1.

Place all the grades given to each candidate, high to low, left to
right in a row, with the name of each candidate on the left of each row.
2.

The median grade for each candidate is in the middle of each row.
Specifically, the middle grade for an odd number of voters, or the grade on
the right in the middle for an even number of voters.
3.

The winner is the candidate with the highest median grade. If more
than one candidate has the same highest median grade, remove the current
median grade from each tied candidate and start again at step 1 with those
tied candidates.

4. What do you think?
5. Steve Bosworth (stevebosworth@hotmail.com

Ted, I'm anxious to see how it does in simulations. Thanks! El mié., 6 de oct. de 2021 11:42 a. m., Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> escribió: > X-ASM! I like it. > > I'll see if I can modify my ASM code to do X-ASM as well. Should be a > small change. > > On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 4:32 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Steve, >> >> Great questions and suggestion! >> >> However, in some venues not every voter has the patience to grade >> potentially dozens if not hundreds of candidates as in past California >> governor recall elections which were plenty cumbersome with FPTP style >> ballots (which should have been voted and tallied under Approval rules). In >> that context many more voters will have enough patience to vote in the >> final round. >> >> In my opinion MJ is a great improvement on most Cardinal Ratings/Score >> based methods, but the certainty of tied median grades is a drawback >> despite its signature clever method for resolving such ties. >> >> A closely related but more robust method invented by Andy Jennings makes >> ties vanishingly rare while preserving all of the advantages of MJ >> including use of familiar, easy to understand grade style ballots with >> minimal strategic incentive for grade inflation/exaggeration. >> >> The voter instructions and other features of the voter interface >> environment for Jennings' method are identical to those of MJ. >> >> The method is called Chiastic Approval (XA) because of an X shaped (i.e. >> Chi shaped) graphical interpretation showing how MJ, Approval, and XA are >> related to the candidates' grade distributions. >> >> [Those distributions are discontinuous graphs that stair step down >> through the six grade levels. A vertical line through the middle of such a >> graph crosses at the midrange approval cutoff point between acceptable and >> poor. An horizontal line through the middle of the graph crosses it at the >> median ... which illustrates the ambiguity of the median, since an >> horizontal line will either miss the stair stepping graph entirely, or will >> intersect it along an entire line segment. On the other hand, a diagonal >> line of unit slope will cross the graph at precisely one point .. at the >> instant it crosses from below to above the graph. The descending >> distribution graph and the ascending diagonal line (segment) form the shape >> of the Greek letter chi.] >> >> It is pleasant for election geeks to contemplate such schematic diagrams, >> but the beauty will be lost on anybody else ... best to save it for those >> who might appreciate it :-) >> >> The algebraic representation will be even more of an imposition ... best >> to shred any reference to it except as documentation of the software: >> >> The distribution function F whose graph forms the descending staircase >> alluded to above is defined as follows: >> >> F(x) is the percentage of ballots that rate candidate C greater than or >> equal to x ... as x increases F(x) decreases. >> >> So the chiastic approval of candidate C is the greatest value of x such >> F(x) is no greater than x. >> >> Putting it all together we have ... >> >> The chiastic approval for candidate C is the greatest value of x such >> that x is less than or equal to the percentage of ballots that rate (i.e. >> grade) candidate C at or above x. >> >> I warned you! >> >> How many of you understand the Huntingto-Hill method of apportionment? >> Yet that is the official method for determining how many representatives >> each state gets in Congress and the Electoral College. And people trust in >> it unquestioningly just as they implicitly trust the medical pharmaceutical >> complex. >> >> Chiastic Approval is arguably easier to explain than MJ except perhaps at >> a superficial level that avoids the tie breaking details of MJ. >> >> Once you understand the beauty and efficiency of both Chiastic Approval >> and Approval Sorted Margins it becomes apparent that no Condorcet compliant >> deterministic social order (single winner order of finish) can surpass >> XASM, Chiastic Approval Sorted Margins, IMHO:-) >> >> Forest >> >> El mar., 5 de oct. de 2021 11:33 a. m., steve bosworth < >> stevebosworth@hotmail.com> escribió: >> >>> >>> Today's Topics: Replacing Top Two primaries >>> >>> From: Steve Bosworth >>> TO: Kevin Venzke >>> >>> Kevin Venzke wants to replace Top Two Primaries. >>> >>> Could not the objections to top two primaries be optimally satisfied by >>> removing such primaries altogether, and instead electing the winner in the >>> general election by using Majority Judgment (MJ)? Regardless of the >>> number of candidates, MJ guarantees that the winner has received the >>> highest median grade from at least 50% plus 1 of all the ballots cast. As >>> you know, MJ invites each voter to judge the suitability for office of >>> at least one of the candidates as either Excellent (*ideal*), Very >>> Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (*entirely unsuitable*). Voters >>> may give the same grade to any number of candidates. Each candidate who is >>> not explicitly graded is counted as a ‘Reject’ by that voter. As a result, >>> all candidates have the same number of evaluations but a different set of >>> grades awarded from all voters. The MJ winner is the one who receives an >>> absolute majority of all the grades equal to, or higher than, the highest *median >>> grade* given to any candidate. This median grade can be found as >>> follows: >>> >>> 1. >>> >>> Place all the grades given to each candidate, high to low, left to >>> right in a row, with the name of each candidate on the left of each row. >>> 2. >>> >>> The median grade for each candidate is in the middle of each row. >>> Specifically, the middle grade for an odd number of voters, or the grade on >>> the right in the middle for an even number of voters. >>> 3. >>> >>> The winner is the candidate with the highest median grade. If more >>> than one candidate has the same highest median grade, remove the current >>> median grade from each tied candidate and start again at step 1 with those >>> tied candidates. >>> >>> 4. What do you think? >>> 5. Steve Bosworth (stevebosworth@hotmail.com >>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >