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Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sun, Apr 7, 2024 3:43 AM

On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 11:43 AM Joshua Boehme joshua.p.boehme@gmail.com
wrote:

Reading this, my question was: what's the specific question we'd be
answering?

"How would you rank (or approve) these various voting-systems, in regards

to their merit-in-use (cost & difficulty of implementation, administration
& auditing against count-fraud--& strategy demands or problems for the
voter?"

Obviously we don't all agree on the relative importance of those
considerations for merit-in-use. I value count-fraud-security very highly,
more importantly than the benefits brought by the best ranked-methdos.

In almost any real world application (i.e., anything other than an
audience with a very strong math or programming background) I'd personally
favor Approval over Schulze.

EXACTLY !!!

I don't know why I blocked that person a long time ago, but I'm unblocking.

From a pure theoretical standpoint, though, I'd put them in the opposite
order

Of course. RP(wv) is my favorite for polls, & for offering to jurisdictions
where people insist on ranked-methods.

.

On 4/4/24 01:13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least

two

states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.

It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to

know

how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
some voting-systems.

So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the

experience

of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.

It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
about to vote on the enactment of.

The voting-method for the poll:

It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system,

among

the people at EM.

…& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
voting-system, Approval won.

Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.

I prefer RP(wv) to Beatpath, mostly for its simple, intuitively natural &
obvious rule, but also for its LIIAC compliance, & the fact that its

winner

usually pairbeats Schulze’s winner.

But I guess Schulze is more popular due to its more efficient algorithm.

Anyway so I suggest that the poll I propose have a Schulze balloting &
count, & an Approval balloting & count.

Voting would consist of posting a ranking & an approval-set, in one post.

Candidate voting-systems:

My purpose isn’t an all-inclusive poll among all proposed voting-systems.
…just a very few ones that are the most popular here at EM, solely to

have

a little comparison to the main voting system being publicly voted on

this

year.

So it should just be among a few voting-systems. Additionally, no reason

to

make the alternatives-lineup too time-consumingly large by including
methods unlikely to win anyway.

I’ll suggest a few obvious inclusions. But, of course every poll here
should have the possibility of nomination of whatever alternative anyone
wants to nominate.

I’ll list my nominations in this post, & I claim that those few are all

the

alternatives needed for the poll.  …& anyone can nominate anything

during a

1-week nomination-period.

I suggest the following voting-systems as candidates in the poll, the
alternatives among which to vote:

Approval
RP(wv)
Schulze
IRV

(Schulze & RP are often said to be the ranked-methods most popular among
single-winner reform  community, & that seems true at EM.)

Is there any need for more alternatives than that?

I suggest a nomination period of exactly one week, starting at the time
recorded as the posting-time-&-date of this post.

After which a voting-period of exactly one month would start…at the exact
time as the end of the nomination-period.

If there are no nominations (I suggest that none are needed) during the
nomination-period—& if, during the nomination-period, no one posts the
words “I second the suggestion of a poll”—then of course there’d not be a
poll.

Again, I realize that polls are no longer popular here, but this is a
special situation, bringing a need for voters in the upcoming public
enactment-election to have a chance to hear how people at EM feel about
relative merit among voting-systems. So let’s make an exception to the
absence of polls here, for voters in the next election.


