JQ
Jameson Quinn
Mon, Nov 7, 2016 2:27 PM
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
PAR to something like "Old Par
http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting.
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
- Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
- Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
- Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on ballots
that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
- Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
(I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails summability;
but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will happen only
once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be reasonably
acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to tallies, not
anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
PAR to something like "Old Par
<http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on ballots
that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
(I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails summability;
but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will happen only
once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be reasonably
acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to tallies, not
anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
leading contender for "next step after approval"?
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Mon, Nov 7, 2016 10:25 PM
When I hear that, it's certainly worth checking out.This is just a brief
preliminary reply/comment:
But MDDTR fully avoids the chicken-dilemma problem in the chicken-dilemma
example, and, in the strongest way, avoids center-squeeze with its wv-like
strategy.
Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
PAR to something like "Old Par
http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting.
1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
(I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
When I hear that, it's certainly worth checking out.This is just a brief
preliminary reply/comment:
But MDDTR _fully_ avoids the chicken-dilemma problem in the chicken-dilemma
example, and, in the strongest way, avoids center-squeeze with its wv-like
strategy.
Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
> squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
> considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
> PAR to something like "Old Par
> <http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
> Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
>
>
> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
> Accept.
> 2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
> 3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
> 4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
> ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
> 5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
> final leader.
>
>
> ...
>
> This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
> (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
> with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
> center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
> Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
> use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
> election without breaking any compliances).
>
> It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
> summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
> happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
> cycle.)
>
> It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
> weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
> strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
> holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
> the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
>
> I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
> reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
> tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
> like.
>
> Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
> leading contender for "next step after approval"?
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
KV
Kevin Venzke
Tue, Nov 8, 2016 1:25 AM
Hi Jameson,
Except for a couple of details I have a method like this on the wiki (called CdlA). The differences are that I don't have step 2 at all, and in step 4 instead of "don't prefer the leader" I have "reject the leader."
Under my method, FBC is violated because if my favorite happens to become a tally leader, this could cause other voters, who reject my favorite, to provide additional preferences that I may not myself like. (Whereas, if I had not top-rated my favorite, the other voters' preferences may have stayed concealed.) Generally speaking we have to guarantee that raising a favorite to equal-top won't change the winner unless it makes the favorite win. Alternatives are possible, but we would have to be extremely careful in how we use the information.
I believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't eventually upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he prefers every tally leader that ever comes up. I guess most of the time, accepts and prefers end up counting the same. But the concern would be that there are ballots out there that prefer all the tally leaders (including my compromise choice, but excluding my favorite) and accept some candidates worse than my compromise. In that case I could regret voting for my favorite because of how it affects the influence contributed by other voters.
I tend to appreciate methods along these lines, though, because they emulate, to some extent, a realistic process of group decision making.
Kevin
De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
À : electionsciencefoundation electionscience@googlegroups.com; EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Lundi 7 novembre 2016 8h27
Objet : [EM] Holy grail: PAR with FBC?
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current PAR to something like "Old Par". Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC.
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
- Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
- Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
- Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
- Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm; weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Jameson,
Except for a couple of details I have a method like this on the wiki (called CdlA). The differences are that I don't have step 2 at all, and in step 4 instead of "don't prefer the leader" I have "reject the leader."
Under my method, FBC is violated because if my favorite happens to become a tally leader, this could cause other voters, who reject my favorite, to provide additional preferences that I may not myself like. (Whereas, if I had not top-rated my favorite, the other voters' preferences may have stayed concealed.) Generally speaking we have to guarantee that raising a favorite to equal-top won't change the winner unless it makes the favorite win. Alternatives are possible, but we would have to be extremely careful in how we use the information.
I believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't eventually upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he prefers every tally leader that ever comes up. I guess most of the time, accepts and prefers end up counting the same. But the concern would be that there are ballots out there that prefer all the tally leaders (including my compromise choice, but excluding my favorite) and accept some candidates worse than my compromise. In that case I could regret voting for my favorite because of how it affects the influence contributed by other voters.
I tend to appreciate methods along these lines, though, because they emulate, to some extent, a realistic process of group decision making.
Kevin
De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
À : electionsciencefoundation <electionscience@googlegroups.com>; EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Lundi 7 novembre 2016 8h27
Objet : [EM] Holy grail: PAR with FBC?
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current PAR to something like "Old Par". Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC.
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
- Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
- Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
- Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
- Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm; weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a leading contender for "next step after approval"?
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Tue, Nov 8, 2016 6:58 AM
Well, it's a little complicated for offering to the public.
I've asked about methods' acceptability. Alright, I'll be truthful: The
conclusions below are (mostly, but not entirely) only from asking one
person.
Approval: Yes. Some people object to it at first, but the objections are
all answerable. Don't let anyone tell you "It needs study." It's been
studied. What's needed is for practice to catch up with study. Approval's
simple enough that a few minutes' conversation is sufficient "study".
Score: Acceptable, but not as much as Approval. But when I explain that
people seem to do better in Score than in Approval, because it softens
their voting errors (overompromise & rivalry), then Score is fully
acceptable.
MDDTR: Yes. A simple & brief rule.
IRV: Can be explained briefly (like all the proposable methods).
(Repeatedly, eliminate from the rankings the candidate currently at the top
of fewest rankings.)
Popular with activists, organizations & progressive parties. Not as good as
the methods that I propose, but not bad, if you don't expect much for
voters not in a mutual majority.
Bucklin: Too wordy. But maybe can be acceptably explained as stepwise
Approval. Approval given one candidate at a time, according to rankings. Of
course, as you know, Bucklin, during the Progressive Era, was used in at
least 39 cities.
Approval, Score & Bucklin have use-precedence, and that might make them the
only methods that would be accepted for a 1st reform from Plurality.
IRV too, of course, but I'm sure we all agree that we should try for better
than that. Acceptable, but not among the best, or the ones that I propose.
Well, let's look at that. IRV's problem is that the CWs, if smallest, can
be immediately eliminated before you can help hir (unless you
favorite-bury). But in Bucklin the CWs can lose if hir voters don't plump.
And they might not, if it isn't reliably-known who the CWs is.
But, in Bucklin, you can protect the CWs by top-rating hir, thereby giving
hir an immediate vote (instead of waiting for hir turn way down in your
ranking) before s/he gives away the election by giving it to the other wing.
And, as I was saying: If your favorite is big enough to eliminate the CWs,
then s/he's big enough to be well-known (unless there's a media blackout on
non-Republocrats, like now). So the CWs's voters will know well about your
candidate. For that reason, if their and your candidates are close and
similar enough that you like the CWs, & consider hir in your top-set or
strong top-set, then most likely the CWs's voters won't transfer to the
opposite wing when s/he gets eliminated.
I've just been stating some mitigations of IRV's problem. And, aside from
that problem, especially if you're majority-favored, IRV has a lot of good
properties, and is strategy-free if you're sure that you're
majority-favored.
But I want things that IRV doesn't offer. Better guarantees for the voter
who isn't majority-protected, because not everyone is (I'm probably not).
By the way, I define majority-protected as:
A voter is majority-protected if a majority prefer at least part of hir
strong top-set to everyone else.
Majority protected is more than and better than just being in a
mutual-majority. It means that you're in a mutual majority that doesn't
reach beyond your strong top-set.
Of course, by that definition, there's no such thing as the
"majority-protected" distinction if you don't have a strong top-set.
Anyway, PAR is complicated for a public proposal. I know that you only
suggest it for a 2nd reform...a reform to replace one better method with
another.
...probably after Approval, Score or Bucklin.
But PAR is still complicated. But, in the future when Approval, Score or
Bucklin has been in use, of course it isn't possible to say for sure that
PAR would still be too complicated.
One more thing: Shouldn't the default rating always be Bottom?
Otherwise everyone will be Accepting a candidate that they don't even know
about.
Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
PAR to something like "Old Par
http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting.
1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
(I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Well, it's a little complicated for offering to the public.
I've asked about methods' acceptability. Alright, I'll be truthful: The
conclusions below are (mostly, but not entirely) only from asking one
person.
Approval: Yes. Some people object to it at first, but the objections are
all answerable. Don't let anyone tell you "It needs study." It's been
studied. What's needed is for practice to catch up with study. Approval's
simple enough that a few minutes' conversation is sufficient "study".
Score: Acceptable, but not as much as Approval. But when I explain that
people seem to do better in Score than in Approval, because it softens
their voting errors (overompromise & rivalry), then Score is fully
acceptable.
MDDTR: Yes. A simple & brief rule.
IRV: Can be explained briefly (like all the proposable methods).
(Repeatedly, eliminate from the rankings the candidate currently at the top
of fewest rankings.)
Popular with activists, organizations & progressive parties. Not as good as
the methods that I propose, but not bad, if you don't expect much for
voters not in a mutual majority.
Bucklin: Too wordy. But maybe can be acceptably explained as stepwise
Approval. Approval given one candidate at a time, according to rankings. Of
course, as you know, Bucklin, during the Progressive Era, was used in at
least 39 cities.
Approval, Score & Bucklin have use-precedence, and that might make them the
only methods that would be accepted for a 1st reform from Plurality.
IRV too, of course, but I'm sure we all agree that we should try for better
than that. Acceptable, but not among the best, or the ones that I propose.
Well, let's look at that. IRV's problem is that the CWs, if smallest, can
be immediately eliminated before you can help hir (unless you
favorite-bury). But in Bucklin the CWs can lose if hir voters don't plump.
And they might not, if it isn't reliably-known who the CWs is.
But, in Bucklin, you can protect the CWs by top-rating hir, thereby giving
hir an immediate vote (instead of waiting for hir turn way down in your
ranking) before s/he gives away the election by giving it to the other wing.
And, as I was saying: If your favorite is big enough to eliminate the CWs,
then s/he's big enough to be well-known (unless there's a media blackout on
non-Republocrats, like now). So the CWs's voters will know well about your
candidate. For that reason, if their and your candidates are close and
similar enough that you like the CWs, & consider hir in your top-set or
strong top-set, then most likely the CWs's voters won't transfer to the
opposite wing when s/he gets eliminated.
