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Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane Rouillon

SB
steve bosworth
Tue, Jul 21, 2015 11:53 PM

From:

Subject:

Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 17

To:

Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015

12:01:59 -0700

…..........................

  1. Real

Democracy (St?phane Rouillon)


Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 23:09:04 -0400
From: St?phane

To:

Subject: [EM] Real

Democracy (1):  Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane Rouillon

Message-ID:

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1";
Format="flowed"

Stephane Rouillon
wrote:

R: I do not know if you would find it real

democracy, but SPPA is what I

have to offer best...

Dr

Rouillon.

Steve (S):  I

have studied your very useful but brief
bullet-point-type-presentation of SPPA.  Thank you.  I hope you will
send me more details, partly in response to my following points and
suggestions.

Our aims and values
seem to be almost identical.  Therefore, if you have the time, I
would appreciate it if you would study my article ('Equal Voting
Sustained') to see whether or not Associational Proportional
Representation (APR) might not serve your aims even more completely
than your current version of SPPA.  I will send you (or anyone else)
this article separately upon request.

For example, with
regard to your list of SPPA's benefits,  APR would seem to compare as
follows:

still needs only
one visit to the polling station:  Yes.
maintains the
accountability link with elected members:  Yes.
gathers sincere
preferences:  Yes.
allows ordering of
the issues by the electorate:  APR allows this to some extent during
its 'primary election' which determines which geographically or
non-geographically defined voluntary organizations (e.g. political
parties, interest groups) will be officially recognized as electoral
'associations'.  At the same time, each citizen chooses through
which one she will rank as few or as many candidates in the whole
country as she might wish during the later general election.
reduces the
antagonism between candidates:  APR candidates would have every
incentive both to be very clear and exact about her own scale of
values and policy proposals, and to negotiate, even with opponents,
any compromises necessary, to achieve agreements  (e.g. to help form
a majority coalition) to legislate at least some of her policy
goals.
vanishes vote
splitting issues:  APR give no incentive (or possibility) to split
votes.
raises the
individual approbation rate of elected members:  Each APR rep will
have a 'weighted vote' in the legislative assembly exactly equal to
the number of citizens who have helped her to be elected – no vote
is wasted and continues into the assembly.
treats all
candidates equally (independents included)!  Completely!  For
example, 'independents' could either form an 'association' by
themselves, or seek to represent any association's agenda that any
of them  might favor.
eliminates the
democratic deficit:  Completely!
treats all
political parties equally (no quota):  Completely!
gives to every
voter the same weight:  Completely!
elects party-line
builder:  Yes, if this refers to the building and sustaining of a
working  majority coalition (and also its government in a
parliamentary system).
guarantees stable
coalitions of two parties:  see previous response.
guarantees twice
the number of MPs in the worst case:  No, APR guarantees only the
exact proportional election of the pre-established number of MPs.
preserves 
learning [about] a small number of candidates to vote [for]:  If she
wishes, APR allows a citizen to vote for only one candidate in the
country.  Alternatively, she can rank as few or as many candidates
in the whole country as she might wish.
reduces strategic
nominations:  Completely!
hinders bribing
electorate [for]support:  as much as possible.
avoids regional
confrontation:  APR provides alternatives to regional conflicts yet
would allow any such conflicts to be represented, i.e. exactly in
proportion to the number of citizens who care most about them.
eliminates
gerrymandering:  Completely!

To facilitate any of
our future discussions, it  might sometime be helpful if I could 'cut
and paste' some of your words (like the above) to comment upon them.
Thus, might it be possible for you separately to email me your
relevant SPPA works in a suitable [?Word?] format so that I could do
this?

I look forward to your
feedback.

