based. >>>> >>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>> >>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>> >>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>> >>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>> voting errors. >>>> >>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Kristofer, >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>> >>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>> >>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>> >>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>> >>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>> >>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>> second set).] >>>>> >>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of them >>>>> are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>> >>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>> >>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>> >>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>> approval). >>>>> >>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>> >>>>> 40 C >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B >>>>> >>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>> >>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>> >>>>> 40 C >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B>A >>>>> >>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>> the sincere set. >>>>> >>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>> >>>>> 40 C>B >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B>C >>>>> >>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction attempt >>>>> to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by the C >>>>> faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>> >>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>> >>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all of >>>>> the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>> >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> >>>>> Forest >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>> formalization. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of the >>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when only >>>>>> top >>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>> allow >>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this category >>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>> style >>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to be >>>>>> an >>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>> like to >>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info case. >>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>> >>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>> do so. >>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>> burden) >>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, if >>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>> that >>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>> >>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with two >>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>> >>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>> voters >>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>> >>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the way >>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>> votes >>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to pass >>>>>> the >>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>> >>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>> (like >>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have it >>>>>> all. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >

I was unreasonably assuming that all the candidates were named. I didn't realize how little I was paying attention. The fact that they were, for example, A, B, & D should have tipped me off. Next, I'll check the example as I now correctly understand it. How I arrived at the merit midrange for the Approval-cutoff: The mean is greatly affected if you double of triple the number of Republocrats, for example. I felt that the number of candidates in a spectrum region shouldn't affect the popularity or win probability of that region. ,,,& so it seemed unreasonable to assume that the candidates have equal win probability. So that led me to assume (in the absence of good predictive information) that it's the _merit-levels_ that have equal win probability. ...so your expectation is the midrange of the candidates' merit range. And your expectation (necessarily guessed, as by this method) is a good Approval-cutoff, for expectation-maximization. Your suggestion to approve a number of candidates equal to max allowed score, divided by the candidates' score sum is interesting. With two candidates, and also with three candidates, equally-spaced in merit, & symmetrically placed between the score limits, both voting strategies result in the same Approval ballot. ...same as the one gotten by the old candidate-merit mean. Anything you can tell me about the score-max/score-sum strategy would be appreciated. Michael Ossipoff On Oct 20, 2016 4:41 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Skip half a page to *** > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> This is just a brief partial reply, addressing one topic. >> >> Approval strategy is more important & interesting than most people think, >> including most who discuss voting system. >> >> ...partly because, as I said, improvements in Approval are largely, if >> not entirely, illusory. >> >> So I'm interested in discussion of Approval strategy, & different views >> of it. >> >> Let me make a few comments on the example: >> >> 1. None of those voters should approve or give Score points to their >> last choice (D). >> > ****But D is not truncated on any of the ballots, while A, B, and C are > truncated. I guess I should have put ">>" symbols to indicate truncation: > > 40 A=B>D(90%)>>C > 35 B=C>D(90%)>>A > 25 A=C>D(90%)>>B > > Also, if you consult the context of the example, you will see that just a > slight movement of A, B, and C further from the center of the triangle (D) > converts the preference profile to > > 40 D>A=B(90%)>>C > 35 D>B=C(90%)>>A > 25 D>A=C(90%)>>B > > which converts D from the Condorcet Loser to the CWs. > > Forest > >> 2. If they all vote as I suggest, and approve (only) their top-set, then >> of course it's inevitable that the winner will be the candidate regarded as >> top-set by the most voters. A social optimization achieved by people voting >> purely strategically. >> >> Each voter is voting to maximize hir Pt, Probability of electing from hir >> top-set. >> >> B wins then. >> >> 3. Based on the sincere preferences, there's no CWs, and so >> CWs-protective strategy doesn't apply. >> >> Even if there were one, approving down to it, if it's in your bottom-set, >> would be suboptimal, and un-tempting. >> >> If the CWs is in your top-set, then should you refuse to Approval anyone >> you like less, &, in particular, should you plump if that CWs is your >> favorite? >> >> No. As an individual strategy, it's best to approve your entire top-set, >> to maximize Pt. >> >> ...even though you might be tempted to choose among your top-set. >> >> But, as a _group_ strategy, that might not be so. Say you aren't >> majority-favored (MF), and maybe aren't in a mutual-majority (MM) at all. >> >> Then (I'm assuming a 1D political spectrum) the CWs isn't your favorite, >> and hir voters prefer someone you like less than hir to those you like more >> than hir. >> >> Say that the CWs is at the far edge of your top-set. >> >> You'd like hir voters to plump, just as you'd like other voters on your >> side of hir to not approve past hir. >> >> But then you're asking them to vote suboptimally, if your request >> contradicts my top-set voting advice. >> >> But maybe it would be best, for the group (the voters on your side of the >> CWs) as a whole, to have such an agreement. >> >> Besides, though individually suboptimal, if the CWs's voters plump, they >> get something for it, because they're helping their favorite against >> their other top-set candidates. >> >> Suboptimal, but not without some potential reward. >> >> Part 2 will follow. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> >>> Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly >>> don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much >>> to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin >>> Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe >>> Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob >>> Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve >>> Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane >>> Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James >>> Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, >>> Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, >>> Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James >>> Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. >>> >>> >>> If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the >>> whole thing! >>> >>> When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, >>> among them ... >>> (1) lack of information >>> (2) too much disinformation >>> (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters >>> (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support >>> >>> To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is >>> >>> 40 A=B>D(90%) >>> 35 B=C>D(90%) >>> 25 A=C>D(90%) >>> >>> then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval >>> winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. >>> >>> I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three >>> neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed >>> sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated >>> surface water) >>> >>> Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and >>> C) are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the >>> segments connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the >>> midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. >>> >>> As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, >>> for a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot >>> by the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many >>> candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of >>> approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that >>> decision. >>> >>> Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. >>> >>> In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: >>> >>> D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) >>> >>> >>> In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons >>> doesn't choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, >>> especially if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference >>> ballots, which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Forest >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily >>>> inhibit people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >>>> >>>> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would >>>> be better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are >>>> Inferred. >>>> >>>> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >>>> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >>>> >>>> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after >>>> me. Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >>>> variations. >>>> >>>> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >>>> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >>>> >>>> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >>>> name by which to refer to it. >>>> >>>> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an >>>> approval to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) >>>> pairwise-beats B, and so A wins & the defection fails. >>>> >>>> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >>>> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >>>> & wins the runoff. >>>> >>>> Burial of the CWs?: >>>> >>>> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank >>>> the buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >>>> >>>> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >>>> universal requirement. >>>> >>>> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >>>> >>>> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >>>> finalist-choosing counts. >>>> >>>> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >>>> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >>>> MMPO. >>>> >>>> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, >>>> the CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >>>> >>>> So Simmons has wv strategy. >>>> >>>> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >>>> fiasco, which goes with it. >>>> >>>> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >>>> classes of methods. >>>> >>>> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >>>> >>>> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & >>>> B pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> >>>> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, >>>>> and Michael Ossipoff. >>>>> >>>>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>>>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>>>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>>>> >>>>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>>>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>>>> >>>>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>>>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>>>> >>>>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method >>>>> that doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or >>>>> rated at the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that >>>>> does reduce to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>>>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>>>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>>>> >>>>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to >>>>> vote at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or >>>>> an approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>>>> for the other base method. >>>>> >>>>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>>>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>>>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>>>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>>>> >>>>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>>>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>>>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>>>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>>>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>>>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>>>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>>>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>>>> >>>>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>>>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>>>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>>>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>>>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>>>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>>>> contemplated public applications). >>>>> >>>>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>>>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>>>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Again, >>>>> >>>>> Forest >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need >>>>>> only be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they >>>>>> turn out to be. >>>>>> >>>>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>>>> >>>>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>>>> to the initial proposal: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>>>> >>>>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>>>> which they're based. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>>>> >>>>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>>>> >>>>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>>>> >>>>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>>>> voting errors. >>>>>> >>>>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kristofer, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>>>> second set).] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of >>>>>>> them are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>>>> approval). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B>A >>>>>>> >>>>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>>>> the sincere set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C>B >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B>C >>>>>>> >>>>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction >>>>>>> attempt to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by >>>>>>> the C faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all >>>>>>> of the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What do you think? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Forest >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>>>> formalization. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when >>>>>>>> only top >>>>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>>>> allow >>>>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this >>>>>>>> category >>>>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>>>> style >>>>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to >>>>>>>> be an >>>>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>>>> like to >>>>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info >>>>>>>> case. >>>>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>>>> do so. >>>>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>>>> burden) >>>>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>>>> voters >>>>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the >>>>>>>> way >>>>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>>>> votes >>>>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to >>>>>>>> pass the >>>>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>>>> (like >>>>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have >>>>>>>> it all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>> >

When I said that the 2 Approval strategies give the same Approval ballot with two candidates & with three candidates, under certain conditions, I meant three or four, not two or three. Obviously, with only two, there's no decision to be made. Michael Ossipoff On Oct 20, 2016 4:41 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Skip half a page to *** > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> This is just a brief partial reply, addressing one topic. >> >> Approval strategy is more important & interesting than most people think, >> including most who discuss voting system. >> >> ...partly because, as I said, improvements in Approval are largely, if >> not entirely, illusory. >> >> So I'm interested in discussion of Approval strategy, & different views >> of it. >> >> Let me make a few comments on the example: >> >> 1. None of those voters should approve or give Score points to their >> last choice (D). >> > ****But D is not truncated on any of the ballots, while A, B, and C are > truncated. I guess I should have put ">>" symbols to indicate truncation: > > 40 A=B>D(90%)>>C > 35 B=C>D(90%)>>A > 25 A=C>D(90%)>>B > > Also, if you consult the context of the example, you will see that just a > slight movement of A, B, and C further from the center of the triangle (D) > converts the preference profile to > > 40 D>A=B(90%)>>C > 35 D>B=C(90%)>>A > 25 D>A=C(90%)>>B > > which converts D from the Condorcet Loser to the CWs. > > Forest > >> 2. If they all vote as I suggest, and approve (only) their top-set, then >> of course it's inevitable that the winner will be the candidate regarded as >> top-set by the most voters. A social optimization achieved by people voting >> purely strategically. >> >> Each voter is voting to maximize hir Pt, Probability of electing from hir >> top-set. >> >> B wins then. >> >> 3. Based on the sincere preferences, there's no CWs, and so >> CWs-protective strategy doesn't apply. >> >> Even if there were one, approving down to it, if it's in your bottom-set, >> would be suboptimal, and un-tempting. >> >> If the CWs is in your top-set, then should you refuse to Approval anyone >> you like less, &, in particular, should you plump if that CWs is your >> favorite? >> >> No. As an individual strategy, it's best to approve your entire top-set, >> to maximize Pt. >> >> ...even though you might be tempted to choose among your top-set. >> >> But, as a _group_ strategy, that might not be so. Say you aren't >> majority-favored (MF), and maybe aren't in a mutual-majority (MM) at all. >> >> Then (I'm assuming a 1D political spectrum) the CWs isn't your favorite, >> and hir voters prefer someone you like less than hir to those you like more >> than hir. >> >> Say that the CWs is at the far edge of your top-set. >> >> You'd like hir voters to plump, just as you'd like other voters on your >> side of hir to not approve past hir. >> >> But then you're asking them to vote suboptimally, if your request >> contradicts my top-set voting advice. >> >> But maybe it would be best, for the group (the voters on your side of the >> CWs) as a whole, to have such an agreement. >> >> Besides, though individually suboptimal, if the CWs's voters plump, they >> get something for it, because they're helping their favorite against >> their other top-set candidates. >> >> Suboptimal, but not without some potential reward. >> >> Part 2 will follow. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> >>> Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly >>> don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much >>> to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin >>> Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe >>> Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob >>> Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve >>> Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane >>> Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James >>> Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, >>> Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, >>> Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James >>> Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. >>> >>> >>> If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the >>> whole thing! >>> >>> When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, >>> among them ... >>> (1) lack of information >>> (2) too much disinformation >>> (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters >>> (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support >>> >>> To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is >>> >>> 40 A=B>D(90%) >>> 35 B=C>D(90%) >>> 25 A=C>D(90%) >>> >>> then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval >>> winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. >>> >>> I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three >>> neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed >>> sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated >>> surface water) >>> >>> Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and >>> C) are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the >>> segments connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the >>> midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. >>> >>> As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, >>> for a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot >>> by the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many >>> candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of >>> approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that >>> decision. >>> >>> Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. >>> >>> In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: >>> >>> D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) >>> >>> >>> In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons >>> doesn't choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, >>> especially if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference >>> ballots, which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Forest >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily >>>> inhibit people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >>>> >>>> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would >>>> be better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are >>>> Inferred. >>>> >>>> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >>>> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >>>> >>>> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after >>>> me. Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >>>> variations. >>>> >>>> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >>>> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >>>> >>>> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >>>> name by which to refer to it. >>>> >>>> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an >>>> approval to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) >>>> pairwise-beats B, and so A wins & the defection fails. >>>> >>>> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >>>> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >>>> & wins the runoff. >>>> >>>> Burial of the CWs?: >>>> >>>> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank >>>> the buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >>>> >>>> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >>>> universal requirement. >>>> >>>> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >>>> >>>> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >>>> finalist-choosing counts. >>>> >>>> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >>>> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >>>> MMPO. >>>> >>>> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, >>>> the CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >>>> >>>> So Simmons has wv strategy. >>>> >>>> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >>>> fiasco, which goes with it. >>>> >>>> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >>>> classes of methods. >>>> >>>> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >>>> >>>> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & >>>> B pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> >>>> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, >>>>> and Michael Ossipoff. >>>>> >>>>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>>>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>>>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>>>> >>>>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>>>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>>>> >>>>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>>>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>>>> >>>>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method >>>>> that doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or >>>>> rated at the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that >>>>> does reduce to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>>>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>>>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>>>> >>>>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to >>>>> vote at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or >>>>> an approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>>>> for the other base method. >>>>> >>>>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>>>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>>>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>>>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>>>> >>>>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>>>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>>>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>>>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>>>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>>>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>>>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>>>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>>>> >>>>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>>>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>>>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>>>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>>>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>>>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>>>> contemplated public applications). >>>>> >>>>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>>>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>>>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Again, >>>>> >>>>> Forest >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need >>>>>> only be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they >>>>>> turn out to be. >>>>>> >>>>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>>>> >>>>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>>>> to the initial proposal: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>>>> >>>>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>>>> which they're based. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>>>> >>>>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>>>> >>>>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>>>> >>>>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>>>> voting errors. >>>>>> >>>>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kristofer, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>>>> second set).] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of >>>>>>> them are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>>>> approval). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B>A >>>>>>> >>>>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>>>> the sincere set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C>B >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B>C >>>>>>> >>>>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction >>>>>>> attempt to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by >>>>>>> the C faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all >>>>>>> of the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What do you think? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Forest >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>>>> formalization. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when >>>>>>>> only top >>>>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>>>> allow >>>>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this >>>>>>>> category >>>>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>>>> style >>>>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to >>>>>>>> be an >>>>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>>>> like to >>>>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info >>>>>>>> case. >>>>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>>>> do so. >>>>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>>>> burden) >>>>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>>>> voters >>>>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the >>>>>>>> way >>>>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>>>> votes >>>>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to >>>>>>>> pass the >>>>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>>>> (like >>>>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have >>>>>>>> it all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>> >

