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Later No Help? Better Late Than Never (was IRV Finisher DSV)

FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Jun 17, 2022 8:03 PM

This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of
Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than Never
(aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not)

It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too late
... still, better than nothing!

El jue., 16 de jun. de 2022 4:55 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:

Thanks, Kevin and Ted.

My idea is to give a fair chance to all of the candidates that were
eliminated "prematurely" ... to partially remedy the failed promise that if
your first choice is eliminated, then your vote will transfer to your
second choice.

In the finisher approval step, each ballot B approves every candidate that
was once its transferred top choice and every candidate that would have
been its top choice at some stage had it not already been eliminated ... in
sum every candidate that is not outranked on B by its last transferred vote.

To preserve the flavor of IRV we add one post final step: each ballot's
vote is transferred to its approved candidate that is approved on the
greatest number of ballots.

Then elect the candidate with the greatest number of final transferred
votes.

This method (like IRV itself) is too cumbersome to be a good public
proposal.  But it can serve as a good educational tool.

In simulations a comparison of the VSE of the outcomes with and without
the finisher steps will reveal some of the social cost of the premature
eliminations ... i.e. the cost of the betrayal of the failed promises.

-Forest

El jue., 16 de jun. de 2022 9:33 a. m., Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr
escribió:

With Forest's idea, the sense seems to be that the IRV winner can win as
long as that
is somewhat reasonable. I.e. that there isn't some eliminated candidate
who can defeat
all the final-round support for the IRV winner.

If the IRV winner will be considered below all cutoffs, it looks like we
want the IRV
winner to be defeated if at all possible. That doesn't sound good from a
monotonicity
standpoint.

That said, I'm not seeing how the two rules give a different treatment of
the "Z>X>..."
ballot in that scenario, where X was the IRV winner and Z was the other
finalist.

Kevin

Le mercredi 15 juin 2022, 21:34:38 UTC−5, Andy Dienes <
andydienes@gmail.com> a écrit :

It is an interesting idea but I think it would be more fair if it were

like:

IRV winner X, approval winner Y where X is (exclusive) cutoff on all

ballots, then

pairwise of X and Y wins

Otherwise, what if the final round of IRV is X and Z, but my

preferences happen to be

Z > X > (everything else), seems like my vote would be mostly ignored.

On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 10:22 PM Forest Simmons <

One Approval step determines the winner W after the IRV winner X has

been found:

The IRV winner X is the approval cutoff on all ballots ... inclusive

only on the

ballots whose transferred vote went to X on the final IRV round.

This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not) It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too late ... still, better than nothing! El jue., 16 de jun. de 2022 4:55 p. m., Forest Simmons < forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió: > Thanks, Kevin and Ted. > > My idea is to give a fair chance to all of the candidates that were > eliminated "prematurely" ... to partially remedy the failed promise that if > your first choice is eliminated, then your vote will transfer to your > second choice. > > In the finisher approval step, each ballot B approves every candidate that > was once its transferred top choice and every candidate that would have > been its top choice at some stage had it not already been eliminated ... in > sum every candidate that is not outranked on B by its last transferred vote. > > To preserve the flavor of IRV we add one post final step: each ballot's > vote is transferred to its approved candidate that is approved on the > greatest number of ballots. > > Then elect the candidate with the greatest number of final transferred > votes. > > This method (like IRV itself) is too cumbersome to be a good public > proposal. But it can serve as a good educational tool. > > In simulations a comparison of the VSE of the outcomes with and without > the finisher steps will reveal some of the social cost of the premature > eliminations ... i.e. the cost of the betrayal of the failed promises. > > -Forest > > El jue., 16 de jun. de 2022 9:33 a. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak@yahoo.fr> > escribió: > >> With Forest's idea, the sense seems to be that the IRV winner can win as >> long as that >> is somewhat reasonable. I.e. that there isn't some eliminated candidate >> who can defeat >> all the final-round support for the IRV winner. >> >> If the IRV winner will be considered below all cutoffs, it looks like we >> want the IRV >> winner to be defeated if at all possible. That doesn't sound good from a >> monotonicity >> standpoint. >> >> That said, I'm not seeing how the two rules give a different treatment of >> the "Z>X>..." >> ballot in that scenario, where X was the IRV winner and Z was the other >> finalist. >> >> Kevin >> >> >> Le mercredi 15 juin 2022, 21:34:38 UTC−5, Andy Dienes < >> andydienes@gmail.com> a écrit : >> > It is an interesting idea but I think it would be more fair if it were >> like: >> > >> > IRV winner X, approval winner Y where X is (exclusive) cutoff on all >> ballots, then >> > pairwise of X and Y wins >> > >> > Otherwise, what if the final round of IRV is X and Z, but my >> preferences happen to be >> > Z > X > (everything else), seems like my vote would be mostly ignored. >> > >> > On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 10:22 PM Forest Simmons < >> forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote: >> > > One Approval step determines the winner W after the IRV winner X has >> been found: >> > > >> > > The IRV winner X is the approval cutoff on all ballots ... inclusive >> only on the >> > > ballots whose transferred vote went to X on the final IRV round. >> >
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Sat, Jun 18, 2022 8:49 AM

On 6/17/22 10:03 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:

This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of
Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than
Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not)

It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too
late ... still, better than nothing!