I've just been stating some mitigations of IRV's problem. And, aside from
that problem, especially if you're majority-favored, IRV has a lot of good
properties, and is strategy-free if you're sure that you're
majority-favored.
But I want things that IRV doesn't offer. Better guarantees for the voter
who _isn't_ majority-protected, because not everyone is (I'm probably not).
By the way, I define majority-protected as:
A voter is majority-protected if a majority prefer at least part of hir
strong top-set to everyone else.
Majority protected is more than and better than just being in a
mutual-majority. It means that you're in a mutual majority that doesn't
reach beyond your strong top-set.
Of course, by that definition, there's no such thing as the
"majority-protected" distinction if you don't have a strong top-set.
Anyway, PAR is complicated for a public proposal. I know that you only
suggest it for a 2nd reform...a reform to replace one better method with
another.
...probably after Approval, Score or Bucklin.
But PAR is still complicated. But, in the future when Approval, Score or
Bucklin has been in use, of course it isn't possible to say for sure that
PAR would still be too complicated.
One more thing: Shouldn't the default rating always be Bottom?
Otherwise everyone will be Accepting a candidate that they don't even know
about.
Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
> squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
> considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
> PAR to something like "Old Par
> <http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
> Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
>
>
> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
> Accept.
> 2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
> 3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
> 4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
> ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
> 5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
> final leader.
>
>
> ...
>
> This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
> (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
> with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
> center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
> Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
> use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
> election without breaking any compliances).
>
> It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
> summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
> happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
> cycle.)
>
> It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
> weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
> strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
> holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
> the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
>
> I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
> reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
> tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
> like.
>
> Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
> leading contender for "next step after approval"?
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Tue, Nov 8, 2016 7:04 AM
Oops! When I said "majority-protected", I meant "majority-favored".
MIchael Ossipoff
On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 1:58 AM, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Well, it's a little complicated for offering to the public.
I've asked about methods' acceptability. Alright, I'll be truthful: The
conclusions below are (mostly, but not entirely) only from asking one
person.
Approval: Yes. Some people object to it at first, but the objections are
all answerable. Don't let anyone tell you "It needs study." It's been
studied. What's needed is for practice to catch up with study. Approval's
simple enough that a few minutes' conversation is sufficient "study".
Score: Acceptable, but not as much as Approval. But when I explain that
people seem to do better in Score than in Approval, because it softens
their voting errors (overompromise & rivalry), then Score is fully
acceptable.
MDDTR: Yes. A simple & brief rule.
IRV: Can be explained briefly (like all the proposable methods).
(Repeatedly, eliminate from the rankings the candidate currently at the
top of fewest rankings.)
Popular with activists, organizations & progressive parties. Not as good
as the methods that I propose, but not bad, if you don't expect much for
voters not in a mutual majority.
Bucklin: Too wordy. But maybe can be acceptably explained as stepwise
Approval. Approval given one candidate at a time, according to rankings. Of
course, as you know, Bucklin, during the Progressive Era, was used in at
least 39 cities.
Approval, Score & Bucklin have use-precedence, and that might make them
the only methods that would be accepted for a 1st reform from Plurality.
IRV too, of course, but I'm sure we all agree that we should try for
better than that. Acceptable, but not among the best, or the ones that I
propose.
Well, let's look at that. IRV's problem is that the CWs, if smallest, can
be immediately eliminated before you can help hir (unless you
favorite-bury). But in Bucklin the CWs can lose if hir voters don't plump.
And they might not, if it isn't reliably-known who the CWs is.
But, in Bucklin, you can protect the CWs by top-rating hir, thereby giving
hir an immediate vote (instead of waiting for hir turn way down in your
ranking) before s/he gives away the election by giving it to the other wing.
And, as I was saying: If your favorite is big enough to eliminate the CWs,
then s/he's big enough to be well-known (unless there's a media blackout on
non-Republocrats, like now). So the CWs's voters will know well about your
candidate. For that reason, if their and your candidates are close and
similar enough that you like the CWs, & consider hir in your top-set or
strong top-set, then most likely the CWs's voters won't transfer to the
opposite wing when s/he gets eliminated.
I've just been stating some mitigations of IRV's problem. And, aside from
that problem, especially if you're majority-favored, IRV has a lot of good
properties, and is strategy-free if you're sure that you're
majority-favored.
But I want things that IRV doesn't offer. Better guarantees for the voter
who isn't majority-protected, because not everyone is (I'm probably not).
By the way, I define majority-protected as:
A voter is majority-protected if a majority prefer at least part of hir
strong top-set to everyone else.
Majority protected is more than and better than just being in a
mutual-majority. It means that you're in a mutual majority that doesn't
reach beyond your strong top-set.
Of course, by that definition, there's no such thing as the
"majority-protected" distinction if you don't have a strong top-set.
Anyway, PAR is complicated for a public proposal. I know that you only
suggest it for a 2nd reform...a reform to replace one better method with
another.
...probably after Approval, Score or Bucklin.
But PAR is still complicated. But, in the future when Approval, Score or
Bucklin has been in use, of course it isn't possible to say for sure that
PAR would still be too complicated.
One more thing: Shouldn't the default rating always be Bottom?
Otherwise everyone will be Accepting a candidate that they don't even know
about.
Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
PAR to something like "Old Par
http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting.
1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer,
are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
(I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
Oops! When I said "majority-protected", I meant "majority-favored".
MIchael Ossipoff
On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 1:58 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Well, it's a little complicated for offering to the public.
>
> I've asked about methods' acceptability. Alright, I'll be truthful: The
> conclusions below are (mostly, but not entirely) only from asking one
> person.
>
> Approval: Yes. Some people object to it at first, but the objections are
> all answerable. Don't let anyone tell you "It needs study." It's been
> studied. What's needed is for practice to catch up with study. Approval's
> simple enough that a few minutes' conversation is sufficient "study".
>
> Score: Acceptable, but not as much as Approval. But when I explain that
> people seem to do better in Score than in Approval, because it softens
> their voting errors (overompromise & rivalry), then Score is fully
> acceptable.
>
> MDDTR: Yes. A simple & brief rule.
>
> IRV: Can be explained briefly (like all the proposable methods).
>
> (Repeatedly, eliminate from the rankings the candidate currently at the
> top of fewest rankings.)
>
> Popular with activists, organizations & progressive parties. Not as good
> as the methods that I propose, but not bad, if you don't expect much for
> voters not in a mutual majority.
>
> Bucklin: Too wordy. But maybe can be acceptably explained as stepwise
> Approval. Approval given one candidate at a time, according to rankings. Of
> course, as you know, Bucklin, during the Progressive Era, was used in at
> least 39 cities.
>
> Approval, Score & Bucklin have use-precedence, and that might make them
> the only methods that would be accepted for a 1st reform from Plurality.
>
> IRV too, of course, but I'm sure we all agree that we should try for
> better than that. Acceptable, but not among the best, or the ones that I
> propose.
>
> Well, let's look at that. IRV's problem is that the CWs, if smallest, can
> be immediately eliminated before you can help hir (unless you
> favorite-bury). But in Bucklin the CWs can lose if hir voters don't plump.
> And they might not, if it isn't reliably-known who the CWs is.
>
> But, in Bucklin, you can protect the CWs by top-rating hir, thereby giving
> hir an immediate vote (instead of waiting for hir turn way down in your
> ranking) before s/he gives away the election by giving it to the other wing.
>
> And, as I was saying: If your favorite is big enough to eliminate the CWs,
> then s/he's big enough to be well-known (unless there's a media blackout on
> non-Republocrats, like now). So the CWs's voters will know well about your
> candidate. For that reason, if their and your candidates are close and
> similar enough that you like the CWs, & consider hir in your top-set or
> strong top-set, then most likely the CWs's voters won't transfer to the
> opposite wing when s/he gets eliminated.
>
> I've just been stating some mitigations of IRV's problem. And, aside from
> that problem, especially if you're majority-favored, IRV has a lot of good
> properties, and is strategy-free if you're sure that you're
> majority-favored.
>
> But I want things that IRV doesn't offer. Better guarantees for the voter
> who _isn't_ majority-protected, because not everyone is (I'm probably not).
>
> By the way, I define majority-protected as:
>
> A voter is majority-protected if a majority prefer at least part of hir
> strong top-set to everyone else.
>
> Majority protected is more than and better than just being in a
> mutual-majority. It means that you're in a mutual majority that doesn't
> reach beyond your strong top-set.
>
> Of course, by that definition, there's no such thing as the
> "majority-protected" distinction if you don't have a strong top-set.
>
> Anyway, PAR is complicated for a public proposal. I know that you only
> suggest it for a 2nd reform...a reform to replace one better method with
> another.
>
> ...probably after Approval, Score or Bucklin.
>
> But PAR is still complicated. But, in the future when Approval, Score or
> Bucklin has been in use, of course it isn't possible to say for sure that
> PAR would still be too complicated.
>
> One more thing: Shouldn't the default rating always be Bottom?
>
> Otherwise everyone will be Accepting a candidate that they don't even know
> about.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
>> squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
>> considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
>> PAR to something like "Old Par
>> <http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
>> Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
>>
>>
>> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
>> Accept.
>> 2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer,
>> are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
>> 3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
>> 4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
>> ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
>> 5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
>> final leader.
>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>> This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
>> (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
>> with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
>> center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
>> Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
>> use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
>> election without breaking any compliances).
>>
>> It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
>> summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
>> happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
>> cycle.)
>>
>> It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
>> weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
>> strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
>> holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
>> the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
>>
>> I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
>> reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
>> tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
>> like.
>>
>> Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
>> leading contender for "next step after approval"?
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
>
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Tue, Nov 8, 2016 3:02 PM
Kevin Venzke is right: the method I'd called PARFBC does not actually meet
FBC. However, it is bloody close; I'm trying to define an FBC-like
guarantee that it does meet.
I think it's better, and closer to FBC, than Kevin's prior version without
step 2, because in a chicken dilemma case, the winner actually gets more
votes in step 4. Because in my version, the mutual threat candidate C is
eliminated before it ever becomes the leader, so most-preferred wins,
without causing a slippery slope by showing all accepted votes and thus
having least-rejected win.
