---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> Date: Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:33 Subject: Re: Some thoughts on Condorcet and Burial To: Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> Sorry—I meant that CW wins that 1st comparison, against BF, & so CW then goes against Bus. Bus wins. SP is autodeterrent. On Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:29 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > So that suggests that, for SP, agenda-ordered by Borda or implicit > approval, would, in the strategic top-cycle, start by comparing CW & BF. > > BF wins that comparison, & goes against Bus. > > Bus wins. > > The burial is penalized. > > The familiar, widely used & precedented SP is autodeterrent. > > On Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:20 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Referring to what I was saying about the order of the 3 too-cycle >> candidates’ Borda or implicit approval: >> >> I told why I claim that BF is the most likely one to be middle. >> >> So what’s the most likely order for the top & bottom of that ordering? >> >> Well, top & bottom are the most extreme difference in the ordering “. So, >> isn’t that difference more likely to not contradict a pairwise defeat? >> >> Together, those two facts suggest that the most likely order for the 3 >> candidates’ Borda or implicit approval is: >> >> Bus>BF>CW. >> >> >> On Fri, Nov 3, 2023 at 06:35 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 30, 2023, 6:21 PM C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Why do we support the Condorcet criterion? For me there are three >>>> reasons: >>>> >>>> (1) Failure to elect a voted CW can give the voters who voted the CW >>>> over the actual winner >>>> a potentially very strong, difficult (if not impossible ) to answer >>>> complaint. >>>> >>>> And those voters could be more than half the total. >>>> >>>> (2) Always electing a voted CW is (among methods that fail Favorite >>>> Betrayal) is the best way to minimise >>>> Compromise incentive. >>>> >>>> (3) Limited to the information we can glean for pure ranked ballots >>>> (especially if we decide to only refer >>>> to the pairwise matrix), the voted CW is the most likely utility >>>> maximiser. >>>> >>>> If there is no voted CW , then the winner should come from the Smith >>>> set. Condorcet is just the logical >>>> consequence of Smith and Clone Independence (specifically Clone-Winner). >>>> >>>> Some methods are able to meet Condorcet but not Smith, but hopefully >>>> they get something in return. >>>> (For example I think Min Max Margins gets Mono-add-Top and maybe >>>> something else). >>>> >>>> So coming to the question of which individual member of the Smith set >>>> should we elect, I don't see that a >>>> supposed, guessed-at "sincere CW" has an especially strong claim, >>>> certainly nothing compared to an actual >>>> voted CW. >>>> >>>> Suppose sincere looks like: >>>> >>>> 49 A>>>C>B >>>> 48 B>>>C>A >>>> 03 C>A>>>B >>>> >>> My favorite burial proof method is to elect the nemesis of the nemesis >>> of the (repeated) Submidway Approval Elimination winner. >>> >>> Max Approval is 52 >>> Min Approval is 3 >>> Midway is 27.5 >>> >>> So we eliminate C. >>> >>> Updating approvals we have 52 for A and 48 for B. Midway is 50. B is the >>> only Sub Midway candidate so A is the SubMidway Approval winner. >>> >>> The nemesis of A is C, and C has no nemesis because it not pairbeaten. >>> We respect the Condorcet Criterion and elect C, a very weak CW. >>> >>> There is no way out of it if we want a Condorcet Criterion Compliant >>> method. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Suppose that all voters get about the same utility from electing their >>>> favourites. In that case A is the big utility >>>> maximiser. >>>> >>>> Now suppose that this is say the first post-FPP election, and the >>>> voters are all exhorted to express their full >>>> rankings, no matter how weak or uncertain some of their preferences may >>>> be, because we don't want anything >>>> that looks like the (shudder) "minority rule" we had under FPP. >>>> >>> >>> This reminds me of the practice omanipulative judges in the US warning >>> jurors to ignore their sacred right of "Jury Nullification" (inherited from >>> English Common Law). >>> >>> Those lying (by intimidation) judges are a disgrace to their office ... >>> and should be stripped of their holy robes ... imho. >>> >>>> >>>> So they vote: >>>> >>>> 49 A>C >>>> 48 B>C >>>> 03 C>A >>>> >>>> C is the voted CW. For some pro-Condorcet zealots, this is ideal. No >>>> sincere preferences were reversed or >>>> "concealed", resulting in the election of