When I reported preliminary poll-results I didn’t report about RCV or STV, because there were small-electorate ties that prevent a typical count, & require tiebreaking rules (which would have to have been stated before the voting). But I applied two plausible nonrandom tiebreakers, &, by both of them, RCV elected Biden. Note that, while RCV elected Biden, Approval returned an unresolvable tie between Biden & the CW, Marianne Williamson. Approval thereby came closer to electing the CW, & more likely would have, with a larger, but similarly-constituted, electorate. Approval doesn’t share rank-methods’ drastic compromise-strategy of voting someone the voter like less, over someone s/he likes more. Therefore there’s certainly a strong case for not bothering with the implementation-expense of rank-balloting, & instead just using Approval. …which doesn’t have rank-methods’ worst-case strategy. Yes, defensive order-reversal needn’t happen in rank-methods. In the best Condorcet methods, no one needs defensive order-reversal (or, really, due to autodeterence, *any* defensive strategy). But those methods are disqualified from public political elections, by their enormous computational need, with consequent correspondingly-high count-fraud vulnerability. Yes there are some Condorcet-Criterion complying methods that don’t need the exhaustive pairwise count, but they haven’t been shown to have wv Condorcet’s excellent strategy-properties. But RP(wv), MinMax(wv) or Smith//MinMax(wv) would be good for single-winner choices in Parliament. For that purpose, might as well use the very best: RP(wv). ..& I like them for some polls, like the current one here, & Christina Tobin’s Free-&-Equal polls. Not all polls. Some polls are better with RCV. Some are better with Approval. What about RCV, in public political elections? For members of the Mutual-Majority, there’s absolutely no need for any strategy. Just rank sincerely, & RCV is guaranteed to elect a candidate of the Mutual-Majority. …the one with the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority. Then why do the Republicans dislike RCV? Well, they’ve been finding that they’re not in the Mutual-Majority. Which way did the transfers, & the win, go in Burlington & Alaska? The Republicans can’t have not noticed that. There’s been a lot of criticism of RCV, because the situation isn’t as good for those *not* in the Mutual-Majority. But: 1. Those outside the Mutual-Majority are still no worse off than they were, with Plurality. …& aren’t the nonprogressives the ones who think that Plurality is good enough? 2. Who says that a good method has to elect someone majority-unpreferred? Yes, when the Condorcet-complying methods elect the CW, they’re electing the Mutual-Majority candidate most liked by those outside the Mutual--Majority. That’s mighty considerate! It’s unnecessarily considerate. Who ever said that people not in the mutual-majority should gays say in which Mutual-Majority candidate is elected? That’s the business of Mutual-Majority. *They* should choose which if their candidates to elect. I don’t give a shit what the losers want. RCV always elects the candidate of the Mutual-Majority who has the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority. …& guess what: Most of the people wan what’s best for most of the people. i.e. The Progressives are the Mutual-Majority. They can’t lose in RCV. Then what about in my poll? A public election, in a jurisdiction where the Progressives have enacted RCV is different. They certainly didn’t enact RCV so that they could bury someone they like more, under someone they like less. …& so they won’t. Have I been critical of RCV? No! I’ve merely been critical of what I now (more politely) call the FairVote-Fib (FF). The FF has given a good method a bad-name, a bad reputation. …& has turned a lot of people against a good method. The FF is Indy’s fib to Republicans (…&, I claim, to all Republocratic candidates …& their minority of preferrers. But, to Progressives, it isn’t a fib at all. A sincere-ranking Mutual-Majority can’t lose in RCV. Yes I like Approval, & it has advantages. Approvals remains my main proposal to jurisdictions where there’s no already-existent RCV proposal or even big public interest in one. …places where there’s nothing happening yet with singl-winner reform. But, where there’s an RCV ballot-measure, & RCV is what’s on the ballot…or anywhere where RCV is already what people want & are talking about , then I support the RCV proposal. In the 35 years of the current RCV project, how many states use it statewide: 2 Hopefully that will soon be 4. But even then, & if RCV keeps gaining 2 seats every 2 years, it will take 46 years to succeed nationwide. Too slow. Approval with is minimalness, it’s minimal change from the status-quo, & it’s zero implementation-expense, Approval could take off a LOT faster. Plurality lets you give a point to one candidate…& requires you to give zero points to each of the others. It lets you rate one candidate “Yes”, & requires you to rate all the others “No”. What, it isn’t intended as points or ratings? Irrelevant—That’s the count result. Plurality forces you to ( usually insincerely, unwillingly & complainingly) make some compromise that you despise beat your favorite. How Democratic is that coercion? With 3 or more candidates, democracy requires letting you express, & have-counted, relative preference or merit among & across those candidates. If it forbids that expression, it isn’t democracy. Approval consists of no change other than dropping the current antidemocratic forbidding of expression of merit & preference among & across the candidates…dropping the artificial antidemocratic requirement to rate all but one at zero, thereby forcing falsification of preferences.