Having been discussing Approval strategy when there's no top-set, and when it's 0-info, I should re- emphasize that there most definitely _is_ a top-set for progressive voters in this country. And our official elections aren't really 0-info. In a recent post here, I spoke of evidence regarding who's CWs, and who can beat whom. But, for most voters under current conditions, it _is_ 0-info, because the "information" from the mass media is unreliable, and that's an understatement. The corporate media from which most people get their "information" is intentionally, systematically, consistently, & routinely disinfomational, in the interest of the 1%. So, voting instructions to the public should be 0-info instructions. The primary fact about conditions for strategy, in our elections, is the top-set/bottom-set nature of the elections, at least for progressive voters. They (we) should approve (only) our top-set, all of the progressive candidates. (If the elections were legitimate & if we had Approval-voting). If there are some voters who don't have a top-set, then, for them, the more general 0-info strategy applies. ...such as the merit-median Approval-cutoff, or Forest's sum/max instruction. Michael Ossipoff On Oct 20, 2016 4:41 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Skip half a page to *** > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> This is just a brief partial reply, addressing one topic. >> >> Approval strategy is more important & interesting than most people think, >> including most who discuss voting system. >> >> ...partly because, as I said, improvements in Approval are largely, if >> not entirely, illusory. >> >> So I'm interested in discussion of Approval strategy, & different views >> of it. >> >> Let me make a few comments on the example: >> >> 1. None of those voters should approve or give Score points to their >> last choice (D). >> > ****But D is not truncated on any of the ballots, while A, B, and C are > truncated. I guess I should have put ">>" symbols to indicate truncation: > > 40 A=B>D(90%)>>C > 35 B=C>D(90%)>>A > 25 A=C>D(90%)>>B > > Also, if you consult the context of the example, you will see that just a > slight movement of A, B, and C further from the center of the triangle (D) > converts the preference profile to > > 40 D>A=B(90%)>>C > 35 D>B=C(90%)>>A > 25 D>A=C(90%)>>B > > which converts D from the Condorcet Loser to the CWs. > > Forest > >> 2. If they all vote as I suggest, and approve (only) their top-set, then >> of course it's inevitable that the winner will be the candidate regarded as >> top-set by the most voters. A social optimization achieved by people voting >> purely strategically. >> >> Each voter is voting to maximize hir Pt, Probability of electing from hir >> top-set. >> >> B wins then. >> >> 3. Based on the sincere preferences, there's no CWs, and so >> CWs-protective strategy doesn't apply. >> >> Even if there were one, approving down to it, if it's in your bottom-set, >> would be suboptimal, and un-tempting. >> >> If the CWs is in your top-set, then should you refuse to Approval anyone >> you like less, &, in particular, should you plump if that CWs is your >> favorite? >> >> No. As an individual strategy, it's best to approve your entire top-set, >> to maximize Pt. >> >> ...even though you might be tempted to choose among your top-set. >> >> But, as a _group_ strategy, that might not be so. Say you aren't >> majority-favored (MF), and maybe aren't in a mutual-majority (MM) at all. >> >> Then (I'm assuming a 1D political spectrum) the CWs isn't your favorite, >> and hir voters prefer someone you like less than hir to those you like more >> than hir. >> >> Say that the CWs is at the far edge of your top-set. >> >> You'd like hir voters to plump, just as you'd like other voters on your >> side of hir to not approve past hir. >> >> But then you're asking them to vote suboptimally, if your request >> contradicts my top-set voting advice. >> >> But maybe it would be best, for the group (the voters on your side of the >> CWs) as a whole, to have such an agreement. >> >> Besides, though individually suboptimal, if the CWs's voters plump, they >> get something for it, because they're helping their favorite against >> their other top-set candidates. >> >> Suboptimal, but not without some potential reward. >> >> Part 2 will follow. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> >>> Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly >>> don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much >>> to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin >>> Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe >>> Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob >>> Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve >>> Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane >>> Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James >>> Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, >>> Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, >>> Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James >>> Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. >>> >>> >>> If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the >>> whole thing! >>> >>> When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, >>> among them ... >>> (1) lack of information >>> (2) too much disinformation >>> (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters >>> (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support >>> >>> To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is >>> >>> 40 A=B>D(90%) >>> 35 B=C>D(90%) >>> 25 A=C>D(90%) >>> >>> then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval >>> winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. >>> >>> I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three >>> neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed >>> sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated >>> surface water) >>> >>> Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and >>> C) are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the >>> segments connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the >>> midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. >>> >>> As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, >>> for a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot >>> by the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many >>> candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of >>> approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that >>> decision. >>> >>> Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. >>> >>> In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: >>> >>> D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) >>> >>> >>> In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons >>> doesn't choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, >>> especially if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference >>> ballots, which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Forest >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily >>>> inhibit people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >>>> >>>> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would >>>> be better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are >>>> Inferred. >>>> >>>> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >>>> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >>>> >>>> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after >>>> me. Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >>>> variations. >>>> >>>> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >>>> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >>>> >>>> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >>>> name by which to refer to it. >>>> >>>> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an >>>> approval to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) >>>> pairwise-beats B, and so A wins & the defection fails. >>>> >>>> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >>>> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >>>> & wins the runoff. >>>> >>>> Burial of the CWs?: >>>> >>>> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank >>>> the buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >>>> >>>> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >>>> universal requirement. >>>> >>>> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >>>> >>>> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >>>> finalist-choosing counts. >>>> >>>> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >>>> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >>>> MMPO. >>>> >>>> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, >>>> the CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >>>> >>>> So Simmons has wv strategy. >>>> >>>> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >>>> fiasco, which goes with it. >>>> >>>> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >>>> classes of methods. >>>> >>>> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >>>> >>>> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & >>>> B pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> >>>> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, >>>>> and Michael Ossipoff. >>>>> >>>>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>>>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>>>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>>>> >>>>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>>>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>>>> >>>>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>>>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>>>> >>>>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method >>>>> that doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or >>>>> rated at the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that >>>>> does reduce to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>>>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>>>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>>>> >>>>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to >>>>> vote at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or >>>>> an approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>>>> for the other base method. >>>>> >>>>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>>>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>>>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>>>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>>>> >>>>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>>>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>>>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>>>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>>>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>>>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>>>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>>>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>>>> >>>>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>>>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>>>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>>>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>>>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>>>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>>>> contemplated public applications). >>>>> >>>>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>>>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>>>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Again, >>>>> >>>>> Forest >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need >>>>>> only be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they >>>>>> turn out to be. >>>>>> >>>>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>>>> >>>>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>>>> to the initial proposal: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>>>> >>>>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>>>> which they're based. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>>>> >>>>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>>>> >>>>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>>>> >>>>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>>>> voting errors. >>>>>> >>>>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kristofer, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>>>> second set).] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of >>>>>>> them are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>>>> approval). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B>A >>>>>>> >>>>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>>>> the sincere set. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 40 C>B >>>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>>> 28 B>C >>>>>>> >>>>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction >>>>>>> attempt to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by >>>>>>> the C faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all >>>>>>> of the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What do you think? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Forest >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>>>> formalization. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when >>>>>>>> only top >>>>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>>>> allow >>>>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this >>>>>>>> category >>>>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>>>> style >>>>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to >>>>>>>> be an >>>>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>>>> like to >>>>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info >>>>>>>> case. >>>>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>>>> do so. >>>>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>>>> burden) >>>>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>>>> voters >>>>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the >>>>>>>> way >>>>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>>>> votes >>>>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to >>>>>>>> pass the >>>>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>>>> (like >>>>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have >>>>>>>> it all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>> >

My 1st comments on Forest's example were based on a misreading of it. Let me quote the example, & comment: Sincere 0 to 1 ratings: 40: A1, B1, D.9, C0 35: B1, C1, D.9, A0 25: A1, C1, D.9, B0 CWs: B Sincere Score elects D. Approval, when probabilistically voted to simulate sincere Score likewise elects D (if the numbers of voters are .multiplied by a large number). Approval, with the approval-cutoff at the candidates' merit midrange, elects D. (I recommend that strategy when there isn't a top-set.) Of course if voters approve (only) their top-set, then Approval will elect the candidate who is in the most people's top-set. D, rated .9 by everyone, is probably in their top-set, and wins if people approve only their top-set. Electing the candidate in the most people's top-set is a good social optimization. Approval is the method in which a sincere vote is a good strategic vote. So this example isn't a bad-example for Approval. What about the CWs? In rank methods I emphasize the importance of being able to elect the CWs without drastic strategy. But, with rank methods, it's assumed that many people are ranking sincerely (instead of equal top ranking) because they want to choose among their top-set, and get the best candidate they can. That doesn't apply if the main goal, the most important goal, is to elect from your top-set. Approval does right in the example. In this example, Bucklin easily elects the CWs. Given the different goal in a rank method, that isn't a wrong result either. If you're majority-favored (MF), then sincere ranking by you & your mutual majority (MM) ensures electing from your top-set. But if you aren't MF, then electing the CWs at least greatly improves the probability of electing from your top-set, because the CWs is especially likely to be in top-sets. ...hence the desirability of electing the CWs without drastic strategy in rank methods. Because the CWs is especially likely to be in top-sets, then it might be desirable, in Bucklin & Approval, to have an agreement among similar voters, to not approve or rank past the CWs. So, though that's suboptimal for you as an individual, it might be socially best for your group of similar voters. If my top-set includes candidates whom we both like less than the CWs, but yours doesn't, then you'd rather that I not approve or rank past the CWs. ...meaning that you'd rather that I plump if my candidate is the CWs A bonus for me is that, thereby, I'm choosing among my top-set. Suboptimal for me, but bringing that slight reward, for complying with that social agreement. I emphasize that such an agreement is an extra, a possible optional group refinement, and needn't be added to Approval or Bucklin strategy As an individual, your best strategy in Approval or Bucklin is to approve or rank (only) your entire top-set. In Bucklin, you might want to rank them in sincere order, to choose among them, if you're sure that you're majority-favored. Otherwise equal top-rank them. Michael Ossipoff On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly > don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much > to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin > Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe > Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob > Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve > Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane > Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James > Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, > Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, > Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James > Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. > > > If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the whole > thing! > > When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, > among them ... > (1) lack of information > (2) too much disinformation > (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters > (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support > > To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is > > 40 A=B>D(90%) > 35 B=C>D(90%) > 25 A=C>D(90%) > > then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval > winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. > > I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three > neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed > sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated > surface water) > > Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and C) > are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the segments > connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the > midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. > > As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, for > a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot by > the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many > candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of > approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that > decision. > > Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. > > In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: > > D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) > > > In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons doesn't > choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, especially > if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference ballots, > which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. > > Thanks, > > Forest > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily inhibit >> people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >> >> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would be >> better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are Inferred. >> >> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >> >> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after me. >> Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >> variations. >> >> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >> >> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >> name by which to refer to it. >> >> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an approval >> to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) pairwise-beats B, >> and so A wins & the defection fails. >> >> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >> & wins the runoff. >> >> Burial of the CWs?: >> >> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank the >> buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >> >> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >> universal requirement. >> >> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >> >> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >> finalist-choosing counts. >> >> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >> MMPO. >> >> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, the >> CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >> >> So Simmons has wv strategy. >> >> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >> fiasco, which goes with it. >> >> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >> classes of methods. >> >> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >> >> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & B >> pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> >>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, and >>> Michael Ossipoff. >>> >>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>> >>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>> >>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>> >>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method that >>> doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or rated at >>> the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that does reduce >>> to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>> >>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to vote >>> at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or an >>> approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>> for the other base method. >>> >>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>> >>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>> >>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>> contemplated public applications). >>> >>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>> >>> Thanks Again, >>> >>> Forest >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need only >>>> be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they turn >>>> out to be. >>>> >>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>> >>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>> to the initial proposal: >>>> >>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>> >>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>> which they're based. >>>> >>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>> >>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>> >>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>> >>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>> voting errors. >>>> >>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Kristofer, >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>> >>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>> >>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>> >>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>> >>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>> >>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>> second set).] >>>>> >>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of them >>>>> are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>> >>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>> >>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>> >>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>> approval). >>>>> >>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>> >>>>> 40 C >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B >>>>> >>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>> >>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>> >>>>> 40 C >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B>A >>>>> >>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>> the sincere set. >>>>> >>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>> >>>>> 40 C>B >>>>> 32 A>B >>>>> 28 B>C >>>>> >>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction attempt >>>>> to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by the C >>>>> faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>> >>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>> >>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all of >>>>> the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>> >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> >>>>> Forest >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>> formalization. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of the >>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when only >>>>>> top >>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>> allow >>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this category >>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>> style >>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to be >>>>>> an >>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>> like to >>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info case. >>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>> >>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>> do so. >>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>> burden) >>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, if >>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>> that >>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>> >>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with two >>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>> >>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>> voters >>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>> >>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the way >>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>> votes >>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to pass >>>>>> the >>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>> >>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>> (like >>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have it >>>>>> all. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >

Some more comments about what various methods do in Forest's example: First let me add that MMPO chooses the CWs in that example, as it always does unless there's burial, or too much indifference. Can I digress a little? I speak of various different voting-conditions, which depend on the electorate and the media. * Current conditions: Dishonest, disinformational media, and a gullible public who believe them. * Green scenario: Honest open media, and a non-gullible public. (...who are capable of electing a progressive government via Plurality voting). * Ideal Majoritarian conditions: Like the Green scenario, but no chicken dilemma, regardless of the voting-system. * Ideal Utopian Altruistic Common-Understanding-&-Agreement conditions: No serious moral disagreements. No immoral voters. Everyone just wants the altruistic social best, the best for everyone. Everyone would rate sincerely in a ratings-method intended to achieve the best for everyone. I'll say that with initials: "IUACUA". In this posting, I'd like to discusss some Ideal Utipian Altulustic Common-Understanding-&-Agreement (IUACUA) methods. Of course, sincerely-voted Score is the familiar IUACUA method. I like Score, for all conditions, including current conditions.. At the minguo website, we were doing polls in which balloting was by Score & by Approval. It was found that voters with an inclination to overecompromise were doing better with Score than with Approval, because they could, at least slightly, downrate their lesser-evil, rating hir somewhat below top; We needn't agree regarding whether people are rating Score-sincerely in Score (ratings representing their gradation of liking of the candidates). I suggest that many apparently Score-sincere ballots might be strategic, a compromise between a compromise strategly and a good strategly, or between a compromise strategy and an Approval-sincere strategly. First, let's clear up the misunderstanding that Approval-like voting is insincere. Rating your top-set at top is thoroughly sincere. Anyway, what I'm saying about apparently Score-sincere ballots is this: Maybe someone was told that, though s/he prefers Jill, s/he has to fully support Hillary as the lesser-of-2-evils. So s/he initially considers rating Hillary at top, with Jill. But top-rating someone Hillary is so distasteful that s/he just doesn't want to do it, regardless of what s/he's been told. So s/he compromises between what s/he's been told, and sincerity, by downrating Hillary a bit below top. Score thus softens and mitigates voting errors. Another voting error that Score softens: Say two parties are so similar that each thinks the other is unneessarly. Rivalry might prevent those 2 parties' voters from approving eachother's party. With Score, they might just downrate eachother a bit. And sure, maybe those voters at minguo were rating Score-sincerely, in which case, Score-sincere rating is better than bad strategy, poor strategic voting. (Noam Chomsky recently said that voting for Hillary instead of Jill is strategic voting. Yes, it's gullible, misinformed strategic voting. It's a strategy. It's a bad strategy. Voting for Jill is strategic voting too. In Plurality, progressives' best strategy is to all vote for the most popular, best-known progressive candidate. That's Jill Stein. If the vote counting were honest and legitimate, then that would be our best strategy. Given that the election is illegitimate, and probably fraudulent, our vote counts for nothing. In that case, too, there's no reason to not vote as if the election were legitimate. ...if we vote. Better to boycott the illegitimate elections, and participate in gigantic pro-democracy demonstrations all across the country, demanding verifiable vote-counting.) Anyway, ... So Score would also be a method for IUACUA conditions. The best one? I say no. It minimizes Bayesian Regret. Is that the best we can do in IUACUA conditions? No. Say we take a dollar away from someone who can barely afford dinner, and we give it to a billioinalre. Or maybe we give the billiionaire something (another mansion or yacht?) that we deem equal in utility to him, as the dollar is to the poor-man.. According to BR minimization (Social Utility maximization), that transfer doesn't affect the BR. The situation is still just as fair, just as right and good. Is it? No, obviously decreasing the greatest disutilities is a lot more important than decreasing lesser dislutilities. Say we assume that the importance of decreasing a disutility is directly proportional to the amount of the disutility. Then, we should sum the _squares_ of the disutilities instead of their 1st power. But should we stop at that? Maybe it would be better still to say that the importance of decreasing a disutility is proportional to the square of the disutilitly's magnitude. If so, we should sum the cubes of the disutilities. Score, which sums the 1st power of the disutilities, I'll call "D1". The method that sums the squares of the disutilities, I'll call that "D2" The method that sums the cubes of the disutilities is "D3". I should say that maybe D2 has some special merit-significance that Forest or Jameson would know more about than I would (and is invited to explain). But maybe it would be better still to use an even faster-increasing function, like an exponential or hyperbolic function. How about these? 1. exp(ax) - 1 I'll call that method Dexp or Dexp(a) The "- 1" is to make the curve go through (0,0). 2. 