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list

info

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 11:43 AM Joshua Boehme <joshua.p.boehme@gmail.com> wrote: > > Reading this, my question was: what's the specific question we'd be > answering? > > "How would you rank (or approve) these various voting-systems, in regards to their merit-in-use (cost & difficulty of implementation, administration & auditing against count-fraud--& strategy demands or problems for the voter?" Obviously we don't all agree on the relative importance of those considerations for merit-in-use. I value count-fraud-security very highly, more importantly than the benefits brought by the best ranked-methdos. > In almost any real world application (i.e., anything other than an > audience with a very strong math or programming background) I'd personally > favor Approval over Schulze. *EXACTLY !!!* I don't know why I blocked that person a long time ago, but I'm unblocking. > From a pure theoretical standpoint, though, I'd put them in the opposite > order Of course. RP(wv) is my favorite for polls, & for offering to jurisdictions where people insist on ranked-methods. > . > > > On 4/4/24 01:13, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose > > one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least > two > > states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system. > > > > It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to > know > > how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of > > some voting-systems. > > > > So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the > experience > > of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are > > therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now > > propose isn’t a poll for its own sake. > > > > It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting > > the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the > > relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re > > about to vote on the enactment of. > > > > The voting-method for the poll: > > > > It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, > among > > the people at EM. > > > > …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite > > voting-system, Approval won. > > > > Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity. > > > > I prefer RP(wv) to Beatpath, mostly for its simple, intuitively natural & > > obvious rule, but also for its LIIAC compliance, & the fact that its > winner > > usually pairbeats Schulze’s winner. > > > > But I guess Schulze is more popular due to its more efficient algorithm. > > > > Anyway so I suggest that the poll I propose have a Schulze balloting & > > count, & an Approval balloting & count. > > > > Voting would consist of posting a ranking & an approval-set, in one post. > > > > Candidate voting-systems: > > > > My purpose isn’t an all-inclusive poll among all proposed voting-systems. > > …just a very few ones that are the most popular here at EM, solely to > have > > a little comparison to the main voting system being publicly voted on > this > > year. > > > > So it should just be among a few voting-systems. Additionally, no reason > to > > make the alternatives-lineup too time-consumingly large by including > > methods unlikely to win anyway. > > > > I’ll suggest a few obvious inclusions. But, of course every poll here > > should have the possibility of nomination of whatever alternative anyone > > wants to nominate. > > > > I’ll list my nominations in this post, & I claim that those few are all > the > > alternatives needed for the poll. …& anyone can nominate anything > during a > > 1-week nomination-period. > > > > I suggest the following voting-systems as candidates in the poll, the > > alternatives among which to vote: > > > > Approval > > RP(wv) > > Schulze > > IRV > > > > (Schulze & RP are often said to be the ranked-methods most popular among > > single-winner reform community, & that seems true at EM.) > > > > > > Is there any need for more alternatives than that? > > > > I suggest a nomination period of exactly one week, starting at the time > > recorded as the posting-time-&-date of this post. > > > > After which a voting-period of exactly one month would start…at the exact > > time as the end of the nomination-period. > > > > If there are no nominations (I suggest that none are needed) during the > > nomination-period—& if, during the nomination-period, no one posts the > > words “I second the suggestion of a poll”—then of course there’d not be a > > poll. > > > > Again, I realize that polls are no longer popular here, but this is a > > special situation, bringing a need for voters in the upcoming public > > enactment-election to have a chance to hear how people at EM feel about > > relative merit among voting-systems. So let’s make an exception to the > > absence of polls here, for voters in the next election. > > > > > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >
TP
Toby Pereira
Sun, Apr 7, 2024 6:21 PM

Since Michael Ossipoff has moved the argument to here from the Voting Theory Forum, I think I have a right of reply (whether he personally reads it or not), and will try to make this post mostly about the actual discussion point rather than arguing about the argument (though I will mention some things for context). Michael said he was done with the conversation previously, but in his post he'd put things in public that I felt needed rebutting, so it was reasonable for me to reply for the benefit of anyone else reading, if nothing else.
With vote-for-one party-list PR (equivalently apportionment, but I'll speak in terms of PR), you have exact proportionality when the number of seats a party has divided by its number of voters is the same for every party. We can say that an individual voter's representation level is s/v, where s is the number of seats their party has won and v the number of voters of that party. A higher s/v is better for a voter. Perfect PR is when s/v is the same for everyone. This was not in dispute.
Sainte-Laguë (equivalently Webster for apportionment) elects the set of candidates that minimises the variance of s/v (looking at absolute differences). This variance of s/v is what I consider to be the most appropriate measure of disproportionality. Huntington-Hill minimises the ratio of voters' representation from exact PR.

