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Binomial STV counters Irish strategic voting.

RL
Richard Lung
Tue, Apr 5, 2016 6:07 PM

To STV voting and to Election methods groups.

The Electoral Reform Society survey of the 2016 Irish general election
describes a strategic voting practice, by which allied candidates seek
to bolster the first preferences of their least prefered colleagues, to
prevent their early exclusion.

My invention of (abstentions-inclusive keep-value averaged) Binomial STV
would do away with the need for this insincere voting. It does this by a
minimum of two complementary counts: an election count and an exclusion
count. The latter is a rational count, in its own right, conducted on
the voters preferences in reverse order, instead of an arbitrary
exclusion, when the transferable surpluses run out, in the election count.

To ensure that the exclusion count is not given undue importance,
compared to the election count, all preferences are counted, including
abstentions, which are generally at the end of the ballot papers, when
voters cease to express a preference.

Hence it is possible for the abstentions to reach a quota, in which
case, a seat remains unfilled.

It is possible for consistently rational counts, both for election and
for exclusion, by extending the Meek method use of the re-adjustable
keep value, to candidates in deficit of a quota, as well as in surplus
of a quota.

Each candidates election keep value and exclusion keep value, inverted
to provide a back-up election keep value, are averaged to arrive at
deciding keep values.

This describes only the simplest first order Binomial STV, corresponding
to the first order of the binomial theorem, consisting of just two
terms: one election count of preferences and one exclusion count of
unpreferences.

But it is also possible to have a second-order Binomial STV, based on
the four combinations of the second-order binomial theorem. And so on.

An example of how first and second order Binomial STV work is given here:

http://www.voting.ukscientists.com/Binomial_STV.html

The example is drastically over-simplified, for a system requiring
computer programming, as does Meek method. Unlike Meek method, all the
abstentions are counted, so there is no requirement to reduce the Droop
quota, as the preferences run out. Otherwise, the way to code Binomial
STV is to start from the Meek method program and adapt to the modified
rules, extending the use of the keep value, and so forth.

I am looking for some organisation that might take up this work of
implementing Binomial STV and running preliminary trials.

--
Richard Lung.

E-books (mostly available free or reader-sets-price)
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com/colverse.html
Includes the series of books on:
Democracy Science (starting with electoral reform and research);
Commentaries (literature and liberty; science and democracy);
Collected verse (in five books).

To STV voting and to Election methods groups. The Electoral Reform Society survey of the 2016 Irish general election describes a strategic voting practice, by which allied candidates seek to bolster the first preferences of their least prefered colleagues, to prevent their early exclusion. My invention of (abstentions-inclusive keep-value averaged) Binomial STV would do away with the need for this insincere voting. It does this by a minimum of two complementary counts: an election count and an exclusion count. The latter is a rational count, in its own right, conducted on the voters preferences in reverse order, instead of an arbitrary exclusion, when the transferable surpluses run out, in the election count. To ensure that the exclusion count is not given undue importance, compared to the election count, all preferences are counted, including abstentions, which are generally at the end of the ballot papers, when voters cease to express a preference. Hence it is possible for the abstentions to reach a quota, in which case, a seat remains unfilled. It is possible for consistently rational counts, both for election and for exclusion, by extending the Meek method use of the re-adjustable keep value, to candidates in deficit of a quota, as well as in surplus of a quota. Each candidates election keep value and exclusion keep value, inverted to provide a back-up election keep value, are averaged to arrive at deciding keep values. This describes only the simplest first order Binomial STV, corresponding to the first order of the binomial theorem, consisting of just two terms: one election count of preferences and one exclusion count of unpreferences. But it is also possible to have a second-order Binomial STV, based on the four combinations of the second-order binomial theorem. And so on. An example of how first and second order Binomial STV work is given here: http://www.voting.ukscientists.com/Binomial_STV.html The example is drastically over-simplified, for a system requiring computer programming, as does Meek method. Unlike Meek method, all the abstentions are counted, so there is no requirement to reduce the Droop quota, as the preferences run out. Otherwise, the way to code Binomial STV is to start from the Meek method program and adapt to the modified rules, extending the use of the keep value, and so forth. I am looking for some organisation that might take up this work of implementing Binomial STV and running preliminary trials. -- Richard Lung. E-books (mostly available free or reader-sets-price) http://www.voting.ukscientists.com/colverse.html Includes the series of books on: Democracy Science (starting with electoral reform and research); Commentaries (literature and liberty; science and democracy); Collected verse (in five books).