> I would like to nominate  Double Defeat, Hare. > > *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish and > also may specify an approval cutoff. > > Default approval is only goes to top-ranked candidates. > > All candidates that are pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate are > disqualified. > > If that leaves more than one qualified (i.e. not disqualified) > candidate, commence eliminations according to Hare > rules until only one qualified candidate remains.* > > This is a compromise between Hare and Condorcet which will probably not > please the fundamentalist supporters of either, > because it doesn't meet the Condorcet criterion and is more complicated > than Hare and fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help. > > But it addresses the concern some have about electing a weak low social > utility Condorcet winner, and I think it might simulate > well. I think that methods that allow voters to both rank the candidates and specify an approval threshold/cutoff should never elect a candidate that is pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate. I coined this criterion as "Double Defeat" and it occurred to me that it could be a disqualification device that is part of a method. Some people are wary of Condorcet electing a "weak centrist" candidate, for example 49 A>>>C>B 48 B>>>C>A 03 C>A>>>B Assuming all voters get the same utility from electing their favourites, the Hare (and FPP and presumably Approval) winner is the highest Social Utility candidate A. With those sincere preferences, the ranking-with-specified-approval ballots would be 49 A|>C 48 B|>C 03 C>A| Here the Double Defeat rule doesn't interfere with Hare.  B is disqualified because B is pairwise beaten by the more approved A. So then, following Hare rules C is eliminated leaving A as the only qualified candidate and so winner. The C>A voters have no real complaint other than "The method should meet the Condorcet criterion" and any complaint from the B>C voters is answered by "To get a result you prefer you didn't have to order-reverse, you could have had A disqualified by approving C". The method is similar in spirit to an "Approval-enhanced Hare" that arose from discussion I had here a few months ago with Forest, but which I forgot about and didn't rediscover until after nominations for the poll had closed: *Elect the most approved member of the set comprising the Hare winner and all the candidates with a beat-path to the Hare winner.* 49 A (sincere might be A>B) 24 B (sincere might be B>C) 27 C>B A classic example that has been interpreted as Hare and Margins by electing A failing Minimal Defense and avoidably causing the C voters to regret not Compromising, and alternatively by electing B the C>B voters having been taken advantage of by the B voters using a Defection strategy, a failure of the Chicken Dilemma criterion. In this example it is true that in all the methods that meet Double Defeat it is up to the C>B voters to decide which is more important for them: preventing the election of their greater evil A, or preventing being taken advantage of by Defecting B voters. Chris B.

Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he rage quit the forum. On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 4:50 PM Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > I would like to nominate Double Defeat, Hare. > > *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish and > also may specify an approval cutoff. > > Default approval is only goes to top-ranked candidates. > > All candidates that are pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate are > disqualified. > > If that leaves more than one qualified (i.e. not disqualified) > candidate, commence eliminations according to Hare > rules until only one qualified candidate remains.* > > This is a compromise between Hare and Condorcet which will probably not > please the fundamentalist supporters of either, > because it doesn't meet the Condorcet criterion and is more complicated > than Hare and fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help. > > But it addresses the concern some have about electing a weak low social > utility Condorcet winner, and I think it might simulate > well. > > > I think that methods that allow voters to both rank the candidates and > specify an approval threshold/cutoff > should never elect a candidate that is pairwise beaten by a more approved > candidate. > > I coined this criterion as "Double Defeat" and it occurred to me that it > could be a disqualification device that > is part of a method. > > Some people are wary of Condorcet electing a "weak centrist" candidate, > for example > > 49 A>>>C>B > 48 B>>>C>A > 03 C>A>>>B > > Assuming all voters get the same utility from electing their favourites, > the Hare (and FPP and presumably Approval) > winner is the highest Social Utility candidate A. > > With those sincere preferences, the ranking-with-specified-approval > ballots would be > > 49 A|>C > 48 B|>C > 03 C>A| > > Here the Double Defeat rule doesn't interfere with Hare. B is > disqualified because B is pairwise beaten by the more approved A. > > So then, following Hare rules C is eliminated leaving A as the only > qualified candidate and so winner. > > The C>A voters have no real complaint other than "The method should meet > the Condorcet criterion" and any complaint from > the B>C voters is answered by "To get a result you prefer you didn't have > to order-reverse, you could have had A disqualified by > approving C". > > The method is similar in spirit to an "Approval-enhanced Hare" that arose > from discussion I had here a few months ago with Forest, > but which I forgot about and didn't rediscover until after nominations for > the poll had closed: > > *Elect the most approved member of the set comprising the Hare winner and > all the candidates with a beat-path to the Hare winner.* > > 49 A (sincere might be A>B) > 24 B (sincere might be B>C) > 27 C>B > > A classic example that has been interpreted as Hare and Margins by > electing A failing Minimal Defense and avoidably causing the C voters to > regret > not Compromising, and alternatively by electing B the C>B voters having > been taken advantage of by the B voters using a Defection strategy, a > failure > of the Chicken Dilemma criterion. > > In this example it is true that in all the methods that meet Double Defeat > it is up to the C>B voters to decide which is more important for them: > preventing the election of their greater evil A, or preventing being taken > advantage of by Defecting B voters. > > Chris B. > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

On 2024-04-17 11:42, Michael Garman wrote: > Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he > rage quit the forum. It's still happening, I think Mike just didn't want anything to do with it. I'll gather up the poll posts and run them through Schulze (for the ranked ballots) and Approval (for the approval ballots) once the period is up. That reminds me: I should make a post showing the subject of the poll, per Mike's first post, and the deadline. If I can just get enough time from the things claiming my attention at the moment. -km

Got it. Excited to see how it goes! Hope everything is okay! On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 11:53 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm < km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > On 2024-04-17 11:42, Michael Garman wrote: > > Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he > > rage quit the forum. > > It's still happening, I think Mike just didn't want anything to do with > it. I'll gather up the poll posts and run them through Schulze (for the > ranked ballots) and Approval (for the approval ballots) once the period > is up. > > That reminds me: I should make a post showing the subject of the poll, > per Mike's first post, and the deadline. If I can just get enough time > from the things claiming my attention at the moment. > > -km >

I didn’t quit in rage, twit, I quit in disgust when I ran out of patience with zero progress due to Dunning-Kruger exemplars like you. On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 02:43 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he rage > quit the forum. > On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 4:50 PM Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> > wrote: > >> >> I would like to nominate Double Defeat, Hare. >> >> *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish and >> also may specify an approval cutoff. >> >> Default approval is only goes to top-ranked candidates. >> >> All candidates that are pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate are >> disqualified. >> >> If that leaves more than one qualified (i.e. not disqualified) >> candidate, commence eliminations according to Hare >> rules until only one qualified candidate remains.* >> >> This is a compromise between Hare and Condorcet which will probably not >> please the fundamentalist supporters of either, >> because it doesn't meet the Condorcet criterion and is more complicated >> than Hare and fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help. >> >> But it addresses the concern some have about electing a weak low social >> utility Condorcet winner, and I think it might simulate >> well. >> >> >> I think that methods that allow voters to both rank the candidates and >> specify an approval threshold/cutoff >> should never elect a candidate that is pairwise beaten by a more approved >> candidate. >> >> I coined this criterion as "Double Defeat" and it occurred to me that it >> could be a disqualification device that >> is part of a method. >> >> Some people are wary of Condorcet electing a "weak centrist" candidate, >> for example >> >> 49 A>>>C>B >> 48 B>>>C>A >> 03 C>A>>>B >> >> Assuming all voters get the same utility from electing their favourites, >> the Hare (and FPP and presumably Approval) >> winner is the highest Social Utility candidate A. >> >> With those sincere preferences, the ranking-with-specified-approval >> ballots would be >> >> 49 A|>C >> 48 B|>C >> 03 C>A| >> >> Here the Double Defeat rule doesn't interfere with Hare. B is >> disqualified because B is pairwise beaten by the more approved A. >> >> So then, following Hare rules C is eliminated leaving A as the only >> qualified candidate and so winner. >> >> The C>A voters have no real complaint other than "The method should meet >> the Condorcet criterion" and any complaint from >> the B>C voters is answered by "To get a result you prefer you didn't have >> to order-reverse, you could have had A disqualified by >> approving C". >> >> The method is similar in spirit to an "Approval-enhanced Hare" that arose >> from discussion I had here a few months ago with Forest, >> but which I forgot about and didn't rediscover until after nominations >> for the poll had closed: >> >> *Elect the most approved member of the set comprising the Hare winner and >> all the candidates with a beat-path to the Hare winner.* >> >> 49 A (sincere might be A>B) >> 24 B (sincere might be B>C) >> 27 C>B >> >> A classic example that has been interpreted as Hare and Margins by >> electing A failing Minimal Defense and avoidably causing the C voters to >> regret >> not Compromising, and alternatively by electing B the C>B voters having >> been taken advantage of by the B voters using a Defection strategy, a >> failure >> of the Chicken Dilemma criterion. >> >> In this example it is true that in all the methods that meet Double >> Defeat it is up to the C>B voters to decide which is more important for >> them: >> preventing the election of their greater evil A, or preventing being >> taken advantage of by Defecting B voters. >> >> Chris B. >> >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

