Fwd: The Top-Set. Method-Merit.
For anyone, there exists a set of candidates such that, for that person, electing from that set is more important than the matter of which member of that set wins.
That is hir "operational top-set".
Also, there's a set of candidates who are so close to you that you perceive them as the very best, whom you really like & completely trust--what you really want.
I'll call that your "best top-set".
When I say " top-set " or "favorites", I mean operational top-set, with the understanding that I suggest that your operational top-set should consist of your best top-set.
...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important categories (top-set & bottom-set).
Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your top-set.
Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
Based in the above, it is possible to objectively say what the best method is. It's Approval.
Yes, people want to vote not only for their top-set--they want to also vote among their top-set.
In other words, they want it all.
That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the probability of electing from your bottom-set.
If you're concerned that people will over-compromise in Approval, remember that, if we ever even have verifiably-counted (and therefore legitimate) elections--let alone a better voting-system--that would only happen in a very different world. ...one in which we'd also have honest, open, participatory media, free & open public discussion, and a well-informed e!ectorate.
In that world, I suggest that your worry is unfounded.
But a choice of proposal must depend on what voters and the proposal committee or organization demands.
And if you want a better voting-system in some municipality, under current conditions, you might be tempted to use ranking, to achieve MMC...for something relatively foolproof.
But MMC knly benefits voters who are majority-favored.
A voter is majority-favored if a majority prefer at least part of hir top-set to everyone else.
Arguably it's more fair without MMC, because it can't be available for all voters.
Also, because strategy is usually different, depending on whether you're majority-favore, then the safety of your top-set depends on judging whether you're majority-favored. If you aren't sure you're majority-favored, you should assume that you aren't...suggesting that Approval would be better.
With a rank-method instead of Approval, in general, you must accept at least a somewhat greater probability of electing from your bottom-set.
But if you choose ranking, then there's no best. No rank-methods dominates the others.
I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
3 Bucklin versions:
- Plain Bucklin:
No equal-ranking or skipping.
- B or A:
You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
- ER Bucklin:
Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank n candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds before giving votes at your next rank.
None of those dominates the others. It depends on people's demands, expected strategy, and on how daring & adventurous voters are.
MAM is the method that could offer the safest sincere-order ranking, if people avoid ranking below the expected CW.
That deters burial, which would backfire.
In Bucklin, too, and Approval, it's best to not vote below the expected sincere CW. But in MAM, doing so is harmless unless burial is attempted.
A few merit comparisons are sure, however:
MJ is nowhere near as good as the Bucklin versions with MMC and sufficient rating or ranking levels.
MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their non-Bucklin wording of it.
Michael Ossipoff
Mike,
What happened to the Michael Ossipoff who coined the Chicken Dilemma
criterion?
It seems to me that your argument here for Approval applies equally well
to any method that meets FBC and for which
the voter's best strategy to elect a member of hir "top set" is vote
them all equal-top and the rest all equal-bottom
(and if they all do that the result will be the same as Approval).
But if some voters are willing to take some strategic risk for the sake
of being more expressive, or they are more certain of
their ranking than the location of their approval threshold, I don't see
why they shouldn't be indulged.
In view of my sentence before last, I'm puzzled by the inclusion of
"Plain Bucklin" (that doesn't allow equal-ranking) on your
list of "best rank methods".
Chris Benham
On 9/7/2016 4:14 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
For anyone, there exists a set of candidates such that, for that
person, electing from that set is more important than the matter of
which member of that set wins.
That is hir "operational top-set".
Also, there's a set of candidates who are so close to youthat you
perceive them as the very best, whom you really like & completely
trust--what you really want.
I'll call that your "best top-set".
When I say " top-set " or "favorites", I mean operational top-set,
with the understanding that I suggest that your operational top-set
should consist of your best top-set.
...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2
important categories (top-set & bottom-set).
Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
top-set.
Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
Based in the above, it is possible to objectively say what the best
method is. It's Approval.