1/(ax+b) I'll call that Dhyp or Dhyp(a,b) The "+b" is to move the asymptote a little away from x = 0. In forest's example: D1, D2, D3, Dexp(1), Dexp(100), Dexp(10), & Dhyp(1, .01) all choose candidate D. I'd say that D it's reliably right to say that D is the right and best IUACUA choice, wouldn't you? I suggests that, in general, Approval will do better at that than Condorcet does, as is the case in Forest's example. Michael Ossipoff On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > My 1st comments on Forest's example were based on a misreading of it. > > Let me quote the example, & comment: > > Sincere 0 to 1 ratings: > > 40: A1, B1, D.9, C0 > 35: B1, C1, D.9, A0 > 25: A1, C1, D.9, B0 > > CWs: B > > Sincere Score elects D. > > Approval, when probabilistically voted to simulate sincere Score likewise > elects D (if the numbers of voters are .multiplied by a large number). > > Approval, with the approval-cutoff at the candidates' merit midrange, > elects D. (I recommend that strategy when there isn't a top-set.) > > Of course if voters approve (only) their top-set, then Approval will elect > the candidate who is in the most people's top-set. > > D, rated .9 by everyone, is probably in their top-set, and wins if people > approve only their top-set. > > Electing the candidate in the most people's top-set is a good social > optimization. > > Approval is the method in which a sincere vote is a good strategic vote. > > So this example isn't a bad-example for Approval. > > What about the CWs? In rank methods I emphasize the importance of being > able to elect the CWs without drastic strategy. > > But, with rank methods, it's assumed that many people are ranking > sincerely (instead of equal top ranking) because they want to choose among > their top-set, and get the best candidate they can. > > That doesn't apply if the main goal, the most important goal, is to elect > from your top-set. > > Approval does right in the example. > > In this example, Bucklin easily elects the CWs. Given the different goal > in a rank method, that isn't a wrong result either. > > If you're majority-favored (MF), then sincere ranking by you & your mutual > majority (MM) ensures electing from your top-set. > > But if you aren't MF, then electing the CWs at least greatly improves the > probability of electing from your top-set, because the CWs is especially > likely to be in top-sets. > > ...hence the desirability of electing the CWs without drastic strategy in > rank methods. > > Because the CWs is especially likely to be in top-sets, then it might be > desirable, in Bucklin & Approval, to have an agreement among similar > voters, to not approve or rank past the CWs. > > So, though that's suboptimal for you as an individual, it might be > socially best for your group of similar voters. > > If my top-set includes candidates whom we both like less than the CWs, but > yours doesn't, then you'd rather that I not approve or rank past the CWs. > ...meaning that you'd rather that I plump if my candidate is the CWs > > A bonus for me is that, thereby, I'm choosing among my top-set. Suboptimal > for me, but bringing that slight reward, for complying with that social > agreement. > > I emphasize that such an agreement is an extra, a possible optional group > refinement, and needn't be added to Approval or Bucklin strategy > > As an individual, your best strategy in Approval or Bucklin is to approve > or rank (only) your entire top-set. > > In Bucklin, you might want to rank them in sincere order, to choose among > them, if you're sure that you're majority-favored. Otherwise equal top-rank > them. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > On Oct 20, 2016 12:52 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > >> Very kind of you to suggest "Simmons" for this method, and I certainly >> don't mind associating my name with it, although every idea in it owes much >> to input from you all, especially Chris Benham, Michael Ossipoff, Kevin >> Venzke, Kristofer M, Jameson Q, Andy Jennings, Jobst Heitzig, Joe >> Weinstein, Craig Layton,Warren Smith, Toby Pereira, Rob LeGrand, Rob >> Lanphier, Richard Moore, Bart Ingles, Rick Denman. Steven J Brams, Steve >> Eppley, Francis Edward Su, Sylvia Owl, Adam Tarr, Alex Small, Stephane >> Rouillon, Craig Carey, Dave Ketchum, Douglas Greene, Blake Cretney, James >> Gilmour, Jan Kok, Josh Narins, Steve Barney, Joseph Malkevitch, Olli Salmi, >> Gervase Lam, Elisabeth Varin, Mike Rouse, Donald E Davison, Markus Schulze, >> Martin Harper, DEMOREP1, Buddha Buck, David Catchpole, Anthony Simmons, James >> Green-Armytage, Kathy Dopp, Juho Laatu, and too many more to mention. >> >> >> If it turns out to have a serious Achilles heel, I will disavow the whole >> thing! >> >> When Approval doesn't elect the CWs, there are several possible excuses, >> among them ... >> (1) lack of information >> (2) too much disinformation >> (3) poor approval strategy by the CW supporters >> (4) sincere reflection of the intensity of support >> >> To elaborate on (4), if the preference profile is >> >> 40 A=B>D(90%) >> 35 B=C>D(90%) >> 25 A=C>D(90%) >> >> then D is the sincere Range winner, as well as the Sincere Approval >> winner, but is the Condorcet Loser. >> >> I have constructed an example that yields this profile based on three >> neighborhoods whose centers form an equilateral triangle, and four proposed >> sites for a deep well (into a pure aquifer far below the contaminated >> surface water) >> >> Site D is the center of the triangle. The other three sites (A, B, and >> C) are exterior to the triangle on the perpendicular bisectors of the >> segments connecting the neighborhood centers, but not quite as far from the >> midpoints of those segments as the center of the triangle. >> >> As for "sincere approval, " I have described it elsewhere. Basically, >> for a score ballot divide the total score of the candidates on that ballot >> by the max possible score. Take the integer part and approve that many >> candidates. The fractional part left over determines the probability of >> approving the next candidate in line. A spin of a spinner can make that >> decision. >> >> Or in the above case, community spirit can make the difference.. >> >> In this case Sincere Approval and Range give the same expected results: >> >> D(90), A(65), B(75), and C(60) >> >> >> In conclusion, I don't think we need to be embarrassed if Simmons doesn't >> choose the CWs revealed by the second (sincere) set of ballots, especially >> if the ballots in the second set are merely ranked preference ballots, >> which are perfectly adequate for their purpose. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Forest >> >> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com >> > wrote: >> >>> Yes, saying that everyone ranked is approved would unnecessarily inhibit >>> people's MMPO rankings, as would a Score-count. >>> >>> So an approval-cutoff inferred at the candidates rating-midrange would >>> be better. ...in the ratings from whose order the MMPO rankings are >>> Inferred. >>> >>> ...or an explicitly-voted approval-cutoff in a ranked MMPO ballot. If >>> course it comes to the same thing, just different ballot-implementation. >>> >>> If I'd introduced this best-appearing method, I'd want it named after >>> me. Beatpath is named after Markus. So: Simmons' method, in its various >>> variations. >>> >>> ...which, anyway, is lot less cumbersome than something like >>> MMPO/Approval-like Fnalist-Choice. >>> >>> That is relevant because, when discussing something, it helps to have a >>> name by which to refer to it. >>> >>> It avoids chicken dilemma, because, even if the A voters give an >>> approval to B, and B wins the Approval count, A (the MMPO winner) >>> pairwise-beats B, and so A wins & the defection fails. >>> >>> Truncation of the CWs doesn't take away hir win in MMPO. Even if the >>> truncators' candidate wins the approval count, the CWs pairwise-beats hir, >>> & wins the runoff. >>> >>> Burial of the CWs?: >>> >>> Here, MMPO & wv need the CWs's voters to plump, or at least not rank the >>> buriers' candidate over the candidate insincerely ranked over hir. >>> >>> So, too, Approval, Score & Bucklin need that plumping. It seems a >>> universal requirement. >>> >>> So Simmons doesn't escape that requirement. >>> >>> But, when done, that defensive plumping protects the CWs's win, in both >>> finalist-choosing counts. >>> >>> ...And, if the burial is deterred, as it often or usually will be in >>> MMPO, but the plumping isn't actually done, then the CWs still wins in >>> MMPO. >>> >>> Even if the truncators' candidates wins in the Approval-like method, the >>> CWs pairbeats hir, & wins the runoff. >>> >>> So Simmons has wv strategy. >>> >>> But that means it also has the possibility of the perpetual burial >>> fiasco, which goes with it. >>> >>> But that possibility doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular >>> classes of methods. >>> >>> Simmons, though using MMPO, doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example: >>> >>> C doesn't win in any Approval-like method. They give an A & B tie. A & B >>> pairbeat C, and would therefore win the runoff. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>> On Oct 18, 2016 1:42 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>> >>>> I appreciate all of the great insights from Kristofer, Chris Benham, >>>> and Michael Ossipoff. >>>> >>>> Especially thanks to Kristofer for being a good sport about my >>>> forwarding an email with his private earlier input included. It was too >>>> late when I realized I hadn't deleted that part. >>>> >>>> Intuitively, I think Chris is right that Pushover is the biggest >>>> potential problem. But I don't see an obvious example. >>>> >>>> Michael is right that we need to consider other possibilities for the >>>> two base methods for picking the finalists. >>>> >>>> I like MMPO or Smith//MMPO as one of them since MMPO is one method that >>>> doesn't just reduce to Approval when all candidates are ranked or rated at >>>> the extremes. I think that the other method should be one that does reduce >>>> to Approval at the extremes, like River, MAM/RankedPairs, or >>>> Beatpath/Tideman/Schulz. It could be a Bucklin variant like MJ, Andy >>>> Jennings's Chiastic Approval, or Jameson's MAS. >>>> >>>> Like Michael I think that Range itself gives too much incentive to >>>> vote at the extremes on the strategic ballots. Better to use Approval or >>>> an approval variant so that the strategic ratings are not unduly compressed >>>> for the other base method. >>>> >>>> I like Kristofer's insights about the subtle differences between the >>>> proposed "manual" version in contradistinction to a DSV version that >>>> automates strategy for the two methods based on the first set of (perhaps >>>> somewhat pre-strategized) ratings. >>>> >>>> In particular he pointed out how certain procedural rules can >>>> externalize the paradoxes of voting. To a certain extent Approval avoids >>>> bad properties by externalizing them. The cost is the "burden" of the >>>> voter deciding whom to approve. As Ron LeGrand has so amply demonstrated, >>>> any time you try to automate approval strategy in a semi-optimal way, you >>>> end up with a non-monotone method. By the same token