I would argue that it makes most sense to use the arithmetic variance because it is essentially an arithmetic distribution. If you total s/v for all voters, then you get the same number (s) under any result. If you were instead looking at v/s, you would use harmonic statistics. If you were using data that multiplied to a set number, you would use geometric statistics. And so on.
And because Huntington-Hill uses geometric statistics for arithmetic data, it breaks if any party gets 0 seats (it is important to note that this is a causal thing, not a coincidence). If, for example, the number of seats was equal to the number of parties with at least one vote, Huntington-Hill must award each party exactly one seat each (even if one party has 99% of the vote and several have just one vote). Michael questioned whether breaking in one case made Huntington-Hill the wrong measure in general, and I answered yes. If we want something to be mathematically correct, it should work in all cases. It might give good results in many cases, but you can't trust it to reliably do so, and to be a contender for objectively correct, it must work in all cases. Analogously, something is not a law of physics if it breaks under certain conditions.
These were the main arguments I put in favour of Sainte-Laguë over Huntington-Hill. I also pointed out that in "Fair Representation: meeting the ideal of one man", Balinski and Peyton Young conclude that Webster (equivalently Sainte-Laguë) is "the unique unbiased divisor method". Michael simply doubted that they said that, but it was indeed a quote. I later expanded on the quote (which I found on Google books online - https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/_/ZsSHDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 ) "Webster's is the unique unbiased divisor method. It seems amazing therefore that Hill's method could have been chosen in 1941 on precisely the ground that it was the unbiased method, and that Webster's method was discarded." This is a quote, not a paraphrasing.
Michael mentioned Huntington's paper to me, yes. He did not provide a reference or quote, and upon finding it myself I had a look through it and did not find anything that challenged the positive arguments that I had put forward in favour of Sainte-Laguë. It should also be pointed out that Michael at no point made any real attempt to argue against my specific points, or indeed address the Balinski and Peyton Young quote and I did not block him for that. It is also poor form in an argument to simply say "I am posting this paper as my argument. You must rebut that to win", especially without highlighting the specific, relevant parts of the paper. In any case, when pressed, I went back to the paper (available here: https://www.ams.org/journals/tran/1928-030-01/S0002-9947-1928-1501423-0/S0002-9947-1928-1501423-0.pdf - The Apportionment of Representatives in Congress by E.V. Huntington) and found what I considered to be the crux of the argument:
"The rather vague concept of the inequality between two states is thus reduced to the more definite concept of the inequality between two numbers.
The question then comes down to this: what shall be meant by the inequality between these two numbers? Shall we mean the absolute difference between the two numbers, or the relative difference between them? If the size of the congressional districts is large, say 250,000 in one state and 250,005 in the other, then the difference of five people is of little consequence in so large a number. But if the districts were themselves very small, say 10 and 15, then the same difference of five people becomes important; 15, we say, is larger than 10 by fifty per cent, while 250,005 is larger than 250,000 by only (1/500) th of 1 per cent. In the present problem it is clearly the relative or percentage difference, rather than the mere absolute difference, which is significant."
I pointed out in reply to this that any (sensible) method will attempt to give the district with 15 people 50% more representatives than the one with 10 and the one with 250,005 a fraction of a per cent more than the one with 250,000. It doesn't take a method that specifically looks at percentage differences in individual representation to do that. We would need to look at how methods actually behaved. But I also pointed out (perhaps more relevantly) that the variance we are looking at is the variance of s/v, not variance of total number of seats, and therefore the big numbers simply cancel out and we are dealing with numbers of the same order of magnitude as each other. If you look at s/v and use ratios as well, you are double-compensating. If there's something else Michael wants me to refute, it's up to him to explicitly point it out.
That's largely it. But I should also point out for context that this was initially a discussion about Michael's "Bias-Free" method. I argued that while it might be unbiased under a certain definition of bias and under certain assumptions, it is biased towards small parties when using the most sensible measure of proportionality (the Sainte-Laguë measure). This is where Huntington-Hill came in, as Michael argued that Sainte-Laguë wasn't the only sensible measure. However, he went further and argued that Huntington-Hill made more sense than Sainte-Laguë. Michael did also separately say that Sainte-Laguë is nearly unbiased by his measure, and Huntington-Hill is twice as biased as Sainte-Laguë, so I'm not sure how that squares with Huntington-Hill making more sense as a method.
Anyway, Michael might or might not read this, but maybe I should wear it as a badge of honour that I'm the only member on here that he won't unblock.
Toby