Steve

> From: election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com > Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 17 > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 12:01:59 -0700 > ….......................... > 1. Real Democracy (St?phane Rouillon) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 23:09:04 -0400 > From: St?phane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon@sympatico.ca> > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Subject: [EM] Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane Rouillon > Message-ID: <BLU437-SMTP1063BACDACEABF3872910208F860@phx.gbl> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed" > Stephane Rouillon wrote: > >R: I do not know if you would find it real democracy, but SPPA is what I > have to offer best... > http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/p199397_index.html > http://votebook.ca/pdf/SPPAforMPSA13042007.pdf > > Dr Rouillon. > >>Steve (S): I have studied your very useful but brief bullet-point-type-presentation of SPPA. Thank you. I hope you will send me more details, partly in response to my following points and suggestions. Our aims and values seem to be almost identical. Therefore, if you have the time, I would appreciate it if you would study my article ('Equal Voting Sustained') to see whether or not Associational Proportional Representation (APR) might not serve your aims even more completely than your current version of SPPA. I will send you (or anyone else) this article separately upon request. For example, with regard to your list of SPPA's benefits, APR would seem to compare as follows: still needs only one visit to the polling station: Yes. maintains the accountability link with elected members: Yes. gathers sincere preferences: Yes. allows ordering of the issues by the electorate: APR allows this to some extent during its 'primary election' which determines which geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups) will be officially recognized as electoral 'associations'. At the same time, each citizen chooses through which one she will rank as few or as many candidates in the whole country as she might wish during the later general election. reduces the antagonism between candidates: APR candidates would have every incentive both to be very clear and exact about her own scale of values and policy proposals, and to negotiate, even with opponents, any compromises necessary, to achieve agreements (e.g. to help form a majority coalition) to legislate at least some of her policy goals. vanishes vote splitting issues: APR give no incentive (or possibility) to split votes. raises the individual approbation rate of elected members: Each APR rep will have a 'weighted vote' in the legislative assembly exactly equal to the number of citizens who have helped her to be elected – no vote is wasted and continues into the assembly. treats all candidates equally (independents included)! Completely! For example, 'independents' could either form an 'association' by themselves, or seek to represent any association's agenda that any of them might favor. eliminates the democratic deficit: Completely! treats all political parties equally (no quota): Completely! gives to every voter the same weight: Completely! elects party-line builder: Yes, if this refers to the building and sustaining of a working majority coalition (and also its government in a parliamentary system). guarantees stable coalitions of two parties: see previous response. guarantees twice the number of MPs in the worst case: No, APR guarantees only the exact proportional election of the pre-established number of MPs. preserves learning [about] a small number of candidates to vote [for]: If she wishes, APR allows a citizen to vote for only one candidate in the country. Alternatively, she can rank as few or as many candidates in the whole country as she might wish. reduces strategic nominations: Completely! hinders bribing electorate [for]support: as much as possible. avoids regional confrontation: APR provides alternatives to regional conflicts yet would allow any such conflicts to be represented, i.e. exactly in proportion to the number of citizens who care most about them. eliminates gerrymandering: Completely! To facilitate any of our future discussions, it might sometime be helpful if I could 'cut and paste' some of your words (like the above) to comment upon them. Thus, might it be possible for you separately to email me your relevant SPPA works in a suitable [?Word?] format so that I could do this? I look forward to your feedback. Steve
SR
Stéphane Rouillon
Wed, Jul 22, 2015 2:55 AM

Hello Steve,

  1. The whole document is available from
    http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-1.php
    to
    http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-10.php
    You can copy (Ctrl-C) any of the 10 pages in a text document...

  2. I will read your APR document as soon I find which software opens
    .odt document...

For the moment I can only give some comments on your APR comparison. I
am sorry if it sounds negative but it is not. I just want more details
about the few differences between APR and SPPA:

  1. Does APR "geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary
    organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups)" /that/ "will be
    officially recognized as electoral 'associations" prevent
    outsiders to infiltrate artificially an electoral 'associations? Like
    partisan of a mainstream idea that would decide to sink another debate
    using their strong majority...? Lets suppose that massive
    supporters of gay weddings want to dilute a more 50%-50% debate about
    adoption froms homosexual parents (just an example). Would APR detect
    organized infiltration movements?

  2. What happens if a very low number of APR representatives controls a
    majority (more than 50%) of the parliament voices? Oligarchy?

  3. SPPA garantees a stable bipartite coalition around the main political
    parties, despite balanced national split supports like 30%, 18%, 17%,
    14%, 11% and 10%.
    In such a case, it would boost the main party to 50% and reduce the
    mandate to 3/7 of tis original length to ensure fairness. How does APR
    handle unstable splits?

  4. How do you organize fair debates when a voter can choose between a
    huge amount of candidates?

It might take some time before I comment: plenty of work...
S. Rouillon

Le 2015-07-21 19:53, steve bosworth a écrit :

From: election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 17
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 12:01:59 -0700
.............................

  1. Real Democracy (St?phane Rouillon)

Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 23:09:04 -0400
From: St?phane Rouillon stephane.rouillon@sympatico.ca
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com

Subject: [EM] Real Democracy (1):  Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane

Rouillon

Message-ID: BLU437-SMTP1063BACDACEABF3872910208F860@phx.gbl
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"

Stephane Rouillon wrote:

R: I do not know if you would find it real democracy, but SPPA is what I
have to offer best...

Steve (S): I have studied your very useful but brief

bullet-point-type-presentation of SPPA. Thank you. I hope you will
send me more details, partly in response to my following points and
suggestions.

Our aims and values seem to be almost identical. Therefore, if you
have the time, I would appreciate it if you would study my article
('Equal Voting Sustained') to see whether or not Associational
Proportional Representation (APR) might not serve your aims even more
completely than your current version of SPPA. I will send you (or
anyone else) this article separately upon request.

For example, with regard to your list of SPPA's benefits, APR would
seem to compare as follows:

 still needs only one visit to the polling station: Yes.
 maintains the accountability link with elected members: Yes.
 gathers sincere preferences: Yes.
 allows ordering of the issues by the electorate: APR allows this
 to some extent during its 'primary election' which determines
 which geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary
 organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups) will be
 officially recognized as electoral 'associations'. At the same
 time, each citizen chooses through which one she will rank as few
 or as many candidates in the whole country as she might wish
 during the later general election.
 reduces the antagonism between candidates: APR candidates would
 have every incentive both to be very clear and exact about her own
 scale of values and policy proposals, and to negotiate, even with
 opponents, any compromises necessary, to achieve agreements (e.g.
 to help form a majority coalition) to legislate at least some of
 her policy goals.
 vanishes vote splitting issues: APR give no incentive (or
 possibility) to split votes.
 raises the individual approbation rate of elected members: Each
 APR rep will have a 'weighted vote' in the legislative assembly
 exactly equal to the number of citizens who have helped her to be
 elected -- no vote is wasted and continues into the assembly.
 treats all candidates equally (independents included)! Completely!
 For example, 'independents' could either form an 'association' by
 themselves, or seek to represent any association's agenda that any
 of them might favor.
 eliminates the democratic deficit: Completely!
 treats all political parties equally (no quota): Completely!
 gives to every voter the same weight: Completely!
 elects party-line builder: Yes, if this refers to the building and
 sustaining of a working majority coalition (and also its
 government in a parliamentary system).
 guarantees stable coalitions of two parties: see previous response.
 guarantees twice the number of MPs in the worst case: No, APR
 guarantees only the exact proportional election of the
 pre-established number of MPs.
 preserves learning [about] a small number of candidates to vote
 [for]: If she wishes, APR allows a citizen to vote for only one
 candidate in the country. Alternatively, she can rank as few or as
 many candidates in the whole country as she might wish.
 reduces strategic nominations: Completely!
 hinders bribing electorate [for]support: as much as possible.
 avoids regional confrontation: APR provides alternatives to
 regional conflicts yet would allow any such conflicts to be
 represented, i.e. exactly in proportion to the number of citizens
 who care most about them.
 eliminates gerrymandering: Completely!

To facilitate any of our future discussions, it might sometime be
helpful if I could 'cut and paste' some of your words (like the above)
to comment upon them. Thus, might it be possible for you separately to
email me your relevant SPPA works in a suitable [?Word?] format so
that I could do this?

I look forward to your feedback.

Steve


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Hello Steve, 1) The whole document is available from http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-1.php to http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-10.php You can copy (Ctrl-C) any of the 10 pages in a text document... 2) I will read your APR document as soon I find which software opens .odt document... For the moment I can only give some comments on your APR comparison. I am sorry if it sounds negative but it is not. I just want more details about the few differences between APR and SPPA: 3) Does APR "geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups)" /that/ "will be officially recognized as electoral 'associations" prevent outsiders to infiltrate artificially an electoral 'associations? Like partisan of a mainstream idea that would decide to sink another debate using their strong majority...? Lets suppose that massive supporters of gay weddings want to dilute a more 50%-50% debate about adoption froms homosexual parents (just an example). Would APR detect organized infiltration movements? 4) What happens if a very low number of APR representatives controls a majority (more than 50%) of the parliament voices? Oligarchy? 5) SPPA garantees a stable bipartite coalition around the main political parties, despite balanced national split supports like 30%, 18%, 17%, 14%, 11% and 10%. In such a case, it would boost the main party to 50% and reduce the mandate to 3/7 of tis original length to ensure fairness. How does APR handle unstable splits? 6) How do you organize fair debates when a voter can choose between a huge amount of candidates? It might take some time before I comment: plenty of work... S. Rouillon Le 2015-07-21 19:53, steve bosworth a écrit : > > * > * > > > > From: election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com > > Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 17 > > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 12:01:59 -0700 > > ............................. > > 1. Real Democracy (St?phane Rouillon) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 23:09:04 -0400 > > From: St?phane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon@sympatico.ca> > > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > <mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > > > Subject: [EM] Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane > Rouillon > > > > Message-ID: <BLU437-SMTP1063BACDACEABF3872910208F860@phx.gbl> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed" > > > > > Stephane Rouillon wrote: > > > >R: I do not know if you would find it real democracy, but SPPA is what I > > have to offer best... > > > http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/p199397_index.html > > http://votebook.ca/pdf/SPPAforMPSA13042007.pdf > > > > Dr Rouillon. > > > > > >>Steve (S): I have studied your very useful but brief > bullet-point-type-presentation of SPPA. Thank you. I hope you will > send me more details, partly in response to my following points and > suggestions. > > > Our aims and values seem to be almost identical. Therefore, if you > have the time, I would appreciate it if you would study my article > ('Equal Voting Sustained') to see whether or not Associational > Proportional Representation (APR) might not serve your aims even more > completely than your current version of SPPA. I will send you (or > anyone else) this article separately upon request. > > > For example, with regard to your list of SPPA's benefits, APR would > seem to compare as follows: > > > * > > still needs only one visit to the polling station: Yes. > > * > > maintains the accountability link with elected members: Yes. > > * > > gathers sincere preferences: Yes. > > * > > allows ordering of the issues by the electorate: APR allows this > to some extent during its 'primary election' which determines > which geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary > organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups) will be > officially recognized as electoral 'associations'. At the same > time, each citizen chooses through which one she will rank as few > or as many candidates in the whole country as she might wish > during the later general election. > > * > > reduces the antagonism between candidates: APR candidates would > have every incentive both to be very clear and exact about her own > scale of values and policy proposals, and to negotiate, even with > opponents, any compromises necessary, to achieve agreements (e.g. > to help form a majority coalition) to legislate at least some of > her policy goals. > > * > > vanishes vote splitting issues: APR give no incentive (or > possibility) to split votes. > > * > > raises the individual approbation rate of elected members: Each > APR rep will have a 'weighted vote' in the legislative assembly > exactly equal to the number of citizens who have helped her to be > elected -- no vote is wasted and continues into the assembly. > > * > > treats all candidates equally (independents included)! Completely! > For example, 'independents' could either form an 'association' by > themselves, or seek to represent any association's agenda that any > of them might favor. > > * > > eliminates the democratic deficit: Completely! > > * > > treats all political parties equally (no quota): Completely! > > * > > gives to every voter the same weight: Completely! > > * > > elects party-line builder: Yes, if this refers to the building and > sustaining of a working majority coalition (and also its > government in a parliamentary system). > > * > > guarantees stable coalitions of two parties: see previous response. > > * > > guarantees twice the number of MPs in the worst case: No, APR > guarantees only the exact proportional election of the > pre-established number of MPs. > > * > > preserves learning [about] a small number of candidates to vote > [for]: If she wishes, APR allows a citizen to vote for only one > candidate in the country. Alternatively, she can rank as few or as > many candidates in the whole country as she might wish. > > * > > reduces strategic nominations: Completely! > > * > > hinders bribing electorate [for]support: as much as possible. > > * > > avoids regional confrontation: APR provides alternatives to > regional conflicts yet would allow any such conflicts to be > represented, i.e. exactly in proportion to the number of citizens > who care most about them. > > * > > eliminates gerrymandering: Completely! > > > To facilitate any of our future discussions, it might sometime be > helpful if I could 'cut and paste' some of your words (like the above) > to comment upon them. Thus, might it be possible for you separately to > email me your relevant SPPA works in a suitable [?Word?] format so > that I could do this? > > I look forward to your feedback. > > > > > Steve > > > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info