2016-11-07 20:25 GMT-05:00 Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr:
Hi Jameson,
Except for a couple of details I have a method like this on the wiki
(called CdlA). The differences are that I don't have step 2 at all, and in
step 4 instead of "don't prefer the leader" I have "reject the leader."
Under my method, FBC is violated because if my favorite happens to become
a tally leader, this could cause other voters, who reject my favorite, to
provide additional preferences that I may not myself like. (Whereas, if I
had not top-rated my favorite, the other voters' preferences may have
stayed concealed.) Generally speaking we have to guarantee that raising a
favorite to equal-top won't change the winner unless it makes the favorite
win. Alternatives are possible, but we would have to be extremely careful
in how we use the information.
I believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't eventually
upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he prefers every tally leader
that ever comes up. I guess most of the time, accepts and prefers end up
counting the same. But the concern would be that there are ballots out
there that prefer all the tally leaders (including my compromise choice,
but excluding my favorite) and accept some candidates worse than my
compromise. In that case I could regret voting for my favorite because of
how it affects the influence contributed by other voters.
I tend to appreciate methods along these lines, though, because they
emulate, to some extent, a realistic process of group decision making.
Kevin
De : Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
À : electionsciencefoundation electionscience@googlegroups.com; EM <
election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Lundi 7 novembre 2016 8h27
Objet : [EM] Holy grail: PAR with FBC?
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
PAR to something like "Old Par
http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting.
1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
(I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kevin Venzke is right: the method I'd called PARFBC does not actually meet
FBC. However, it is bloody close; I'm trying to define an FBC-like
guarantee that it does meet.
I think it's better, and closer to FBC, than Kevin's prior version without
step 2, because in a chicken dilemma case, the winner actually gets more
votes in step 4. Because in my version, the mutual threat candidate C is
eliminated before it ever becomes the leader, so most-preferred wins,
without causing a slippery slope by showing all accepted votes and thus
having least-rejected win.
2016-11-07 20:25 GMT-05:00 Kevin Venzke <stepjak@yahoo.fr>:
> Hi Jameson,
>
> Except for a couple of details I have a method like this on the wiki
> (called CdlA). The differences are that I don't have step 2 at all, and in
> step 4 instead of "don't prefer the leader" I have "reject the leader."
>
> Under my method, FBC is violated because if my favorite happens to become
> a tally leader, this could cause other voters, who reject my favorite, to
> provide additional preferences that I may not myself like. (Whereas, if I
> had not top-rated my favorite, the other voters' preferences may have
> stayed concealed.) Generally speaking we have to guarantee that raising a
> favorite to equal-top won't change the winner unless it makes the favorite
> win. Alternatives are possible, but we would have to be extremely careful
> in how we use the information.
>
> I believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't eventually
> upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he prefers every tally leader
> that ever comes up. I guess most of the time, accepts and prefers end up
> counting the same. But the concern would be that there are ballots out
> there that prefer all the tally leaders (including my compromise choice,
> but excluding my favorite) and accept some candidates worse than my
> compromise. In that case I could regret voting for my favorite because of
> how it affects the influence contributed by other voters.
>
> I tend to appreciate methods along these lines, though, because they
> emulate, to some extent, a realistic process of group decision making.
>
> Kevin
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *De :* Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
> *À :* electionsciencefoundation <electionscience@googlegroups.com>; EM <
> election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
> *Envoyé le :* Lundi 7 novembre 2016 8h27
> *Objet :* [EM] Holy grail: PAR with FBC?
>
> Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
> squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
> considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
> PAR to something like "Old Par
> <http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
> Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
>
>
> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
> Accept.
> 2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
> 3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
> 4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
> ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
> 5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
> final leader.
>
>
> ...
>
> This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
> (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
> with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
> center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
> Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
> use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
> election without breaking any compliances).
>
> It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
> summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
> happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
> cycle.)
>
> It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
> weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
> strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
> holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
> the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
>
> I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
> reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
> tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
> like.
>
> Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
> leading contender for "next step after approval"?
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
C
C.Benham
Thu, Nov 10, 2016 2:04 PM
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
favourite and content to keep voting the
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so
under Approval).
They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
"Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
and dumb.
It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
I don't like arbitrary thresholds. Obviously this causes failure of
Irrelevant Ballots Independence. But also there is the problem
that the final exact number of valid ballots can be disputed and/or take
quite a while to establish.
Postal votes can take a while to come in, or may be mislaid and later
found. The validity of certain ballots can be disputed and
the subject of legal proceedings. Some people might have initially been
denied the right to vote, but then succeed in having that
over-turned and are then allowed to vote.
It is much better if the algorithm just (more-or-less directly) compares
the candidates with each other rather than measure them against
arbitrary percentage-of-the-votes thresholds.
- Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
- Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been
tallied).
- Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
As Kevin pointed out and you now concede, this fails FBC. Kevin
Venzke's post included:
I believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't eventually
upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he prefers every tally
leader that ever comes up. I guess most of the time, accepts and
prefers end up counting the same. But the concern would be that there
are ballots out there that prefer all the tally leaders (including my
compromise choice, but excluding my favorite) and accept some
candidates worse than my compromise. In that case I could regret
voting for my favorite because of how it affects the influence
contributed by other voters.