On Sunday, 7 April 2024 at 03:26:42 BST, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:  

I'm reading from the Spam-Folder to find out what nominations I've missed from blocked individuaos.
But there's no guarantee that I'll find everything that I missed, & so it would be great if someone would post a few additional updates of the nominations-list, at least until I get the remaining 2 persons( for a total of 3 of the 4) provisionally unblocked.
On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 3:15 AM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:

I notice you haven't included my nominations. I'm guessing you blocked me after you threw your toys out of the pram over your "Bias Free" method on the Voting Theory Forum. I

I told you that I was done with that conversation, & then you posted "I know that Michael said he was done with this conversation, but..."
...& then proceeded to continue your repetition of your unusual personal definition of bias & your interpretation of "most proportional"., without saying where Professor Huntington went wrong with his justification of ratio as a measure of variation in s/v. You said that you found Huntington's paper, but evidently either didn't read it or didn't understand it. You didn't share with us what you believe was the error in his argument, or why your interpretation is better than his.
I certainly had the right to block you instead of continuing to receive your messages with your repetition. You didn't give me a choice, when you continued it.

 
notice Kristofer suggested some methods that aren't in the list either. I'm not sure this can really count as a poll of EM members if this person has decided to selectively ignore people.

I haven't decided to ignore anyone. I've requested that nominations from the 4 blocked individuals be re-posted by someone else. Additionally, I've already provisionally unblocked Garman, & will next unblock Kristofer & Bristow, provisionally.
Anyway, there's no need to say that anyone is "running" the poll. The nominations count, & are distributed to all of us. Someone other than me should post a few more nomination-list updates, because obviously mine can't be reliably-complete until I've unblocked the 2 remaining persons whom I intend to provisionally unblock, for the purpose of my participation in the poll