the "sincere CW". >>>> >>>> (In passing I note that in most places if the non-Condorcet method >>>> IRV/RCV were used, A would be uncontroversially >>>> elected probably without anyone even noticing that C is the CW.) >>>> >>>> Backing up a bit, suppose that instead of the voters being exhorted to >>>> fully rank no-matter-what, they are given the >>>> message "this election is for a serious powerful office, so we don't >>>> want anything like GIGO ("garbage in, garbage out") >>>> so if some of your preferences are weak or uncertain it is quite ok to >>>> keep them to yourself via truncation or equal-ranking." >>>> >>> >>> That warning should be mandatory ... as should an honest effort to >>> "fully inform" a jury of their most sacred rights predatimg even the Magna >>> Carta. >>> >>>> >>>> So they vote: >>>> >>>> 49 A >>>> 48 B >>>> 03 C>A >>>> >>>> Now the voted CW is A. Should anyone be seriously concerned that, >>>> due to so many voters truncating, that some other >>>> candidate might actually be the "sincere CW"? >>>> >>> >>> Your example shows the wisdom of electing the ballot CW when there is >>> one. >>> >>> In fact, all of our burial resistant methods elect the voted CW when one >>> exists. But when one does not exist we suspiciously suspect that its >>> absence was most likely caused by subversion of a CW, since that is by far >>> the easiest way to create a beat cycle ... whether innocently or with >>> "malice aforethought." >>> >>>> >>>> For me, if voters have the freedom to fully rank but for whatever >>>> reason choose to truncate (and/or equal-rank, assuming that >>>> is allowed) a lot of that is fine and the voting method should prefer >>>> not to know about weak and uncertain preferences. >>>> >>>> The type of insincere voting that most concerns me is that which >>>> produces outrageous failure of Later-no-Help, achieving by order-reversal >>>> Burial what could not have been done by simple truncation. >>>> >>>> 46 A >>>> 44 B>C (sincere is B or B>A) >>>> 10 C >>>> >>> >>> Let's see what our Sub Midway Approval Elimination burial resistant >>> method does here: >>> >>> The respective max and min implicit approval scores are 54 for C and 44 >>> for B. So Midway is 49. Both A and B have Sub Midway Approval leaving C as >>> the candidate whose nemesis's nemesis we should elect. >>> >>> C's nemesis is B, and B's nemesis is A. >>> >>> So A is the winner of our burial resistant method. >>> >>> How does this work? >>> >>> Well, Nanson is very good at fingering the Burial Faction Favorite, but >>> Poor man's Nanson aka SubMidApproval Elimination is even better at electing >>> the BFF than ordinary Nanson or RP wv, although they are both pretty good >>> at it as this example shows. >>> >>> Once you have the likely BFF you can follow the cycle forward one or >>> backward two candidates to the "bus" under which the buried candidate was >>> buried. >>> >>> [Electing this "bus" is what makes the method backfire on the burying >>> faction ... so electing the strongest bus (their could be a clone set of >>> them) is the proper aim of a good burial proof method designer ... to >>> completely deter potential subverters from even flirting with the idea.] >>> >>> Like I said you can go in either direction around the cycle to get to a >>> "bus" from the BFF candidate .... but it's better psychologically to elect >>> the syrongest wv defeater of the strongest wv defeater of the Nanson winner >>> .... as opposed to saying "Elect the candidate with the most losing votes >>> against the Nanson winner" .. they are almost always the same candidate >>> even when Smith has more than three members. >>> >>> Like I say, SubMidAolroval Elimination is more reliable than even >>> ordinary Nanson or RP wv at finding the BFF candidate. But for the >>> curjous, you can always do a sincere runoff between the likely strongest >>> Bus (the nemesis of the nemesis of the likely BFF), and the Smith candidate >>> with the fewest losing votes against it (i.e.against the bus) the same as >>> the weakest Smith weakest Smith candidate to defeat the BFF. >>> >>> [It is easy to show that a subverted CW always defeats the BFF, which >>> beats the bus that beat the buried candidate that precipitated the >>> insincere cycle resulting from the burial.] >>> >>> In this example the sincere runoff (were that option to be taken) would >>> be between the Bus A and the Smith candidate B with the fewest losing votes >>> to it A. >>> >>> For the sincere winner of this runoff we have to go clear back to the >>> original scenario. And it turns out that A is the sincere winner of the >>> runoff, because C, the sincere CW was acting more like a BFF ... so not a >>> finalist in the runoff! >>> >>>> >>>> Electing B here is completely unacceptable. >>>> >>> >>> Right, and now we have a method designed to automatically avoid that >>> kind of mistake. >>> >>>> Regardless of whether or not the B>C voters are sincere, there isn't >>>> any case that B has a stronger >>>> claim than A. >>>> >>>> I don't like (but it can sometimes be justified) a larger faction being >>>> stung by a successful truncation Defection strategy of a smaller one, but >>>> apart >>>> from that I consider a lot of truncation to be normal, natural and >>>> mostly desirable. >>>> >>>> More later. >>>> >>>> Chris Benham >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *Forest Simmons* forest.simmons21 at gmail.com >>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Benefit%20of%20a%20doubt%20runoff%20challenge&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfru_xs%2BEE6kd7Xbb4p%2Bsh3Zijqy-yCmBwNPOdwLP1emgQ%40mail.gmail.com%3E> >>>> *Sun Oct 29 21:30:58 PDT 2023* >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> >>>> Are the beatcycles that sometimes arise from expressed ballot preferences >>>> ... are these cycles more likely to arise from occasional inevitable >>>> inconsistencies inherent in sincerely voted ballots? ... or from ballots >>>> that reflect exaggerated preferences from attempts to improve the election >>>> outcome over the one likely to result from honest, unexagerated ballots (?) >>>> >>>> Should Condorcet methods be designed on the assumption that most ballot >>>> cycles are sincere? .... or on the assumption that most are the result of >>>> insincere ballots (?) >>>> >>>> Some people think that the question is irrelevant ... that no matter the >>>> answer, the best result will be obtained by assuming the sincerity of the >>>> voted ballots. Others think healthy skepticism is necessary for optimal >>>> results. What do you think? >>>> >>>> >>>>

In SP, if there are many candidates instead of only 3, causing Bus to pairbeat CW, just replaces a possible CW win with a Bus win. So, with only 3 candidates, or with many, SP is autodeterrent. SP could be used as the Condorcet completion method, applied to the top-cycle, for autodeterrence. But plain SP, by itself, is autodeterrent too. On Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:40 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > Date: Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:33 > Subject: Re: Some thoughts on Condorcet and Burial > To: Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> > > > Sorry—I meant that CW wins that 1st comparison, against BF, & so CW then > goes against Bus. Bus wins. > > SP is autodeterrent. > > On Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:29 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> So that suggests that, for SP, agenda-ordered by Borda or implicit >> approval, would, in the strategic top-cycle, start by comparing CW & BF. >> >> BF wins that comparison, & goes against Bus. >> >> Bus wins. >> >> The burial is penalized. >> >> The familiar, widely used & precedented SP is autodeterrent. >> >> On Sat, Nov 4, 2023 at 10:20 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Referring to what I was saying about the order of the 3 too-cycle >>> candidates’ Borda or implicit approval: >>> >>> I told why I claim that BF is the most likely one to be middle. >>> >>> So what’s the most likely order for the top & bottom of that ordering? >>> >>> Well, top & bottom are the most extreme difference in the ordering “. >>> So, isn’t that difference more likely to not contradict a pairwise defeat? >>> >>> Together, those two facts suggest that the most likely order for the 3 >>> candidates’ Borda or implicit approval is: >>> >>> Bus>BF>CW. >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 3, 2023 at 06:35 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 30, 2023, 6:21 PM C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Why do we support the Condorcet criterion? For me there are three >>>>> reasons: >>>>> >>>>> (1) Failure to elect a voted CW can give the voters who voted the CW >>>>> over the actual winner >>>>> a potentially very strong, difficult (if not impossible ) to answer >>>>> complaint. >>>>> >>>>> And those voters could be more than half the total. >>>>> >>>>> (2) Always electing a voted CW is (among methods that fail Favorite >>>>> Betrayal) is the best way to minimise >>>>> Compromise incentive. >>>>> >>>>> (3) Limited to the information we can glean for pure ranked ballots >>>>> (especially if we decide to only refer >>>>> to the pairwise matrix), the voted CW is the most likely utility >>>>> maximiser. >>>>> >>>>> If there is no voted CW , then the winner should come from the Smith >>>>> set. Condorcet is just the logical >>>>> consequence of Smith and Clone Independence (specifically >>>>> Clone-Winner). >>>>> >>>>> Some methods are able to meet Condorcet but not Smith, but hopefully >>>>> they get something in return. >>>>> (For example I think Min Max Margins gets Mono-add-Top and maybe >>>>> something else). >>>>> >>>>> So coming to the question of which individual member of the Smith set >>>>> should we elect, I don't see that a >>>>> supposed, guessed-at "sincere CW" has an especially strong claim, >>>>> certainly nothing compared to an actual >>>>> voted CW. >>>>> >>>>> Suppose sincere looks like: >>>>> >>>>> 49 A>>>C>B >>>>> 48 B>>>C>A >>>>> 03 C>A>>>B >>>>> >>>> My favorite burial proof method is to elect the nemesis of the nemesis >>>> of the (repeated) Submidway Approval Elimination winner. >>>> >>>> Max Approval is 52 >>>> Min Approval is 3 >>>> Midway is 27.5 >>>> >>>> So we eliminate C. >>>> >>>> Updating approvals we have 52 for A and 48 for B. Midway is 50. B is >>>> the only Sub Midway candidate so A is the SubMidway Approval winner. >>>> >>>> The nemesis of A is C, and C has no nemesis because it not pairbeaten. >>>> We respect the Condorcet Criterion and elect C, a very weak CW. >>>> >>>> There is no way out of it if we want a Condorcet Criterion Compliant >>>> method. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Suppose that all voters get about the same utility from electing their >>>>> favourites. In that case A is the big utility >>>>> maximiser. >>>>> >>>>> Now suppose that this is say the first post-FPP election, and the >>>>> voters are all exhorted to express their full >>>>> rankings, no matter how weak or uncertain some of their preferences >>>>> may be, because we don't want anything >>>>> that looks like the (shudder) "minority rule" we had under FPP. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This reminds me of the practice omanipulative judges in the US warning >>>> jurors to ignore their sacred right of "Jury Nullification" (inherited from >>>> English Common Law). >>>> >>>> Those lying (by intimidation) judges are a disgrace to their office ... >>>> and should be stripped of their holy robes ... imho. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> So they vote: >>>>> >>>>> 49 A>C >>>>> 48 B>C >>>>> 03 C>A >>>>> >>>>> C is the voted CW. For some pro-Condorcet zealots, this is ideal. No >>>>> sincere preferences were reversed or >>>>> "concealed", resulting in the election of the "sincere CW". >>>>> >>>>> (In passing I note that in most places if the non-Condorcet method >>>>> IRV/RCV were used, A would be uncontroversially >>>>> elected probably without anyone even noticing that C is the CW.) >>>>> >>>>> Backing up a bit, suppose that instead of the voters being exhorted to >>>>> fully rank no-matter-what, they are given the >>>>> message "this election is for a serious powerful office, so we don't >>>>> want anything like GIGO ("garbage in, garbage out") >>>>> so if some of your preferences are weak or uncertain it is quite ok to >>>>> keep them to yourself via truncation or equal-ranking." >>>>> >>>> >>>> That warning should be mandatory ... as should an honest effort to >>>> "fully inform" a jury of their most sacred rights predatimg even the Magna >>>> Carta. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> So they vote: >>>>> >>>>> 49 A >>>>> 48 B >>>>> 03 C>A >>>>> >>>>> Now the voted CW is A. Should anyone be seriously concerned that, >>>>> due to so many voters truncating, that some other >>>>> candidate might actually be the "sincere CW"? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Your example shows the wisdom of electing the ballot CW when there is >>>> one. >>>> >>>> In fact, all of our burial resistant methods elect the voted CW when >>>> one exists. But when one does not exist we suspiciously suspect that its >>>> absence was most likely caused by subversion of a CW, since that is by far >>>> the easiest way to create a beat cycle ... whether innocently or with >>>> "malice aforethought." >>>> >>>>> >>>>> For me, if voters have the freedom to fully rank but for whatever >>>>> reason choose to truncate (and/or equal-rank, assuming that >>>>> is allowed) a lot of that is fine and the voting method should prefer >>>>> not to know about weak and uncertain preferences. >>>>> >>>>> The type of insincere voting that most concerns me is that which >>>>> produces outrageous failure of Later-no-Help, achieving by order-reversal >>>>> Burial what could not have been done by simple truncation. >>>>> >>>>> 46 A >>>>> 44 B>C (sincere is B or B>A) >>>>> 10 C >>>>> >>>> >>>> Let's see what our Sub Midway Approval Elimination burial resistant >>>> method does here: >>>> >>>> The respective max and min implicit approval scores are 54 for C and 44 >>>> for B. So Midway is 49. Both A and B have Sub Midway Approval leaving C as >>>> the candidate whose nemesis's nemesis we should elect. >>>> >>>> C's nemesis is B, and B's nemesis is A. >>>> >>>> So A is the winner of our burial resistant method. >>>> >>>> How does this work? >>>> >>>> Well, Nanson is very good at fingering the Burial Faction Favorite, but >>>> Poor man's Nanson aka SubMidApproval Elimination is even better at electing >>>> the BFF than ordinary Nanson or RP wv, although they are both pretty good >>>> at it as this example shows. >>>> >>>> Once you have the likely BFF you can follow the cycle forward one or >>>> backward two candidates to the "bus" under which the buried candidate was >>>> buried. >>>> >>>> [Electing this "bus" is what makes the method backfire on the burying >>>> faction ... so electing the strongest bus (their could be a clone set of >>>> them) is the proper aim of a good burial proof method designer ... to >>>> completely deter potential subverters from even flirting with the idea.] >>>> >>>> Like I said you can go in either direction around the cycle to get to >>>> a "bus" from the BFF candidate .... but it's better psychologically to >>>> elect the syrongest wv defeater of the strongest wv defeater of the Nanson >>>> winner .... as opposed to saying "Elect the candidate with the most losing >>>> votes against the Nanson winner" .. they are almost always the same >>>> candidate even when Smith has more than three members. >>>> >>>> Like I say, SubMidAolroval Elimination is more reliable than even >>>> ordinary Nanson or RP wv at finding the BFF candidate. But for the >>>> curjous, you can always do a sincere runoff between the likely strongest >>>> Bus (the nemesis of the nemesis of the likely BFF), and the Smith candidate >>>> with the fewest losing votes against it (i.e.against the bus) the same as >>>> the weakest Smith weakest Smith candidate to defeat the BFF. >>>> >>>> [It is easy to show that a subverted CW always defeats the BFF, which >>>> beats the bus that beat the buried candidate that precipitated the >>>> insincere cycle resulting from the burial.] >>>> >>>> In this example the sincere runoff (were that option to be taken) would >>>> be between the Bus A and the Smith candidate B with the fewest losing votes >>>> to it A. >>>> >>>> For the sincere winner of this runoff we have to go clear back to the >>>> original scenario. And it turns out that A is the sincere winner of the >>>> runoff, because C, the sincere CW was acting more like a BFF ... so not a >>>> finalist in the runoff! >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Electing B here is completely unacceptable. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Right, and now we have a method designed to automatically avoid that >>>> kind of mistake. >>>> >>>>> Regardless of whether or not the B>C voters are sincere, there isn't >>>>> any case that B has a stronger >>>>> claim than A. >>>>> >>>>> I don't like (but it can sometimes be justified) a larger faction >>>>> being stung by a successful truncation Defection strategy of a smaller >>>>> one, but apart >>>>> from that I consider a lot of truncation to be normal, natural and >>>>> mostly desirable. >>>>> >>>>> More later. >>>>> >>>>> Chris Benham >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Forest Simmons* forest.simmons21 at gmail.com >>>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Benefit%20of%20a%20doubt%20runoff%20challenge&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfru_xs%2BEE6kd7Xbb4p%2Bsh3Zijqy-yCmBwNPOdwLP1emgQ%40mail.gmail.com%3E> >>>>> *Sun Oct 29 21:30:58 PDT 2023* >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> Are the beatcycles that sometimes arise from expressed ballot preferences >>>>> ... are these cycles more likely to arise from occasional inevitable >>>>> inconsistencies inherent in sincerely voted ballots? ... or from ballots >>>>> that reflect exaggerated preferences from attempts to improve the election >>>>> outcome over the one likely to result from honest, unexagerated ballots (?) >>>>> >>>>> Should Condorcet methods be designed on the assumption that most ballot >>>>> cycles are sincere? .... or on the assumption that most are the result of >>>>> insincere ballots (?) >>>>> >>>>> Some people think that the question is irrelevant ... that no matter the >>>>> answer, the best result will be obtained by assuming the sincerity of the >>>>> voted ballots. Others think healthy skepticism is necessary for optimal >>>>> results. What do you think? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>