Speaking of the LNHs, does IRNR pass them? My first guess would be so,
but perhaps the change from Plurality to Range for the exclusion
mechanism changes things?

-km

On 6/17/22 10:03 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: > This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of > Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than > Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not) > > It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too > late ... still, better than nothing! Speaking of the LNHs, does IRNR pass them? My first guess would be so, but perhaps the change from Plurality to Range for the exclusion mechanism changes things? -km
KV
Kevin Venzke
Sat, Jun 18, 2022 5:30 PM

IRNR doesn't satisfy them. Consider that if you give fewer candidates the bottom rating,
you create more situations where higher-rated candidates would see a score reduction in
some round, due to rescaling. And it's not possible to say that only certain candidates
will ultimately be helped or hurt by this.

Kevin

Le samedi 18 juin 2022, 03:49:10 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de a écrit :
On 6/17/22 10:03 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:

This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of
Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than
Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not)

It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too
late ... still, better than nothing!

Speaking of the LNHs, does IRNR pass them? My first guess would be so,
but perhaps the change from Plurality to Range for the exclusion
mechanism changes things?

-km


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

IRNR doesn't satisfy them. Consider that if you give fewer candidates the bottom rating, you create more situations where higher-rated candidates would see a score reduction in some round, due to rescaling. And it's not possible to say that only certain candidates will ultimately be helped or hurt by this. Kevin Le samedi 18 juin 2022, 03:49:10 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit : On 6/17/22 10:03 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: > This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of > Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than > Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not) > > It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too > late ... still, better than nothing! Speaking of the LNHs, does IRNR pass them? My first guess would be so, but perhaps the change from Plurality to Range for the exclusion mechanism changes things? -km ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
RL
Richard Lung
Sat, Jun 18, 2022 5:41 PM

"Later no help" turns out to be an old foe, sabotaging other partys primaries by voting for their dud candidates. A couple of decades ago, US constitutional lawyers argued endlessly about open or closed primaries. The dilemma is solved by STV, as Hoag and Hallett were well aware, in the 1930s. And as Vernon Bogdanor also said: At-large STV/PR doesn't need primaries.
The same holds for Binomial STV. Why wouldn't it?
UK Labour, Plant report opposed STV, precisely because Irish elections do solve the primaries problem, which Labour reviled as "intra-party competition." They avowedly supported the Additional Member System because it didn't threaten their incumbency.
A New Zealand Labour Royal Commission parroted UK Labour and after a couple of referendums, lo! NZ, -- well, for health boards, a matter of life and death, they have STV -- for politicians general elections, they have the idiot system.
The real threat to democracy is not an alleged illogic of democratic procedure, but wilful ignorance of the reality that contestants cannot be their own referees.

Regards,
Richard Lung.

On 18 Jun 2022, at 9:49 am, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:

On 6/17/22 10:03 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not)
It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too late ... still, better than nothing!

Speaking of the LNHs, does IRNR pass them? My first guess would be so, but perhaps the change from Plurality to Range for the exclusion mechanism changes things?

-km

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

"Later no help" turns out to be an old foe, sabotaging other partys primaries by voting for their dud candidates. A couple of decades ago, US constitutional lawyers argued endlessly about open or closed primaries. The dilemma is solved by STV, as Hoag and Hallett were well aware, in the 1930s. And as Vernon Bogdanor also said: At-large STV/PR doesn't need primaries. The same holds for Binomial STV. Why wouldn't it? UK Labour, Plant report opposed STV, precisely because Irish elections do solve the primaries problem, which Labour reviled as "intra-party competition." They avowedly supported the Additional Member System because it didn't threaten their incumbency. A New Zealand Labour Royal Commission parroted UK Labour and after a couple of referendums, lo! NZ, -- well, for health boards, a matter of life and death, they have STV -- for politicians general elections, they have the idiot system. The real threat to democracy is not an alleged illogic of democratic procedure, but wilful ignorance of the reality that contestants cannot be their own referees. Regards, Richard Lung. On 18 Jun 2022, at 9:49 am, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > On 6/17/22 10:03 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: > This IRV finisher is a partial fulfillment of the IRV (fake) promise of Reliable Later Help. We should call the method BLTN, Better Late Than Never (aka Bacon Lettuce Tomato Not) > It tries to do what Kevin's Gradual Approval does, but too little too late ... still, better than nothing! Speaking of the LNHs, does IRNR pass them? My first guess would be so, but perhaps the change from Plurality to Range for the exclusion mechanism changes things? -km ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info