Yes, people want to vote not only for their top-set--they want to
also vote among their top-set.
In other words, they want it all.
That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the
probability of electing from your bottom-set.
Ifyou'reconcerned that people will over-compromisein Approval,
remember that, if we ever even have verifiably-counted (and therefore
legitimate) elections--let alone a better voting-system--that would
only happen in a very different world. ...one in which we'd also
have honest, open, participatory media, free & open public discussion,
andawell-informede!ectorate.
In that world, I suggest that your worry is unfounded.
But a choice of proposal must depend on what voters and the proposal
committee or organization demands.
And if you want a better voting-system in some municipality, under
current conditions, you might be tempted to use ranking, to achieve
MMC...for something relatively foolproof.
But MMC knly benefits voters who are majority-favored.
A voter is majority-favored if a majority prefer at least part of hir
top-set to everyone else.
Arguably it's more fair without MMC, because it can't be available for
all voters.
Also, because strategy is usually different, depending on whether
you're majority-favore, then the safety of your top-set depends on
judging whether you're majority-favored.
Ifyouaren'tsureyou'remajority-favored, youshouldassumethatyou
aren't...suggesting that Approval would be better.
Witharank-methodinsteadofApproval, in general,
youmustacceptatleastasomewhatgreaterprobabilityofelectingfromyourbottom-set.
But if you choose ranking, then there's no best. No rank-methods
dominates the others.
I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
3 Bucklin versions:
- Plain Bucklin:
No equal-ranking or skipping.
- B or A:
You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
- ER Bucklin:
Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank
n candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1
rounds before giving votes at your next rank.
None of those dominates the others. It depends on people's demands,
expected strategy, and on how daring & adventurous voters are.
MAM is the method that could offer the safest sincere-order ranking,
ifpeopleavoidrankingbelowtheexpectedCW.
Thatdetersburial, whichwouldbackfire.
In Bucklin, too, andApproval, it'sbesttonotvotebelowthe
expectedsincereCW. ButinMAM, doingsoisharmlessunlessburialisattempted.
A few merit comparisons are sure, however:
MJ is nowhere near as good as the Bucklin versions with MMC and
sufficient rating or ranking levels.
MJadvocatesobfuscateit& itsstrategy, for themselves,
bytheirnon-Bucklinwordingofit.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
This is, of course, moving away from abstract voting theory into concrete
politics. I'm going to follow that move. I don't want this to turn into a
thread on the list, though; so, if you want to answer this, feel free to
respond to individually to me and/or Mike (at the "Janet Robinson"
address), without including the list.
So, you consider Hillary to be a "dismal pessimistic compromise". It seems
likely you're saying this from the left, as otherwise she wouldn't be any
kind of compromise, but simply the greater evil.
In an absolute sense, you may well be right. But I think the relevant
comparison set is that of historical presidents, and perhaps major party
nominees as well. In that comparison set, I'd argue that Hillary is
actually among the more progressive, more honest, and more competent as an
administrator; and that she's not significantly worse than average in terms
of her inherent charisma and skills as a campaigner.
Note that I'm NOT saying that she is actually progressive, honest, or
competent in an absolute sense. Far from it. I'm just saying that she is
above average for a successful politician at the national level.
If all that's true, why is her approval level among the lowest in history
for a nominee (aside from Trump)? I'd say that she's faced an unprecedented
level of media bias. Her actions regarding Whitewater, Benghazi, the email
server, and the Clinton Foundation have all faced extreme scrutiny, and
while she clearly acted wrongly in some ways, at the end of the day there
are more "troubling questions" than troubling answers. I think that the
average politician has done much worse.
How is any of this relevant to voting theory? I think that Mike is
suggesting that there should be some kind of absolute cutoff for "honest
approval". And I see the allure of that attitude. But I think that it's
clear that there are plausible sets of candidates among which a progressive
voter would be strategically well-advised to approve Hillary. (And I can
easily imagine corresponding scenarios where a conservative or libertarian
voter should strategically approve of someone they find unpalatable.)