Toby

Since Michael Ossipoff has moved the argument to here from the Voting Theory Forum, I think I have a right of reply (whether he personally reads it or not), and will try to make this post mostly about the actual discussion point rather than arguing about the argument (though I will mention some things for context). Michael said he was done with the conversation previously, but in his post he'd put things in public that I felt needed rebutting, so it was reasonable for me to reply for the benefit of anyone else reading, if nothing else. With vote-for-one party-list PR (equivalently apportionment, but I'll speak in terms of PR), you have exact proportionality when the number of seats a party has divided by its number of voters is the same for every party. We can say that an individual voter's representation level is s/v, where s is the number of seats their party has won and v the number of voters of that party. A higher s/v is better for a voter. Perfect PR is when s/v is the same for everyone. This was not in dispute. Sainte-Laguë (equivalently Webster for apportionment) elects the set of candidates that minimises the variance of s/v (looking at absolute differences). This variance of s/v is what I consider to be the most appropriate measure of disproportionality. Huntington-Hill minimises the ratio of voters' representation from exact PR. I would argue that it makes most sense to use the arithmetic variance because it is essentially an arithmetic distribution. If you total s/v for all voters, then you get the same number (s) under any result. If you were instead looking at v/s, you would use harmonic statistics. If you were using data that multiplied to a set number, you would use geometric statistics. And so on. And because Huntington-Hill uses geometric statistics for arithmetic data, it breaks if any party gets 0 seats (it is important to note that this is a causal thing, not a coincidence). If, for example, the number of seats was equal to the number of parties with at least one vote, Huntington-Hill must award each party exactly one seat each (even if one party has 99% of the vote and several have just one vote). Michael questioned whether breaking in one case made Huntington-Hill the wrong measure in general, and I answered yes. If we want something to be mathematically correct, it should work in all cases. It might give good results in many cases, but you can't trust it to reliably do so, and to be a contender for objectively correct, it must work in all cases. Analogously, something is not a law of physics if it breaks under certain conditions. These were the main arguments I put in favour of Sainte-Laguë over Huntington-Hill. I also pointed out that in "Fair Representation: meeting the ideal of one man", Balinski and Peyton Young conclude that Webster (equivalently Sainte-Laguë) is "the unique unbiased divisor method". Michael simply doubted that they said that, but it was indeed a quote. I later expanded on the quote (which I found on Google books online - https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/_/ZsSHDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 ) "Webster's is the unique unbiased divisor method. It seems amazing therefore that Hill's method could have been chosen in 1941 on precisely the ground that it was the unbiased method, and that Webster's method was discarded." This is a quote, not a paraphrasing. Michael mentioned Huntington's paper to me, yes. He did not provide a reference or quote, and upon finding it myself I had a look through it and did not find anything that challenged the positive arguments that I had put forward in favour of Sainte-Laguë. It should also be pointed out that Michael at no point made any real attempt to argue against my specific points, or indeed address the Balinski and Peyton Young quote and I did not block him for that. It is also poor form in an argument to simply say "I am posting this paper as my argument. You must rebut that to win", especially without highlighting the specific, relevant parts of the paper. In any case, when pressed, I went back to the paper (available here: https://www.ams.org/journals/tran/1928-030-01/S0002-9947-1928-1501423-0/S0002-9947-1928-1501423-0.pdf - The Apportionment of Representatives in Congress by E.V. Huntington) and found what I considered to be the crux of the argument: "The rather vague concept of the inequality between two states is thus reduced to the more definite concept of the inequality between two numbers. The question then comes down to this: what shall be meant by the inequality between these two numbers? Shall we mean the absolute difference between the two numbers, or the relative difference between them? If the size of the congressional districts is large, say 250,000 in one state and 250,005 in the other, then the difference of five people is of little consequence in so large a number. But if the districts were themselves very small, say 10 and 15, then the same difference of five people becomes important; 15, we say, is larger than 10 by fifty per cent, while 250,005 is larger than 250,000 by only (1/500) th of 1 per cent. In the present problem it is clearly the relative or percentage difference, rather than the mere absolute difference, which is significant." I pointed out in reply to this that any (sensible) method will attempt to give the district with 15 people 50% more representatives than the one with 10 and the one with 250,005 a fraction of a per cent more than the one with 250,000. It doesn't take a method that specifically looks at percentage differences in individual representation to do that. We would need to look at how methods actually behaved. But I also pointed out (perhaps more relevantly) that the variance we are looking at is the variance of s/v, not variance of total number of seats, and therefore the big numbers simply cancel out and we are dealing with numbers of the same order of magnitude as each other. If you look at s/v and use ratios as well, you are double-compensating. If there's something else Michael wants me to refute, it's up to him to explicitly point it out. That's largely it. But I should also point out for context that this was initially a discussion about Michael's "Bias-Free" method. I argued that while it might be unbiased under a certain definition of bias and under certain assumptions, it is biased towards small parties when using the most sensible measure of proportionality (the Sainte-Laguë measure). This is where Huntington-Hill came in, as Michael argued that Sainte-Laguë wasn't the only sensible measure. However, he went further and argued that Huntington-Hill made more sense than Sainte-Laguë. Michael did also separately say that Sainte-Laguë is nearly unbiased by his measure, and Huntington-Hill is twice as biased as Sainte-Laguë, so I'm not sure how that squares with Huntington-Hill making more sense as a method. Anyway, Michael might or might not read this, but maybe I should wear it as a badge of honour that I'm the only member on here that he won't unblock. Toby On Sunday, 7 April 2024 at 03:26:42 BST, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: I'm reading from the Spam-Folder to find out what nominations I've missed from blocked individuaos. But there's no guarantee that I'll find everything that I missed, & so it would be great if someone would post a few additional updates of the nominations-list, at least until I get the remaining 2 persons( for a total of 3 of the 4) provisionally unblocked. On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 3:15 AM Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote: I notice you haven't included my nominations. I'm guessing you blocked me after you threw your toys out of the pram over your "Bias Free" method on the Voting Theory Forum. I I told you that I was done with that conversation, & then you posted "I know that Michael said he was done with this conversation, but..." ...& then proceeded to continue your repetition of your unusual personal definition of bias & your interpretation of "most proportional"., without saying where Professor Huntington went wrong with his justification of ratio as a measure of variation in s/v. You said that you found Huntington's paper, but evidently either didn't read it or didn't understand it. You didn't share with us what you believe was the error in his argument, or why your interpretation is better than his. I certainly had the right to block you instead of continuing to receive your messages with your repetition. You didn't give me a choice, when you continued it.   notice Kristofer suggested some methods that aren't in the list either. I'm not sure this can really count as a poll of EM members if this person has decided to selectively ignore people. I haven't decided to ignore anyone. I've requested that nominations from the 4 blocked individuals be re-posted by someone else. Additionally, I've already provisionally unblocked Garman, & will next unblock Kristofer & Bristow, provisionally. Anyway, there's no need to say that anyone is "running" the poll. The nominations count, & are distributed to all of us. Someone other than me should post a few more nomination-list updates, because obviously mine can't be reliably-complete until I've unblocked the 2 remaining persons whom I intend to provisionally unblock, for the purpose of my participation in the poll Toby
RL
Richard Lung
Sun, Apr 21, 2024 6:54 AM

