On 15.10.2021 06:42, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote: > In the Wikipedia article about the Minimax method, the section titled > "Satisfied and failed criteria" indicates that the "winning votes" and > "margins" versions are Condorcet compliant, but the "pairwise > opposition" version is not. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method#Satisfied_and_failed_criteria > > > Specifically it says: > "When the pairwise opposition variant is used, minimax also does not > satisfy the Condorcet criterion." > > That seems to conflict with what Kristofer is saying here: > >> El jue., 14 de oct. de 2021 1:45 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm >>     Minmax(wv) passes the Condorcet criterion: >> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method#Satisfied_and_failed_criteria > >>     Are you referring to another method here? The confusion, I think, is that you originally said: > And I believe it would include the version of Minimax that uses > winning votes -- even though this variation does not always elect the > Condorcet winner. Since you said "winning votes", I took that to mean Mimax(wv), which Wikipedia calls the winning votes version. This is distinct from the pairwise opposition version, which doesn't use winning votes; it uses the raw Condorcet matrix instead without any transformation. > My point was that although it does not fit the official category of > "most of the Condorcet methods" (according to Wikipedia), I would expect > that most of the people who signed the "Declaration of Election-Method > Reform Advocates" would regard that method as also worth considering for > adoption. > > I mentioned the method because the first steps toward adopting better > methods in governmental elections require simplicity, and the pairwise > opposition version is easier to explain (and easier to calculate) for > non-math-savvy folks. I would say the "bad-example" would, if not make people drop MMPO outright, at least be considered *very* unintuitive. It is this: 3950000000: A 1: A=C 1: B=C 3950000000: B and C wins. (Feel free to substitute a larger number if you desire!) In the words of Chris Benham: > The result is completely outrageous and absurd. > > The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were > wronged, because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning. Faced with something like that, I'd rather take the phrasing that "A's score in the A vs B matchup is his margin of victory in the simulated runoff". Minmax(wv) would be better still, but it's harder to describe since it involves a threshold. -km

Kristofer, thank you for the extensive reply. I will now need quite some time to digest all information provided in yours and Richard's replies. Kristofer, one thing I can say already though, is that the Plurality method will have to be supported on the universal voting platform from the very beginning as it is just so popular and it is the best in meeting the KISS principle - the fundamental requirement for any mass platform. BTW, Kristofer, Richard or anyone in this community if you have a bit / some / a lot of free time, I would like to invite you to review our design for the "universal voting platform" in private (we are not yet ready to make it public). Please write to me directly if you are interested. Disclaimer, this "universal voting platform" is going to be a for profit platform, but with a free service for public elections. Thank you all, -Bohdan On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 7:10 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > > On 15.10.2021 14:24, Bohdan Andriyiv wrote: > > Richard, thank you for the detailed list of (as I understood) the best > > / the most fair / the most supported by this forum election methods. > > It is very helpful and works for me as a good starting point to > > explore the election methods. Thanks to the others who made their > > inputs as well. > > > > But my question is different. I guess it worked as a trick question > > for this community and I should have explained better the context > > behind it. > > > > I am asking what election methods are the most important/popular in > > the current world? Not, which ones are the best, the fairest. BTW, by > > "important" I mean - the methods that might be not so popular, but are > > important in the current world for some other reason (for example, > > used in small, but important elections). > > Plurality (FPTP), clearly, by sheer numbers, although the method is > nothing to write home about. > > Probably also, if you're willing to bend the criteria of what counts as > voting: Approval with no opinion (thumbs up/down on FB, YouTube, etc.), > and Range (star ratings used on e.g. Amazon). I say "bend" because these > are not elections - they do not designate a given winner, but rather > they provide feedback on a per item (video, product, etc) basis. > > The most popular multiwinner election methods are (to my knowledge) > party list, single member district Plurality, SNTV, and STV. They can be > combined as in MMP. Perhaps you could also include cumulative voting and > bloc voting, but they're not as common. > > The Schulze method seems to be favored among open-source organizations > and pro open-source parties such as the Pirate Parties. See e.g. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Users. It is also used in a > few cities for referenda or as part of a liquid democracy/delegable > proxy system. > > The Condorcet Internet Voting Service supports minmax, Schulze, MAM, and > Condorcet-IRV: https://civs1.civs.us/rp.html > > Approval (with or without runoff) is also in current use in the US. See > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Current_use. > > FairVote is pushing IRV pretty hard, and it's used in some US states > (see > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked-choice_voting_in_the_United_States > ) but it's not a particularly good method IMHO. > > Finally, there's the meta-method "whatever election method, then the > president leans on the electoral commission and stays in power > regardless". This method is unfortunately all too common; I would not > suggest implementing it. > > > In other words my question is the following. > > > > What types of election methods are most likely to be used to organize > > different votings on the universal voting platform in the current > > world? > > Also, what methods, although not so popular, but important in the > > current world, should be supported by this platform? > > I would not suggest implementing Plurality even though it's popular, > because it's just that bad. I'd probably say: Approval, Range, STAR, and > a Condorcet method (Schulze if you're going by popularity, though I'd > personally prefer Ranked Pairs for relative simplicity). This gives you > both the ranked standard (according to many people on this list at least > :), the cardinal standards (Approval and Range), and a compromise > between the two (STAR). > > The only thing really missing is Majority Judgment; it's not used > anywhere but it has an interface unlike either Range or Condorcet, using > neither scores nor rankings but grades instead. > > If you're going to implement proportional representation multiwinner > methods, then some form of STV. Probably also some kind of cardinal PR > method (although none are used for political elections at the moment) to > give the cardinal voters a multiwinner method too. > > There's a similar argument to the "include IRV or not?" about what kind > of STV to use. Every form of STV used politically at the moment reduces > to IRV in the single-winner case, which means that its results get worse > the fewer winners you have. On the one hand, if you want to stick with > what's used in political elections, you should pick IRV-based STV. On > the other, if you want better outcomes, it would be better to pick a > Condorcet-based multiwinner method (e.g. Schulze STV, CPO-STV or CIVS's > PR method). > > -km

