RL
Richard Lung
Mon, Apr 11, 2022 8:04 PM
Sorry, if I didn't make the distinction clear. I am talking about the
Condorcet (binary) count, not being an ordinal count, not the Condorcet
preference vote, which of course is an ordinal vote.
"Hare RCV" is no less wrong for being repeated! I do not dispute that
RCV loses information. Binomial STV is a remedy of this, and to a lesser
extent traditiopnal STV..
On 11/04/2022 20:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com wrote:
The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated. Basically the right way of doing elections.
Do you mean multi-winner elections? (Even so, it might be a disputed notion.)
It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a "nothing burger". It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made the method feasible.
The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
That makes pretty much no sense to me. The ballots are purely ordinal and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet. But for each individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the consideration...
What information is lost? Because I can certainly point to how information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed with Borda.
I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article. The author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition based on these rankings."
It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Sorry, if I didn't make the distinction clear. I am talking about the
Condorcet (binary) count, not being an ordinal count, not the Condorcet
preference vote, which of course is an ordinal vote.
"Hare RCV" is no less wrong for being repeated! I do not dispute that
RCV loses information. Binomial STV is a remedy of this, and to a lesser
extent traditiopnal STV..
On 11/04/2022 20:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>> On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated. Basically the right way of doing elections.
> Do you mean multi-winner elections? (Even so, it might be a disputed notion.)
>
>> It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
>
>
> In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a "nothing burger". It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made the method feasible.
>
>> The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
> That makes pretty much no sense to me. The ballots are **purely** ordinal and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet. But for each individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
>
>> Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the consideration...
>>
> What information is lost? Because I can certainly point to how information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
>
>> On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
>>
>>> As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed with Borda.
>>>
> I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article. The author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition based on these rankings."
>
> It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
HP
Hahn, Paul
Mon, Apr 11, 2022 9:07 PM
Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
"Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the one with the highest rank-order score."
That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
--pH
-----Original Message-----
From: Election-Methods election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com On Behalf Of robert bristow-johnson
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2022 2:30 PM
To: Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com; Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] So I got an email... / IIA
On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com wrote:
The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated. Basically the right way of doing elections.
Do you mean multi-winner elections? (Even so, it might be a disputed notion.)
It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a "nothing burger". It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made the method feasible.
The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
That makes pretty much no sense to me. The ballots are purely ordinal and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet. But for each individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the consideration...
What information is lost? Because I can certainly point to how information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed with Borda.
I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article. The author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition based on these rankings."
It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
"Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the one with the highest rank-order score."
That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
--pH
-----Original Message-----
From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com> On Behalf Of robert bristow-johnson
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2022 2:30 PM
To: Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com>; Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] So I got an email... / IIA
> On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated. Basically the right way of doing elections.
Do you mean multi-winner elections? (Even so, it might be a disputed notion.)
> It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a "nothing burger". It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made the method feasible.
> The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
That makes pretty much no sense to me. The ballots are **purely** ordinal and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet. But for each individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
> Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the consideration...
>
What information is lost? Because I can certainly point to how information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
>
> On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> > As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed with Borda.
> >
I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article. The author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition based on these rankings."
It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
FS
Forest Simmons
Mon, Apr 11, 2022 9:59 PM
Thanks for that fact check.
My memory is not as good as it used to be but I remember how amazed I was
at the time to see a clone dependent Condorcet method with a clone
dependent completion method recommended in print!
El lun., 11 de abr. de 2022 2:07 p. m., Hahn, Paul manynote@wustl.edu
escribió:
Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
"Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet
paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such
cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this
can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one
obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who
defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the
one with the highest rank-order score."
That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
--pH
-----Original Message-----
From: Election-Methods election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com On
Behalf Of robert bristow-johnson
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2022 2:30 PM
To: Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com; Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] So I got an email... / IIA
On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com wrote:
The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated.
Basically the right way of doing elections.
Do you mean multi-winner elections? (Even so, it might be a disputed
notion.)
It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a
"nothing burger". It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the
Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to
convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made
the method feasible.
The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary
comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
That makes pretty much no sense to me. The ballots are purely ordinal
and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet. But for each
individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the
What information is lost? Because I can certainly point to how
information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze
(which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed
I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article. The
author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple
majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and
the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition
based on these rankings."
It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Thanks for that fact check.