Others have noticed the single-member bias, which reflects the
monopolistic bias of the Anglo-American system.

I agree with what you and they say. However, a Condorcet compliant
method would not be helpful. It is not only a needless complication but
a confusing one. In this I think the many official variants of STV are
right not to complicate their system with a Condorcet complication.
Their implementers may not all be entirely ignorant of the matter.
Condorcet pairing is something of a cult on this list but it was refuted
two centuries ago by Pierre Simon Laplace, because it ignored the
relative imporance of orders of preference. Borda method did not too
satisfactorily solve the matter but Gregory method, used in STV,
superseded Borda method.

No knowledgable study can be satisfied with an explanation that
contradicts itself. That is why hybrid election systems are such a bad
idea. My voting method uses one system, Meek surplus transfer for both
the election and exclusion of candidates, and follows the consequences.
The basic system (not the advanced version) is simpler, at least in
principle, than conventional STV.

This voting innovation has already been programmed. The coder had some
difficulty because he knew the conventional methods too well. Eventually
I had to say something like: Please forget about eliminating a candidate
("last past the post") when the surplus votes run out.

The list owner belatedly released my Binomial STV programmer links. But
the list owner has also stopped my two or three line reply to your
"trying to understand BSTV" subject line, as too large a post.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 05/04/2024 15:03, Filip Ejlak wrote:

First thing: it's surprising how all the options that have been
mentioned are single-winner methods, despite the poll subject not
being worded in such a restrictive way. Are multi-winner options
allowed as well, or should this be a different poll? Because it needs
to be said that every legislative election needs proportional
representation
. I guess any single-winner method, no matter how good,
will be bad in comparison with a PR method. So if multi-winner options
were allowed in the poll, I would nominate *STV *(a
Condorcet-compliant variant would be better if there was any
polynomial one with good recognition; an optional indirect element -
like GVT, but strongly improved - would also be nice).

And speaking of single-winner methods, in my opinion Woodall and
Benham seem to be the best, at least among the well-known ones.
While Woodall (especially Schwartz Woodall) is perhaps marginally
better, Benham is so easy to explain (and it's a very obvious/natural
way to make IRV actually good) that it should be seriously considered
by voting reform campaigners. So I'd like to nominate these two.

Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes, that’s true. It’s the reason why reform is needed, & the
 reforms should be compared to the worse current alternatives to
 show the need.

 I nominate:

 Approval
 RP(wv)
 Schulze
 MinMax(wv)
 IRV
 Plurality

 On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 04:06 John T Whelan
 <john.whelan@astro.rit.edu> wrote:

     Given the purpose of the poll, I think FPTP should also be
     included, since that's what the real world propositions are
     presumably to replace.

     John Whelan
     jtw24@cornell.edu

     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     *From:* Election-Methods
     <election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com> on behalf of
     Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
     *Sent:* Thursday, April 4, 2024 1:13:28 AM
     *To:* EM list <election-methods@electorama.com>
     *Subject:* [EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in
     upcoming enactment-elections
     EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I
     wouldn’t propose one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this
     year, the voters of at least two states are going to vote on
     whether to enact a certain voting-system.

     It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a
     right to know how people familiar with voting-systems feel
     about the relative merits of some voting-systems.

