This is another voting system, very similar to PAR, but hopefully simpler to describe. SABR stands for the ratings each voter can give to each candidate: "Support", "Accept", Blank, or "Reject". The winner is the first candidate, going in order from most to least "support" ratings, who isn't “strongly beaten”. To see whether a candidate X is "strongly beaten", give X one point for each voter who rates them “support” or “accept”, and each other candidate Y one point for each voter who rates Y above “reject” and at least as high as X. Any Y who has more points than X "strongly beats" them. If there’s no candidate who’s not strongly beaten, count all blanks as "reject" and try again; this guarantees a winner. This method is monotonic; passes Majority, Mutual Majority, Majority Condorcet Winner, and Majority Condorcet Loser; does well in center-squeeze scenarios (by Majority Condorcet Winner); and does well in chicken dilemma scenarios, without a slippery slope. It obeys a weakened form of later-no-harm, Later-lower-no-harm (LLNH): adding an “accept” ranking for X cannot cause a candidate Y you “support” to lose, *unless* X is supported by more voters than Y. This method does not meet the favorite betrayal criterion, but I believe that it has no favorite betrayal incentive in normal scenarios. (I'd like to find a way to define "normal" so that's rigorous, but I haven't yet got something I'm ready to share.) This method does not meet participation and consistency, but it is easy to define weakened versions of these criteria which it meets. I'm interested in making a statement of this method that's as clear and concise as possible, so I'd love to hear any criticism of, suggestions for, or questions about the definition above.