My memory is not as good as it used to be but I remember how amazed I was
at the time to see a clone dependent Condorcet method with a clone
dependent completion method recommended in print!
El lun., 11 de abr. de 2022 2:07 p. m., Hahn, Paul <manynote@wustl.edu>
escribió:
> Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
>
> "Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet
> paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such
> cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this
> can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one
> obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who
> defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the
> one with the highest rank-order score."
>
> That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
>
> --pH
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com> On
> Behalf Of robert bristow-johnson
> Sent: Monday, April 11, 2022 2:30 PM
> To: Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com>; Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] So I got an email... / IIA
>
>
>
> > On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated.
> Basically the right way of doing elections.
>
> Do you mean multi-winner elections? (Even so, it might be a disputed
> notion.)
>
> > It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
>
>
> In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a
> "nothing burger". It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the
> Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to
> convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made
> the method feasible.
>
> > The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary
> comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
>
> That makes pretty much no sense to me. The ballots are **purely** ordinal
> and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet. But for each
> individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
>
> > Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the
> consideration...
> >
>
> What information is lost? Because I can certainly point to how
> information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze
> (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
>
> >
> > On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >
> > > As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed
> with Borda.
> > >
>
> I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article. The
> author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple
> majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and
> the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition
> based on these rankings."
>
> It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 12:27 AM
Thanks. I did remember the article talking about the Condorcet paradox and that you can put in another method in case of a cycle. I didn't remember that they were pushing a specific method.
I don't like the semantics in the article:
"true majority rule" = Condorcet RCV
"rank-order voting" = Borda count RCV
but maybe the semantics were different in 2004. I relate that timing to Burlington voting to adopt IRV in 2005, elections in 2006 and 2009, repeal in 2010. Sometime after that, "IRV" sorta lost cachet and FairVote seemed to ditch it and relabel the product "RCV" which bothers me. I think the words "Borda" or "Bucklin" or "Hare" or "Condorcet" should precede the term "RCV".
On 04/11/2022 5:07 PM Hahn, Paul manynote@wustl.edu wrote:
Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
"Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the one with the highest rank-order score."
That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
Thanks. I did remember the article talking about the Condorcet paradox and that you can put in another method in case of a cycle. I didn't remember that they were pushing a specific method.
I don't like the semantics in the article:
"true majority rule" = Condorcet RCV
"rank-order voting" = Borda count RCV
but maybe the semantics were different in 2004. I relate that timing to Burlington voting to adopt IRV in 2005, elections in 2006 and 2009, repeal in 2010. Sometime after that, "IRV" sorta lost cachet and FairVote seemed to ditch it and relabel the product "RCV" which bothers me. I think the words "Borda" or "Bucklin" or "Hare" or "Condorcet" should precede the term "RCV".
> On 04/11/2022 5:07 PM Hahn, Paul <manynote@wustl.edu> wrote:
>
>
> Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
>
> "Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the one with the highest rank-order score."
>
> That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
>
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
FS
Forest Simmons
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 12:42 AM
Kevin's suggestion's simplicity may make it the best choice in this context
...
the method where
each candidate's score is that candidate's first preferences minus the
first preferences of the candidate who beats that candidate and has the
most first preferences.
I suggest the rewording
Elect the the candidate whose top preference count most greatly exceeds
(when greater) or most nearly equals (when smaller) the greatest top
preference count of any candidate defeating it pairwise.
In other words, compare the number fX of first place preferences of
candidate X, and the greatest number fY of first place preferences of any
candidate Y among those defeating X pairwise. Elect the candidate X with
the most favorable comparison between fX and fY.
-Forest
El lun., 11 de abr. de 2022 8:03 a. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
On 11.04.2022 10:48, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kevin Venzke's rule that also passes single-candidate DMTBR might be
more well-behaved yet more complex still:
Elect the CW if there is one, otherwise each candidate's score is the
sum of that candidate's first preferences plus the first preferences of
every candidate he beats. Elect the candidate with the highest score.
I mustn't have been properly awake. Kevin suggested the method where
each candidate's score is that candidate's first preferences minus the
first preferences of the candidate who beats that candidate and has the
most first preferences.
The sum variant suggestion was mine, and it is:
Elect the CW if there is one, otherwise each candidate's score is that
candidate's first preferences minus the sum of first preferences of
every candidate who beats him. Elect the candidate with the highest score.
