MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Nov 2, 2016 6:49 PM
Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of
It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm
in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to
use the normal approval strategy
(endquote)
But what I'm saying is that "normal Approval strategy"
won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.
...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best &
perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set
will be optimal.
Michael Ossipoff
unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info
available, is acceptable.
Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. That
is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs
about parties.
Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total
poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
Though there might not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic
political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99%
could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still
a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are
significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no
But what if there weren't, because all the candidates quality equally
Only then will there be no top-set.
Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of
approving only your top-set.
But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma,
If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or
two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a
richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly
wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system,
there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target
system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers
all administration and representative bodies).
You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information
about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected
winner-merit, & approve down to there.
Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may
not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it
may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I
proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the
actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used
strategies in the polls.
But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy
simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly
happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and
equally being just what you most want.
...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
Michael Ossipoff
On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" juho.laatu@gmail.com wrote:
Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically
(constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a
difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to
deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are
expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from
the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all
polls, not only approval based polls.
It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the
best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving
down to hir.
Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that your
vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically means
approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at least one
of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the polls I
assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be applied.)
But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this
country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates.
(I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the
population to elect a progressive government).
So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows
what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is
entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your
top-set.
Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections, or
to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention was
to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the normal
approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal approval
strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
(I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the
progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
In a different & better society, with honest elections and media,
maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable
that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a
top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest
elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's
the CWs. Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the
CWs, if s/he's identifiable. ...and s/he likely would be, then.
Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't
identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing
strategy would be the next best. ...approving down to the expected
winner-merit.
The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs
(Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates
from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal
approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner
instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info,
but some insincere poll information instead.
I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which no
election is really 0-info:
The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some
knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the
range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that
range, is it really 0-info?
Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be
less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the
voter-median is. ...where the CWs is.
So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one shouldn't
approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve only down
to some unknown distance short of it.
My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy
can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must
however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other
candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the
voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of
the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners)
the strategy tries to modify.
The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to
be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side.
One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one
can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups
(in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to
fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that
increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the
same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that,
even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a
section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my
suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater
than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be
expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political
system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who
wants the country to be better for the 99%.
Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
Michael Ossipoff
I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the
proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the
election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not
be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate
in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of
not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after
also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation
would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and
easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public
elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem
as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are
often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have
also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B
supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in
the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the
polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate
than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to
longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the
following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to
one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they
are not elected this time.
In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency to
vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote strategically
(one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more typical to just vote
sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality elections, where strategic
voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is often the only rational
thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if one's only goal is to win
this particular election), many people still prefer to vote sincerely.
I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval
elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in
practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would
have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This
applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet.
I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public
Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for
someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be
applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none.
The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how
strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I
have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy
friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party
strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive
strategies are considered to be fools).
Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll
to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the
informational poll.
That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who
suggests such pre-election informational polls.
Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I
missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">"
have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the
preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are
not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A
supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even
worse C).
Approving hir or not is ok.
I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve
That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and
B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere
preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters
believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic
answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with
good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
(although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
simply bullet voted).
The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere
opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A
supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it
makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In
the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
I generated one example of strategic polling in approval
elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food
for your thoughts.
Sincere preferences:
51: A>B>C
49-c: B>C>A
c: C>B>A
Approval poll results:
51-ab: {A}
ab: {A, B}
49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)
x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
c-cb: {C}
cb: {C, B}
Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The
intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make
B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval
level of C.
Approval election results:
51-ab': {A}
ab': {A, B}
49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)
bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)
c-cb': {C}
cb': {C, B}
The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as
large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil,
to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters
should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very
popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of
a middle candidate between A and C.
The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A
supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B.
The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic
tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <
I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My
comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line
of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
Introduction
Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots.
While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is
external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For instance,
voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing just one
candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a
variety of common scenarios.
Polling Assumption
Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay
with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest
utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
Awful: 0
Better: 6
Classy: 10
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
{Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
You should approve both.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Polling Assumption
Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper
suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such
information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their
favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended
to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if
by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive
information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Approval Voting Example #1
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 50%
Classy: 30%
You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful.
Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your
support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
Approval Voting Example #2
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 50%
Classy: 50%
You still vote for Better and Classy.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong
preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy,
you risk Awful winning against both of them.
Approval Voting Example #3
If approval polls:
Awful: 30%
Better: 50%
Classy: 50%
You actually only vote for Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
I disagree.
{Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters
more than the matter of which of is members wins.
In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of
Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling
Classy. So you approve your top-set.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights
against Better and show your support for Classy.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far
out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike
Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and
Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a
voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to
winning.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were
holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Approval Voting Example #4
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 30%
Classy: 50%
Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Disagree.
Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if
Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you
should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s
Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote
would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the
first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better
in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the
outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view
he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and
Classy.
[...]
Conclusion
These examples remove the argument that approval voting
regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Of course.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting
simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for
one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we
just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note
that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will
ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's
"information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media,
and should be completely disregarded.
Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs
(Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations
on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more
candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average. There
may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that
share certain views.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will
nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head
race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve
this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also
argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it
does so for good reason.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
More on this topic here.
Topic:
Tactical Voting
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
(Replying farther down)
On Nov 2, 2016 11:19 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 19:51, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>
>> Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of
questionable value.
>
> It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm
in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to
use the normal approval strategy
(endquote)
But what I'm saying is that "normal Approval strategy"
won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.
...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best &
perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set
will be optimal.
Michael Ossipoff
unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info
available, is acceptable.
>
>> Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. _That_
is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs
about parties.
>
> Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total
poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
>
>> Though there _might_ not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic
political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
>>
>> Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99%
could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still
a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
>>
>> Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are
significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
>>
>> So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no
longer odious.
>>
>> But what if there weren't, because _all_ the candidates quality equally
as the very best.
>>
>> Only then will there be no top-set.
>>
>> Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of
approving only your top-set.
>>
>> But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma,
wouldn't you agree?
>
> If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or
two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a
richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly
wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system,
there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target
system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers
all administration and representative bodies).
>
>> You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information
about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected
winner-merit, & approve down to there.
>
> Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may
not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it
may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I
proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the
actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used
strategies in the polls.
>
> Juho
>
>> But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy
simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly
happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and
equally being just what you most want.
>>
>>
>> ...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 18:13, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:27 AM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically
(constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a
difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to
deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are
expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from
the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all
polls, not only approval based polls.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the
best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving
down to hir.
>>>
>>>
>>> Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that your
vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically means
approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at least one
of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the polls I
assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be applied.)
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this
country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates.
(I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the
population to elect a progressive government).
>>>>
>>>> So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows
what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
>>>>
>>>> For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is
entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your
top-set.
>>>
>>>
>>> Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections, or
to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention was
to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the normal
approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal approval
strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
>>>
>>> (I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the
progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
>>>
>>>>
>>>> In a different & better society, with honest elections and media,
maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable
that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a
top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest
elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's
the CWs. Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the
CWs, if s/he's identifiable. ...and s/he likely would be, then.
>>>>
>>>> Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't
identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing
strategy would be the next best. ...approving down to the expected
winner-merit.
>>>
>>>
>>> The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs
(Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates
from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal
approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner
instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info,
but some insincere poll information instead.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
>>>>
>>>> Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which no
election is really 0-info:
>>>>
>>>> The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some
knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the
range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that
range, is it really 0-info?
>>>>
>>>> Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be
less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
>>>>
>>>> That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the
voter-median is. ...where the CWs is.
>>>>
>>>> So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one shouldn't
approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve only down
to some unknown distance short of it.
>>>
>>>
>>> My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy
can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must
however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other
candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the
voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of
the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners)
the strategy tries to modify.
>>>
>>> The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to
be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side.
One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one
can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups
(in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to
fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that
increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the
same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that,
even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a
section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
>>>>
>>>> So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my
suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater
than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be
expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
>>>>
>>>> But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political
system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who
wants the country to be better for the 99%.
>>>>
>>>> Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
>>>>
>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the
proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the
election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not
be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate
in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of
not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after
also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation
would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
>>>
>>> Juho
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and
easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public
elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem
as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are
often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have
also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B
supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in
the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the
polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate
than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to
longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the
following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to
one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they
are not elected this time.
>>>>>
>>>>> In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency to
vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote strategically
(one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more typical to just vote
sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality elections, where strategic
voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is often the only rational
thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if one's only goal is to win
this particular election), many people still prefer to vote sincerely.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval
elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in
practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would
have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This
applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet.
I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public
Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for
someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be
applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none.
The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how
strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I
have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy
friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party
strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive
strategies are considered to be fools).
>>>>>
>>>>> Juho
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 07:29, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll
to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the
informational poll.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who
suggests such pre-election informational polls.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I
missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">"
have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the
preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are
not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A
supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even
worse C).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Approving hir or not is ok.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve
B.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and
B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere
preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters
believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic
answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with
good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
(although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
simply bullet voted).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere
opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A
supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it
makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In
the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Juho
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval
elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food
for your thoughts.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sincere preferences:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 51: A>B>C
>>>>>>>>> 49-c: B>C>A
>>>>>>>>> c: C>B>A
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Approval poll results:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 51-ab: {A}
>>>>>>>>> ab: {A, B}
>>>>>>>>> 49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)
>>>>>>>>> x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
>>>>>>>>> c-cb: {C}
>>>>>>>>> cb: {C, B}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
>>>>>>>>> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The
intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make
B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval
level of C.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Approval election results:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 51-ab': {A}
>>>>>>>>> ab': {A, B}
>>>>>>>>> 49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)
>>>>>>>>> bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)
>>>>>>>>> c-cb': {C}
>>>>>>>>> cb': {C, B}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as
large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil,
to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters
should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very
popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of
a middle candidate between A and C.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A
supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B.
The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic
tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Juho
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <
email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My
comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line
of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Introduction
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots.
While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is
external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For instance,
voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing just one
candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a
variety of common scenarios.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay
with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest
utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 0
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 6
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 10
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You should approve both.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper
suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such
information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their
favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended
to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if
by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive
information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #1
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 30%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful.
Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your
support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #2
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You still vote for Better and Classy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong
preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy,
you risk Awful winning against both of them.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #3
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 30%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You actually only vote for Classy here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I disagree.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters
more than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of
Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling
Classy. So you approve your top-set.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights
against Better and show your support for Classy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far
out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike
Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and
Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a
voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to
winning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were
holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #4
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 30%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Disagree.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if
Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you
should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s
Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote
would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the
first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better
in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the
outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view
he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and
Classy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>>> Conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> These examples remove the argument that approval voting
regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Of course.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting
simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for
one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we
just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note
that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will
ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's
"information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media,
and should be completely disregarded.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs
(Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations
on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more
candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average. There
may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that
share certain views.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will
nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head
race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve
this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also
argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it
does so for good reason.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> More on this topic here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Topic:
>>>>>>>>>> Tactical Voting
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
>>>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Nov 2, 2016 8:31 PM
Well, suppose that all the candidates are excellent, but some qualify as
"very best excellent" and perfect.
If you're like me, you'll just approve the "very best excellent"
near-perfect ones, instead of needing to choose among the merely excellent
ones
.If one of merely excellent ones wins, then just take a chance on which
merely excellent candidate wins.
But what if, due to equal candidate merit spacing, there's a gradual
uniform gradation between those 2 sets, making it not so easy to say where
to draw the line, and the approval-cutoff?
Two possibilities suggest themselves:
-
If there are some that are definitely perfect, and some that are in a a
gradation-region where it's difficult to draw the line, then why settle for
"maybe perfect". Just approve the definitely perfect ones.
-
But if that uniform gradation extends all the way to the top, then,
within that gradation, choose an Approval cutoff that's as close as
possible to the expected CWs, or as close as possible to the expected
winner-merit, however estimated.
But don't worry--We won't have to deal with that problem for a little while.
Michael Ossipoff
On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of
It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm
in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to
use the normal approval strategy
(endquote)
But what I'm saying is that "normal Approval strategy"
won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.
...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best &
perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set
will be optimal.
Michael Ossipoff
unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info
available, is acceptable.
Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. That
is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs
about parties.
Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total
poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
Though there might not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic
political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99%
could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still
a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are
significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no
But what if there weren't, because all the candidates quality equally
Only then will there be no top-set.
Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of
approving only your top-set.
But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma,
If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or
two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a
richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly
wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system,
there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target
system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers
all administration and representative bodies).
You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information
about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected
winner-merit, & approve down to there.
Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may
not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it
may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I
proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the
actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used
strategies in the polls.
But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy
simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly
happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and
equally being just what you most want.
...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
Michael Ossipoff
On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" juho.laatu@gmail.com wrote:
Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically
(constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a
difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to
deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are
expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from
the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all
polls, not only approval based polls.
It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the
best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving
down to hir.
Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that
your vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically
means approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at
least one of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the
polls I assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be
applied.)
But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this
country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates.
(I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the
population to elect a progressive government).
So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows
what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is
entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your
top-set.
Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections,
or to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention
was to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the
normal approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal
approval strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
(I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the
progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
In a different & better society, with honest elections and media,
maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable
that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a
top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest
elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's
the CWs. Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the
CWs, if s/he's identifiable. ...and s/he likely would be, then.
Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't
identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing
strategy would be the next best. ...approving down to the expected
winner-merit.
The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs
(Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates
from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal
approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner
instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info,
but some insincere poll information instead.
I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which
no election is really 0-info:
The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some
knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the
range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that
range, is it really 0-info?
Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be
less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the
voter-median is. ...where the CWs is.
So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one
shouldn't approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve
only down to some unknown distance short of it.
My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy
can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must
however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other
candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the
voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of
the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners)
the strategy tries to modify.
The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to
be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side.
One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one
can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups
(in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to
fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that
increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the
same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that,
even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a
section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my
suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater
than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be
expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political
system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who
wants the country to be better for the 99%.
Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
Michael Ossipoff
I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the
proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the
election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not
be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate
in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of
not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after
also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation
would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and
easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public
elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem
as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are
often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have
also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B
supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in
the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the
polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate
than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to
longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the
following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to
one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they
are not elected this time.
In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency
to vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote
strategically (one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more
typical to just vote sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality
elections, where strategic voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is
often the only rational thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if
one's only goal is to win this particular election), many people still
prefer to vote sincerely.
I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval
elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in
practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would
have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This
applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet.
