Re: [EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting
I agree with everything Jameson says except for one point in his ps. I
don't think it's important that voters know exactly how votes are
tallied to decide the winner as long as they understand the basic idea
that in Condorcet voting, the winning candidate is the one who outranks
every other candidate in one to one comparisons. Furthermore, figuring
out how votes are tallied in IRV voting is not especially easy either
for most voters, despite the arguments about it's simplicity that IRV
supporters often make, which I have never found terribly persuasive.
One other point I'd like to make is that in some voting situations, such
as voting in informal meetings for options that most participants aren't
terribly passionate about (e.g., "where and when shall we meet again"),
approval voting is often vastly preferable to any ranked choice method
and has a much lower cognitive burden. That's why I believe we need to
discuss the relative merits of different voting methods not just for the
purpose of elections for public office but for all kinds of voting
situations.
It may also be (and probably is) that some methods are better for some
kinds of public elections than for other kinds. For example, approval
may be preferable to any ranked choice method in many if not most
elections for city council, while ranked choice may be preferable to
approval for the U.S. presidential election.
-Ralph Suter
On 10/11/2016 1:02 PM, election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com wrote:
ps. You mention Condorcet, and argue that the strategic cognitive
burden is
higher than IRV. I disagree; but since Condorcet comes with a higher
cognitive burden in just figuring out why a given candidate won, I agree
that Condorcet methods are probably not best for large-scale elections.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting
From: "Ralph Suter" RLSuter@aol.com
Date: Tue, October 11, 2016 2:35 pm
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
I agree with everything Jameson says except for one point in his ps. I
don't think it's important that voters know exactly how votes are
tallied to decide the winner as long as they understand the basic idea
that in Condorcet voting, the winning candidate is the one who outranks
every other candidate in one to one comparisons.
And this basic idea can be stated even more simply and persuasively:
"If more voters mark their ballots that they prefer Candidate A over Candidate B than the number of voters who mark their ballots to the contrary, then
Candidate B is not elected."
stated more loosely (but less accurately, considering the meaning of "majority")
"If a majority of voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected."
�
That's all
voters need to really know about a Condorcet method. �Of course, this is in the case of no cycle, if there is a cycle, this principle cannot be satisfied.
�
Furthermore, figuring
out how votes are tallied in IRV voting is not especially easy either
for most voters, despite the arguments about it's simplicity that IRV
supporters often make, which I have never found terribly persuasive.
terribly unpersuasive. �i call it the "Kabuki dance of transferred votes."
One other point I'd like to make is that in some voting situations, such
as voting in informal meetings for options that most participants aren't
terribly passionate about (e.g., "where and when shall we meet again"),
approval voting is often vastly preferable to any ranked choice method
and has a much lower cognitive burden.
makes sense.
That's why I believe we need to
discuss the relative merits of different voting methods not just for the
purpose of elections for public office but for all kinds of voting
situations.
It may also be (and probably is) that some methods are better for some
kinds of public elections than for other kinds. For example, approval
may be preferable to any ranked choice method in many if not most
elections for city council, while ranked choice may be preferable to
approval for the U.S. presidential election.
...
On 10/11/2016 1:02 PM, election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com wrote:
ps. You mention Condorcet, and argue that the strategic cognitive
burden is
higher than IRV. I disagree; but since Condorcet comes with a higher
cognitive burden in just figuring out why a given candidate won, I agree
that Condorcet methods are probably not best for large-scale elections.
not true at all. �IRV requires more of a cognitive burden because its result, in the ideal, cannot be stated as simply as with Condorcet. �if someone asks how do we do Condorcet and pick the winner,
we say we examine runoffs between every pair of candidates and elect the only candidate who doesn't lose to another candidate.
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
I claim that rankings aren't important or necessary.
That's why my favorite methods are 3-Slot ICT (to be voted like Approval),
Approval & Score.
But it would be tremendously helpful for a method to avoid the
Chicken-Dilemma.
But, in this country's official state & national elections, rankings might
be psychologically necessary:
- We have some seriously overcompromising cowardly lesser-of-2-evils
voter's (like the ones who are going to vote for Hillary).
Maybe , with a rank method, some of them would be willing to rank Favorite
over Sleaze-Compromize.
But, for the most dedicated overcompromiser, it's important to also allow
hir to fully help & protect both Favorite & Compromise, when voting both at
top.
Hence the need for FBC under current conditions.
- Often, parties whose policy-proposals are very similar have tremendous
rivalry and mutually inimical feelings.
Those voters might be reluctant to approve eachother's candidates.
But they might be willing to rank a close & similar rival just below their
favorite.
Methods that have what all of the above kinds of voters need:
1.Bucklin versions that allow equal top ranking.
...such as ER Bucklin, and Bucklin(B or A), as I've defined them.
- Plain MMPO, which, additionally, meets Weak CD.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 11, 2016 11:35 AM, "Ralph Suter" RLSuter@aol.com wrote:
I agree with everything Jameson says except for one point in his ps. I
don't think it's important that voters know exactly how votes are tallied
to decide the winner as long as they understand the basic idea that in
Condorcet voting, the winning candidate is the one who outranks every other
candidate in one to one comparisons. Furthermore, figuring out how votes
are tallied in IRV voting is not especially easy either for most voters,
despite the arguments about it's simplicity that IRV supporters often make,
which I have never found terribly persuasive.
One other point I'd like to make is that in some voting situations, such
as voting in informal meetings for options that most participants aren't
terribly passionate about (e.g., "where and when shall we meet again"),
approval voting is often vastly preferable to any ranked choice method and
has a much lower cognitive burden. That's why I believe we need to discuss
the relative merits of different voting methods not just for the purpose of
elections for public office but for all kinds of voting situations.
It may also be (and probably is) that some methods are better for some
kinds of public elections than for other kinds. For example, approval may
be preferable to any ranked choice method in many if not most elections for
city council, while ranked choice may be preferable to approval for the
U.S. presidential election.
-Ralph Suter
On 10/11/2016 1:02 PM, election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com
wrote:
ps. You mention Condorcet, and argue that the strategic cognitive burden
is
higher than IRV. I disagree; but since Condorcet comes with a higher
cognitive burden in just figuring out why a given candidate won, I agree
that Condorcet methods are probably not best for large-scale elections.
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