I like it!
Possible rewording ...
Lacking a CW, elect the alternative whose top preference count most nearly
surpasses the top preference total of the alternatives that beat it
pairwise.
Kevin's suggestion's simplicity may make it the best choice in this context
...
the method where
each candidate's score is that candidate's first preferences minus the
first preferences of the candidate who beats that candidate and has the
most first preferences.
I suggest the rewording
Elect the the candidate whose top preference count most greatly exceeds
(when greater) or most nearly equals (when smaller) the greatest top
preference count of any candidate defeating it pairwise.
In other words, compare the number fX of first place preferences of
candidate X, and the greatest number fY of first place preferences of any
candidate Y among those defeating X pairwise. Elect the candidate X with
the most favorable comparison between fX and fY.
-Forest
El lun., 11 de abr. de 2022 8:03 a. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
>
>
> El lun., 11 de abr. de 2022 6:09 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet@t-online.de> escribió:
>
>> On 11.04.2022 10:48, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>
>> > Kevin Venzke's rule that also passes single-candidate DMTBR might be
>> > more well-behaved yet more complex still:
>> >
>> > Elect the CW if there is one, otherwise each candidate's score is the
>> > sum of that candidate's first preferences plus the first preferences of
>> > every candidate he beats. Elect the candidate with the highest score.
>>
>> I mustn't have been properly awake. Kevin suggested the method where
>> each candidate's score is that candidate's first preferences minus the
>> first preferences of the candidate who beats that candidate and has the
>> most first preferences.
>>
>> The sum variant suggestion was mine, and it is:
>>
>> Elect the CW if there is one, otherwise each candidate's score is that
>> candidate's first preferences minus the sum of first preferences of
>> every candidate who beats him. Elect the candidate with the highest score.
>>
>
> I like it!
>
> Possible rewording ...
>
> Lacking a CW, elect the alternative whose top preference count most nearly
> surpasses the top preference total of the alternatives that beat it
> pairwise.
>
>
>
>> -k
>>
>
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 8:23 AM
On 12.04.2022 02:42, Forest Simmons wrote:
Kevin's suggestion's simplicity may make it the best choice in this
context ...
the method where
each candidate's score is that candidate's first preferences minus the
first preferences of the candidate who beats that candidate and has the
most first preferences.
I suggest the rewording
Elect the the candidate whose top preference count most greatly exceeds
(when greater) or most nearly equals (when smaller) the greatest top
preference count of any candidate defeating it pairwise.
In other words, compare the number fX of first place preferences of
candidate X, and the greatest number fY of first place preferences of
any candidate Y among those defeating X pairwise. Elect the candidate X
with the most favorable comparison between fX and fY.
Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive. The reason I constructed
mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
As they're pretty similar, it'll probably come down to which method the
legislators (or public) think is the simplest.
-km
On 12.04.2022 02:42, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Kevin's suggestion's simplicity may make it the best choice in this
> context ...
> the method where
> each candidate's score is that candidate's first preferences minus the
> first preferences of the candidate who beats that candidate and has the
> most first preferences.
>
> I suggest the rewording
>
> Elect the the candidate whose top preference count most greatly exceeds
> (when greater) or most nearly equals (when smaller) the greatest top
> preference count of any candidate defeating it pairwise.
>
> In other words, compare the number fX of first place preferences of
> candidate X, and the greatest number fY of first place preferences of
> any candidate Y among those defeating X pairwise. Elect the candidate X
> with the most favorable comparison between fX and fY.
Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive. The reason I constructed
mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
As they're pretty similar, it'll probably come down to which method the
legislators (or public) think is the simplest.
-km
KV
Kevin Venzke
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 6:39 PM
Hi Kristofer,
Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de a écrit :
Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
It might be hard to top.
To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
Plurality will have a negative score.
Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
been using a random fill strategy:
0.327: D
0.322: B>A>C>D
0.186: A
0.164: C
The reason I constructed
mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
Kevin
Hi Kristofer,
Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit :
> Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
> thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
> the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
> opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
> perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
It might be hard to top.
To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
> As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
> simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
> incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
Plurality will have a negative score.
Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
been using a random fill strategy:
0.327: D
0.322: B>A>C>D
0.186: A
0.164: C
> The reason I constructed
> mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
>
> E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
> beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
> beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
> preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
> lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
> just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
>
> Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
Kevin
FS
Forest Simmons
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 7:40 PM
How about FairestTrue Majority Winner Ranked Choice Voting? FTMWRCV
(fight fire with fire)
It alludes to the title of the March 2004 sciam article ("The Fairest Vote
of All") and its description of the CW as the "True Majority Winner."
El mar., 12 de abr. de 2022 11:41 a. m., Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr
escribió:
Hi Kristofer,
Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit :
Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually
get.
It might be hard to top.
To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at
least
one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
Plurality will have a negative score.
Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent
you
there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could
have
been using a random fill strategy:
0.327: D
0.322: B>A>C>D
0.186: A
0.164: C
The reason I constructed
mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
Kevin
How about FairestTrue Majority Winner Ranked Choice Voting? FTMWRCV
(fight fire with fire)
It alludes to the title of the March 2004 sciam article ("The Fairest Vote
of All") and its description of the CW as the "True Majority Winner."
El mar., 12 de abr. de 2022 11:41 a. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak@yahoo.fr>
escribió:
> Hi Kristofer,
>
> Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit :
> > Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
> > thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
> > the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
> > opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
> > perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
>
> I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually
> get.
> It might be hard to top.
>
> To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
>
> > As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
> > simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
> > incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
>
> I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at
> least
> one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
> Plurality will have a negative score.
>
> Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent
> you
> there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could
> have
> been using a random fill strategy:
>
> 0.327: D
> 0.322: B>A>C>D
> 0.186: A
> 0.164: C
>
> > The reason I constructed
> > mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
> >
> > E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
> > beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
> > beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
> > preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
> > lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
> > just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
> >
> > Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
>
> Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
>
> Kevin
>
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 8:04 PM
Forest, I have been sending a pdf of exactly that article to everyone (along with my own paper) in the great debate. If you want, I will send you a copy. This is what got me started in this whole Condorcet thing, even before the Burlington 2009 election.
Also, I am trying to get Eric Maskin to testify before Vermont Senate Government Operations committee. Now he has a Nobel (he didn't in 2004).
And, I am inviting any scholars here to testify (via Zoom) if you want. Or offer to testify (of course it's the Chair of the committee, Jeanette White, who determines which witnesses testify before the committee.) I do not know dates yet, but it's gonna be soon.
I think, the big deal will be Precinct Summability. The RCV in statewide Maine and in NYC were both a clusterfuck. Took them more than 4 days to get a result. Had to haul 600,000 ballots from every corner of the state to Augusta.
L8r,
r b-j
On 04/12/2022 3:40 PM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
How about FairestTrue Majority Winner Ranked Choice Voting? FTMWRCV
(fight fire with fire)
It alludes to the title of the March 2004 sciam article ("The Fairest Vote of All") and its description of the CW as the "True Majority Winner."
El mar., 12 de abr. de 2022 11:41 a. m., Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr escribió:
Hi Kristofer,
Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de a écrit :
Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
It might be hard to top.
To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
Plurality will have a negative score.
Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
been using a random fill strategy:
0.327: D
0.322: B>A>C>D
0.186: A
0.164: C
The reason I constructed
mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
Kevin
Forest, I have been sending a pdf of exactly that article to everyone (along with my own paper) in the great debate. If you want, I will send you a copy. This is what got me started in this whole Condorcet thing, even before the Burlington 2009 election.
Also, I am trying to get Eric Maskin to testify before Vermont Senate Government Operations committee. Now he has a Nobel (he didn't in 2004).
And, I am inviting any scholars here to testify (via Zoom) if you want. Or offer to testify (of course it's the Chair of the committee, Jeanette White, who determines which witnesses testify before the committee.) I do not know dates yet, but it's gonna be soon.
I think, the *big* deal will be Precinct Summability. The RCV in statewide Maine and in NYC were both a clusterfuck. Took them more than 4 days to get a result. Had to haul 600,000 ballots from every corner of the state to Augusta.
L8r,
r b-j
> On 04/12/2022 3:40 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> How about FairestTrue Majority Winner Ranked Choice Voting? FTMWRCV
>
> (fight fire with fire)
>
> It alludes to the title of the March 2004 sciam article ("The Fairest Vote of All") and its description of the CW as the "True Majority Winner."
>
>
>
>
> El mar., 12 de abr. de 2022 11:41 a. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak@yahoo.fr> escribió:
> > Hi Kristofer,
> >
> > Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit :
> > > Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
> > > thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
> > > the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
> > > opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
> > > perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
> >
> > I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
> > It might be hard to top.
> >
> > To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
> >
> > > As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
> > > simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
> > > incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
> >
> > I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
> > one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
> > Plurality will have a negative score.
> >
> > Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
> > there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
> > been using a random fill strategy:
> >
> > 0.327: D
> > 0.322: B>A>C>D
> > 0.186: A
> > 0.164: C
> >
> > > The reason I constructed
> > > mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
> > >
> > > E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
> > > beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
> > > beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
> > > preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
> > > lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
> > > just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
> > >
> > > Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
> >
> > Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
> >
> > Kevin
> >
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Tue, Apr 12, 2022 8:06 PM
On 12.04.2022 20:39, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de a écrit :
Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
It might be hard to top.
To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
Yeah, as a descriptive name, fpA-max(fpC) is pretty good, but it may
seem nonsensical if you don't know the context. I was thinking of a
"friendly name" (like "instant runoff voting").
Forest's seems a little over the top :-) He has a point, though, that
some of the friendly names sound like "super duper majority everywhere
voting". It's a difficult balance to get right.
As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
Plurality will have a negative score.
Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
been using a random fill strategy:
0.327: D
0.322: B>A>C>D
0.186: A
0.164: C
That's a good point. I guess I was thinking that extending towards DMTBR
is more novel than getting Plurality resistance, so I'd like to try that
first. But for a public proposal, Plurality is definitely a desirable
criterion.
The reason I constructed
mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
Here's a concept that popped into my head last night:
Let v be the number of voters, S be a set of candidates, C the set of
all candidates, and C\S be the set of every candidate but the ones in S.
Let f(S) = v if someone in S is the CW, otherwise f(S) is the sum of all
candidates in S's first preferences, minus the first preferences of
every candidate in C\S who beats at least one candidate in S.
Now f(S) stays the same no matter how you clone candidates in C\S. And
if you clone A, f({A}) before the cloning is the same as f({A1, A2})
after the cloning - indeed pre-cloning f({A} union S) is the same as
post-cloning f({A1, A2} union S) for any S.
Perhaps f can be arranged in some way to create clone independence? E.g.
something like DAC/DSC, sorting sets by their f value and intersecting.
I don't know if that would preserve DMTCBR or DMTBR though; it gets very
murky very quickly.
-km
On 12.04.2022 20:39, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Kristofer,
>
> Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit :
>> Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
>> thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
>> the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
>> opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
>> perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
>
> I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
> It might be hard to top.
>
> To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
Yeah, as a descriptive name, fpA-max(fpC) is pretty good, but it may
seem nonsensical if you don't know the context. I was thinking of a
"friendly name" (like "instant runoff voting").
Forest's seems a little over the top :-) He has a point, though, that
some of the friendly names sound like "super duper majority everywhere
voting". It's a difficult balance to get right.
>> As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
>> simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
>> incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
>
> I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
> one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
> Plurality will have a negative score.
>
> Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
> there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
> been using a random fill strategy:
>
> 0.327: D
> 0.322: B>A>C>D
> 0.186: A
> 0.164: C
That's a good point. I guess I was thinking that extending towards DMTBR
is more novel than getting Plurality resistance, so I'd like to try that
first. But for a public proposal, Plurality is definitely a desirable
criterion.
>> The reason I constructed
>> mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
>>
>> E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
>> beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
>> beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
>> preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
>> lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
>> just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
>>
>> Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
>
> Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
Here's a concept that popped into my head last night:
Let v be the number of voters, S be a set of candidates, C the set of
all candidates, and C\S be the set of every candidate but the ones in S.
Let f(S) = v if someone in S is the CW, otherwise f(S) is the sum of all
candidates in S's first preferences, minus the first preferences of
every candidate in C\S who beats at least one candidate in S.
Now f(S) stays the same no matter how you clone candidates in C\S. And
if you clone A, f({A}) before the cloning is the same as f({A1, A2})
after the cloning - indeed pre-cloning f({A} union S) is the same as
post-cloning f({A1, A2} union S) for any S.
Perhaps f can be arranged in some way to create clone independence? E.g.
something like DAC/DSC, sorting sets by their f value and intersecting.
I don't know if that would preserve DMTCBR or DMTBR though; it gets very
murky very quickly.
-km