I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public
Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for
someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be
applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none.
The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how
strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I
have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy
friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party
strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive
strategies are considered to be fools).
Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll
to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the
informational poll.
That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who
suggests such pre-election informational polls.
Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I
missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <
B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the
">" have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the
preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are
not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A
supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even
worse C).
Approving hir or not is ok.
I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't
That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and
B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere
preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters
believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic
answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with
good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
(although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
simply bullet voted).
The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere
opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A
supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it
makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In
the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
I generated one example of strategic polling in approval
elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food
for your thoughts.
Sincere preferences:
51: A>B>C
49-c: B>C>A
c: C>B>A
Approval poll results:
51-ab: {A}
ab: {A, B}
49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)
x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
c-cb: {C}
cb: {C, B}
Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The
intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make
B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval
level of C.
Approval election results:
51-ab': {A}
ab': {A, B}
49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)
bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)
c-cb': {C}
cb': {C, B}
The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as
large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil,
to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters
should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very
popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of
a middle candidate between A and C.
The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A
supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B.
The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic
tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <
I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My
comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line
of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
Introduction
Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest
ballots. While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting
(link is external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For
instance, voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing
just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in
a variety of common scenarios.
Polling Assumption
Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay
with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest
utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
Awful: 0
Better: 6
Classy: 10
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
{Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
You should approve both.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Polling Assumption
Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper
suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such
information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their
favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended
to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if
by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive
information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Approval Voting Example #1
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 50%
Classy: 30%
You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful.
Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your
support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
Approval Voting Example #2
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 50%
Classy: 50%
You still vote for Better and Classy.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong
preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy,
you risk Awful winning against both of them.
Approval Voting Example #3
If approval polls:
Awful: 30%
Better: 50%
Classy: 50%
You actually only vote for Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
I disagree.
{Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set
matters more than the matter of which of is members wins.
In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of
Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling
Classy. So you approve your top-set.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your
sights against Better and show your support for Classy.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far
out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike
Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and
Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a
voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to
winning.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were
holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Approval Voting Example #4
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 30%
Classy: 50%
Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Disagree.
Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if
Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you
should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore;
it’s Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote
would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the
first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better
in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the
outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view
he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and
Classy.
[...]
Conclusion
These examples remove the argument that approval voting
regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Of course.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet
voting simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only
vote for one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the
outcome. Also, factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway
when considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval
voting, we just have more options on what we can do with that information.
Also note that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That
will ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's
"information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media,
and should be completely disregarded.
Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs
(Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations
on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more
candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average. There
may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that
share certain views.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will
nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head
race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve
this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also
argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it
does so for good reason.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
More on this topic here.
Topic:
Tactical Voting
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
Well, suppose that all the candidates are excellent, but some qualify as
"very best excellent" and perfect.
If you're like me, you'll just approve the "very best excellent"
near-perfect ones, instead of needing to choose among the merely excellent
ones
.If one of merely excellent ones wins, then just take a chance on which
merely excellent candidate wins.
But what if, due to equal candidate merit spacing, there's a gradual
uniform gradation between those 2 sets, making it not so easy to say where
to draw the line, and the approval-cutoff?
Two possibilities suggest themselves:
1. If there are some that are definitely perfect, and some that are in a a
gradation-region where it's difficult to draw the line, then why settle for
"maybe perfect". Just approve the definitely perfect ones.
2. But if that uniform gradation extends all the way to the top, then,
within that gradation, choose an Approval cutoff that's as close as
possible to the expected CWs, or as close as possible to the expected
winner-merit, however estimated.
But don't worry--We won't have to deal with that problem for a little while.
Michael Ossipoff
On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> (Replying farther down)
>
> On Nov 2, 2016 11:19 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> On 02 Nov 2016, at 19:51, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of
> questionable value.
> >
> > It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm
> in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to
> use the normal approval strategy
>
> (endquote)
>
> But what I'm saying is that "normal Approval strategy"
> won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.
>
> ...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best &
> perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set
> will be optimal.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info
> available, is acceptable.
> >
> >> Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. _That_
> is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs
> about parties.
> >
> > Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total
> poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
> >
> >> Though there _might_ not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic
> political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
> >>
> >> Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99%
> could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still
> a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
> >>
> >> Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are
> significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
> >>
> >> So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no
> longer odious.
> >>
> >> But what if there weren't, because _all_ the candidates quality equally
> as the very best.
> >>
> >> Only then will there be no top-set.
> >>
> >> Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of
> approving only your top-set.
> >>
> >> But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma,
> wouldn't you agree?
> >
> > If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or
> two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a
> richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly
> wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system,
> there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target
> system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers
> all administration and representative bodies).
> >
> >> You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information
> about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected
> winner-merit, & approve down to there.
> >
> > Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may
> not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it
> may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I
> proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the
> actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used
> strategies in the polls.
> >
> > Juho
> >
> >> But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy
> simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly
> happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and
> equally being just what you most want.