Many of the "most popular" election systems involve political parties, such as marking a favorite party. Also, many of the "most popular" election systems are multi-winner elections. Do you intend to implement those kinds of voting? Or just single-winner methods? Is your target audience limited geographically? The U.S.? Europe? etc. That too affects what you mean by popular. In another message you offer a peek at your platform. I don't have time to assist much, but if you want more feedback please send me a link (privately, which is what you prefer) and that would be helpful for better understanding what it is you are attempting to build. All of that affects the interpretation of your words "important" and "popular." Richard Fobes On 10/15/2021 5:24 AM, Bohdan Andriyiv wrote: > Richard, thank you for the detailed list of (as I understood) the best > / the most fair / the most supported by this forum election methods. > It is very helpful and works for me as a good starting point to > explore the election methods. Thanks to the others who made their > inputs as well. > > But my question is different. I guess it worked as a trick question > for this community and I should have explained better the context > behind it. > > I am asking what election methods are the most important/popular in > the current world? Not, which ones are the best, the fairest. BTW, by > "important" I mean - the methods that might be not so popular, but are > important in the current world for some other reason (for example, > used in small, but important elections). > > Why am I interested in this? I am designing a universal voting > platform where anyone will be able to create and conduct *any* kind of > voting (serious or not). > > As this community knows much much better than I do, the voting can be > organized in the multitude of different ways. Hence it is too > difficult (complex and time consuming) to design a system that > supports all of the methods right from the start. So I want to > prioritise the implementation of the methods that are the most popular > or important. > > In other words my question is the following. > > What types of election methods are most likely to be used to organize > different votings on the universal voting platform in the current > world? > Also, what methods, although not so popular, but important in the > current world, should be supported by this platform? > > Thank you, > -Bohdan

  Are you referring to another method here?