It sounds to me from this that the method would also fail Mono-raise.
I think it even meets the voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an
election with 3 candidates and where all ballots use the full range
49: A>C>>B
03: C>A>>B
48: B>C>>A
100 ballots. C>A 51-49, C>B 52-48, A>B 52-48.
C is the "majority CW", but this method eliminates C and B.
Chris Benham
On 11/8/2016 12:57 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with
center squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't.
I'm considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the
current PAR to something like "Old Par
http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg".
Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting.
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
Accept.
- Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer,
are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
- Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
- Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been
tallied).
- Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
final leader.
...
This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets
FBC (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It
deals with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals
with center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the
voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates
and where all ballots use the full range (and you can add irrelevant
"also-rans" to such an election without breaking any compliances).
It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so
will happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted
Condorcet cycle.)
It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No
Harm; weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed
criteria, but strong enough so that I think most voters would be
honest. Later No Help holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle;
and Later No Harm holds if the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of
being eliminated.
I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding
to tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or
the like.
Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered
a leading contender for "next step after approval"?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
favourite and content to keep voting the
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so
under Approval).
They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
"Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
and dumb.
It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
> 2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
I don't like arbitrary thresholds. Obviously this causes failure of
Irrelevant Ballots Independence. But also there is the problem
that the final exact number of valid ballots can be disputed and/or take
quite a while to establish.
Postal votes can take a while to come in, or may be mislaid and later
found. The validity of certain ballots can be disputed and
the subject of legal proceedings. Some people might have initially been
denied the right to vote, but then succeed in having that
over-turned and are then allowed to vote.
It is much better if the algorithm just (more-or-less directly) compares
the candidates with each other rather than measure them against
arbitrary percentage-of-the-votes thresholds.
> 3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
> 4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
> ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been
> tallied).
> 5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
> final leader.
As Kevin pointed out and you now concede, this fails FBC. Kevin
Venzke's post included:
>
> I believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't eventually
> upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he prefers every tally
> leader that ever comes up. I guess most of the time, accepts and
> prefers end up counting the same. But the concern would be that there
> are ballots out there that prefer all the tally leaders (including my
> compromise choice, but excluding my favorite) and accept some
> candidates worse than my compromise. In that case I could regret
> voting for my favorite because of how it affects the influence
> contributed by other voters.
It sounds to me from this that the method would also fail Mono-raise.
> I think it even meets the voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an
> election with 3 candidates and where all ballots use the full range
49: A>C>>B
03: C>A>>B
48: B>C>>A
100 ballots. C>A 51-49, C>B 52-48, A>B 52-48.
C is the "majority CW", but this method eliminates C and B.
Chris Benham
On 11/8/2016 12:57 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with
> center squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't.
> I'm considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the
> current PAR to something like "Old Par
> <http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
> Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
>
> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
> Accept.
> 2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer,
> are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
> 3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
> 4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
> ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been
> tallied).
> 5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
> final leader.
>
>
> ...
>
> This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets
> FBC (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It
> deals with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals
> with center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the
> voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates
> and where all ballots use the full range (and you can add irrelevant
> "also-rans" to such an election without breaking any compliances).
>
> It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
> summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so
> will happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted
> Condorcet cycle.)
>
> It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No
> Harm; weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed
> criteria, but strong enough so that I think most voters would be
> honest. Later No Help holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle;
> and Later No Harm holds if the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of
> being eliminated.
>
> I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
> reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding
> to tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or
> the like.
>
> Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered
> a leading contender for "next step after approval"?
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Thu, Nov 10, 2016 3:39 PM
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
favourite and content to keep voting the
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so under
Approval).
They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote possible
by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
"Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
and dumb.
It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of his/her
supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to
check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would
be obvious which to reject.
But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject for
voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those who
do."
2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
I don't like arbitrary thresholds. Obviously this causes failure of
Irrelevant Ballots Independence. But also there is the problem
that the final exact number of valid ballots can be disputed and/or take
quite a while to establish.
Postal votes can take a while to come in, or may be mislaid and later
found. The validity of certain ballots can be disputed and
the subject of legal proceedings. Some people might have initially been
denied the right to vote, but then succeed in having that
over-turned and are then allowed to vote.
It is much better if the algorithm just (more-or-less directly) compares
the candidates with each other rather than measure them against
arbitrary percentage-of-the-votes thresholds.
If the number of uncounted ballots is enough to sway the election using a
threshold, it has every chance of being enough to sway the election without
thresholds. Only under the assumption that all uncounted ballots are
irrelevant does your objection apply particularly to threshold methods.
...
I'm giving up on the method I'd proposed earlier. It's now called "CPAR",
for Complicated PAR. But I do have a new patch to PAR to make it pass FBC:
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
"Accept"; except that for voters who do not explicitly reject any
candidates, default is "Reject". Voters can also mark a global option that
says: "I believe that voters like me should be the first to compromise."
- Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates. If a candidate
would have been eliminatable considering all the "prefer" votes they got on
"compromise" ballots as "rejects", then they are considered "eager to
compromise"
- The winner is the non-eliminated candidate with the highest score.
