to-coordinate (and somewhat risky) Push-over are all things of use in a
tough competitive election (with plenty of mutual enmity).

What's useful or attractive about any of those properties in a friendly
election about pizza toppings or movies?  For that some Condorcet method
or Score or even Borda should be fine.

Chris B.

On 12/05/2024 5:58 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

info

On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 20:08 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

What do you have against pizza & movies?

FairVote makes much of that because it’s IRV’s claim-to-game. Its
strong-suit.

LNHa gives you the freedom to express preference among even your
bottom-most choices. … to vote nearly-worst over even-worse.

You pay for your bottom-end freedom with abysmal top-end favorite-burial
need.

LNHelp

Is that a problem with Condorcet? It hasn’t worried me, & I haven’t heard
about it as a problem.

Clone Independence,

Of course RP & Schulz are clone-independent.

a quite weak Compromise

In what part of the Twilight-Zone?

IRV has horrendous favorite-burial need.

Just for this discussion, let’s simplify by pretending that the Democrats
are acceptable.

Say it’s Trump, Biden & Jill Stein.

Say you like Stein best.

But say that a lot of Biden-preferrers like her least & are expected to
rank Trump 2nd because their sources have so much bad to say about Stein.

But say Stein has a strong following, & her preferrers, including  you,
are numerous enough to make her eliminate Biden.

Maybe Stein can beat Trump, & maybe not (because this is a story).

Do you toprank Stein, to eliminate Joe, so that his voters will transfer
to Trump, electing Trump?

If you know what you’re doing, you bury your favorite under Joe.

Will that situation happen all the time? No.

But if preventing the election of an unacceptable is paramount, so that
you don’t want to take any chance when it’s uncertain, then you must bury
your favorite under the compromise, even if you dislike the compromise.

But wait—it gets even better:

Say it isn’t certain which Acceptable will be the one that you can help to
avoid elimination.

You have to guess. You have to try your best to rank the Acceptables in
order of winnability… starting with the one most likely to get enough
2st-choice support from the other Acceptables-preferrers to escape
elimination.

You have to make that guess about the other Acceptables-preferrers…the
order in which the Acceptables will be supported by them, thereby making
them prospects for escaping elimination.

Sound familiar? That’s right: It’s just the same as Plurality.

Just a more expensive Plurality election.

wv Condorcet has zero “compromise incentive”.

Yes, other Condorcet versions have that problem, due to their
burial-vulnerability. …resulting in a problem resembling IRV.

But, with wv Condorcet, burial is well-deterred, because it’s 10 times
more likely to backfire than to succeed.

Offensive-strategy is the only problem with Condorcet. FairVote makes
much of that, claiming that all Condorcet has that problem.

Forgive me for disappointing you, but wv * doesn’t* have that or any
strategy problem.

I prefer Hare to Condorcet for pizza-topping, ice-cream flavor or
movie-choice, because of the 2 Hare advantages that I stated.

The choice between Condorcet & Hare for public political elections is:

Do you want complete freedom from strategy-need, or do you want abominable
favorite- burial need?

and invulnerability to any other strategy except difficult-

In this poll, I topranked Condorcet,IRV (aka Benham), because it’s
Condorcet-complying, & it’s Hare-ancestry confers
offensive-strategy-resistance.

On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 21:36 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 20:08 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

What do you have against pizza & movies?

FairVote makes much of that because it’s IRV’s claim-to-game. Its
strong-suit.

LNHa gives you the freedom to express preference among even your
bottom-most choices. … to vote nearly-worst over even-worse.

You pay for your bottom-end freedom with abysmal top-end favorite-burial
need.

LNHelp

Is that a problem with Condorcet? It hasn’t worried me, & I haven’t heard
about it as a problem.

Clone Independence,

Of course RP & Schulz are clone-independent.

a quite weak Compromise

In what part of the Twilight-Zone?

IRV has horrendous favorite-burial need.

Just for this discussion, let’s simplify by pretending that the Democrats
are acceptable.

Say it’s Trump, Biden & Jill Stein.

Say you like Stein best.

But say that a lot of Biden-preferrers like her least & are expected to
rank Trump 2nd because their sources have so much bad to say about Stein.

But say Stein has a strong following, & her preferrers, including  you,
are numerous enough to make her eliminate Biden.

Maybe Stein can beat Trump, & maybe not (because this is a story).

Do you toprank Stein, to eliminate Joe, so that his voters will transfer
to Trump, electing Trump?

If you know what you’re doing, you bury your favorite under Joe.

Will that situation happen all the time? No.

But if preventing the election of an unacceptable is paramount, so that
you don’t want to take any chance when it’s uncertain, then you must bury
your favorite under the compromise, even if you dislike the compromise.

But wait—it gets even better:

Say it isn’t certain which Acceptable will be the one that you can help to
avoid elimination.

You have to guess. You have to try your best to rank the Acceptables in
order of winnability… starting with the one most likely to get enough
2st-choice support from the other Acceptables-preferrers to escape
elimination.

You have to make that guess about the other Acceptables-preferrers…the
order in which the Acceptables will be supported by them, thereby making
them prospects for escaping elimination.

Sound familiar? That’s right: It’s just the same as Plurality.

Just a more expensive Plurality election.

wv Condorcet has zero “compromise incentive”.

Yes, other Condorcet versions have that problem, due to their
burial-vulnerability. …resulting in a problem resembling IRV.

But, with wv Condorcet, burial is well-deterred, because it’s 10 times
more likely to backfire than to succeed.

Offensive-strategy is the only problem with Condorcet. FairVote makes
much of that, claiming that all Condorcet has that problem.

Forgive me for disappointing you, but wv * doesn’t* have that or any
strategy problem.

I prefer Hare to Condorcet for pizza-topping, ice-cream flavor or
movie-choice, because of the 2 Hare advantages that I stated.

The choice between Condorcet & Hare for public political elections is:

Do you want complete freedom from strategy-need, or do you want abominable
favorite- burial need?

and invulnerability to any other strategy except difficult-

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 9:49 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 20:23 Closed Limelike Curves
<closed.limelike.curves wrote:

[quote]
But allowing any plurality-strength Condorcet candidate to win creates
screwy burial and favorite-betrayal incentives that can end up with a
unanimous favorite/least favorite winning.
[quote]

I’ve told how wv Condorcet deters offensive-strategy.  …without which
there’s no “incentive” ( need) for favorite-burial, or any
defensive-strategy.

Alright, that’s enough from Closed. Enough assertions from someone who
needs instead to listen & ask.

I’m blocking Closed, so that I won’t have receive copies of his blather.

As I usually mention at this point, when I don’t answer Closed, that
doesn’t mean he’s said something irrefutable. It’s just that I’ve rerouted
his messages so Trash.

On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 20:23 Closed Limelike Curves
<closed.limelike.curves wrote:

I’ve told how wv Condorcet deters offensive-strategy.  …without which
there’s no “incentive” ( need) for favorite-burial, or any
defensive-strategy.