Though I said that “ I don’t give a shit what the losers want”, & that the Mutual-Majority, rightfully, should be the ones to choose which of their candidates should be the ones who choose which if their candidate is elected… … & though I said that Condorcet is unnecessarily considerate [to those outside of the Mutual-Majority… Nonetheless I’ve wanted that unnecessary considerateness. In fact I’d still like it, to displease as few as possible. …if Condorcet didn’t have its problem of an overly computationally-intensive count. That’s why Condorcet ( in its best versions) has been my ranked-method proposal. But Condorcet *does* have that problem, & so yes not having that unnecessary considerateness for the losers is perfectly okay. On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 15:34 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > When I reported preliminary poll-results I didn’t report about RCV or STV, > because there were small-electorate ties that prevent a typical count, & > require tiebreaking rules (which would have to have been stated before the > voting). > > But I applied two plausible nonrandom tiebreakers, &, by both of them, RCV > elected Biden. > > Note that, while RCV elected Biden, Approval returned an unresolvable tie > between Biden & the CW, Marianne Williamson. > > Approval thereby came closer to electing the CW, & more likely would have, > with a larger, but similarly-constituted, electorate. > > Approval doesn’t share rank-methods’ drastic compromise-strategy of voting > someone the voter like less, over someone s/he likes more. > > Therefore there’s certainly a strong case for not bothering with the > implementation-expense of rank-balloting, & instead just using Approval. > …which doesn’t have rank-methods’ worst-case strategy. > > Yes, defensive order-reversal needn’t happen in rank-methods. > > In the best Condorcet methods, no one needs defensive order-reversal (or, > really, due to autodeterence, *any* defensive strategy). > > But those methods are disqualified from public political elections, by > their enormous computational need, with consequent correspondingly-high > count-fraud vulnerability. > > Yes there are some Condorcet-Criterion complying methods that don’t need > the exhaustive pairwise count, but they haven’t been shown to have wv > Condorcet’s excellent strategy-properties. > > But RP(wv), MinMax(wv) or Smith//MinMax(wv) would be good for > single-winner choices in Parliament. > > For that purpose, might as well use the very best: RP(wv). > > ..& I like them for some polls, like the current one here, & Christina > Tobin’s Free-&-Equal polls. > > Not all polls. Some polls are better with RCV. Some are better with > Approval. > > What about RCV, in public political elections? > > For members of the Mutual-Majority, there’s absolutely no need for any > strategy. Just rank sincerely, & RCV is guaranteed to elect a candidate of > the Mutual-Majority. > > …the one with the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority. > > Then why do the Republicans dislike RCV? Well, they’ve been finding that > they’re not in the Mutual-Majority. > > Which way did the transfers, & the win, go in Burlington & Alaska? The > Republicans can’t have not noticed that. > > There’s been a lot of criticism of RCV, because the situation isn’t as > good for those *not* in the Mutual-Majority. > > But: > > 1. Those outside the Mutual-Majority are still no worse off than they > were, with Plurality. …& aren’t the nonprogressives the ones who think that > Plurality is good enough? > > 2. Who says that a good method has to elect someone majority-unpreferred? > > Yes, when the Condorcet-complying methods elect the CW, they’re electing > the Mutual-Majority candidate most liked by those outside the > Mutual--Majority. That’s mighty considerate! It’s unnecessarily > considerate. > > Who ever said that people not in the mutual-majority should gays say in > which Mutual-Majority candidate is elected? > > That’s the business of Mutual-Majority. *They* should choose which if > their candidates to elect. > > I don’t give a shit what the losers want. > > RCV always elects the candidate of the Mutual-Majority who has the best > broad-support among the Mutual-Majority. > > …& guess what: Most of the people wan what’s best for most of the people. > > i.e. The Progressives are the Mutual-Majority. > > They can’t lose in RCV. > > Then what about in my poll? > > A public election, in a jurisdiction where the Progressives have enacted > RCV is different. > > They certainly didn’t enact RCV so that they could bury someone they like > more, under someone they like less. …& so they won’t. > > Have I been critical of RCV? No! > > I’ve merely been critical of what I now (more politely) call the > FairVote-Fib (FF). > > The FF has given a good method a bad-name, a bad reputation. …& has > turned a lot of people against a good method. > > The FF is Indy’s fib to Republicans (…&, I claim, to all Republocratic > candidates …& their minority of preferrers. > > But, to Progressives, it isn’t a fib at all. > > A sincere-ranking Mutual-Majority can’t lose in RCV. > > Yes I like Approval, & it has advantages. > > Approvals remains my main proposal to jurisdictions where there’s no > already-existent RCV proposal or even big public interest in one. …places > where there’s nothing happening yet with singl-winner reform. > > But, where there’s an RCV ballot-measure, & RCV is what’s on the ballot…or > anywhere where RCV is already what people want & are talking about , then I > support the RCV proposal. > > In the 35 years of the current RCV project, how many states use it > statewide: 2 > > Hopefully that will soon be 4. > > But even then, & if RCV keeps gaining 2 seats every 2 years, it will take > 46 years to succeed nationwide. > > Too slow. > > Approval with is minimalness, it’s minimal change from the status-quo, & > it’s zero implementation-expense, Approval could take off a LOT faster. > > Plurality lets you give a point to one candidate…& requires you to give > zero points to each of the others. > > It lets you rate one candidate “Yes”, & requires you to rate all the > others “No”. > > What, it isn’t intended as points or ratings? > > Irrelevant—That’s the count result. > > Plurality forces you to ( usually insincerely, unwillingly & > complainingly) make some compromise that you despise beat your favorite. > > How Democratic is that coercion? > > With 3 or more candidates, democracy requires letting you express, & > have-counted, relative preference or merit among & across those candidates. > > If it forbids that expression, it isn’t democracy. > > Approval consists of no change other than dropping the current > antidemocratic forbidding of expression of merit & preference among & > across the candidates…dropping the artificial antidemocratic requirement to > rate all but one at zero, thereby forcing falsification of preferences. > > > > > > > > > > > >

One more thing: I want to be explicit that RCV is my rank-method proposal, because Condorcet is disqualified as I described. RCV vs Approval: They’re both excellent, for completely different reasons that make it impossible to meaningfully say that one is better than the other. RCV: For proposing to a jurisdiction where public, activists &/or administrators like, want intend, plan, know, or are familiar with RCV (or where RCV is already proposed or on the ballot). Approval: Elsewhere. ———- Why Approval where neither is known?: I claim that an okay method that is enacted nationwide trumps a method that’s strategy-free & strategically-ideal for progressives, but not enacted nationwide yet. …a bird 🐦 in the hand… And what do RCVists say: Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Bonuses: Though RCV & Approval require the same amount of votecounting, both methods allowing easy handcount-audit—Approval’s simpler count, without RCV’s count-logistics-situation gives Approval somewhat of a security-edge. Approval’s easier & less-expensive administration counts in its favor. …& also helps security, because more money remains for security, due to the less expensive administration. On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 17:42 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Though I said that “ I don’t give a shit what the losers want”, & that the > Mutual-Majority, rightfully, should be the ones to choose which of their > candidates should be the ones who choose which if their candidate is > elected… > > … & though I said that Condorcet is unnecessarily considerate [to those > outside of the Mutual-Majority… > > Nonetheless I’ve wanted that unnecessary considerateness. In fact I’d > still like it, to displease as few as possible. > > …if Condorcet didn’t have its problem of an overly > computationally-intensive count. > > That’s why Condorcet ( in its best versions) has been my ranked-method > proposal. > > But Condorcet *does* have that problem, & so yes not having that > unnecessary considerateness for the losers is perfectly okay. > > > On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 15:34 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> When I reported preliminary poll-results I didn’t report about RCV or >> STV, because there were small-electorate ties that prevent a typical count, >> & require tiebreaking rules (which would have to have been stated before >> the voting). >> >> But I applied two plausible nonrandom tiebreakers, &, by both of them, >> RCV elected Biden. >> >> Note that, while RCV elected Biden, Approval returned an unresolvable tie >> between Biden & the CW, Marianne Williamson. >> >> Approval thereby came closer to electing the CW, & more likely would >> have, with a larger, but similarly-constituted, electorate. >> >> Approval doesn’t share rank-methods’ drastic compromise-strategy of >> voting someone the voter like less, over someone s/he likes more. >> >> Therefore there’s certainly a strong case for