> >>
> >>
> >> ...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
> >>
> >> Michael Ossipoff
> >>
> >> On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 18:13, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:27 AM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically
> (constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a
> difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to
> deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are
> expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from
> the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all
> polls, not only approval based polls.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the
> best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving
> down to hir.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that
> your vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically
> means approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at
> least one of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the
> polls I assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be
> applied.)
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this
> country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates.
> (I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the
> population to elect a progressive government).
> >>>>
> >>>> So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows
> what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
> >>>>
> >>>> For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is
> entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your
> top-set.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections,
> or to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention
> was to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the
> normal approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal
> approval strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
> >>>
> >>> (I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the
> progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> In a different & better society, with honest elections and media,
> maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable
> that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a
> top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest
> elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's
> the CWs. Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the
> CWs, if s/he's identifiable. ...and s/he likely would be, then.
> >>>>
> >>>> Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't
> identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing
> strategy would be the next best. ...approving down to the expected
> winner-merit.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs
> (Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates
> from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal
> approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner
> instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info,
> but some insincere poll information instead.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
> >>>>
> >>>> Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which
> no election is really 0-info:
> >>>>
> >>>> The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some
> knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the
> range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that
> range, is it really 0-info?
> >>>>
> >>>> Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be
> less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
> >>>>
> >>>> That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the
> voter-median is. ...where the CWs is.
> >>>>
> >>>> So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one
> shouldn't approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve
> only down to some unknown distance short of it.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy
> can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must
> however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other
> candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the
> voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of
> the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners)
> the strategy tries to modify.
> >>>
> >>> The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to
> be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side.
> One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one
> can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups
> (in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to
> fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that
> increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the
> same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that,
> even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a
> section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
> >>>>
> >>>> So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my
> suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater
> than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be
> expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
> >>>>
> >>>> But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political
> system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who
> wants the country to be better for the 99%.
> >>>>
> >>>> Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
> >>>>
> >>>> Michael Ossipoff
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the
> proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the
> election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not
> be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate
> in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of
> not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after
> also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation
> would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
> >>>
> >>> Juho
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and
> easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public
> elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem
> as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are
> often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have
> also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B
> supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in
> the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the
> polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate
> than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to
> longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the
> following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to
> one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they
> are not elected this time.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency
> to vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote
> strategically (one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more
> typical to just vote sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality
> elections, where strategic voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is
> often the only rational thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if
> one's only goal is to win this particular election), many people still
> prefer to vote sincerely.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval
> elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in
> practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would
> have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This
> applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet.
> I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public
> Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for
> someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be
> applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none.
> The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how
> strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I
> have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy
> friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party
> strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive
> strategies are considered to be fools).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Juho
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 07:29, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll
> to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the
> informational poll.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who
> suggests such pre-election informational polls.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I
> missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
> discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <
> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the
> ">" have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the
> preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are
> not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A
> supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even
> worse C).
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Approving hir or not is ok.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't
> approve B.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and
> B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere
> preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters
> believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic
> answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with
> good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
> (although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
> simply bullet voted).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere
> opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A
> supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it
> makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In
> the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Juho
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval
> elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food
> for your thoughts.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Sincere preferences:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> 51: A>B>C
> >>>>>>>>> 49-c: B>C>A
> >>>>>>>>> c: C>B>A
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Approval poll results:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> 51-ab: {A}
> >>>>>>>>> ab: {A, B}
> >>>>>>>>> 49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)
> >>>>>>>>> x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
> >>>>>>>>> c-cb: {C}
> >>>>>>>>> cb: {C, B}
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
> >>>>>>>>> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The
> intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make
> B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval
> level of C.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Approval election results:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> 51-ab': {A}
> >>>>>>>>> ab': {A, B}
> >>>>>>>>> 49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)
> >>>>>>>>> bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)
> >>>>>>>>> c-cb': {C}
> >>>>>>>>> cb': {C, B}
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as
> large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil,
> to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters
> should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very
> popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of
> a middle candidate between A and C.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A
> supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B.
> The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic
> tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
> elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Juho
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <
> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My
> comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line
> of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Introduction
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest
> ballots. While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting
> (link is external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For
> instance, voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing
> just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in
> a variety of common scenarios.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
> polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
> different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay
> with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest
> utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 0
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 6
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 10
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You should approve both.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
> polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
> different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper
> suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such
> information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their
> favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended
> to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if
> by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive
> information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #1
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 30%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful.
> Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your
> support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #2
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You still vote for Better and Classy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong
> preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy,
> you risk Awful winning against both of them.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #3
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 30%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You actually only vote for Classy here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I disagree.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set
> matters more than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of
> Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling
> Classy. So you approve your top-set.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your
> sights against Better and show your support for Classy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far
> out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike
> Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and
> Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a
> voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to
> winning.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were
> holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #4
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 30%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Disagree.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if
> Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you
> should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore;
> it’s Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote
> would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the
> first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better
> in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the
> outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view
> he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and
> Classy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> [...]