Kristofer, thank you for this insight! I passed it along to a local election-reform advocate who is adjusting which Minimax variation he advocates as a result of this insight. And I too am adjusting my understanding of the Minimax variations, which previously I hadn't paid much attention to (because of course I prefer the Condorcet-Kemeny method). Once again, thank you for another great contribution to this forum! (Also, your reply to Bohdan was excellent!) Richard Fobes On 10/15/2021 9:26 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 15.10.2021 06:42, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote: >> In the Wikipedia article about the Minimax method, the section titled >> "Satisfied and failed criteria" indicates that the "winning votes" and >> "margins" versions are Condorcet compliant, but the "pairwise >> opposition" version is not. >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method#Satisfied_and_failed_criteria >> >> >> Specifically it says: >> "When the pairwise opposition variant is used, minimax also does not >> satisfy the Condorcet criterion." >> >> That seems to conflict with what Kristofer is saying here: >> >>> El jue., 14 de oct. de 2021 1:45 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm >>> Minmax(wv) passes the Condorcet criterion: >>> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method#Satisfied_and_failed_criteria >> >>> Are you referring to another method here? > The confusion, I think, is that you originally said: > >> And I believe it would include the version of Minimax that uses >> winning votes -- even though this variation does not always elect the >> Condorcet winner. > > Since you said "winning votes", I took that to mean Mimax(wv), which > Wikipedia calls the winning votes version. This is distinct from the > pairwise opposition version, which doesn't use winning votes; it uses > the raw Condorcet matrix instead without any transformation. > >> My point was that although it does not fit the official category of >> "most of the Condorcet methods" (according to Wikipedia), I would expect >> that most of the people who signed the "Declaration of Election-Method >> Reform Advocates" would regard that method as also worth considering for >> adoption. >> >> I mentioned the method because the first steps toward adopting better >> methods in governmental elections require simplicity, and the pairwise >> opposition version is easier to explain (and easier to calculate) for >> non-math-savvy folks. > > I would say the "bad-example" would, if not make people drop MMPO > outright, at least be considered *very* unintuitive. It is this: > > 3950000000: A > 1: A=C > 1: B=C > 3950000000: B > > and C wins. (Feel free to substitute a larger number if you desire!) In > the words of Chris Benham: > >> The result is completely outrageous and absurd. >> >> The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were >> wronged, because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning. > > Faced with something like that, I'd rather take the phrasing that "A's > score in the A vs B matchup is his margin of victory in the simulated > runoff". > > Minmax(wv) would be better still, but it's harder to describe since it > involves a threshold. > > -km >

Richard, > Do you intend to implement those kinds of voting? Or just single-winner methods? It is going to be a universal platform - it will support *all* kinds of voting. It will be up to elections' organisers to choose what method they want to use. > Is your target audience limited geographically? The U.S.? Europe? etc. It is going to be a platform for the whole world. But the first go-to market is intended to be the U.S., because it is the biggest market and in many ways the example of democracy for the rest of the world. > In another message you offer a peek at your platform. I don't have time to assist much, but if you want more feedback please send me a link. Great! Thanks Richard. I will send you a private message. Regards, -Bohdan On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 2:28 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote: > > Many of the "most popular" election systems involve political parties, > such as marking a favorite party. > > Also, many of the "most popular" election systems are multi-winner > elections. > > Do you intend to implement those kinds of voting? Or just single-winner > methods? > > Is your target audience limited geographically? The U.S.? Europe? etc. > That too affects what you mean by popular. > > In another message you offer a peek at your platform. I don't have time > to assist much, but if you want more feedback please send me a link > (privately, which is what you prefer) and that would be helpful for > better understanding what it is you are attempting to build. > > All of that affects the interpretation of your words "important" and > "popular." > > Richard Fobes > > > On 10/15/2021 5:24 AM, Bohdan Andriyiv wrote: > > Richard, thank you for the detailed list of (as I understood) the best > > / the most fair / the most supported by this forum election methods. > > It is very helpful and works for me as a good starting point to > > explore the election methods. Thanks to the others who made their > > inputs as well. > > > > But my question is different. I guess it worked as a trick question > > for this community and I should have explained better the context > > behind it. > > > > I am asking what election methods are the most important/popular in > > the current world? Not, which ones are the best, the fairest. BTW, by > > "important" I mean - the methods that might be not so popular, but are > > important in the current world for some other reason (for example, > > used in small, but important elections). > > > > Why am I interested in this? I am designing a universal voting > > platform where anyone will be able to create and conduct *any* kind of > > voting (serious or not). > > > > As this community knows much much better than I do, the voting can be > > organized in the multitude of different ways. Hence it is too > > difficult (complex and time consuming) to design a system that > > supports all of the methods right from the start. So I want to > > prioritise the implementation of the methods that are the most popular > > or important. > > > > In other words my question is the following. > > > > What types of election methods are most likely to be used to organize > > different votings on the universal voting platform in the current > > world? > > Also, what methods, although not so popular, but important in the > > current world, should be supported by this platform? > > > > Thank you, > > -Bohdan