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"Strategy with RCV" on reddit

RL
Rob Lanphier
Tue, May 11, 2021 11:39 PM

Hi folks,

Interesting proposed strategy for RCV posted on reddit here:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/n7wqxa/strategy_with_rcv/

Those of y'all that have reddit accounts should just post your
response there rather than replying here.  I have some thoughts
swirling about the 2018 mayoral race here in San Francisco, but I
haven't done a full analysis of THAT election yet.  I'm curious how
similar I'm going to find SF 2018 to what /u/After-Season9338

Rob

Hi folks, Interesting proposed strategy for RCV posted on reddit here: https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/n7wqxa/strategy_with_rcv/ Those of y'all that have reddit accounts should just post your response there rather than replying here. I have some thoughts swirling about the 2018 mayoral race here in San Francisco, but I haven't done a full analysis of THAT election yet. I'm curious how similar I'm going to find SF 2018 to what /u/After-Season9338 Rob
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Wed, May 12, 2021 9:49 AM

On 12/05/2021 01.39, Rob Lanphier wrote:

Hi folks,

Interesting proposed strategy for RCV posted on reddit here:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/n7wqxa/strategy_with_rcv/

As I understand it, the strategy is that the Republicans support a
further-left party (the Greens) so as to engineer a center squeeze
against the Democrats.

But given that the republicans' sincere ranking presumably is R>D>G, it
doesn't seem like they gain anything by doing so, since getting the
Greens elected instead of the Democrats would be a worse outcome.

Maybe it could be used to discredit IRV and return to FPTP. That could
be an interesting perspective: any voting method where enough voters can
be convinced to vote against their honest preferences, and which then
results in a seemingly incomprehensible or bad outcome, would be
vulnerable to such an attack.

For instance, an Approval election could be attacked by splitting a
party into a better and worse party, and then through duplicitous
"advice", engineering a Burr failure.

However, there's a kind of tension. If the bad outcome is obviously bad,
it's going to be hard to get the voters to go along with the unwitting
sabotage. On the other hand, if the bad outcome is not obviously bad,
the voters might not get sufficiently angry to repeal the method.

The concept of an attack on the legitimacy of the method itself is an
interesting one, though. The more advanced early EM criteria (SFC, SDSC,
immunity to majority complaints, etc.) might help defend against such
attacks.

Those of y'all that have reddit accounts should just post your
response there rather than replying here.

I used to be on Reddit, but I didn't like what it was turning me into,
so I've taken a break :-)

-km

On 12/05/2021 01.39, Rob Lanphier wrote: > Hi folks, > > Interesting proposed strategy for RCV posted on reddit here: > https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/n7wqxa/strategy_with_rcv/ As I understand it, the strategy is that the Republicans support a further-left party (the Greens) so as to engineer a center squeeze against the Democrats. But given that the republicans' sincere ranking presumably is R>D>G, it doesn't seem like they gain anything by doing so, since getting the Greens elected instead of the Democrats would be a worse outcome. Maybe it could be used to discredit IRV and return to FPTP. That could be an interesting perspective: any voting method where enough voters can be convinced to vote against their honest preferences, and which then results in a seemingly incomprehensible or bad outcome, would be vulnerable to such an attack. For instance, an Approval election could be attacked by splitting a party into a better and worse party, and then through duplicitous "advice", engineering a Burr failure. However, there's a kind of tension. If the bad outcome is obviously bad, it's going to be hard to get the voters to go along with the unwitting sabotage. On the other hand, if the bad outcome is not obviously bad, the voters might not get sufficiently angry to repeal the method. The concept of an attack on the legitimacy of the method itself is an interesting one, though. The more advanced early EM criteria (SFC, SDSC, immunity to majority complaints, etc.) might help defend against such attacks. > Those of y'all that have reddit accounts should just post your > response there rather than replying here. I used to be on Reddit, but I didn't like what it was turning me into, so I've taken a break :-) -km