Forest Simmons sent me a mail and asked me to forward it to the EM list
with my reply. So here it is :-)
(Let's try that again, with the right From address this time.)
On 2024-10-01 19:47, Forest Simmons wrote:
Warm greetings to both of you!
The current United States presidential election debacle begs for an
alternative like the following method:
-
The incumbent party announces its pick for the next term of office 5
months before the election.
-
The ballot lists all of the other candidates below this incumbent
Party candidate.
-
Each voter marks the names of all candidates that she prefers over
incumbent Party candidate.
-
If no candidate is marked on a full 50% Plus majority of the ballots,
then the incumbent party candidate wins the election.
-
Otherwise the candidate that is marked on the most ballots i.e. to be
elected.
It seems to me that this method would have worked better than the de
facto two-party system has worked in the current election.
I wonder if you guys light forward this on to the election methods
mailing list and open it up for discussion.
In particular would it give an inappropriate advantage or disadvantage
to the incumbent party?
Would it exacerbate or remedy Duverger's Dilemma?
Wood voters find it harder or easier to work with than the so-called
Alternative Vote?
Thanks!
This seems to basically be Approval voting, just with a majority
requirement that makes it harder to replace the incumbent.
As such, I would expect it to have most of the benefits and drawbacks of
ordinary Approval voting - simplicity and FBC, but also the inherent
jumbling together of "sincere" and "strategic" votes to the point that
voters with non-dichotomous preferences pretty much have to think
instrumentally.
The majority threshold would make "cooperating" in the Burr dilemma more
likely for opposition candidates, because there's more of a risk that
voting only for a subset of the opposition candidates could lead them
all to lose.
So it would be less friendly to small parties than ordinary Approval,
but probably more than ordinary FPTP.
-km
Forest Simmons sent me a mail and asked me to forward it to the EM list
with my reply. So here it is :-)
(Let's try that again, with the right From address this time.)
On 2024-10-01 19:47, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
>
> Warm greetings to both of you!
>
> The current United States presidential election debacle begs for an
> alternative like the following method:
>
> 1. The incumbent party announces its pick for the next term of office 5
> months before the election.
>
> 2. The ballot lists all of the other candidates below this incumbent
> Party candidate.
>
> 3. Each voter marks the names of all candidates that she prefers over
> incumbent Party candidate.
>
> 4. If no candidate is marked on a full 50% Plus majority of the ballots,
> then the incumbent party candidate wins the election.
>
> 5. Otherwise the candidate that is marked on the most ballots i.e. to be
> elected.
>
> It seems to me that this method would have worked better than the de
> facto two-party system has worked in the current election.
>
> I wonder if you guys light forward this on to the election methods
> mailing list and open it up for discussion.
>
> In particular would it give an inappropriate advantage or disadvantage
> to the incumbent party?
>
> Would it exacerbate or remedy Duverger's Dilemma?
>
> Wood voters find it harder or easier to work with than the so-called
> Alternative Vote?
>
> Thanks!
This seems to basically be Approval voting, just with a majority
requirement that makes it harder to replace the incumbent.
As such, I would expect it to have most of the benefits and drawbacks of
ordinary Approval voting - simplicity and FBC, but also the inherent
jumbling together of "sincere" and "strategic" votes to the point that
voters with non-dichotomous preferences pretty much have to think
instrumentally.
The majority threshold would make "cooperating" in the Burr dilemma more
likely for opposition candidates, because there's more of a risk that
voting only for a subset of the opposition candidates could lead them
all to lose.
So it would be less friendly to small parties than ordinary Approval,
but probably more than ordinary FPTP.
-km