Candidates score 1 point for each voter who prefers them, and 1 point for
each voter who accepts them and prefers only candidates who were eliminated
or eager to compromise.
The above method meets FBC, except in vanishingly rare cases where multiple
candidates are simultaneously at a threshold (analogous to perfect ties).
2016-11-10 9:04 GMT-05:00 C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au>:
> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
>
>
> This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
> candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
> I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
> favourite and content to keep voting the
> way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so under
> Approval).
>
> They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote possible
> by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
> favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
> "Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
> and dumb.
>
> It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
> resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
> from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of his/her
> supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
> Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
>
My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to
check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would
be obvious which to reject.
But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject for
voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those who
do."
>
> 2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
>
>
> I don't like arbitrary thresholds. Obviously this causes failure of
> Irrelevant Ballots Independence. But also there is the problem
> that the final exact number of valid ballots can be disputed and/or take
> quite a while to establish.
>
> Postal votes can take a while to come in, or may be mislaid and later
> found. The validity of certain ballots can be disputed and
> the subject of legal proceedings. Some people might have initially been
> denied the right to vote, but then succeed in having that
> over-turned and are then allowed to vote.
>
> It is much better if the algorithm just (more-or-less directly) compares
> the candidates with each other rather than measure them against
> arbitrary percentage-of-the-votes thresholds.
>
If the number of uncounted ballots is enough to sway the election using a
threshold, it has every chance of being enough to sway the election without
thresholds. Only under the assumption that all uncounted ballots are
irrelevant does your objection apply particularly to threshold methods.
...
I'm giving up on the method I'd proposed earlier. It's now called "CPAR",
for Complicated PAR. But I do have a new patch to PAR to make it pass FBC:
1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
"Accept"; except that for voters who do not explicitly reject any
candidates, default is "Reject". Voters can also mark a global option that
says: "I believe that voters like me should be the first to compromise."
2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates. If a candidate
would have been eliminatable considering all the "prefer" votes they got on
"compromise" ballots as "rejects", then they are considered "eager to
compromise"
3. The winner is the non-eliminated candidate with the highest score.
Candidates score 1 point for each voter who prefers them, and 1 point for
each voter who accepts them and prefers only candidates who were eliminated
or eager to compromise.
The above method meets FBC, except in vanishingly rare cases where multiple
candidates are simultaneously at a threshold (analogous to perfect ties).
JL
Juho Laatu
Fri, Nov 11, 2016 4:05 PM
Negative votes and default votes that are not bottom votes are often problematic. There can be some problems also with rule "default is accept for voters who do explicitly reject some candidates".
Candidates A and B are considered to be the strongest potential winners. Their first preference support is about 45% and 45%. Candidates from C to Z have much less first preference support.
It makes sense to A supporters to reject B (hoping that rule 2 will eliminate B, even if B would have more support than A). B supporters will do the same to A. It is thus possible (or even probable in this scenario, if the election is competitive) that the leading candidates will be eliminated.
Let's assume that there are no obvious compromise candidates that would be preferred over B by A supporters, and vice versa. Some of the other (than A and B) candidates might be rejected too (those that many enough voters bother to reject sincerely). As a result the winner will be someone that could be quite disliked among both A and B supporters.
A linear opinion space might look like this: D - [C] - [A] - [B] - [E] - F - [G] - ... - X - Y - Z where square brackets point out the eliminated candidates. D and F are maybe the most likely winners, but surprises are possible if many A and B supporters explicitly reject (sincerely but incompletely) only few smaller candidates (e.g. D, C, E, F, G) and thereby give default accept to all the others (e.g. X, Y, Z). If candidate Y has more first preference support than other minor candidates, and some support from X and Z supporters, he/she might win.
If this is of concern, the easiest fix is of course to use reject as default value in all ballots.
BR, Juho
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their favourite and content to keep voting the
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so under Approval).
They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give "Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
and dumb.
It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would be obvious which to reject.
But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those who do."
2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
Negative votes and default votes that are not bottom votes are often problematic. There can be some problems also with rule "default is accept for voters who do explicitly reject some candidates".
Candidates A and B are considered to be the strongest potential winners. Their first preference support is about 45% and 45%. Candidates from C to Z have much less first preference support.
It makes sense to A supporters to reject B (hoping that rule 2 will eliminate B, even if B would have more support than A). B supporters will do the same to A. It is thus possible (or even probable in this scenario, if the election is competitive) that the leading candidates will be eliminated.
Let's assume that there are no obvious compromise candidates that would be preferred over B by A supporters, and vice versa. Some of the other (than A and B) candidates might be rejected too (those that many enough voters bother to reject sincerely). As a result the winner will be someone that could be quite disliked among both A and B supporters.
A linear opinion space might look like this: D - [C] - [A] - [B] - [E] - F - [G] - ... - X - Y - Z where square brackets point out the eliminated candidates. D and F are maybe the most likely winners, but surprises are possible if many A and B supporters explicitly reject (sincerely but incompletely) only few smaller candidates (e.g. D, C, E, F, G) and thereby give default accept to all the others (e.g. X, Y, Z). If candidate Y has more first preference support than other minor candidates, and some support from X and Z supporters, he/she might win.
If this is of concern, the easiest fix is of course to use reject as default value in all ballots.
BR, Juho
> On 10 Nov 2016, at 17:39, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> 2016-11-10 9:04 GMT-05:00 C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au <mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au>>:
>> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
>
> This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
> I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their favourite and content to keep voting the
> way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so under Approval).
>
> They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
> favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give "Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
> and dumb.
>
> It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
> from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
> Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
>
> My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would be obvious which to reject.
>
> But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those who do."
>
>> 2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
>
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Fri, Nov 11, 2016 4:17 PM
In the case that Juho discusses, PAR is designed to disqualify/eliminate
the minor candidates X, Y, Z, etc. due to the fact that they will have
under 25% first preferences. The theory is that any candidate X with over
25% first preferences will be getting enough attention so that voters who
don't like X, and who explicitly reject at least one candidate, will take
the trouble to explicitly reject X.
2016-11-11 11:05 GMT-05:00 Juho Laatu juho.laatu@gmail.com:
Negative votes and default votes that are not bottom votes are often
problematic. There can be some problems also with rule "default is accept
for voters who do explicitly reject some candidates".
Candidates A and B are considered to be the strongest potential winners.
Their first preference support is about 45% and 45%. Candidates from C to Z
have much less first preference support.
It makes sense to A supporters to reject B (hoping that rule 2 will
eliminate B, even if B would have more support than A). B supporters will
do the same to A. It is thus possible (or even probable in this scenario,
if the election is competitive) that the leading candidates will be
eliminated.
Let's assume that there are no obvious compromise candidates that would be
preferred over B by A supporters, and vice versa. Some of the other (than A
and B) candidates might be rejected too (those that many enough voters
bother to reject sincerely). As a result the winner will be someone that
could be quite disliked among both A and B supporters.
A linear opinion space might look like this: D - [C] - [A] - [B] - [E] - F
- [G] - ... - X - Y - Z where square brackets point out the eliminated
candidates. D and F are maybe the most likely winners, but surprises are
possible if many A and B supporters explicitly reject (sincerely but
incompletely) only few smaller candidates (e.g. D, C, E, F, G) and thereby
give default accept to all the others (e.g. X, Y, Z). If candidate Y has
more first preference support than other minor candidates, and some support
from X and Z supporters, he/she might win.
If this is of concern, the easiest fix is of course to use reject as
default value in all ballots.
BR, Juho
On 10 Nov 2016, at 17:39, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
2016-11-10 9:04 GMT-05:00 C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au:
- Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
favourite and content to keep voting the
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so
under Approval).
They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
"Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
and dumb.
It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to
check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would
be obvious which to reject.
But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject
for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those
who do."
2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
In the case that Juho discusses, PAR is designed to disqualify/eliminate
the minor candidates X, Y, Z, etc. due to the fact that they will have
under 25% first preferences. The theory is that any candidate X with over
25% first preferences will be getting enough attention so that voters who
don't like X, and who explicitly reject at least one candidate, will take
the trouble to explicitly reject X.
2016-11-11 11:05 GMT-05:00 Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com>:
> Negative votes and default votes that are not bottom votes are often
> problematic. There can be some problems also with rule "default is accept
> for voters who do explicitly reject some candidates".
>
> Candidates A and B are considered to be the strongest potential winners.
> Their first preference support is about 45% and 45%. Candidates from C to Z
> have much less first preference support.
>
> It makes sense to A supporters to reject B (hoping that rule 2 will
> eliminate B, even if B would have more support than A). B supporters will
> do the same to A. It is thus possible (or even probable in this scenario,
> if the election is competitive) that the leading candidates will be
> eliminated.
>
> Let's assume that there are no obvious compromise candidates that would be
> preferred over B by A supporters, and vice versa. Some of the other (than A
> and B) candidates might be rejected too (those that many enough voters
> bother to reject sincerely). As a result the winner will be someone that
> could be quite disliked among both A and B supporters.
>
> A linear opinion space might look like this: D - [C] - [A] - [B] - [E] - F
> - [G] - ... - X - Y - Z where square brackets point out the eliminated
> candidates. D and F are maybe the most likely winners, but surprises are
> possible if many A and B supporters explicitly reject (sincerely but
> incompletely) only few smaller candidates (e.g. D, C, E, F, G) and thereby
> give default accept to all the others (e.g. X, Y, Z). If candidate Y has
> more first preference support than other minor candidates, and some support
> from X and Z supporters, he/she might win.
>
> If this is of concern, the easiest fix is of course to use reject as
> default value in all ballots.
>
> BR, Juho
>
>
> On 10 Nov 2016, at 17:39, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> 2016-11-10 9:04 GMT-05:00 C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au>:
>
>> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
>>
>>
>> This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
>> candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
>> I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
>> favourite and content to keep voting the
>> way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so
>> under Approval).
>>
>> They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
>> possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
>> favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
>> "Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair
>> and dumb.
>>
>> It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
>> resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate
>> from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
>> his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
>> Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
>>
>
> My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to
> check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would
> be obvious which to reject.
>
> But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject
> for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those
> who do."
>
>>
>> 2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
>> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
