How could it not? In Approval, you always approve your favorite, or your equal-favorites. ...in any situation, including the various Nash equilibria. So top-ranking an additional candidate can't hurt your other, previously, top-ranked canidates. There are very few methods that meet FBC, Weak CD, and have wv strategy. They an be counted on the toes of one of a cow's feet. 1. MMPO 2. NEO NEO works fine in the simplified examples that we all use for demonstrating method-properties. I don't know of any particular reason why it wouildn't work in a large national election. ...but, because it's such an unfamiliar kind of count, I can't say for sure that it's implementable in a large election. Maybe the NEO(combo) version has a better chance of large-election implementability than NEO(cohort) does. The only advantage that I'm aware of that NEO has over MMPO is that NEO doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example. That bad-example, though answerable, would have to be disclosed and answered in an MMPO proposal. That greatly complicates and lengthens an MMPO proposal. And, as I was saying, reform-opponents tend to haver much more access to media, meaning that reform-advocates might not be able to afford to reach many people with the answer to the bad-example criticism. But MMPO's count-rule is a lot more briefly and simply stated: The winner is the candidate over whom fewest people have ranked someone else. (...some same other candidate) Also, even if NEO is implementable in large elections, it would still be a little problematic. For one thing, I guess it isn't precinct-summable. So, most likely MMPO's drawback is outweighed by those of NEO, even if NEO is implementable in large elections. Michael Ossipoff