Hallo, in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet advocacy group, has launched its website: https://www.betterchoices.vote This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin, Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage. They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the winner is determined by IRV. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy independence of clones. Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice Voting then selects candidate A. Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3 and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3. Markus Schulze

I find it curious why was a Smith method not chosen? If Condorcet is the Consensus Choice it would follow that follow that even when there is not one candidate who wins, the winner would preferably be from the set of candidates who are all preferred to every single candidate outside of that set. While there are good arguments for integrating IRV in one way or the other, it is still surprising that it would override the natural extension of the Condorcet rule, thereby also leading to the weird possible outcome below. I have to assume the main reasons, intentions behind this initiative are: -To have incremental progress by moving from IRV to Condorcet, where possible, since this is just an easy extra step. If that is the case, I wonder why not go with BTR-IRV though... (but Smith//IRV would also be just one step further) -To provide an alternative for Ranked Choice Voting as a brand. In this case, it is also questionable, if for nothing else, because it is to mosr people, going to seem like just a variant of the former. Moreover, calling it "consensus" choice might be overselling it. It is a consensus of simple majorities, not a qualitative consensus process or a quantitative consensus such as one aiming for some sort of supermajority as legitimacy. I guess it makes sense regarding center squeeze, and aimong for a median, but then "compromise" would be more accurate. However, of course that also may not seem correct to some, since any candidate who is the favorite of the absolute majority will not really seem like a compromise. -Abel On Thu, Jun 19, 2025, 18:17 Markus Schulze via Election-Methods < election-methods@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > Hallo, > > in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet > advocacy group, has launched its website: > > https://www.betterchoices.vote > > This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin, > Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage. > > They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice > Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate > is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the > winner is determined by IRV. See: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A > > Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy > independence of clones. > > Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but > doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice > Voting then selects candidate A. > > Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3 > and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV > kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3. > > Markus Schulze > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

Markus, > Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy > independence of clones. Yes.  They could have avoided that by using the somewhat more simple method that James-Green Armytage named "Benham" in his "Condorcet-Hare Hybrids" paper: > Benham method:14 Eliminate the plurality loser until there is a > Condorcet winner. http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/voting-matters/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf He describes three other methods in his paper, but they are all more complicated without any justification. I think this method would be usually easier to operate than the Condorcet//Hare method they suggest, and generally less clunky. Chris Benham On 20/06/2025 1:47 am, Markus Schulze via Election-Methods wrote: > Hallo, > > in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet > advocacy group, has launched its website: > > https://www.betterchoices.vote > > This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin, > Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage. > > They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice > Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate > is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the > winner is determined by IRV. See: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A > > Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy > independence of clones. > > Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but > doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice > Voting then selects candidate A. > > Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3 > and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV > kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3. > > Markus Schulze > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info