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Technical discussion of election methods

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Re: [EM] [CES #15276] Re: PAR: nearly-equivalent rules

JQ
Jameson Quinn
Tue, Nov 15, 2016 12:13 AM

Nevin's proposed method is pretty good, but it suffers from a slippery
slope problem in a chicken dilemma scenario.

2016-11-14 17:54 GMT-05:00 Nevin Brackett-Rozinsky <
nevin.brackettrozinsky@gmail.com>:

How about something like this:

  1. Voters indicate whether they Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate.
  2. Identify the candidate with the most Prefer votes, call them P.
  3. Identify the candidate with the most Accept-or-better votes, call them
    Q.
  4. Elect the head-to-head winner between P and Q.

For step 4, this means to count the number of ballots which rate P ahead
of Q, and vice versa, and elect whichever is higher up on more ballots.

Essentially, this method looks at the ballots and says, “We know who the
most voters prefer, and we know who the most voters accept, but which of
them should win? Hey, I know, we can let the votes decide!”

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Nevin's proposed method is pretty good, but it suffers from a slippery slope problem in a chicken dilemma scenario. 2016-11-14 17:54 GMT-05:00 Nevin Brackett-Rozinsky < nevin.brackettrozinsky@gmail.com>: > How about something like this: > > 1. Voters indicate whether they Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. > 2. Identify the candidate with the most Prefer votes, call them P. > 3. Identify the candidate with the most Accept-or-better votes, call them > Q. > 4. Elect the head-to-head winner between P and Q. > > For step 4, this means to count the number of ballots which rate P ahead > of Q, and vice versa, and elect whichever is higher up on more ballots. > > Essentially, this method looks at the ballots and says, “We know who the > most voters prefer, and we know who the most voters accept, but which of > them should win? Hey, I know, we can let the votes decide!” > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "The Center for Election Science" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >
C
C.Benham
Tue, Nov 15, 2016 4:53 AM

The proposed method has an easy Push-over incentive and fails FBC and
Condorcet.

Chris Benham

On 11/15/2016 10:43 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

Nevin's proposed method is pretty good, but it suffers from a slippery
slope problem in a chicken dilemma scenario.

2016-11-14 17:54 GMT-05:00 Nevin Brackett-Rozinsky
<nevin.brackettrozinsky@gmail.com
mailto:nevin.brackettrozinsky@gmail.com>:

 How about something like this:

 1. Voters indicate whether they Prefer, Accept, or Reject each
 candidate.
 2. Identify the candidate with the most Prefer votes, call them P.
 3. Identify the candidate with the most Accept-or-better votes,
 call them Q.
 4. Elect the head-to-head winner between P and Q.

 For step 4, this means to count the number of ballots which rate P
 ahead of Q, and vice versa, and elect whichever is higher up on
 more ballots.

 Essentially, this method looks at the ballots and says, “We know
 who the most voters prefer, and we know who the most voters
 accept, but which of them should win? Hey, I know, we can let the
 votes decide!”
 -- 
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 Groups "The Center for Election Science" group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
 send an email to electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
 <mailto:electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
 <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>.

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The proposed method has an easy Push-over incentive and fails FBC and Condorcet. Chris Benham On 11/15/2016 10:43 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > Nevin's proposed method is pretty good, but it suffers from a slippery > slope problem in a chicken dilemma scenario. > > 2016-11-14 17:54 GMT-05:00 Nevin Brackett-Rozinsky > <nevin.brackettrozinsky@gmail.com > <mailto:nevin.brackettrozinsky@gmail.com>>: > > How about something like this: > > 1. Voters indicate whether they Prefer, Accept, or Reject each > candidate. > 2. Identify the candidate with the most Prefer votes, call them P. > 3. Identify the candidate with the most Accept-or-better votes, > call them Q. > 4. Elect the head-to-head winner between P and Q. > > For step 4, this means to count the number of ballots which rate P > ahead of Q, and vice versa, and elect whichever is higher up on > more ballots. > > Essentially, this method looks at the ballots and says, “We know > who the most voters prefer, and we know who the most voters > accept, but which of them should win? Hey, I know, we can let the > votes decide!” > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "The Center for Election Science" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send an email to electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com > <mailto:electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com> > Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13405 - Release Date: 11/13/16 >