I have more to say on this, but I'll continue quoting Mike for a bit first:
Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important
categories (top-set & bottom-set).
Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
top-set.
Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
Based in the above, it is possible to objectively say what the best
method is. It's Approval.
Yes, people want to vote not only for their top-set--they want to also
vote among their top-set.
In other words, they want it all.
Yes! Of course they want it all! And I think that a system like U/P can
give it all! Your best top-set is "preferred", your broader operational
top-set is "acceptable", and others are "unacceptable".
That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the probability
of electing from your bottom-set.
I have no idea what the logic is here. There is no sense in which U/P is
more likely to elect a voter's bottom-set than approval.
....
I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
I agree that MAM is good.
3 Bucklin versions:
- Plain Bucklin:
No equal-ranking or skipping.
- B or A:
You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
Why would you consider either of these better than something like U/P or MJ
- ER Bucklin:
Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank n
candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds
before giving votes at your next rank.
I don't entirely understand what you mean by "automatically skips n-1
rounds", except that it seems that this makes the system more ranked than
rated.
I'd say that any graded Bucklin method that uses strictly-above-median
tallies as a tiebreaker — such as, in the simplest-to-describe case, U/P —
is better than any of the three above.
Not that the above aren't better than many methods. But I wouldn't call
them best.
...
MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their
non-Bucklin wording of it.
I have sympathy for this criticism, which is why I'm now pushing U/P over
MJ.
On Sep 7, 2016 5:54 AM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
Mike,
What happened to the Michael Ossipoff who coined the Chicken Dilemma
criterion?
I still value, it, which is why I prefer 3-Slot ICT (Deluxe Approval), DA,
& your new TTR MGR to plain Approval.
I consider them Aporoval-versions.
But I realized that chicken dilemma isn't as common as the more ordinary
strategy problems. That changed some of my method-suggestions.
It seems to me that your argument here for Approval applies equally well
to any method that meets FBC and for which
the voter's best strategy to elect a member of hir "top set" is vote
them all equal-top and the rest all equal-bottom
(and if they all do that the result will be the same as Approval).
Yes, incl 2 good Bucklin versions.
But if some voters are willing to take some strategic risk for the sake
of being more expressive, or they are more certain of
their ranking than the location of their approval threshold, I don't see
why they shouldn't be indulged.
Yes, that's a good argument for Bucklin with the Approval option.
...especially now, when many might overcomprise in Approval, &/or rival
similar parties don't want to vote eachother equal.
...could even be an argument for MAM.
In view of my sentence before last, I'm puzzled by the inclusion of
"Plain Bucklin" (that doesn't allow equal-ranking) on your
list of "best rank methods".
True. I prefer the others. But if people want to rank, then Plajn B. is
simpler to propose.
Michael Ossipoff
Chris Benham
On 9/7/2016 4:14 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
For anyone, there exists a set of candidates such that, for that person,
electing from that set is more important than the matter of which member
of that set wins.
That is hir "operational top-set".
Also, there's a set of candidates who are so close to you that you
perceive them as the very best, whom you really like & completely
trust--what you really want.
I'll call that your "best top-set".
When I say " top-set " or "favorites", I mean operational top-set, with
the understanding that I suggest that your operational top-set should
consist of your best top-set.
...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important
categories (top-set & bottom-set).
Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
top-set.
Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
Based in the above, it is possible to objectively say what the best
method is. It's Approval.
Yes, people want to vote not only for their top-set--they want to also
vote among their top-set.
In other words, they want it all.
That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the
probability of electing from your bottom-set.
If you're concerned that people will over-compromise in Approval,
remember that, if we ever even have verifiably-counted (and therefore
legitimate) elections--let alone a better voting-system--that would only
happen in a very different world. ...one in which we'd also have honest,
open, participatory media, free & open public discussion, and a
well-informed e!ectorate.
