closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:

to strategy, because it just sounds like it means the majority-Condorcet
criterion ("if a candidate majority-beats every other, they have to win if
everyone is honest"). @Michael Ossipoff ?

"My system is only intended for honest men." - Jean-Charles, chevalier de
Borda

We vote by secret ballot.  We have the right to vote for whomever we
choose for whatever reasons we choose.  There is no way to stop people from
voting in a manner that is nefarious.  Like for bigoted or for dishonest
reasons.

The voting system must not be dependent on voters voting honestly.  We are
partisans, not judges.  No voter can be prevented from voting insincerely,
but we can try to disincentivize that.  We should not assume, or require in
advance, that voters vote sincerely for the election method to work
correctly.  We should expect them to vote in a manner that they rationally
believe is in their best political interest.

On Wed, May 29, 2024 at 14:15 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
Ppwrote:

Closed, isn’t “Strategy-Free Criterion” your new name for FBC.

It’s a very inaccurate name. FBC-complying methods aren’t strategy-free in
any sense.

But they’re free of any need for drastic defensive strategy
(favorite-burial or any defensive order-reversal).

You want strategy-free? The wv Condorcet methods, such as RP(wv) &
MinMax(wv), are strategy-free in a meaningful sense…effectively free of
need for any defensive strategy…due to their autodeterence.

Some time ago, I wrote a criterion that I called Strategy-Free-Criterion
(SFC).

Is that what you were referring to?

It was about a circumstance in which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At
that time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.

SFC didn’t catch-on, & I haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I don’t
know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet is strategy-free in a meaningful
sense.

On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 5:16 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

Why are we having a public discussion about a voting method criterion
without anyone giving its definition, and with apparently most of the
participants in the discussion knowing nothing about it besides its name?

https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion

The strategy-free criterion is a voting system criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion for evaluating voting
systems https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system.
Definitions

A sincere vote is one with no falsified preferences or preferences left
unspecified when the election method allows them to be specified (in
addition to the preferences already specified).

One candidate is preferred over another candidate if, in a one-on-one
competition, more voters prefer the first candidate than prefer the other
candidate.

If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates, that
candidate is called "Condorcet candidate" or "Condorcet winner".
Statement of criterion

If a Condorcet candidate exists, and if a majority prefers this candidate
to another candidate, then the other candidate should not win if that
majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies any preferences.

In a ranked method, it is nearly equivalent to say:

If more than half of the voters rank x above y, and there is no
candidate z whom more than half of the voters rank above x, then y must
not be elected.

I think this evolved into the Minimal Defense criterion, the "votes-only
version" of which says that if more than half the voters vote A over B and
B no higher than equal-bottom then B can't win.

On 31/05/2024 9:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

Some time ago, I wrote a criterion that I called Strategy-Free-Criterion
(SFC).

Is that what you were referring to?

It was about a circumstance in which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At
that time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.

SFC didn’t catch-on, & I haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I don’t
know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet is strategy-free in a meaningful
sense.

On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

Evidently, then,  SFC merely says that the candidate can’t win without
order-reversal, while Minimal-Defense says he can’t win at all if the
minimal defensive-strategy is used.

It seems to me that Eppley’s Minimal-Defense was the votes-only criterion
based on SDSC.

…& that SDSC was the original, preference-&-sincerity version.

I preferred preference-&-sincerity because of its universal applicability,
where votes-only had to stipulate a balloting.

On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 12:33 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

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info