I can’t find the thread 🧵conversation that I want to reply to, so it’s necessary to post my answer as a new thread, even though it’s just a reply: It was about Condorcet-Plurality, which I call “ CW,Plurality”. With wv Condorcet, burial’s ratio of backfires to successes is 10. b/s = 10. For CW,Plurality, b/s = 1. Given that would-be buriers will sometimes feel that there’s a good chance of their candidate being Plurality-winner, then there’s incentive for burial, & it will probably succeed. When burial isn’t deterred, as it isn’t in CW,Plurality, that burial might well defeat the CW& elect an unacceptable candidate. If avoiding the election of an Unacceptable is paramount, then it’s necessary to maximally protect the Acceptables. In CW,Plurality—as in IRV—that would consist of trying to prevent burial from successfully making a strategic cycle. So, equal-toprank all of the Acceptables, so that you aren’t helping the buriers make anyone beat any Acceptable. But you can’t count on the other Acceptable-preferrers doing that. So you must take it farther than that. You must try to rank the Acceptables in order of their probability of being the CW that you need to, & can, protect from defeat by burial. You have to guess about the other Acceptable-preferrers: What candidates, in what order, are most likely to be the one whom you must & can protect from burial… to maximize the probability of electing an Acceptable instead of an Unacceptable. That’s just like IRV. …which is just like Plurality.

Additionally, wv Condorcet meets Minimal-Defense. I completely agree with wanting simplicity, for various reasons. But not when it loses the difference between Condorcet from IRV & Plurality. If you want simplicity improvement from Condorcet (as do I), then you’re better off with Approval, which meets FBC. wv Condorcet theoretically, but not practically, fails FBC. Plurality, IRV & CW,Plurality blatantly & fully-problematically fail FBC. On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 13:14 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > I can’t find the thread 🧵conversation that I want to reply to, so it’s > necessary to post my answer as a new thread, even though it’s just a reply: > > It was about Condorcet-Plurality, which I call “ CW,Plurality”. > > With wv Condorcet, burial’s ratio of backfires to successes is 10. b/s = > 10. > > For CW,Plurality, b/s = 1. > > Given that would-be buriers will sometimes feel that there’s a good chance > of their candidate being Plurality-winner, then there’s incentive for > burial, & it will probably succeed. > > When burial isn’t deterred, as it isn’t in CW,Plurality, that burial might > well defeat the CW& elect an unacceptable candidate. > > If avoiding the election of an Unacceptable is paramount, then it’s > necessary to maximally protect the Acceptables. > > In CW,Plurality—as in IRV—that would consist of trying to prevent burial > from successfully making a strategic cycle. > > So, equal-toprank all of the Acceptables, so that you aren’t helping the > buriers make anyone beat any Acceptable. > > But you can’t count on the other Acceptable-preferrers doing that. So you > must take it farther than that. You must try to rank the Acceptables in > order of their probability of being the CW that you need to, & can, protect > from defeat by burial. > > You have to guess about the other Acceptable-preferrers: What candidates, > in what order, are most likely to be the one whom you must & can protect > from burial… to maximize the probability of electing an Acceptable instead > of an Unacceptable. > > That’s just like IRV. …which is just like Plurality. >

…&, I forgot to mention, Approval doesn’t have Condorcet’s facilitation of count-fraud, due to humungously computation-intensive count. Hand-count audit in Condorcet? Forgot it. On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 13:40 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Additionally, wv Condorcet meets Minimal-Defense. > > I completely agree with wanting simplicity, for various reasons. But not > when it loses the difference between Condorcet from IRV & Plurality. > > If you want simplicity improvement from Condorcet (as do I), then you’re > better off with Approval, which meets FBC. > > wv Condorcet theoretically, but not practically, fails FBC. Plurality, IRV > & CW,Plurality blatantly & fully-problematically fail FBC. > > On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 13:14 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I can’t find the thread 🧵conversation that I want to reply to, so it’s >> necessary to post my answer as a new thread, even though it’s just a reply: >> >> It was about Condorcet-Plurality, which I call “ CW,Plurality”. >> >> With wv Condorcet, burial’s ratio of backfires to successes is 10. b/s >> = 10. >> >> For CW,Plurality, b/s = 1. >> >> Given that would-be buriers will sometimes feel that there’s a good >> chance of their candidate being Plurality-winner, then there’s incentive >> for burial, & it will probably succeed. >> >> When burial isn’t deterred, as it isn’t in CW,Plurality, that burial >> might well defeat the CW& elect an unacceptable candidate. >> >> If avoiding the election of an Unacceptable is paramount, then it’s >> necessary to maximally protect the Acceptables. >> >> In CW,Plurality—as in IRV—that would consist of trying to prevent burial >> from successfully making a strategic cycle. >> >> So, equal-toprank all of the Acceptables, so that you aren’t helping the >> buriers make anyone beat any Acceptable. >> >> But you can’t count on the other Acceptable-preferrers doing that. So you >> must take it farther than that. You must try to rank the Acceptables in >> order of their probability of being the CW that you need to, & can, protect >> from defeat by burial. >> >> You have to guess about the other Acceptable-preferrers: What candidates, >> in what order, are most likely to be the one whom you must & can protect >> from burial… to maximize the probability of electing an Acceptable instead >> of an Unacceptable. >> >> That’s just like IRV. …which is just like Plurality. >> >