IRV can be thought of >>>> as a rudimentary DSV approach to plurality voting, so it should be no >>>> surprise that IRV/STV is non-monotone. >>>> >>>> A better example, closer to the Kristofer's, idea is Asset Voting. It >>>> externalizes everything, which makes it impossible to contradict any nice >>>> ballot based property. Because of this there is an extreme resulting >>>> strategic burden, but in this case that burden is placed squarely onto the >>>> shoulders of the candidates, not the voters. Presumably the candidates are >>>> up to that kind of burden since they are, after all, politicians (in our >>>> contemplated public applications). >>>> >>>> But this brings up another intriguing idea. Let one of the two base >>>> methods be Asset Voting, so that the sincere ballots decide between (say) >>>> the MMPO winner and the Asset Voting winner. >>>> >>>> Thanks Again, >>>> >>>> Forest >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> If course the balloting for choosing between the 2 finalists need only >>>>> be rankings, to show preferences between the 2 finalists, whoever they turn >>>>> out to be. >>>>> >>>>> Some variations occurred to me. I'm not saying that any of them would >>>>> be better. I just wanted to mention them, without any implication that they >>>>> haven't already occurred to everyone. >>>>> >>>>> Both of the following possibilities have disadvantages, in comparison >>>>> to the initial proposal: >>>>> >>>>> 1. What if, for the initial 2 counts, it were a Score-count, in >>>>> addition to the MMPO count. >>>>> >>>>> One argument against that variation is that a voter's inferred >>>>> approvals are likely to be more optimal for hir than the Score ratings on >>>>> which they're based. >>>>> >>>>> 2. For the 2 initial counts, what if the MMPO count used a separate >>>>> ranking, & the Approval count used a separate set of Approval-marks? >>>>> >>>>> Would that make it easier for Chris's pushover strategist? >>>>> >>>>> What other positive & negative results? >>>>> >>>>> One possible disadvantage that occurs to me is that overcompromising >>>>> voters might approve lower than than necessary, if the approval were >>>>> explicitly voted. ...in comparison to their ratings-which tend to soften >>>>> voting errors. >>>>> >>>>> So far, it appears that the initial proposal is probably the best one. >>>>> >>>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>>> On Oct 17, 2016 1:49 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Kristofer, >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps the way out is to invite two ballots from each voter. The >>>>>> first set of ballots is used to narrow down to two alternatives. It is >>>>>> expected that these ballots will be voted with all possible manipulative >>>>>> strategy ... chicken defection, pushover, burial, etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> The second set is used only to decide between the two alternatives >>>>>> served up by the first set. >>>>>> >>>>>> A voter who doesn't like strategic burden need not contribute to the >>>>>> first set, or could submit the same ballot to both sets. >>>>>> >>>>>> If both ballots were Olympic Score style, with scores ranging from >>>>>> blank (=0) to 10, there would be enough resolution for all practical >>>>>> purposes. Approval voters could simply specify their approvals with 10 and >>>>>> leave the other candidates' scores blank. >>>>>> >>>>>> There should be no consistency requirement between the two ballots. >>>>>> They should be put in separate boxes and counted separately. Only that >>>>>> policy can guarantee the sincerity of the ballots in the second set. >>>>>> >>>>>> In this regard it is important to realize that optimal perfect >>>>>> information approval strategy may require you to approve out of order, i.e. >>>>>> approve X and not Y even if you sincerely rate Y higher than X. [We're >>>>>> talking about optimal in the sense of maximizing your expectation, meaning >>>>>> the expectation of your sincere ratings ballot, (your contribution to the >>>>>> second set).] >>>>>> >>>>>> Nobody expects sincerity on the first set of ballots. If some of >>>>>> them are sincere, no harm done, as long as the methods for choosing the two >>>>>> finalists are reasonable. >>>>>> >>>>>> On the other hand, no rational voter would vote insincerely on hir >>>>>> contribution to the second set. The social scientist has a near perfect >>>>>> window into the sincere preferences of the voters. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suppose the respective finalists are chosen by IRV and Implicit >>>>>> Approval, respectively, applied to the first set of ballots. People's eyes >>>>>> would be opened when they saw how often the Approval Winner was sincerely >>>>>> preferred over the IRV winner. >>>>>> >>>>>> Currently my first choice of methods for choosing the respective >>>>>> finalists would be MMPO for one of them and Approval for the other, with >>>>>> the approval cutoff at midrange (so scores of six through ten represent >>>>>> approval). >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the strategical ballot set profile conforming to >>>>>> >>>>>> 40 C >>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>> 28 B >>>>>> >>>>>> The MMPO finalist would be A, and the likely Approval finalist would >>>>>> be B, unless too many B ratings were below midrange. >>>>>> >>>>>> If the sincere ballots were >>>>>> >>>>>> 40 C >>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>> 28 B>A >>>>>> >>>>>> then the runoff winner determined by the second set of ballots would >>>>>> be A, the CWs. The chicken defection was to no avail. Note that even >>>>>> though this violates Plurality on the first set of ballots, it does not on >>>>>> the sincere set. >>>>>> >>>>>> On the other hand, if the sincere set conformed to >>>>>> >>>>>> 40 C>B >>>>>> 32 A>B >>>>>> 28 B>C >>>>>> >>>>>> then the runoff winner would be B, the CWs, and the C faction attempt >>>>>> to win by truncation of B would have no effect. A burial of B by the C >>>>>> faction would be no more rewarding than their truncation of B. >>>>>> >>>>>> So this idea seems to take care of the tension between methods that >>>>>> are immune to burial and methods that are immune to chicken defection. >>>>>> >>>>>> Furthermore, the plurality problem of MMPO evaporates. Even if all >>>>>> of the voters vote approval style in either or both sets of ballots, the >>>>>> Plurality problem will automatically evaporate; on approval style ballots >>>>>> the Approval winner pairwise beats all other candidates, including the MMPO >>>>>> candidate (if different from the approval winner). >>>>>> >>>>>> What do you think? >>>>>> >>>>>> Forest >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < >>>>>> km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 11:56 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: >>>>>>> > Thanks, Kristofer; it seems to be a folk theorem waiting for >>>>>>> formalization. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > That reminds me that someone once pointed out that almost all of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> > methods favored by EM list enthusiasts reduce to Approval when >>>>>>> only top >>>>>>> > and bottom votes are used, in particular when Condorcet methods >>>>>>> allow >>>>>>> > equal top and multiple truncation votes they fall into this >>>>>>> category >>>>>>> > because the Approval Winner is the pairwise winner for approval >>>>>>> style >>>>>>> > ballots. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > Everything else (besides approval strategy) that we do seems to be >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> > effort to lift the strategical burden from the voter. We would >>>>>>> like to >>>>>>> > remove that burden in all cases, but at least in the zero info >>>>>>> case. >>>>>>> > Yet that simple goal is somewhat elusive as well. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Suppose we have a proof for such a theorem. Then you could have a >>>>>>> gradient argument going like this: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - If you're never harmed by ranking Approval style, then you should >>>>>>> do so. >>>>>>> - But figuring out the correct threshold to use is tough (strategic >>>>>>> burden) >>>>>>> - So you may err, which leads to a problem. And even if you don't, if >>>>>>> the voters feel they have to burden their minds, that's a bad thing. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here, traditional game theory would probably pick some kind of mixed >>>>>>> strategy, where you "exaggerate" (Approval-ize) only to the extent >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> you benefit even when taking your errors into account. But such an >>>>>>> equilibrium is unrealistic (we'd have to find out why, but probably >>>>>>> because it would in the worst case require everybody to know about >>>>>>> everybody else's level of bounded rationality). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And if the erring causes sufficiently bad results, we're left with >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Either suppose that the method is sufficiently robust that most >>>>>>> voters >>>>>>> won't use Approval strategy (e.g. the pro-MJ argument that Approval >>>>>>> strategy only is a benefit if enough people use it, so most people >>>>>>> won't, so we'll have a correlated equilibrium of sorts) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - That any admissible method must have a "bump in the road" on the >>>>>>> way >>>>>>> from a honest vote to an Approval vote, where moving closer to >>>>>>> Approval-style harms the voter. Then a game-theoretical voter only >>>>>>> votes >>>>>>> Approval style if he can coordinate with enough other voters to pass >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> bump, which again is unrealistic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But solution #2 will probably destroy quite a few nice properties >>>>>>> (like >>>>>>> monotonicity + FBC; if the proof is by contradiction, then we'd know >>>>>>> some property combinations we'd have to violate). So we can't have >>>>>>> it all. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>

. I neglected to add this: Rawls said that it's best to minimize the greatest disutility, the disutililty for the person who has the greatest disutility. I agree. Lets say that, as a method, that's called "Rawls method", or "Rawls". In Forest's example, Rawls chooses candidate D. If we had honest, legitimate elections, and an IUACUA electorate, then Rawls would be my 1st choice for the voting-system. But if Rawls isn't feasible, then I'd suggest one of the other IUACUA methods that I described. Michael Ossipoff