In that world, I suggest that your worry is unfounded.
But a choice of proposal must depend on what voters and the proposal
committee or organization demands.
And if you want a better voting-system in some municipality, under
current conditions, you might be tempted to use ranking, to achieve
MMC...for something relatively foolproof.
But MMC knly benefits voters who are majority-favored.
A voter is majority-favored if a majority prefer at least part of hir
top-set to everyone else.
Arguably it's more fair without MMC, because it can't be available for
all voters.
Also, because strategy is usually different, depending on whether you're
majority-favore, then the safety of your top-set depends on judging whether
you're majority-favored. If you aren't sure you're majority-favored, you
should assume that you aren't...suggesting that Approval would be better.
With a rank-method instead of Approval, in general, you must accept at
least a somewhat greater probability of electing from your bottom-set.
But if you choose ranking, then there's no best. No rank-methods
dominates the others.
I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
3 Bucklin versions:
- Plain Bucklin:
No equal-ranking or skipping.
- B or A:
You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
- ER Bucklin:
Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank n
candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds
before giving votes at your next rank.
None of those dominates the others. It depends on people's demands,
expected strategy, and on how daring & adventurous voters are.
MAM is the method that could offer the safest sincere-order ranking, if
people avoid ranking below the expected CW.
That deters burial, which would backfire.
In Bucklin, too, and Approval, it's best to not vote below the expected
sincere CW. But in MAM, doing so is harmless unless burial is attempted.
A few merit comparisons are sure, however:
MJ is nowhere near as good as the Bucklin versions with MMC and
sufficient rating or ranking levels.
MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their
non-Bucklin wording of it.
info
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09/06/16
On Sep 7, 2016 8:11 AM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
This is, of course, moving away from abstract voting theory into concrete
politics. I'm going to follow that move. I don't want this to turn into a
thread on the list, though; so, if you want to answer this, feel free to
respond to individually to me and/or Mike (at the "Janet Robinson"
address), without including the list.
(end quote)
I'm at first replying individually, because you said not to post political
replies.
But I claim that these political matters are crucially and inseparably
related to the choice of voting-system, and so aren't off topic for EM.
So can I forward this reply, including the politics, to EM?
So, you consider Hillary to be a "dismal pessimistic compromise". It
seems likely you're saying this from the left, as otherwise she wouldn't be
any kind of compromise, but simply the greater evil.
Neither is any good. Both represent only the rich.
" greater"? Hillary makes Donald look like a peace candidate.
In an absolute sense, you may well be right. But I think the relevant
comparison set is that of historical presidents, and perhaps major party
nominees as well.
(endquote)
A book was titled _I've Been Down So Long It Looks Like Up To Me".
Compare one corrupt criminal to another?
You imply that the historical presidents and nominees you spoke of
represent what we can realistically get
At the least, non-bought candidates and the pro-people, policy-solutions
are excluded from media, including NPR.
Even worse, our vote-counting is unverifiable, and so the elections are
illegitimate.
After both of GWB's elections, Harper's listed much count-fraud evidence.
There's no reason to believe that your historical presidents and
Republocrat nominees represent the best we could get in a legitimate
election.
But yes, the immediate need is to demand and get verifiable count..then we
can benefit from a good voting-system.
I hear terrible pessimism and resignation in your statements.
Give the public some credit:
One of the best could win, in a legitimate election. ...especially with
honest, open media.
So disregard supposed predictive information, and vote only for what you
really want.
But, right now, yes, many voters will dismally overcompromise, a good
argument for rankings.
You wrote:
In that comparison set, I'd argue that Hillary is actually among the more
progressive, more honest, and more competent as an administrator
(end quote)
... More honest & progressive than...what? Ugh.
; and that she's not significantly worse than average in terms of her
inherent charisma and skills as a candidate.
None of which will help the victims of her policies.