> >>>>>>>>>> Conclusion
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> These examples remove the argument that approval voting
> regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Of course.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet
> voting simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only
> vote for one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the
> outcome. Also, factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway
> when considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval
> voting, we just have more options on what we can do with that information.
> Also note that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That
> will ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's
> "information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media,
> and should be completely disregarded.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs
> (Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
> mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
> something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
> bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations
> on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more
> candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average. There
> may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that
> share certain views.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will
> nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head
> race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve
> this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also
> argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it
> does so for good reason.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> More on this topic here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Topic:
> >>>>>>>>>> Tactical Voting
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> ----
> >>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
> for list info
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> ----
> >>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
> for list info
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ----
> >>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
> list info
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ----
> >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
> list info
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
> info
> >>>
> >
> >
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
> info
> >
>
JL
Juho Laatu
Thu, Nov 3, 2016 7:59 AM
On 02 Nov 2016, at 22:31, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com wrote:
Well, suppose that all the candidates are excellent, but some qualify as "very best excellent" and perfect.
If you're like me, you'll just approve the "very best excellent" near-perfect ones, instead of needing to choose among the merely excellent ones
.If one of merely excellent ones wins, then just take a chance on which merely excellent candidate wins.
I might vote that way if all candidates were excellent and some even better. I think this describes a situation where the election is not very competitive, and as a result I have no need to apply the most efficient strategy that I know. I probably trust that also other voters have similar feelings and plans, and as a result the best / most approved candidate will win.
My problem here is that political elections are typically very competitive, and as a result most voters are interested in casting a vote that is as strong as possible. Voters try to make sure that their vote will help their favourites and absolutely not help the worst candidates and the strongest competitors of their favourites.
In elections that are not competitive one could of course move towards different methods and strategies, like approval based on sincere individual preferences (instead of expected candidate strength based strategy), or sincere range.
But what if, due to equal candidate merit spacing, there's a gradual uniform gradation between those 2 sets, making it not so easy to say where to draw the line, and the approval-cutoff?
Two possibilities suggest themselves:
- If there are some that are definitely perfect, and some that are in a a gradation-region where it's difficult to draw the line, then why settle for "maybe perfect". Just approve the definitely perfect ones.
That still does not offer the best competitive strategy.
- But if that uniform gradation extends all the way to the top, then, within that gradation, choose an Approval cutoff that's as close as possible to the expected CWs, or as close as possible to the expected winner-merit, however estimated.
But now we are getting closer. You should set your approval cutoff to that side of the CWs (or expected winner) where the second strongest candidate is (again assuming that you are competitive).
But don't worry--We won't have to deal with that problem for a little while.
But I guess whoever will one day use approval in competitive spirit should have a clear understanding of the strategies.
It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to use the normal approval strategy
(endquote)
But what I'm saying is that "normal Approval strategy"
won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.
...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best & perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set will be optimal.
You seem to propose that one should not use the (well known, ideal) normal approval strategy. I'm thinking that those voters that use the normal strategy (based on sufficiently accurate estimates on support of key candidates) will have more power than those that do not vote that way. I guess you were saying that in some elections finding the ideal competitive strategy might be less important to the voter than just approving those candidates that the voter finds most approvable.
In competitive elections, if voters can use some poll information to make their vote stronger, they are likely to do so. In the proposed strategy there is of course the small problem that poll information may not always be totally reliable and completely accurate. Also in such cases the voters might get some guidance from their parties, or they might adjust the poll results themselves to make them more credible.
Using personal preference information only, and not paying any attention to available poll results, does not make much sense if one assumes that voters are competitive. I however assume that some voters will do so, even in competitive approval elections.
Jumping once more back to the proposed strategy. I note that any available poll information could influence voting decisions in competitive approval elections. The approval cutoff point of those voters that use the "normal" approval strategy can be moved by influencing the poll results by giving misleading information in the polls.
Juho
Michael Ossipoff
unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info available, is acceptable.
Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. That is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs about parties.
Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
Though there might not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99% could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no longer odious.
But what if there weren't, because all the candidates quality equally as the very best.
Only then will there be no top-set.
Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of approving only your top-set.
But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma, wouldn't you agree?
If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system, there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers all administration and representative bodies).
You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected winner-merit, & approve down to there.
Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used strategies in the polls.
Juho
But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and equally being just what you most want.
...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
Michael Ossipoff
On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically (constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all polls, not only approval based polls.
It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving down to hir.
Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that your vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically means approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at least one of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the polls I assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be applied.)
But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates. (I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the population to elect a progressive government).
So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your top-set.
Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections, or to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention was to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the normal approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal approval strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
(I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
In a different & better society, with honest elections and media, maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's the CWs. Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the CWs, if s/he's identifiable. ...and s/he likely would be, then.
Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing strategy would be the next best. ...approving down to the expected winner-merit.
The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs (Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info, but some insincere poll information instead.
