> > What is "reasonable" about it? > > finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot. > I can see that as an argument against compelling voters to rank all the candidates, as happens in most Australian elections, but not for denying anyone the right to rank as many candidates as they wish. > yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect > the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are > electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots that we > preferred someone else.  that's hardly democratic. Yes that is arguable and I like Condorcet criterion compliance, but that isn't the same as saying there can be "no advantage" to doing without it. > IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A. > > is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR? No. It checks for a CW before the first normal IRV-style elimination and if there isn't one does so before each elimination among remaining candidates and elects the first one it finds. STV-BTR doesn't have good criterion compliances but I forget the details. > how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was > strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere?  > if it's sincere, then B should win. Because ..?? Chris Benham On 5/03/2019 7:09 pm, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > i am not on the other two lists, so i can't post to them. > > ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- > Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town. > From: "Chris Benham" <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> > Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 9:45 pm > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Cc: ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com > RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com > "robert bristow-johnson" <rbj@audioimagination.com> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to bullet-vote > > or rank every single candidate or anything in between. > > Fine. > > >> i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of > >> ranking levels, but it should be more than 3. > > > > What is "reasonable" about it? > > finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot. > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote > >> The contingent vote differs from the alternative vote > >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting>which allows for > >> many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each > >> round. > > > >> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?  all > >> unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.  is any > >> candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? > > Yes. > > > >> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot. > > > > Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate". > > Allowing voters to rank among unapproved > > candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more > > complicated. > > it adds rules.  without this addition rank/approval thing, the rules > of tabulation are simpler. > > > >> i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant > >> over one that is. > > > > All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail the > > Favorite Betrayal Criterion. > > yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect > the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are > electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots that we > preferred someone else.  that's hardly democratic. > > > > As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is > > especially vulnerable to Burial. > > yes it has been pointed out to me.  with anecdotes.  with "suppose > this..." > > > Suppose sincere is: > > > > 46 A > > 44 B > > 10 C > > > > > > I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A is > > the Condorcet (and every other > > type of) winner. > > > > Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the pre-election > > polls, and so the B voters (perhaps > > following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are going to > > lose to A, maybe something good > > will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are: > > > > 46 A > > 44 B>C > > 10 C > > > > A>B 46-44 (margin=2)     B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A 54-46 (margin=8) > > > > Now Margins elects B,  rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy. > > yup it's the impossible Arrow. > > how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was > strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere?  > if it's sincere, then B should win. > > but it's a good example of how, if the election was close and you > could convince enough B voters to vote tactically, that it rewards > Burial.  but it's still a contrived example. > > maybe Winning Votes is better than Margins.  i dunno. > > > I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even > > assuming that all the votes are sincere, > > B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and > > positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten by A.) > > but only very closely beaten by A where it appears that otherwise > voters more strongly prefer B over C and C over A.  if the vote is > sincere, it looks to me that A is *barely* a plurality winner. > > > > > IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A. > > is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR? > > > > The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect C.  The > > B voters "approved" C and they got C. > > looks weak to me (a lot more voters prefer B to C).  i think you would > have some pitchforks in the street if you gave that election to C. > > > If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of "ranking > > levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank > > and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are talking > > about ratings rather than rankings > > No.  If it's scoring (or "rating"), the voter must tactically decide > how much they will score their second choice.  It doesn't make a > difference in ranking.  And every voter's voting power should be equal. > > > and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar. > > dunno what that means, either. > > > But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or Smith//Top > > Ratings and several other voting methods I like. > > I just want it so that when A is compared to B, that everyone who > weighs in on that choice have an equal say (that's One-Person-One-Vote). > > And, excepting a cycle (which is an "impossible" mess), I just want it > that if more voters mark their ballots preferring A to B than the > number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B is not > elected. > > Them's are my dogma.  And eliminating obvious tactical burdens from > voters follows close behind to this dogma.  Simplicity in voting and > tabulation comes next. > > > -- > > r b-j                         rbj@audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. https://www.avg.com

   Condorcet + IRV, the Best of Both ?

Andrew, An author of an article on different versions of Condorcet-IRV labeled it after me but I would prefer it was named something (or after someone) else. http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.PDF https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/l_lor1.htm > > Condorcet + IRV, the Best of Both ? > > Several people have invented voting rules that resolvevoting cycles > <https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/l_cycles.htm>by combining > Condorcet's rule with Hare's rule in various ways.� Each of these > hybrid rules enacts the Condorcet winner when there is one.� When a > cycle occurs, it uses the Hare process of eliminations and transfers > until one option tops each of the other remaining options. > > David Hill, formerly of England's Electoral Reform Society, proposed > in 1988 making the current Condorcet winner exempt from elimination at > each step in an IRV tally. His goal was to make one excellent rule for > both single- and multi- winner elections. (Ref.H > <https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/z_bib.htm#Hill>) > > Robert Loring, formerly of FairVote, proposed in 1990 changing the > criterion for winning Hare from a majority of ballots to the Condorcet > criterion.� This eliminates the option which holds the top rank on the > fewest ballots - until one option can top each of the others > 1-against-1.� To�focus on the tally process, we might call Hare's rule > "Majority-IRV" (M-IRV) and Loring's variation rule "Condorcet-IRV" > (C-IRV). > Thanks. Chris Benham On 5/03/2019 4:20 pm, Andrew Myers wrote: > Chris Benham wrote: >> If� you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think it is fine >> to modify IRV by before each elimination >> we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining >> candidates) and when we find one we stop >> and declare that candidate the winner. > This is one of the algorithms supported by CIVS, the one called > "Condorcet-IRV" though to my understanding it was originally proposed > by Thomas Hill. > > -- Andrew > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. https://www.avg.com

The late Dr David Hill invented an STV-Condorcet hybrid called Sequential STV, which uses Condorcet pairing to alleviate premature exclusion of candidates. Tho, this version of STV is still non-monotonic. (FAB STV is monotonic.) David Hill's great great great grandfather (if that's the right number of greats) was Thomas Wright Hill the first known inventor of the prototype of the single transferable vote, or the quota-preferential method, as the Australians call it. This year 2019 is its bi-centenary. (More information on the STV Action site of Anthony Tufffin, who promised his friend David, to commemorate the occasion.) from Richard Lung. On 05/03/2019 05:50, Andrew Myers wrote: > Chris Benham wrote: >> If  you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think it is fine >> to modify IRV by before each elimination >> we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining >> candidates) and when we find one we stop >> and declare that candidate the winner. > This is one of the algorithms supported by CIVS, the one called > "Condorcet-IRV" though to my understanding it was originally proposed > by Thomas Hill. > > -- Andrew > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

On 05/03/2019 09.56, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- > Subject: Re: [EM] [ApprovalVoting] Re: The IRV-Disease has reached my town. > From: "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> > Date: Tue, March 5, 2019 12:12 am > To: "EM" <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot > of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. > > i can't take any credit for proposing that.  i dunno who thought of it > first.  wasn't me. That seems to have been Rob LeGrand: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-August/081989.html That's the first mention I can find of it (there under the name BTR-IRV) on this list.

Chris, Not so quick; don't throw the baby out with the bath water! Max Covering based on an approval list or any other monotonically generated list of the candidates elects a candidate monotonically from the set of uncovered candidates, i.e. the Landau Set, but not necessarily from the Banks set, because (in general) some Landau candidates may not be Banks candidates. All uncovered candidates are members of Landau. But only candidates that stand at the head of (one or more) maximal totally ordered chains (in the defeat relation) qualify as members of the Banks set. We have several methods (including Copeland) that elect monotonically from Landau, but so far only one from Banks (chain climbing). Copeland elects monotonically from Landau, but is no more clone independent than Borda. As far as Landau methods go, the Max Covering schema is the only one I know of (besides chain climbing itself) which is both monotone and clone free If chain climbing satisfied Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives (IPDA), I would be content to stop looking for a better Banks method. Max Covering does satisfy the IPDA criterion, so perhaps some tweak on it might get us where we want. We would start with the covering relation which is a partial order on the set of candidates. Then we would single out some maximal chain in the covering relation. as in the Max Cover procedure. Finally beef up this chain with additional candidates while relaxing the order relation from covering to mere defeat until it become a maximal totally ordered chain with respect to the defeat relation. In the resulting chain every candidate would defeat all of the candidates below it and would be defeated by all of the candidates above it, and no other candidate could be included into the chain without destroying this total order property. The candidate at the head of the chain would beat all of the other candidates in the chain. And since that chain was built up to be maximal with respect to the defeat relation that candidate would be a member of the Banks set. Can this be done monotonically? The devil is in the details. Our recent attempt got pretty close, but did not (to our disappointment) actually satisfy monotonicity.as it first appeared. Back to the drawiing board!