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Technical discussion of election methods

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Thermodynamics

RL
Richard Lung
Sat, Jun 4, 2022 1:25 PM

Forest,

The efficiency of heat engines, in thermodynamics, offer an analogy with
voting methods. Many other sciences do so, if voting method follows the
Stevens structure of measurement, held in common by other branches of
science. (I published a free e-book, about scientific models of election
method, called: Science is Ethics as Electics.)

The basic principle, that thermodynamics and election method have in
common is conservation, either of energy or information. (I believe
scientists are currently translating energy terms into information terms.)

Common-place teachings of social choice theory, including the American
Mathematics Society, usually make the claim that there is no perfect
voting system. The equivalent statement in thermodynamics is that there
is no perpetual motion machine.

As you point out, that does not preclude voting methods of different
efficiency, the equivalent of heat engines of differing efficiency. The
engines depend on efficient transfer of surplus heat, to work
requirements, to keep the engine going. Similarly, transfers of vote
surpluses, to elective quotas, keep the count procedure going. Heat
forms a random distribution of motion. And votes typically form a random
distribution of choice (subject to left or right skews).

Binomial STV would perhaps be rather more efficient than traditional
STV, because it rationally conserves exclusion information. In rough
analogy, a binomial STV “heat engine” is better “insulated,” to conserve
heat. Thermodynamics is not just a dynamic of heat but also its
insulation, in a closed system. Likewise, an election method is not just
an active election, but also a closed system of exclusion.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

Forest, The efficiency of heat engines, in thermodynamics, offer an analogy with voting methods. Many other sciences do so, if voting method follows the Stevens structure of measurement, held in common by other branches of science. (I published a free e-book, about scientific models of election method, called: Science is Ethics as Electics.) The basic principle, that thermodynamics and election method have in common is conservation, either of energy or information. (I believe scientists are currently translating energy terms into information terms.) Common-place teachings of social choice theory, including the American Mathematics Society, usually make the claim that there is no perfect voting system. The equivalent statement in thermodynamics is that there is no perpetual motion machine. As you point out, that does not preclude voting methods of different efficiency, the equivalent of heat engines of differing efficiency. The engines depend on efficient transfer of surplus heat, to work requirements, to keep the engine going. Similarly, transfers of vote surpluses, to elective quotas, keep the count procedure going. Heat forms a random distribution of motion. And votes typically form a random distribution of choice (subject to left or right skews). Binomial STV would perhaps be rather more efficient than traditional STV, because it rationally conserves exclusion information. In rough analogy, a binomial STV “heat engine” is better “insulated,” to conserve heat. Thermodynamics is not just a dynamic of heat but also its insulation, in a closed system. Likewise, an election method is not just an active election, but also a closed system of exclusion. Regards, Richard Lung.
FS
Forest Simmons
Sat, Jun 4, 2022 8:06 PM

True!

Do an internet search of "information mechanics" to confirm the validity of
this tight connection.

Information mechanics seems to be the key for the "unified field theory"
Einstein was looking for ... and more ... unification of classical and
quantum fields for all of the forces ... strong, weak, and intermediate...
if not a "theory of everything."

El sáb., 4 de jun. de 2022 6:26 a. m., Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com
escribió:

Forest,

The efficiency of heat engines, in thermodynamics, offer an analogy with
voting methods. Many other sciences do so, if voting method follows the
Stevens structure of measurement, held in common by other branches of
science. (I published a free e-book, about scientific models of election
method, called: Science is Ethics as Electics.)

The basic principle, that thermodynamics and election method have in
common is conservation, either of energy or information. (I believe
scientists are currently translating energy terms into information terms.)

Common-place teachings of social choice theory, including the American
Mathematics Society, usually make the claim that there is no perfect voting
system. The equivalent statement in thermodynamics is that there is no
perpetual motion machine.

As you point out, that does not preclude voting methods of different
efficiency, the equivalent of heat engines of differing efficiency. The
engines depend on efficient transfer of surplus heat, to work requirements,
to keep the engine going. Similarly, transfers of vote surpluses, to
elective quotas, keep the count procedure going. Heat forms a random
distribution of motion. And votes typically form a random distribution of
choice (subject to left or right skews).