I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which no election is really 0-info:
The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that range, is it really 0-info?
Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the voter-median is. ...where the CWs is.
So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one shouldn't approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve only down to some unknown distance short of it.
My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners) the strategy tries to modify.
The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side. One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups (in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that, even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who wants the country to be better for the 99%.
Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
Michael Ossipoff
I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
Juho
On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they are not elected this time.
In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency to vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote strategically (one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more typical to just vote sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality elections, where strategic voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is often the only rational thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if one's only goal is to win this particular election), many people still prefer to vote sincerely.
I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet. I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none. The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive strategies are considered to be fools).
Juho
On 02 Nov 2016, at 07:29, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com mailto:email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the informational poll.
That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who suggests such pre-election informational polls.
Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:
I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even worse C).
Approving hir or not is ok.
I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve B.
That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election (although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them simply bullet voted).
The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
Juho
I generated one example of strategic polling in approval elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food for your thoughts.
Sincere preferences:
51: A>B>C
49-c: B>C>A
c: C>B>A
Approval poll results:
51-ab: {A}
ab: {A, B}
49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)
x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
c-cb: {C}
cb: {C, B}
Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval level of C.
Approval election results:
51-ab': {A}
ab': {A, B}
49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)
bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)
c-cb': {C}
cb': {C, B}
The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of a middle candidate between A and C.
The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B. The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
Juho
On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com mailto:email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
Introduction
Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots. While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For instance, voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a variety of common scenarios.
Polling Assumption
Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
Awful: 0
Better: 6
Classy: 10
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
{Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
You should approve both.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Polling Assumption
Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Approval Voting Example #1
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 50%
Classy: 30%
You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful. Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
Approval Voting Example #2
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 50%
Classy: 50%
You still vote for Better and Classy.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy, you risk Awful winning against both of them.
Approval Voting Example #3
If approval polls:
Awful: 30%
Better: 50%
Classy: 50%
You actually only vote for Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
I disagree.
{Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters more than the matter of which of is members wins.
In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling Classy. So you approve your top-set.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights against Better and show your support for Classy.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to winning.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Approval Voting Example #4
If approval polls:
Awful: 50%
Better: 30%
Classy: 50%
Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Disagree.
Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and Classy.
[...]
Conclusion
These examples remove the argument that approval voting regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Of course.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also, factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's "information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media, and should be completely disregarded.
Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs (Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average. There may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that share certain views.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it does so for good reason.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
More on this topic here.
Topic:
Tactical Voting
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em http://electorama.com/em for list info
> On 02 Nov 2016, at 22:31, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Well, suppose that all the candidates are excellent, but some qualify as "very best excellent" and perfect.
>
> If you're like me, you'll just approve the "very best excellent" near-perfect ones, instead of needing to choose among the merely excellent ones
>
> .If one of merely excellent ones wins, then just take a chance on which merely excellent candidate wins.
I might vote that way if all candidates were excellent and some even better. I think this describes a situation where the election is not very competitive, and as a result I have no need to apply the most efficient strategy that I know. I probably trust that also other voters have similar feelings and plans, and as a result the best / most approved candidate will win.
My problem here is that political elections are typically very competitive, and as a result most voters are interested in casting a vote that is as strong as possible. Voters try to make sure that their vote will help their favourites and absolutely not help the worst candidates and the strongest competitors of their favourites.
In elections that are not competitive one could of course move towards different methods and strategies, like approval based on sincere individual preferences (instead of expected candidate strength based strategy), or sincere range.
>
> But what if, due to equal candidate merit spacing, there's a gradual uniform gradation between those 2 sets, making it not so easy to say where to draw the line, and the approval-cutoff?
>
> Two possibilities suggest themselves:
>
> 1. If there are some that are definitely perfect, and some that are in a a gradation-region where it's difficult to draw the line, then why settle for "maybe perfect". Just approve the definitely perfect ones.
That still does not offer the best competitive strategy.
>
> 2. But if that uniform gradation extends all the way to the top, then, within that gradation, choose an Approval cutoff that's as close as possible to the expected CWs, or as close as possible to the expected winner-merit, however estimated.
But now we are getting closer. You should set your approval cutoff to that side of the CWs (or expected winner) where the second strongest candidate is (again assuming that you are competitive).
>
> But don't worry--We won't have to deal with that problem for a little while.
But I guess whoever will one day use approval in competitive spirit should have a clear understanding of the strategies.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
> (Replying farther down)
>
> On Nov 2, 2016 11:19 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> On 02 Nov 2016, at 19:51, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of questionable value.
> >
> > It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to use the normal approval strategy
>
> (endquote)
>
> But what I'm saying is that "normal Approval strategy"
> won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.
>
> ...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best & perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set will be optimal.
>
>
You seem to propose that one should not use the (well known, ideal) normal approval strategy. I'm thinking that those voters that use the normal strategy (based on sufficiently accurate estimates on support of key candidates) will have more power than those that do not vote that way. I guess you were saying that in some elections finding the ideal competitive strategy might be less important to the voter than just approving those candidates that the voter finds most approvable.
In competitive elections, if voters can use some poll information to make their vote stronger, they are likely to do so. In the proposed strategy there is of course the small problem that poll information may not always be totally reliable and completely accurate. Also in such cases the voters might get some guidance from their parties, or they might adjust the poll results themselves to make them more credible.
Using personal preference information only, and not paying any attention to available poll results, does not make much sense if one assumes that voters are competitive. I however assume that some voters will do so, even in competitive approval elections.
Jumping once more back to the proposed strategy. I note that any available poll information could influence voting decisions in competitive approval elections. The approval cutoff point of those voters that use the "normal" approval strategy can be moved by influencing the poll results by giving misleading information in the polls.
Juho
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
> unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info available, is acceptable.
> >
> >> Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. _That_ is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs about parties.
> >
> > Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
> >
> >> Though there _might_ not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
> >>
> >> Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99% could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
> >>
> >> Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
> >>
> >> So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no longer odious.
> >>
> >> But what if there weren't, because _all_ the candidates quality equally as the very best.
> >>
> >> Only then will there be no top-set.
> >>
> >> Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of approving only your top-set.
> >>
> >> But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma, wouldn't you agree?
> >
> > If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system, there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers all administration and representative bodies).
> >
> >> You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected winner-merit, & approve down to there.
> >
> > Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used strategies in the polls.
> >
> > Juho
> >
> >> But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and equally being just what you most want.
> >>
> >>
> >> ...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
> >>
> >> Michael Ossipoff
> >>
> >> On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 18:13, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:27 AM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically (constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all polls, not only approval based polls.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving down to hir.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that your vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically means approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at least one of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the polls I assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be applied.)
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates. (I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the population to elect a progressive government).
> >>>>
> >>>> So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
> >>>>
> >>>> For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your top-set.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections, or to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention was to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the normal approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal approval strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
> >>>
> >>> (I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> In a different & better society, with honest elections and media, maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's the CWs. Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the CWs, if s/he's identifiable. ...and s/he likely would be, then.
> >>>>
> >>>> Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing strategy would be the next best. ...approving down to the expected winner-merit.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs (Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info, but some insincere poll information instead.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
> >>>>
> >>>> Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which no election is really 0-info:
> >>>>
> >>>> The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that range, is it really 0-info?
> >>>>
> >>>> Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
> >>>>
> >>>> That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the voter-median is. ...where the CWs is.
> >>>>
> >>>> So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one shouldn't approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve only down to some unknown distance short of it.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners) the strategy tries to modify.
> >>>
> >>> The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side. One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups (in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that, even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
> >>>>
> >>>> So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
> >>>>
> >>>> But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who wants the country to be better for the 99%.
> >>>>
> >>>> Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
> >>>>
> >>>> Michael Ossipoff
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
> >>>
> >>> Juho
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they are not elected this time.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency to vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote strategically (one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more typical to just vote sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality elections, where strategic voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is often the only rational thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if one's only goal is to win this particular election), many people still prefer to vote sincerely.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet. I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none. The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive strategies are considered to be fools).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Juho
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 07:29, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the informational poll.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who suggests such pre-election informational polls.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">" have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even worse C).
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Approving hir or not is ok.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve B.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election (although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them simply bullet voted).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Juho
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food for your thoughts.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Sincere preferences:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> 51: A>B>C
> >>>>>>>>> 49-c: B>C>A
> >>>>>>>>> c: C>B>A
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Approval poll results:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> 51-ab: {A}
> >>>>>>>>> ab: {A, B}
> >>>>>>>>> 49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)
> >>>>>>>>> x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
> >>>>>>>>> c-cb: {C}
> >>>>>>>>> cb: {C, B}
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
> >>>>>>>>> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval level of C.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Approval election results:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> 51-ab': {A}
> >>>>>>>>> ab': {A, B}
> >>>>>>>>> 49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)
> >>>>>>>>> bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)
> >>>>>>>>> c-cb': {C}
> >>>>>>>>> cb': {C, B}
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of a middle candidate between A and C.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B. The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Juho
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Introduction
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots. While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For instance, voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a variety of common scenarios.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 0
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 6
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 10
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You should approve both.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #1
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 30%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful. Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #2
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You still vote for Better and Classy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy, you risk Awful winning against both of them.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #3
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 30%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You actually only vote for Classy here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I disagree.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters more than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling Classy. So you approve your top-set.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights against Better and show your support for Classy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to winning.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #4
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>> Better: 30%
> >>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Disagree.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and Classy.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> [...]
> >>>>>>>>>> Conclusion
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> These examples remove the argument that approval voting regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Of course.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also, factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's "information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media, and should be completely disregarded.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs (Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average. There may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that share certain views.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it does so for good reason.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Yes.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> More on this topic here.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Topic:
> >>>>>>>>>> Tactical Voting
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> ----
> >>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> ----
> >>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ----
> >>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ----
> >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
> >>>
> >
> >
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
> >
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