Note that I'm NOT saying that she is actually progressive, honest, or
competent in an absolute sense. Far from it. I'm just saying that she is
above average for a successful politician at the national level.
...above average among some crooks who's never win an honest election with
honest media.
If all that's true, why is her approval level among the lowest in history
for a nominee (aside from Trump)? I'd say that she's faced an unprecedented
level of media bias. Her actions regarding Whitewater, Benghazi, the email
server, and the Clinton Foundation have all faced extreme scrutiny, and
while she clearly acted wrongly in some ways, at the end of the day there
are more "troubling questions" than troubling answers. I think that the
average politician has done much worse.
See above.
How is any of this relevant to voting theory? I think that Mike is
suggesting that there should be some kind of absolute cutoff for "honest
approval". And I see the allure of that attitude. But I think that it's
clear that there are plausible sets of candidates among which a progressive
voter would be strategically well-advised to approve Hillary.
...in the belief that Trump could beat Stein in an honest election?
Choosing between Hillary & Donald is miserable, dismal pessimism.
Vote for something you want.
(And I can easily imagine corresponding scenarios where a conservative or
libertarian voter should strategically approve of someone they find
unpalatable.)
I have more to say on this, but I'll continue quoting Mike for a bit
first:
Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important
categories (top-set & bottom-set).
Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
top-set.
Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
Based in the above, it is possible to objectively say what the best
method is. It's Approval.
Yes, people want to vote not only for their top-set--they want to also
vote among their top-set.
In other words, they want it all.
Yes! Of course they want it all! And I think that a system like U/P can
give it all! Your best top-set is "preferred", your broader operational
top-set is "acceptable", and others are "unacceptable".
Yes, in 3 levels. I prefer U/P,
3-Slot ICT, & TTR MGR to Plain Approval.
But fully voting among the top-set needs longer rankings. Sometimes being
able to do so safely needs MMC.
That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the
probability of electing from your bottom-set.
I have no idea what the logic is here. There is no sense in which U/P is
more likely to elect a voter's bottom-set than approval.
True, but voting a longer ranking is more risky than voting like Approval.
If you rank, & aren't majority-favored, top-set safety depends on counting
on others to use the right defensive strategy.
....
I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
I agree that MAM is good.
3 Bucklin versions:
- Plain Bucklin:
No equal-ranking or skipping.
- B or A:
You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
Why would you consider either of these better than something like U/P or
MJ?
Because they meet MMC.
- ER Bucklin:
Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank n
candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds
before giving votes at your next rank.
I don't entirely understand what you mean by "automatically skips n-1
rounds",
If you rank 3 candidates at a rank-level, then the count-rule skips the
next 2 rounds before it gives the vote(s) indicated at your next rank-level.
except that it seems that this makes the system more ranked than rated.
Yes, Bucklin should be a ranking method, for MMC.
...& easier for people.
I'd say that any graded Bucklin method that uses strictly-above-median
tallies as a tiebreaker — such as, in the simplest-to-describe case, U/P —
is better than any of the three above.
Rank methods are for people who want of need to vote more preferences. Yes.
I prefer U/C, 3-Slot ICT, & TTR MGR.
Not that the above aren't better than many methods. But I wouldn't call
them best.
...
MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their
non-Bucklin wording of it.
I have sympathy for this criticism, which is why I'm now pushing U/P over
MJ.
I never meant to say that those 3 Bucklin versions are better than U/P.
3-Slot ICT, U/P, & TTR MGR are my favorite methods.
I call them, collectively, CD Approval, or Deluxe Approval.
When I named the best rank methods, I was referring to unlimited rankings.
I was mistaken to say that Plain Bucklin dominates MJ. Plain Bucklin
doesn't allow Approval voting.
But ER Bucklin & Bucklin B or A allow Approval voting & meet MMC.
I once suggested using top count when > 1 candidate gets a majority in
3-Slot Bucklin.
I don't know who 1st suggested that for general Bucklin, but a too count
should be used in all Bucklin, to choose between n candidates
simultaneously getting majority.
Jameson also suggested using top count if no one gets majority. I'd
considered that, but rejected it because then it stops being Approval.
But, does Bucklin's majority property need it to be Approval to the end?
No, I'd say.
It seems to me that Bucklin should use top count for simultaneous
majorities, & for no majorities.
Chris' alternative majority for Bucklin, IBIFA, makes sense by not letting
added ballots sloil a majority.
It isn't complicated. It says to substitute, for the # of ballots not
ranking X in the top n ranks, the largest # of approvals those ballots gjve
someone.
But, due to its unfamiliarity & newness, it should be reserved as a later
refinement, for after Bucklin is enacted.
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 7, 2016 8:11 AM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
This is, of course, moving away from abstract voting theory into concrete
politics. I'm going to follow that move. I don't want this to turn into a
thread on the list, though; so, if you want to answer this, feel free to
respond to individually to me and/or Mike (at the "Janet Robinson"
address), without including the list.
So, you consider Hillary to be a "dismal pessimistic compromise". It seems
likely you're saying this from the left, as otherwise she wouldn't be any
kind of compromise, but simply the greater evil.
In an absolute sense, you may well be right. But I think the relevant
comparison set is that of historical presidents, and perhaps major party
nominees as well. In that comparison set, I'd argue that Hillary is
actually among the more progressive, more honest, and more competent as an
administrator; and that she's not significantly worse than average in terms
of her inherent charisma and skills as a campaigner.
Note that I'm NOT saying that she is actually progressive, honest, or
competent in an absolute sense. Far from it. I'm just saying that she is
above average for a successful politician at the national level.
If all that's true, why is her approval level among the lowest in history
for a nominee (aside from Trump)? I'd say that she's faced an unprecedented
level of media bias. Her actions regarding Whitewater, Benghazi, the email
server, and the Clinton Foundation have all faced extreme scrutiny, and
while she clearly acted wrongly in some ways, at the end of the day there
are more "troubling questions" than troubling answers. I think that the
average politician has done much worse.
How is any of this relevant to voting theory? I think that Mike is
suggesting that there should be some kind of absolute cutoff for "honest
approval". And I see the allure of that attitude. But I think that it's
clear that there are plausible sets of candidates among which a progressive
voter would be strategically well-advised to approve Hillary. (And I can
easily imagine corresponding scenarios where a conservative or libertarian
voter should strategically approve of someone they find unpalatable.)
I have more to say on this, but I'll continue quoting Mike for a bit first:
Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important
categories (top-set & bottom-set).
Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
top-set.
Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
Based in the above, it is possible to objectively say what the best
method is. It's Approval.
Yes, people want to vote not only for their top-set--they want to also
vote among their top-set.
In other words, they want it all.
Yes! Of course they want it all! And I think that a system like U/P can
give it all! Your best top-set is "preferred", your broader operational
top-set is "acceptable", and others are "unacceptable".
That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the
probability of electing from your bottom-set.
I have no idea what the logic is here. There is no sense in which U/P is
more likely to elect a voter's bottom-set than approval.
....
I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
I agree that MAM is good.
3 Bucklin versions:
- Plain Bucklin:
No equal-ranking or skipping.
- B or A:
You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
Why would you consider either of these better than something like U/P or
MJ
- ER Bucklin:
Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank n
candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds
before giving votes at your next rank.
I don't entirely understand what you mean by "automatically skips n-1
rounds", except that it seems that this makes the system more ranked than
rated.
I'd say that any graded Bucklin method that uses strictly-above-median
tallies as a tiebreaker — such as, in the simplest-to-describe case, U/P —
is better than any of the three above.
Not that the above aren't better than many methods. But I wouldn't call
them best.
...
MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their
non-Bucklin wording of it.
I have sympathy for this criticism, which is why I'm now pushing U/P over
MJ.