Binomial STV would perhaps be rather more efficient than traditional STV,
because it rationally conserves exclusion information. In rough analogy, a
binomial STV “heat engine” is better “insulated,” to conserve heat.
Thermodynamics is not just a dynamic of heat but also its insulation, in a
closed system. Likewise, an election method is not just an active election,
but also a closed system of exclusion.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

True! Do an internet search of "information mechanics" to confirm the validity of this tight connection. Information mechanics seems to be the key for the "unified field theory" Einstein was looking for ... and more ... unification of classical and quantum fields for all of the forces ... strong, weak, and intermediate... if not a "theory of everything." El sáb., 4 de jun. de 2022 6:26 a. m., Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> escribió: > > Forest, > > > > The efficiency of heat engines, in thermodynamics, offer an analogy with > voting methods. Many other sciences do so, if voting method follows the > Stevens structure of measurement, held in common by other branches of > science. (I published a free e-book, about scientific models of election > method, called: Science is Ethics as Electics.) > > The basic principle, that thermodynamics and election method have in > common is conservation, either of energy or information. (I believe > scientists are currently translating energy terms into information terms.) > > Common-place teachings of social choice theory, including the American > Mathematics Society, usually make the claim that there is no perfect voting > system. The equivalent statement in thermodynamics is that there is no > perpetual motion machine. > > As you point out, that does not preclude voting methods of different > efficiency, the equivalent of heat engines of differing efficiency. The > engines depend on efficient transfer of surplus heat, to work requirements, > to keep the engine going. Similarly, transfers of vote surpluses, to > elective quotas, keep the count procedure going. Heat forms a random > distribution of motion. And votes typically form a random distribution of > choice (subject to left or right skews). > > Binomial STV would perhaps be rather more efficient than traditional STV, > because it rationally conserves exclusion information. In rough analogy, a > binomial STV “heat engine” is better “insulated,” to conserve heat. > Thermodynamics is not just a dynamic of heat but also its insulation, in a > closed system. Likewise, an election method is not just an active election, > but also a closed system of exclusion. > > > Regards, > > Richard Lung. > > >
K
KenB
Mon, Jun 6, 2022 8:54 PM
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/06/06/vote-for-everyone-you-like-fargo-tests-approval-voting
FS
Forest Simmons
Tue, Jun 7, 2022 12:47 AM

Good News!

And pretty good explanation.

Some negative and confusion inducing comments from IRV advocates based on
common misconceptions were responded to.

A voter said she was confused because she was not used to voting for more
than one candidate and didn't know how it worked ... despite the simple
instructions: "vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes
votes will be elected."

IRV advocates contribute to that kind of confusion by claiming Approval
violates "one person, one vote."

For that reason I think it would behoove us to distinguish between 'votes'
and marks on the ballot. Instead of saying...

"Vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be
elected."

... say ...

"Mark yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes marks will be
elected."

For additional clarification it might help to say, "For best results, mark
'yes' for the candidate that would get your 'vote' if you could only mark
one, AND also mark 'yes' for all candidates (if any) that you like better
than that candidate."

There was another confusion based the same "one person, one vote" phrase in
supreme court rulings that became the law of the land in the sixties;
Approval detractors in Fargo have been claiming that Approval election
results should be counted fractionally; in other words they are
intentionally confusing Approval Voting with Fractional Cumulative Voting.

Under that burden, if all voters marked yes for their top two favorite
candidates, then the winner could not claim more than fifty percent support
even if she were marked yes on 100 percent of the ballots.

So there is a big quarrel over how to report the results, if not over how
to determine the winner.

For IRV supporters, no method satisfies "one person, one vote," unless each
ballot boils down to a single vote for a single candidate.

To counter that claim, Approval supporters go back to the supreme court
language as in the 1964 Wesberry v. Sanders
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesberry_v._Sanders
decision,

"...the U.S. Supreme Court declared that equality of voting—one person, one
vote—means that "the weight and worth of the citizens' votes as nearly as
is practicable must be the same",[12]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_man,_one_vote#cite_note-:0-13and
ruled that states must also draw federal congressional districts containing
roughly equal represented populations." [from the one person one vote
Wikipededia page]

However, I agree with Martin Harper ... that it is easier, more
informative, and less contentious to humour superstitious detractors by
specifying which of the marked candidates gets the (one and only) vote from
that ballot:

"Mark yes or no for each candidate; your actual vote will go to the one
(from among those that you marked 'yes') with the most yes marks from other
voters."

This rule is equivalent to the standard Approval rule, but allows us to
distinguish (in the post election analysis) the Approval Support
percentages, and the percentage of 'votes' received.

It also highlights the importance of agreement with other voters: Approval
Voting can be considered (primarily?) as a tool for helping like minded
voters to pool their votes conveniently, safely, efficiently, and
effectively.

-Forest

El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 1:54 p. m., KenB kdbearman@gmail.com escribió:

Good News! And pretty good explanation. Some negative and confusion inducing comments from IRV advocates based on common misconceptions were responded to. A voter said she was confused because she was not used to voting for more than one candidate and didn't know how it worked ... despite the simple instructions: "vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be elected." IRV advocates contribute to that kind of confusion by claiming Approval violates "one person, one vote." For that reason I think it would behoove us to distinguish between 'votes' and marks on the ballot. Instead of saying... "Vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be elected." ... say ... "Mark yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes marks will be elected." For additional clarification it might help to say, "For best results, mark 'yes' for the candidate that would get your 'vote' if you could only mark one, AND also mark 'yes' for all candidates (if any) that you like better than that candidate." There was another confusion based the same "one person, one vote" phrase in supreme court rulings that became the law of the land in the sixties; Approval detractors in Fargo have been claiming that Approval election results should be counted fractionally; in other words they are intentionally confusing Approval Voting with Fractional Cumulative Voting. Under that burden, if all voters marked yes for their top two favorite candidates, then the winner could not claim more than fifty percent support even if she were marked yes on 100 percent of the ballots. So there is a big quarrel over how to report the results, if not over how to determine the winner. For IRV supporters, no method satisfies "one person, one vote," unless each ballot boils down to a single vote for a single candidate. To counter that claim, Approval supporters go back to the supreme court language as in the 1964 *Wesberry v. Sanders <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesberry_v._Sanders>* decision, "...the U.S. Supreme Court declared that equality of voting—one person, one vote—means that "the weight and worth of the citizens' votes as nearly as is practicable must be the same",[12] <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_man,_one_vote#cite_note-:0-13>and ruled that states must also draw federal congressional districts containing roughly equal represented populations." [from the one person one vote Wikipededia page] However, I agree with Martin Harper ... that it is easier, more informative, and less contentious to humour superstitious detractors by specifying which of the marked candidates gets the (one and only) vote from that ballot: "Mark yes or no for each candidate; your actual vote will go to the one (from among those that you marked 'yes') with the most yes marks from other voters." This rule is equivalent to the standard Approval rule, but allows us to distinguish (in the post election analysis) the Approval Support percentages, and the percentage of 'votes' received. It also highlights the importance of agreement with other voters: Approval Voting can be considered (primarily?) as a tool for helping like minded voters to pool their votes conveniently, safely, efficiently, and effectively. -Forest El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 1:54 p. m., KenB <kdbearman@gmail.com> escribió: > > https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/06/06/vote-for-everyone-you-like-fargo-tests-approval-voting > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Tue, Jun 7, 2022 1:10 AM

Funny thing is that, while I live in Burlington Vermont now, I grew up 20 miles west of Fargo.  I used to know Fargo like the back of my hand.  Now I don't know it well at all.

About the one-person-one-vote thing, I think that the ND Supreme Court astutely framed the problem and I included the relevant passage from the opinion at the beginning of my RCV paper.

People have rights, marks on a ballot do not.  One of those rights is that you have a right to have your vote count no less than my vote.

So if at the end of the day, no matter what the method is, if more voters mark their ballots that A is preferred over B (it doesn't matter how much more preferred) than then number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B should not be elected.  If, whatever the method is, somehow B does get elected, then we know that the voters supporting B over A cast votes that had more power than the votes coming from voters supporting A over B.

Problem with Approval is that it forces the voter to decide, tactically, if they are going to hide their preference of A over B (by approving both A and B) because they really hate Candidate C (and are worried that C might beat B), or if they decide that C doesn't really have a chance and they don't wanna throw away their preference for A (by not approving B).

Cardinal methods inherently suffer this problem of imposing tactical voting onto voters.

robert

On 06/06/2022 8:47 PM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:

Good News!

And pretty good explanation.

Some negative and confusion inducing comments from IRV advocates based on common misconceptions were responded to.

A voter said she was confused because she was not used to voting for more than one candidate and didn't know how it worked ... despite the simple instructions: "vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be elected."

IRV advocates contribute to that kind of confusion by claiming Approval violates "one person, one vote."

For that reason I think it would behoove us to distinguish between 'votes' and marks on the ballot. Instead of saying...

"Vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be elected."

... say ...

"Mark yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes marks will be elected."

For additional clarification it might help to say, "For best results, mark 'yes' for the candidate that would get your 'vote' if you could only mark one, AND also mark 'yes' for all candidates (if any) that you like better than that candidate."

There was another confusion based the same "one person, one vote" phrase in supreme court rulings that became the law of the land in the sixties; Approval detractors in Fargo have been claiming that Approval election results should be counted fractionally; in other words they are intentionally confusing Approval Voting with Fractional Cumulative Voting.

Under that burden, if all voters marked yes for their top two favorite candidates, then the winner could not claim more than fifty percent support even if she were marked yes on 100 percent of the ballots.

So there is a big quarrel over how to report the results, if not over how to determine the winner.

For IRV supporters, no method satisfies "one person, one vote," unless each ballot boils down to a single vote for a single candidate.

To counter that claim, Approval supporters go back to the supreme court language as in the 1964 Wesberry v. Sanders (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesberry_v._Sanders)decision,

"...the U.S. Supreme Court declared that equality of voting—one person, one vote—means that "the weight and worth of the citizens' votes as nearly as is practicable must be the same",[12] (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_man,_one_vote#cite_note-:0-13)and ruled that states must also draw federal congressional districts containing roughly equal represented populations." [from the one person one vote Wikipededia page]

However, I agree with Martin Harper ... that it is easier, more informative, and less contentious to humour superstitious detractors by specifying which of the marked candidates gets the (one and only) vote from that ballot:

"Mark yes or no for each candidate; your actual vote will go to the one (from among those that you marked 'yes') with the most yes marks from other voters."

This rule is equivalent to the standard Approval rule, but allows us to distinguish (in the post election analysis) the Approval Support percentages, and the percentage of 'votes' received.

It also highlights the importance of agreement with other voters: Approval Voting can be considered (primarily?) as a tool for helping like minded voters topool their votes conveniently, safely,efficiently, and effectively.

-Forest

El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 1:54 p. m., KenB kdbearman@gmail.com escribió:


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

.
.
.

Funny thing is that, while I live in Burlington Vermont now, I grew up 20 miles west of Fargo. I used to know Fargo like the back of my hand. Now I don't know it well at all. About the one-person-one-vote thing, I think that the ND Supreme Court astutely framed the problem and I included the relevant passage from the opinion at the beginning of my RCV paper. People have rights, marks on a ballot do not. One of those rights is that you have a right to have your vote count no less than my vote. So if at the end of the day, no matter what the method is, if more voters mark their ballots that A is preferred over B (it doesn't matter how much *more* preferred) than then number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B should not be elected. If, whatever the method is, somehow B *does* get elected, then we know that the voters supporting B over A cast votes that had more power than the votes coming from voters supporting A over B. Problem with Approval is that it forces the voter to decide, tactically, if they are going to hide their preference of A over B (by approving both A and B) because they really hate Candidate C (and are worried that C might beat B), or if they decide that C doesn't really have a chance and they don't wanna throw away their preference for A (by not approving B). Cardinal methods *inherently* suffer this problem of imposing tactical voting onto voters. robert > On 06/06/2022 8:47 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Good News! > > And pretty good explanation. > > Some negative and confusion inducing comments from IRV advocates based on common misconceptions were responded to. > > A voter said she was confused because she was not used to voting for more than one candidate and didn't know how it worked ... despite the simple instructions: "vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be elected." > > IRV advocates contribute to that kind of confusion by claiming Approval violates "one person, one vote." > > For that reason I think it would behoove us to distinguish between 'votes' and marks on the ballot. Instead of saying... > > "Vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will be elected." > > ... say ... > > "Mark yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes marks will be elected." > > For additional clarification it might help to say, "For best results, mark 'yes' for the candidate that would get your 'vote' if you could only mark one, AND also mark 'yes' for all candidates (if any) that you like better than that candidate." > > There was another confusion based the same "one person, one vote" phrase in supreme court rulings that became the law of the land in the sixties; Approval detractors in Fargo have been claiming that Approval election results should be counted fractionally; in other words they are intentionally confusing Approval Voting with Fractional Cumulative Voting. > > Under that burden, if all voters marked yes for their top two favorite candidates, then the winner could not claim more than fifty percent support even if she were marked yes on 100 percent of the ballots. > > So there is a big quarrel over how to report the results, if not over how to determine the winner. > > For IRV supporters, no method satisfies "one person, one vote," unless each ballot boils down to a single vote for a single candidate. > > To counter that claim, Approval supporters go back to the supreme court language as in the 1964 Wesberry v. Sanders (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesberry_v._Sanders)decision, > > "...the U.S. Supreme Court declared that equality of voting—one person, one vote—means that "the weight and worth of the citizens' votes as nearly as is practicable must be the same",[12] (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_man,_one_vote#cite_note-:0-13)and ruled that states must also draw federal congressional districts containing roughly equal represented populations." [from the one person one vote Wikipededia page] > > However, I agree with Martin Harper ... that it is easier, more informative, and less contentious to humour superstitious detractors by specifying which of the marked candidates gets the (one and only) vote from that ballot: > > "Mark yes or no for each candidate; your actual vote will go to the one (from among those that you marked 'yes') with the most yes marks from other voters." > > This rule is equivalent to the standard Approval rule, but allows us to distinguish (in the post election analysis) the Approval Support percentages, and the percentage of 'votes' received. > > It also highlights the importance of agreement with other voters: Approval Voting can be considered (primarily?) as a tool for helping like minded voters topool their votes conveniently, safely,efficiently, and effectively. > > -Forest > > > > > > > El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 1:54 p. m., KenB <kdbearman@gmail.com> escribió: > > https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/06/06/vote-for-everyone-you-like-fargo-tests-approval-voting > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info -- r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." . . .
FS
Forest Simmons
Wed, Jun 8, 2022 4:06 AM

What you wrote is true, but it's not the whole story:

"Problem with Approval is that it forces the voter to decide, tactically,
if they are going to hide their preference of A over B (by approving both A
and B) because they really hate Candidate C (and are worried that C might
beat B), or if they decide that C doesn't really have a chance and they
don't wanna throw away their preference for A (by not approving B)."

And

"Cardinal methods inherently suffer this problem of imposing
tactical voting onto voters."

The important thing is that it is a great improvement over FPTP
Plurality at no cost.

Just mark yes for the candidate you would have voted for under the
FPTP Plurality system, and also for anybody you like better.

How hard is that. If everybody did that, the result would be at least
as good as the FPTP result, and the center squeeze problem would
disappear (for example).

Equally important ... true levels of support would show.

The other thing is you get what you pay for ... Approval is cheap, so
don't expect too much.

A bicycle is cheaper than a car. A poorly designed car can do a lot of damage.

Mike Ossipoff used to say approval is like a reliable hand tool ...
Ranked Pairs is a reliable power tool ... IRV is a dangerous expensive
power tool that can unexpectedly tear apart your workmanship.

Our new thread "Star Challenge" is based on recently published VSE
simulations that show that simple combinations of rankings and ratings
perform much better than one without the other.

So far the champion is Smith,Score. But there are simpler combinations
that are very close to that, including STAR, which does only one
pairwise comparison, the runoff step between the Score Winner, and the
Score Runnerup.

This result bears out our long standing policy on the EM list that
when a score order (based on cardinal ratings) directly contradicts a
pairwise order (based on rankings) the rankings trump the ratings.

So your intuition is correct as far as it goes.

The methods that combine ordinal and cardinal information are like
predictor-corrector methods for numerical solutions of Initial Value
Problems ... a simple first order predictor like an Euler step
followed by a 2nd ordercorrector like the Trapezoid rule, makes an
improvement over either one by itself.

It's like Approval Sorted Margins. Approval is like the Euler
predictor ... it gives a rough preliminary order.

The corrections are swaps of adjacent candidates that are out of order
pairwise, beginning with the pairs with least certain Approval order,
the pairs where the approval order is most likely wrong.

If there is a Condorcet candidate, the pre-sorted preliminary order
makes no difference, otherwise the Approval order imparts valuable
"Condorcet tie" resolving information ... not perfect information, but
statistically better than nothing.

One of the unexpected bonuses is that the combination methods are
often simpler computationally and have better criteria compliances.
For example BTR-IRV and Benham greatly simplify when based on Score
ballots. Not only that they have higher VSE (Voter Satisfaction
Efficiency), but also they become summable in one pass through the
ballots, and are jrestored to monotonicity.

It's like Paul said to the Corinthians, "Neither is the man without
the woman, nor the woman without the man in the Lord."

Just Saying;-)

Forest

El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 5:47 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:

Good News!

And pretty good explanation.

Some negative and confusion inducing comments from IRV advocates based on
common misconceptions were responded to.

A voter said she was confused because she was not used to voting for more
than one candidate and didn't know how it worked ... despite the simple
instructions: "vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes
votes will be elected."

IRV advocates contribute to that kind of confusion by claiming Approval
violates "one person, one vote."

For that reason I think it would behoove us to distinguish between 'votes'
and marks on the ballot. Instead of saying...

"Vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will
be elected."

... say ...

"Mark yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes marks will
be elected."

For additional clarification it might help to say, "For best results, mark
'yes' for the candidate that would get your 'vote' if you could only mark
one, AND also mark 'yes' for all candidates (if any) that you like better
than that candidate."

There was another confusion based the same "one person, one vote" phrase
in supreme court rulings that became the law of the land in the sixties;
Approval detractors in Fargo have been claiming that Approval election
results should be counted fractionally; in other words they are
intentionally confusing Approval Voting with Fractional Cumulative Voting.

Under that burden, if all voters marked yes for their top two favorite
candidates, then the winner could not claim more than fifty percent support
even if she were marked yes on 100 percent of the ballots.

So there is a big quarrel over how to report the results, if not over how
to determine the winner.

For IRV supporters, no method satisfies "one person, one vote," unless
each ballot boils down to a single vote for a single candidate.

To counter that claim, Approval supporters go back to the supreme court
language as in the 1964 Wesberry v. Sanders
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesberry_v._Sanders
decision,

"...the U.S. Supreme Court declared that equality of voting—one person,
one vote—means that "the weight and worth of the citizens' votes as nearly
as is practicable must be the same",[12]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_man,_one_vote#cite_note-:0-13and
ruled that states must also draw federal congressional districts containing
roughly equal represented populations." [from the one person one vote
Wikipededia page]

However, I agree with Martin Harper ... that it is easier, more
informative, and less contentious to humour superstitious detractors by
specifying which of the marked candidates gets the (one and only) vote from
that ballot:

"Mark yes or no for each candidate; your actual vote will go to the one
(from among those that you marked 'yes') with the most yes marks from other
voters."

This rule is equivalent to the standard Approval rule, but allows us to
distinguish (in the post election analysis) the Approval Support
percentages, and the percentage of 'votes' received.

It also highlights the importance of agreement with other voters: Approval
Voting can be considered (primarily?) as a tool for helping like minded
voters to pool their votes conveniently, safely, efficiently, and
effectively.

-Forest

El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 1:54 p. m., KenB kdbearman@gmail.com
escribió:

What you wrote is true, but it's not the whole story: "Problem with Approval is that it forces the voter to decide, tactically, if they are going to hide their preference of A over B (by approving both A and B) because they really hate Candidate C (and are worried that C might beat B), or if they decide that C doesn't really have a chance and they don't wanna throw away their preference for A (by not approving B)." And "Cardinal methods *inherently* suffer this problem of imposing tactical voting onto voters." The important thing is that it is a great improvement over FPTP Plurality at no cost. Just mark yes for the candidate you would have voted for under the FPTP Plurality system, and also for anybody you like better. How hard is that. If everybody did that, the result would be at least as good as the FPTP result, and the center squeeze problem would disappear (for example). Equally important ... true levels of support would show. The other thing is you get what you pay for ... Approval is cheap, so don't expect too much. A bicycle is cheaper than a car. A poorly designed car can do a lot of damage. Mike Ossipoff used to say approval is like a reliable hand tool ... Ranked Pairs is a reliable power tool ... IRV is a dangerous expensive power tool that can unexpectedly tear apart your workmanship. Our new thread "Star Challenge" is based on recently published VSE simulations that show that simple combinations of rankings and ratings perform much better than one without the other. So far the champion is Smith,Score. But there are simpler combinations that are very close to that, including STAR, which does only one pairwise comparison, the runoff step between the Score Winner, and the Score Runnerup. This result bears out our long standing policy on the EM list that when a score order (based on cardinal ratings) directly contradicts a pairwise order (based on rankings) the rankings trump the ratings. So your intuition is correct as far as it goes. The methods that combine ordinal and cardinal information are like predictor-corrector methods for numerical solutions of Initial Value Problems ... a simple first order predictor like an Euler step followed by a 2nd ordercorrector like the Trapezoid rule, makes an improvement over either one by itself. It's like Approval Sorted Margins. Approval is like the Euler predictor ... it gives a rough preliminary order. The corrections are swaps of adjacent candidates that are out of order pairwise, beginning with the pairs with least certain Approval order, the pairs where the approval order is most likely wrong. If there is a Condorcet candidate, the pre-sorted preliminary order makes no difference, otherwise the Approval order imparts valuable "Condorcet tie" resolving information ... not perfect information, but statistically better than nothing. One of the unexpected bonuses is that the combination methods are often simpler computationally and have better criteria compliances. For example BTR-IRV and Benham greatly simplify when based on Score ballots. Not only that they have higher VSE (Voter Satisfaction Efficiency), but also they become summable in one pass through the ballots, and are jrestored to monotonicity. It's like Paul said to the Corinthians, "Neither is the man without the woman, nor the woman without the man in the Lord." Just Saying;-) Forest El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 5:47 p. m., Forest Simmons < forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió: > Good News! > > And pretty good explanation. > > Some negative and confusion inducing comments from IRV advocates based on > common misconceptions were responded to. > > A voter said she was confused because she was not used to voting for more > than one candidate and didn't know how it worked ... despite the simple > instructions: "vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes > votes will be elected." > > IRV advocates contribute to that kind of confusion by claiming Approval > violates "one person, one vote." > > For that reason I think it would behoove us to distinguish between 'votes' > and marks on the ballot. Instead of saying... > > "Vote yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes votes will > be elected." > > ... say ... > > "Mark yes or no for each candidate; the one with the most yes marks will > be elected." > > For additional clarification it might help to say, "For best results, mark > 'yes' for the candidate that would get your 'vote' if you could only mark > one, AND also mark 'yes' for all candidates (if any) that you like better > than that candidate." > > There was another confusion based the same "one person, one vote" phrase > in supreme court rulings that became the law of the land in the sixties; > Approval detractors in Fargo have been claiming that Approval election > results should be counted fractionally; in other words they are > intentionally confusing Approval Voting with Fractional Cumulative Voting. > > Under that burden, if all voters marked yes for their top two favorite > candidates, then the winner could not claim more than fifty percent support > even if she were marked yes on 100 percent of the ballots. > > So there is a big quarrel over how to report the results, if not over how > to determine the winner. > > For IRV supporters, no method satisfies "one person, one vote," unless > each ballot boils down to a single vote for a single candidate. > > To counter that claim, Approval supporters go back to the supreme court > language as in the 1964 *Wesberry v. Sanders > <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesberry_v._Sanders>* decision, > > "...the U.S. Supreme Court declared that equality of voting—one person, > one vote—means that "the weight and worth of the citizens' votes as nearly > as is practicable must be the same",[12] > <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_man,_one_vote#cite_note-:0-13>and > ruled that states must also draw federal congressional districts containing > roughly equal represented populations." [from the one person one vote > Wikipededia page] > > However, I agree with Martin Harper ... that it is easier, more > informative, and less contentious to humour superstitious detractors by > specifying which of the marked candidates gets the (one and only) vote from > that ballot: > > "Mark yes or no for each candidate; your actual vote will go to the one > (from among those that you marked 'yes') with the most yes marks from other > voters." > > This rule is equivalent to the standard Approval rule, but allows us to > distinguish (in the post election analysis) the Approval Support > percentages, and the percentage of 'votes' received. > > It also highlights the importance of agreement with other voters: Approval > Voting can be considered (primarily?) as a tool for helping like minded > voters to pool their votes conveniently, safely, efficiently, and > effectively. > > -Forest > > > > > > El lun., 6 de jun. de 2022 1:54 p. m., KenB <kdbearman@gmail.com> > escribió: > >> >> https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/06/06/vote-for-everyone-you-like-fargo-tests-approval-voting >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >