Copeland//Plurality --- can it beat IRV?
Hi guys,
As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or the
best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of methods that
might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can get them to ditch
IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the past you've seen me
ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So let me present another
idea:
What about Copeland//Plurality?
-
The method is incredibly easy: "Among the candidates that win the most
head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero) -
I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.
-
For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the winning
candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine any reason
why that would possibly be true, but it means that an X//Plurality method
might appeal to them.
Can anyone help me figure out what properties Copeland//Plurality would
have? Does it have any major downsides that I should know about? It's hard
to see how it could go very wrong.
Cheers,
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
On 22.01.2022 21:33, Daniel Carrera wrote:
Hi guys,
As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or
the best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of
methods that might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can
get them to ditch IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the
past you've seen me ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So
let me present another idea:
What about Copeland//Plurality?
-
The method is incredibly easy: "Among the candidates that win the
most head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero) -
I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.
It probably fails monotonicity, because it's X//Y and it's not Borda.
The thing that makes Copeland//Borda monotone is that the pairwise
matrix doesn't change when you remove candidates. But the number of
first preferences for remaining candidates does change when candidates
are eliminated.
I think the scenario would be something like this: Suppose we have an
A>B>C>D>A cycle. Some voters uprank A which turn the D>A leg into A>D,
so that D is booted from the Copeland set. D-first voters tend to vote
for B second, and A has the most first preferences with B in second
place. After D is booted out, the revealed first preferences for B make
B win instead of A; so raising A made A lose.
I would also guess that it would be pretty susceptible to strategy. It
isn't cloneproof either because neither Copeland nor Plurality is.
- For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the
winning candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine
any reason why that would possibly be true, but it means that an
X//Plurality method might appeal to them.
I always find the core support argument kind of weird. If core support
is the end-all be-all, then Plurality's your man. But clearly it isn't.
On the other hand, IRV can elect a candidate who has only two first
preferences, so the worst case (lack of) reliance on core support can be
pretty bad -- and IRV can fail to elect the CW even when the CW has more
initial first preferences than the IRV winner. So it doesn't really hold up.
-km
On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 5:11 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de
wrote:
On 22.01.2022 21:33, Daniel Carrera wrote:
Hi guys,
As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or
the best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of
methods that might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can
get them to ditch IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the
past you've seen me ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So
let me present another idea:
What about Copeland//Plurality?
-
The method is incredibly easy: "Among the candidates that win the
most head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero) -
I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.
It probably fails monotonicity, because it's X//Y and it's not Borda.
The thing that makes Copeland//Borda monotone is that the pairwise
matrix doesn't change when you remove candidates. But the number of
first preferences for remaining candidates does change when candidates
are eliminated.
I didn't think of that. I think that when I wrote Copeland//Plurality I was
really thinking of Copeland,Plurality --- i.e. keep the first preferences
as is, and pick the highest one that is in the Copeland set. No
redistribution. But changing to Copeland,Plurality just introduces new
problems (below).
I would also guess that it would be pretty susceptible to strategy. It
isn't cloneproof either because neither Copeland nor Plurality is.
Yeah, probably. For Copeland,Plurality you get the same spoiler effect as
Plurality.
- For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the
winning candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine
any reason why that would possibly be true, but it means that an
X//Plurality method might appeal to them.
I always find the core support argument kind of weird. If core support
is the end-all be-all, then Plurality's your man. But clearly it isn't.
On the other hand, IRV can elect a candidate who has only two first
preferences, so the worst case (lack of) reliance on core support can be
pretty bad -- and IRV can fail to elect the CW even when the CW has more
initial first preferences than the IRV winner. So it doesn't really hold
up.
Yeah. It's a weird argument. "We want enough Plurality to dismiss the CW
(sometimes), but not enough to elect the Plurality winner, oh and sometimes
we'll pick the 3rd or 4th highest Plurality candidate even if the CW is 2nd
because... I guess IRV just does that sometimes".
rbj made a point just an hour ago that Condorcet is a principle "if a
majority agrees that A > B, then B must not win", while IRV is an algorithm
without underlying ethic. It's the core principle of Condorcet that
convinces me that it is the embodiment of democracy in a multi-candidate
election.