     So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating
     the experience of using the voting systems, & how they work, &
     what they’ll do—& are therefore useful & worthwhile for their
     own sake—this poll that I now propose isn’t a poll for its own
     sake.

     It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose
     of letting the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know
     how we feel about the relative merits of some voting-systems,
     including the one that they’re about to vote on the enactment of.

     The voting-method for the poll:

     It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked
     voting-system, among the people at EM.

     …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s
     collective favorite voting-system, Approval won.

     Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.

     I prefer RP(wv) to Beatpath, mostly for its simple,
     intuitively natural & obvious rule, but also for its LIIAC
     compliance, & the fact that its winner usually pairbeats
     Schulze’s winner.

     But I guess Schulze is more popular due to its more efficient
     algorithm.

     Anyway so I suggest that the poll I propose have a Schulze
     balloting & count, & an Approval balloting & count.

     Voting would consist of posting a ranking & an approval-set,
     in one post.

     Candidate voting-systems:

     My purpose isn’t an all-inclusive poll among all proposed
     voting-systems. …just a very few ones that are the most
     popular here at EM, solely to have a little comparison to the
     main voting system being publicly voted on this year.

     So it should just be among a few voting-systems. Additionally,
     no reason to make the alternatives-lineup too time-consumingly
     large by including methods unlikely to win anyway.

     I’ll suggest a few obvious inclusions. But, of course every
     poll here should have the possibility of nomination of
     whatever alternative anyone wants to nominate.

     I’ll list my nominations in this post, & I claim that those
     few are all the alternatives needed for the poll.  …& anyone
     can nominate anything during a 1-week nomination-period.

     I suggest the following voting-systems as candidates in the
     poll, the alternatives among which to vote:

     Approval
     RP(wv)
     Schulze
     IRV

     (Schulze & RP are often said to be the ranked-methods most
     popular among single-winner reform  community, & that seems
     true at EM.)


     Is there any need for more alternatives than that?

     I suggest a nomination period of exactly one week, starting at
     the time recorded as the posting-time-&-date of this post.

     After which a voting-period of exactly one month would
     start…at the exact time as the end of the nomination-period.

     If there are no nominations (I suggest that none are needed)
     during the nomination-period—& if, during the
     nomination-period, no one posts the words “I second the
     suggestion of a poll”—then of course there’d not be a poll.

     Again, I realize that polls are no longer popular here, but
     this is a special situation, bringing a need for voters in the
     upcoming public enactment-election to have a chance to hear
     how people at EM feel about relative merit among
     voting-systems. So let’s make an exception to the absence of
     polls here, for voters in the next election.










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 Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
 list info

Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info

Others have noticed the single-member bias, which reflects the monopolistic bias of the Anglo-American system. I agree with what you and they say. However, a Condorcet compliant method would not be helpful. It is not only a needless complication but a confusing one. In this I think the many official variants of STV are right not to complicate their system with a Condorcet complication. Their implementers may not all be entirely ignorant of the matter. Condorcet pairing is something of a cult on this list but it was refuted two centuries ago by Pierre Simon Laplace, because it ignored the relative imporance of orders of preference. Borda method did not too satisfactorily solve the matter but Gregory method, used in STV, superseded Borda method. No knowledgable study can be satisfied with an explanation that contradicts itself. That is why hybrid election systems are such a bad idea. My voting method uses one system, Meek surplus transfer for both the election and exclusion of candidates, and follows the consequences. The basic system (not the advanced version) is simpler, at least in principle, than conventional STV. This voting innovation has already been programmed. The coder had some difficulty because he knew the conventional methods too well. Eventually I had to say something like: Please forget about eliminating a candidate ("last past the post") when the surplus votes run out. The list owner belatedly released my Binomial STV programmer links. But the list owner has also stopped my two or three line reply to your "trying to understand BSTV" subject line, as too large a post. Regards, Richard Lung. On 05/04/2024 15:03, Filip Ejlak wrote: > First thing: it's surprising how all the options that have been > mentioned are single-winner methods, despite the poll subject not > being worded in such a restrictive way. Are multi-winner options > allowed as well, or should this be a different poll? Because it needs > to be said that _every legislative election needs proportional > representation_. I guess any single-winner method, no matter how good, > will be bad in comparison with a PR method. So if multi-winner options > were allowed in the poll, I would nominate *STV *(a > Condorcet-compliant variant would be better if there was any > polynomial one with good recognition; an optional indirect element - > like GVT, but strongly improved - would also be nice). > > And speaking of single-winner methods, in my opinion *Woodall* and > *Benham* seem to be the best, at least among the well-known ones. > While Woodall (especially Schwartz Woodall) is perhaps marginally > better, Benham is so easy to explain (and it's a very obvious/natural > way to make IRV actually good) that it should be seriously considered > by voting reform campaigners. So I'd like to nominate these two. > > > > Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > Yes, that’s true. It’s the reason why reform is needed, & the > reforms should be compared to the worse current alternatives to > show the need. > > I nominate: > > Approval > RP(wv) > Schulze > MinMax(wv) > IRV > Plurality > > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 04:06 John T Whelan > <john.whelan@astro.rit.edu> wrote: > > Given the purpose of the poll, I think FPTP should also be > included, since that's what the real world propositions are > presumably to replace. > > John Whelan > jtw24@cornell.edu > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Election-Methods > <election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com> on behalf of > Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Thursday, April 4, 2024 1:13:28 AM > *To:* EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> > *Subject:* [EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in > upcoming enactment-elections > EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I > wouldn’t propose one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this > year, the voters of at least two states are going to vote on > whether to enact a certain voting-system. > > It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a > right to know how people familiar with voting-systems feel > about the relative merits of some voting-systems. > > So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating > the experience of using the voting systems, & how they work, & > what they’ll do—& are therefore useful & worthwhile for their > own sake—this poll that I now propose isn’t a poll for its own > sake. > > It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose > of letting the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know > how we feel about the relative merits of some voting-systems, > including the one that they’re about to vote on the enactment of. > > The voting-method for the poll: > > It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked > voting-system, among the people at EM. > > …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s > collective favorite voting-system, Approval won. > > Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity. > > I prefer RP(wv) to Beatpath, mostly for its simple, > intuitively natural & obvious rule, but also for its LIIAC > compliance, & the fact that its winner usually pairbeats > Schulze’s winner. > > But I guess Schulze is more popular due to its more efficient > algorithm. > > Anyway so I suggest that the poll I propose have a Schulze > balloting & count, & an Approval balloting & count. > > Voting would consist of posting a ranking & an approval-set, > in one post. > > Candidate voting-systems: > > My purpose isn’t an all-inclusive poll among all proposed > voting-systems. …just a very few ones that are the most > popular here at EM, solely to have a little comparison to the > main voting system being publicly voted on this year. > > So it should just be among a few voting-systems. Additionally, > no reason to make the alternatives-lineup too time-consumingly > large by including methods unlikely to win anyway. > > I’ll suggest a few obvious inclusions. But, of course every > poll here should have the possibility of nomination of > whatever alternative anyone wants to nominate. > > I’ll list my nominations in this post, & I claim that those > few are all the alternatives needed for the poll.  …& anyone > can nominate anything during a 1-week nomination-period. > > I suggest the following voting-systems as candidates in the > poll, the alternatives among which to vote: > > Approval > RP(wv) > Schulze > IRV > > (Schulze & RP are often said to be the ranked-methods most > popular among single-winner reform  community, & that seems > true at EM.) > > > Is there any need for more alternatives than that? > > I suggest a nomination period of exactly one week, starting at > the time recorded as the posting-time-&-date of this post. > > After which a voting-period of exactly one month would > start…at the exact time as the end of the nomination-period. > > If there are no nominations (I suggest that none are needed) > during the nomination-period—& if, during the > nomination-period, no one posts the words “I second the > suggestion of a poll”—then of course there’d not be a poll. > > Again, I realize that polls are no longer popular here, but > this is a special situation, bringing a need for voters in the > upcoming public enactment-election to have a chance to hear > how people at EM feel about relative merit among > voting-systems. So let’s make an exception to the absence of > polls here, for voters in the next election. > > > > > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for > list info > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info