You’re not helping your cause with comments like that, Mike. Just four days ago, you wrote “I’m not an Internet attack-person.” What difference half a week makes :-D On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 6:54 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > I didn’t quit in rage, twit, I quit in disgust when I ran out of patience > with zero progress due to Dunning-Kruger exemplars like you. > > On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 02:43 Michael Garman < > michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > >> Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he rage >> quit the forum. >> On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 4:50 PM Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> I would like to nominate Double Defeat, Hare. >>> >>> *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish and >>> also may specify an approval cutoff. >>> >>> Default approval is only goes to top-ranked candidates. >>> >>> All candidates that are pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate are >>> disqualified. >>> >>> If that leaves more than one qualified (i.e. not disqualified) >>> candidate, commence eliminations according to Hare >>> rules until only one qualified candidate remains.* >>> >>> This is a compromise between Hare and Condorcet which will probably not >>> please the fundamentalist supporters of either, >>> because it doesn't meet the Condorcet criterion and is more complicated >>> than Hare and fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help. >>> >>> But it addresses the concern some have about electing a weak low social >>> utility Condorcet winner, and I think it might simulate >>> well. >>> >>> >>> I think that methods that allow voters to both rank the candidates and >>> specify an approval threshold/cutoff >>> should never elect a candidate that is pairwise beaten by a more >>> approved candidate. >>> >>> I coined this criterion as "Double Defeat" and it occurred to me that it >>> could be a disqualification device that >>> is part of a method. >>> >>> Some people are wary of Condorcet electing a "weak centrist" candidate, >>> for example >>> >>> 49 A>>>C>B >>> 48 B>>>C>A >>> 03 C>A>>>B >>> >>> Assuming all voters get the same utility from electing their favourites, >>> the Hare (and FPP and presumably Approval) >>> winner is the highest Social Utility candidate A. >>> >>> With those sincere preferences, the ranking-with-specified-approval >>> ballots would be >>> >>> 49 A|>C >>> 48 B|>C >>> 03 C>A| >>> >>> Here the Double Defeat rule doesn't interfere with Hare. B is >>> disqualified because B is pairwise beaten by the more approved A. >>> >>> So then, following Hare rules C is eliminated leaving A as the only >>> qualified candidate and so winner. >>> >>> The C>A voters have no real complaint other than "The method should meet >>> the Condorcet criterion" and any complaint from >>> the B>C voters is answered by "To get a result you prefer you didn't >>> have to order-reverse, you could have had A disqualified by >>> approving C". >>> >>> The method is similar in spirit to an "Approval-enhanced Hare" that >>> arose from discussion I had here a few months ago with Forest, >>> but which I forgot about and didn't rediscover until after nominations >>> for the poll had closed: >>> >>> *Elect the most approved member of the set comprising the Hare winner >>> and all the candidates with a beat-path to the Hare winner.* >>> >>> 49 A (sincere might be A>B) >>> 24 B (sincere might be B>C) >>> 27 C>B >>> >>> A classic example that has been interpreted as Hare and Margins by >>> electing A failing Minimal Defense and avoidably causing the C voters to >>> regret >>> not Compromising, and alternatively by electing B the C>B voters having >>> been taken advantage of by the B voters using a Defection strategy, a >>> failure >>> of the Chicken Dilemma criterion. >>> >>> In this example it is true that in all the methods that meet Double >>> Defeat it is up to the C>B voters to decide which is more important for >>> them: >>> preventing the election of their greater evil A, or preventing being >>> taken advantage of by Defecting B voters. >>> >>> Chris B. >>> >>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 02:53 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > On 2024-04-17 11:42, Michael Garman wrote: > > Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he > > rage quit the forum. > > It's still happening, I think Mike just didn't want anything to do with > it. I'll gather up the poll posts and run them through Schulze (for the > ranked ballots) and Approval (for the approval ballots) once the period > is up. I appreciate it. …that the poll is being administered effectively. Sorry again about losing my temper.. I was discouraged when It seemed like Garman’s & Robert’s contrarinesses-for-its own-sake was the state-of affairs. I just feel that Schulze has much long-established support. I still want my ballot counted, but with Smith//Approval(implicit) added directly above Schulze, due to its better simplicity & proposability. I’ll re-send my ballot with that revision. …& thanks for mentioning the initial motivating-question of finding out what members like for public-political-elections. > > > That reminds me: I should make a post showing the subject of the poll, > per Mike's first post, and the deadline. If I can just get enough time > from the things claiming my attention at the moment. > > -km > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >