Of course, with Majority-SP, the winner depends on the order in which the “principals” (top-cycle candidates: CW, BF, & Bus(es) ) encounter eachother, if all the defeats among them are majority defeats. “IA” stands for “ implicit Approval” (number of ballots that rank a candidate, where voters understand that it’s in their best interest to rank only the candidates whom they like or approve). If the sequential-comparison-agenda is ordered by IA, the most-liked candidates are later in the sequential order. That’s most likely CW. So, most likely, BF & Bus will encounter eachother first, eliminating Bus, who will then be eliminated by BE. But which of {BF, Bus} is more likely to win, if CW isn’t the most approved? That’s what determines deterrence, Well the buriers have to rank Bus, but not vice-versus. So of those two, Bus is more likely to be ranked by more people. So, BF encounters CW & eliminated hir, & then CW encounters Bus & gets eliminated by hir. So Bus is more likely to win than BF. There’s probabilistic-deterrence. That would be true even if no defensive-strategy were used. But, if the CW voters aren’t ranking candidates that they don’t approve, & if they don’t approve BF, then BF can’t have a majority-defeat against Bus. That’s because there can’t be a majority that doesn’t include the CW voters…who refuse to rank BF. …resulting in the impossibility of Bus having a majority-defeat, & making hir win inevitable.

I meant to say that if, as is most likely, Initially BF & Bus encounter eachother, BF wins that encounter & then loses to CW. On Thu, Dec 28, 2023 at 16:15 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Of course, with Majority-SP, the winner depends on the order in which the > “principals” (top-cycle candidates: CW, BF, & Bus(es) ) encounter > eachother, if all the defeats among them are majority defeats. > > “IA” stands for “ implicit Approval” (number of ballots that rank a > candidate, where voters understand that it’s in their best interest to rank > only the candidates whom they like or approve). > > If the sequential-comparison-agenda is ordered by IA, the most-liked > candidates are later in the sequential order. That’s most likely CW. > > So, most likely, BF & Bus will encounter eachother first, eliminating Bus, > who will then be eliminated by BE. > > But which of {BF, Bus} is more likely to win, if CW isn’t the most > approved? That’s what determines deterrence, > > Well the buriers have to rank Bus, but not vice-versus. So of those two, > Bus is more likely to be ranked by more people. > > So, BF encounters CW & eliminated hir, & then CW encounters Bus & gets > eliminated by hir. > > So Bus is more likely to win than BF. > > There’s probabilistic-deterrence. > > That would be true even if no defensive-strategy were used. > > But, if the CW voters aren’t ranking candidates that they don’t approve, & > if they don’t approve BF, then BF can’t have a majority-defeat against Bus. > > That’s because there can’t be a majority that doesn’t include the CW > voters…who refuse to rank BF. > > …resulting in the impossibility of Bus having a majority-defeat, & making > hir win inevitable. > >