Cheers,
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
Here's a very simple, seamlessly Condorcet compliant method with an IRV
flavor... but instead of eliminating the candidate with the fewest first
place votes at each step, it eliminates the candidate with the poorest
showing in any "matchup" among the remaining candidates:
While there remain two or more candidates, eliminate the one with the
fewest votes in any matchup among those remaining candidates. Then elect
the sole survivor.
If at any stage two or more candidates tie for fewest votes, look at second
fewest, etc until the tie is broken. Beyond that start comparing max
opposing votes, etc. This tie breaker hierarchy is easy to justify, easy to
execute, and as decisive as all get out!
This method cannot eliminate the CW because the candidate with the fewest
votes will have fewer votes than the CW in their matchup, and perhaps even
fewer in some other matchup.
It is so omputationally simple that a small child can do it manually, given
a copy of the pairwise matrix:
Let k be the row containing the smallest entry in the entire matrix. [Too
hard for a small child to find?] Cross out both row k and column k. [Kids
like this kind of work.] Repeat until only one entry remains. Elect the
candidate whose row is not crossed out.
Not monotonic, but only because Sequential Elimination methods in general
are non-monotonic.
If we want IRV flavor, it's probably gonna have to be non-monotonic.
This method is due to Benham's modification of a non-Condorcet method whose
name slips my mind at the moment.
El sáb., 22 de ene. de 2022 12:33 p. m., Daniel Carrera dcarrera@gmail.com
escribió:
Hi guys,
As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or the
best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of methods that
might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can get them to ditch
IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the past you've seen me
ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So let me present another
idea:
What about Copeland//Plurality?
-
The method is incredibly easy: "Among the candidates that win the most
head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero) -
I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.
-
For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the winning
candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine any reason
why that would possibly be true, but it means that an X//Plurality method
might appeal to them.
Can anyone help me figure out what properties Copeland//Plurality would
have? Does it have any major downsides that I should know about? It's hard
to see how it could go very wrong.
Cheers,
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
On 01/23/2022 3:23 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
Here's a very simple, seamlessly Condorcet compliant method with an IRV flavor... but instead of eliminating the candidate with the fewest first place votes at each step, it eliminates the candidate with the poorest showing in any "matchup" among the remaining candidates:
While there remain two or more candidates, eliminate the one with the fewest votes in any matchup among those remaining candidates.
But isn't that sorta just a stronger way of doing Bottom Two Runoff?
Both methods are eliminating one candidate at a time and both insure that it's not the Condorcet winner that is eliminated.
As long as the candidate count is being reduced and the CW cannot be eliminated, you're pretty much assured of ending up with the CW as the last candidate standing.
Then elect the sole survivor.
If at any stage two or more candidates tie for fewest votes, look at second fewest, etc until the tie is broken. Beyond that start comparing max opposing votes, etc. This tie breaker hierarchy is easy to justify, easy to execute, and as decisive as all get out!
ya know, that's actually true. I wonder if it's better to use margins, instead of fewest votes. So you eliminate the candidate that is defeated with the largest margin in each round.
This method cannot eliminate the CW because the candidate with the fewest votes will have fewer votes than the CW in their matchup, and perhaps even fewer in some other matchup.
It is so computationally simple that a small child can do it manually, given a copy of the pairwise matrix:
But it's more laborious than BTR. BTR has to do only one "matchup" per elimination round.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
The most rational method of counting preference votes is by keep value, or the ratio of the quota to a candidates votes. Exactly the same count can be conducted for the exclusion of candidates as for their election, simply by reversing the preference vote into an unpreference vote.
The exclusion count of unpreferences is inverted for an auxiliary election count. The two counts are averaged, by geometric mean, for the final keep values to the candidates.
Tha advantages of this binomial stv is that it uses all the preference information; does so with rational accuracy; is a simple repetition of a rational count for exclusion, as well as election.
Unlike IRV or the alternative vote, it is not stuck with an approximate ordinal Last Past The Post count, no better than the ordinal First Past The Post, which it is trying to replace.
Richard Lung.
On 22 Jan 2022, at 11:10 pm, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 22.01.2022 21:33, Daniel Carrera wrote:
Hi guys,
As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or
the best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of
methods that might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can
get them to ditch IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the
past you've seen me ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So
let me present another idea:
What about Copeland//Plurality?
-
The method is incredibly easy: "Among the candidates that win the
most head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero) -
I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.
It probably fails monotonicity, because it's X//Y and it's not Borda.
The thing that makes Copeland//Borda monotone is that the pairwise
matrix doesn't change when you remove candidates. But the number of
first preferences for remaining candidates does change when candidates
are eliminated.
I think the scenario would be something like this: Suppose we have an
A>B>C>D>A cycle. Some voters uprank A which turn the D>A leg into A>D,
so that D is booted from the Copeland set. D-first voters tend to vote
for B second, and A has the most first preferences with B in second
place. After D is booted out, the revealed first preferences for B make
B win instead of A; so raising A made A lose.
I would also guess that it would be pretty susceptible to strategy. It
isn't cloneproof either because neither Copeland nor Plurality is.
- For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the
winning candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine
any reason why that would possibly be true, but it means that an
X//Plurality method might appeal to them.
I always find the core support argument kind of weird. If core support
is the end-all be-all, then Plurality's your man. But clearly it isn't.
On the other hand, IRV can elect a candidate who has only two first
preferences, so the worst case (lack of) reliance on core support can be
pretty bad -- and IRV can fail to elect the CW even when the CW has more
initial first preferences than the IRV winner. So it doesn't really hold up.
-km
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
It seems to me that BTR is much more laborous because you have to consult
all of the ballots at every stage to find the transferred votes.
In contrast, this "least matchup votes" method that I'm talking about
requires only one pass; once you have the pairwise matrix you can publish
it, and any child can quickly eliminate all candidates except the winner by
repeatedly crossing out the row and column of the candidate with the
smallest entry in its row.
BTR requires you to identify two candidates at each stage after
transferring votes from the Loser of the previous stage, and then figure
out which of these is defeated by the other.
None of this extra work is needed in the method I'm talking about.
El dom., 23 de ene. de 2022 1:00 a. m., robert bristow-johnson <
rbj@audioimagination.com> escribió:
On 01/23/2022 3:23 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
Here's a very simple, seamlessly Condorcet compliant method with an IRV
flavor... but instead of eliminating the candidate with the fewest first
place votes at each step, it eliminates the candidate with the poorest
showing in any "matchup" among the remaining candidates:
While there remain two or more candidates, eliminate the one with the
fewest votes in any matchup among those remaining candidates.
But isn't that sorta just a stronger way of doing Bottom Two Runoff?
Both methods are eliminating one candidate at a time and both insure that
it's not the Condorcet winner that is eliminated.
As long as the candidate count is being reduced and the CW cannot be
eliminated, you're pretty much assured of ending up with the CW as the last
candidate standing.
Then elect the sole survivor.
If at any stage two or more candidates tie for fewest votes, look at
second fewest, etc until the tie is broken. Beyond that start comparing max
opposing votes, etc. This tie breaker hierarchy is easy to justify, easy to
execute, and as decisive as all get out!
ya know, that's actually true. I wonder if it's better to use margins,
instead of fewest votes. So you eliminate the candidate that is defeated
with the largest margin in each round.
This method cannot eliminate the CW because the candidate with the
fewest votes will have fewer votes than the CW in their matchup, and
perhaps even fewer in some other matchup.
It is so computationally simple that a small child can do it manually,
given a copy of the pairwise matrix:
But it's more laborious than BTR. BTR has to do only one "matchup" per
elimination round.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
El dom., 23 de ene. de 2022 12:23 a. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
Here's a very simple, seamlessly Condorcet compliant method with an IRV
flavor... but instead of eliminating the candidate with the fewest first
place votes at each step, it eliminates the candidate with the poorest
showing in any "matchup" among the remaining candidates:
While there remain two or more candidates, eliminate the one with the
fewest votes in any matchup among those remaining candidates. Then elect
the sole survivor.
If at any stage two or more candidates tie for fewest votes, look at
second fewest, etc until the tie is broken. Beyond that start comparing max
opposing votes, etc. This tie breaker hierarchy is easy to justify, easy to
execute, and as decisive as all get out!
This method cannot eliminate the CW because the candidate with the fewest
votes will have fewer votes than the CW in their matchup, and perhaps even
fewer in some other matchup.
It is so omputationally simple that a small child can do it manually,
given a copy of the pairwise matrix:
Let k be the row containing the smallest entry in the entire matrix. [Too
hard for a small child to find?] Cross out both row k and column k. [Kids
like this kind of work.] Repeat until only one entry remains. Elect the
candidate whose row is not crossed out.
Not monotonic, but only because Sequential Elimination methods in general
are non-monotonic.
If we want IRV flavor, it's probably gonna have to be non-monotonic.
This method is due to Benham's modification of a non-Condorcet method
whose name slips my mind at the moment.
The name might be "Gross Loser Elimination"
The Gross Loser is the candidate that comes closest to being skunked in a
pairwise matchup.
Elect the candidate that remains after repeatedly eliminating the Gross
Loser.
Eleven words ... perhaps the best possible RCV method that can be defined
so unambiguously and succinctly.
No need to mention Smith, but the fact remains it always elects a Smith
member.
Here's a classic example of Chicken Defense:
49 C
26 A>B
25 B (sincere B>C)
B subverts the sincere CW (A) by a chicken defection that creates a cycle
A>B>C>A
RP, Schulze, MinMax, River, etc reward the defector by breaking the cycle
at the A>B step, which is the weakest majority (26 to 25), allowing the
defector to win with impunity.
Benham and Gross Loser both eliminate B first (for different reasons) and
leave C as the winner, disappointing the defector.
Benham eliminates B because it has the fewest first place votes, while GL
eliminates B because it only musters 25 votes against A .. it is the Gross
Loser.
Benham is a hybrid of IRV and Condorcet patched together with duct tape and
baling wire, while GL accomplishes the same thing simply and seamlessly.
It seems too good to be true, but sometimes simple really is the best!
El sáb., 22 de ene. de 2022 12:33 p. m., Daniel Carrera <
dcarrera@gmail.com> escribió:
Hi guys,
As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or the
best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of methods that
might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can get them to ditch
IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the past you've seen me
ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So let me present another
idea:
What about Copeland//Plurality?
-
The method is incredibly easy: "Among the candidates that win the
most head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero) -
I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.
-
For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the winning
candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine any reason
why that would possibly be true, but it means that an X//Plurality method
might appeal to them.
Can anyone help me figure out what properties Copeland//Plurality would
have? Does it have any major downsides that I should know about? It's hard
to see how it could go very wrong.
Cheers,
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 10:06 PM Forest Simmons
forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
The name might be "Gross Loser Elimination"
The Gross Loser is the candidate that comes closest to being skunked in a pairwise matchup.
Ew, ick, what a gross loser! EWWW-W-W-W-W-W! :-D
I only have a cursory idea what y'all are talking about (and don't
bother trying to explain it; I may go back and do more than skim the
messages at some point, but I don't have the mental energy to spend on
this right now).
Regardless, I would love all of your help (everyone on EM-list) in
making electowiki more accessible to people new to electoral reform.
I think it's cool that Forest is trying to come up with names for this
new method that sounds marketable (sorta like "Ranked Robin").
However, my fear is that more names for minor variants of Llull's
method https://electowiki.org/wiki/Lllull's_method) is just going to
confuse people, given that Llull/Condorcet/Copeland has been around
for a while and yet hasn't taken the world by storm.
It could be that I need to study some more in order to participate in
this mailing list. It's been a long, long time since I've truly
wrapped my brain around linear algebra (which .... I didn't do very
well in that subject my first time around). I suppose I should
probably watch enough YouTube videos such that I've had enough of a
refresher in that topic to where I can follow the topic as fluidly as
you all seem to follow the discussions.
Regardless, we could use more editors helping us on electowiki, and
less voting method criteria or new methods to sort, because we're not
even CLOSE to sorting out everything that other editors have dumped on
electowiki over the past fifteen years or so. By "help", I should be
clear: we need people looking at existing articles with fresh eyes,
and improving them so that people new to electoral reform can
understand them. Let's make them as approachable as "Good Articles"
on English Wikipedia (which have a specific meaning:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Good_articles)
Since I'm threadjacking, I'll finish by actually addressing Dr.
Carerra's original suggestion. Because I've been on this mailing list
for so long, I understand what "Copeland//Plurality" means (and I like
the idea of exploring that chain of methods for criterion compliance).
For those of us that like the Condorcet-winner criterion (CWC), some
sort of Copeland hybrid seems like a promising path toward an
explainable CWC system.
Rob
p.s. sorry if this email seems like I'm picking on either of you in
particular (Dr. Daniel Carrera or [TitleUnknown] Forest Simmons). I
just saw "gross loser" and it triggered the smartass in me, which then
provided me an entry point to speak to everyone active in this thread.
p.p.s. In reviewing before hitting "send", I realized I should read
more of the thread. I see now that y'all are talking about something
which MIGHT be better than BTR-IRV, and in general, I really like
Condorcet-winner-compliant alternatives to IRV that might be simple
enough to get people to rally behind. Riffing off of Copeland seems
promising, because sports junkies generally don't have an issue with
Win-Loss-Tie standings, and I think the Copeland-esque view of
Burlington 2009 election provides the clearest view of the unfairness
of what happened:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/2009_Burlington_mayoral_election#Pairwise_results
I think the problem with these long threads is that there are rarely concluding thoughts at the end, so unless you're following very closely, you might miss the best stuff. Understandably people post stuff as it comes to them, so you get people's "stream of consciousness", but I think it would be good if, once a discussion is dying down, the main contributors then posted a summary of their overall thoughts and findings, and which things they would take forward.
Toby
On Friday, 28 January 2022, 09:12:17 GMT, Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 10:06 PM Forest Simmons
forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
The name might be "Gross Loser Elimination"
The Gross Loser is the candidate that comes closest to being skunked in a pairwise matchup.
Ew, ick, what a gross loser! EWWW-W-W-W-W-W! :-D
I only have a cursory idea what y'all are talking about (and don't
bother trying to explain it; I may go back and do more than skim the
messages at some point, but I don't have the mental energy to spend on
this right now).
Regardless, I would love all of your help (everyone on EM-list) in
making electowiki more accessible to people new to electoral reform.
I think it's cool that Forest is trying to come up with names for this
new method that sounds marketable (sorta like "Ranked Robin").
However, my fear is that more names for minor variants of Llull's
method https://electowiki.org/wiki/Lllull's_method) is just going to
confuse people, given that Llull/Condorcet/Copeland has been around
for a while and yet hasn't taken the world by storm.
It could be that I need to study some more in order to participate in
this mailing list. It's been a long, long time since I've truly
wrapped my brain around linear algebra (which .... I didn't do very
well in that subject my first time around). I suppose I should
probably watch enough YouTube videos such that I've had enough of a
refresher in that topic to where I can follow the topic as fluidly as
you all seem to follow the discussions.
Regardless, we could use more editors helping us on electowiki, and
less voting method criteria or new methods to sort, because we're not
even CLOSE to sorting out everything that other editors have dumped on
electowiki over the past fifteen years or so. By "help", I should be
clear: we need people looking at existing articles with fresh eyes,
and improving them so that people new to electoral reform can
understand them. Let's make them as approachable as "Good Articles"
on English Wikipedia (which have a specific meaning:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Good_articles)
Since I'm threadjacking, I'll finish by actually addressing Dr.
Carerra's original suggestion. Because I've been on this mailing list
for so long, I understand what "Copeland//Plurality" means (and I like
the idea of exploring that chain of methods for criterion compliance).
For those of us that like the Condorcet-winner criterion (CWC), some
sort of Copeland hybrid seems like a promising path toward an
explainable CWC system.
Rob
p.s. sorry if this email seems like I'm picking on either of you in
particular (Dr. Daniel Carrera or [TitleUnknown] Forest Simmons). I
just saw "gross loser" and it triggered the smartass in me, which then
provided me an entry point to speak to everyone active in this thread.
p.p.s. In reviewing before hitting "send", I realized I should read
more of the thread. I see now that y'all are talking about something
which MIGHT be better than BTR-IRV, and in general, I really like
Condorcet-winner-compliant alternatives to IRV that might be simple
enough to get people to rally behind. Riffing off of Copeland seems
promising, because sports junkies generally don't have an issue with
Win-Loss-Tie standings, and I think the Copeland-esque view of
Burlington 2009 election provides the clearest view of the unfairness
of what happened:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/2009_Burlington_mayoral_election#Pairwise_results
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info