not bothering with the >> implementation-expense of rank-balloting, & instead just using Approval. >> …which doesn’t have rank-methods’ worst-case strategy. >> >> Yes, defensive order-reversal needn’t happen in rank-methods. >> >> In the best Condorcet methods, no one needs defensive order-reversal (or, >> really, due to autodeterence, *any* defensive strategy). >> >> But those methods are disqualified from public political elections, by >> their enormous computational need, with consequent correspondingly-high >> count-fraud vulnerability. >> >> Yes there are some Condorcet-Criterion complying methods that don’t need >> the exhaustive pairwise count, but they haven’t been shown to have wv >> Condorcet’s excellent strategy-properties. >> >> But RP(wv), MinMax(wv) or Smith//MinMax(wv) would be good for >> single-winner choices in Parliament. >> >> For that purpose, might as well use the very best: RP(wv). >> >> ..& I like them for some polls, like the current one here, & Christina >> Tobin’s Free-&-Equal polls. >> >> Not all polls. Some polls are better with RCV. Some are better with >> Approval. >> >> What about RCV, in public political elections? >> >> For members of the Mutual-Majority, there’s absolutely no need for any >> strategy. Just rank sincerely, & RCV is guaranteed to elect a candidate of >> the Mutual-Majority. >> >> …the one with the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority. >> >> Then why do the Republicans dislike RCV? Well, they’ve been finding that >> they’re not in the Mutual-Majority. >> >> Which way did the transfers, & the win, go in Burlington & Alaska? The >> Republicans can’t have not noticed that. >> >> There’s been a lot of criticism of RCV, because the situation isn’t as >> good for those *not* in the Mutual-Majority. >> >> But: >> >> 1. Those outside the Mutual-Majority are still no worse off than they >> were, with Plurality. …& aren’t the nonprogressives the ones who think that >> Plurality is good enough? >> >> 2. Who says that a good method has to elect someone majority-unpreferred? >> >> Yes, when the Condorcet-complying methods elect the CW, they’re electing >> the Mutual-Majority candidate most liked by those outside the >> Mutual--Majority. That’s mighty considerate! It’s unnecessarily >> considerate. >> >> Who ever said that people not in the mutual-majority should gays say in >> which Mutual-Majority candidate is elected? >> >> That’s the business of Mutual-Majority. *They* should choose which if >> their candidates to elect. >> >> I don’t give a shit what the losers want. >> >> RCV always elects the candidate of the Mutual-Majority who has the best >> broad-support among the Mutual-Majority. >> >> …& guess what: Most of the people wan what’s best for most of the people. >> >> i.e. The Progressives are the Mutual-Majority. >> >> They can’t lose in RCV. >> >> Then what about in my poll? >> >> A public election, in a jurisdiction where the Progressives have enacted >> RCV is different. >> >> They certainly didn’t enact RCV so that they could bury someone they like >> more, under someone they like less. …& so they won’t. >> >> Have I been critical of RCV? No! >> >> I’ve merely been critical of what I now (more politely) call the >> FairVote-Fib (FF). >> >> The FF has given a good method a bad-name, a bad reputation. …& has >> turned a lot of people against a good method. >> >> The FF is Indy’s fib to Republicans (…&, I claim, to all Republocratic >> candidates …& their minority of preferrers. >> >> But, to Progressives, it isn’t a fib at all. >> >> A sincere-ranking Mutual-Majority can’t lose in RCV. >> >> Yes I like Approval, & it has advantages. >> >> Approvals remains my main proposal to jurisdictions where there’s no >> already-existent RCV proposal or even big public interest in one. …places >> where there’s nothing happening yet with singl-winner reform. >> >> But, where there’s an RCV ballot-measure, & RCV is what’s on the >> ballot…or anywhere where RCV is already what people want & are talking >> about , then I support the RCV proposal. >> >> In the 35 years of the current RCV project, how many states use it >> statewide: 2 >> >> Hopefully that will soon be 4. >> >> But even then, & if RCV keeps gaining 2 seats every 2 years, it will >> take 46 years to succeed nationwide. >> >> Too slow. >> >> Approval with is minimalness, it’s minimal change from the status-quo, & >> it’s zero implementation-expense, Approval could take off a LOT faster. >> >> Plurality lets you give a point to one candidate…& requires you to give >> zero points to each of the others. >> >> It lets you rate one candidate “Yes”, & requires you to rate all the >> others “No”. >> >> What, it isn’t intended as points or ratings? >> >> Irrelevant—That’s the count result. >> >> Plurality forces you to ( usually insincerely, unwillingly & >> complainingly) make some compromise that you despise beat your favorite. >> >> How Democratic is that coercion? >> >> With 3 or more candidates, democracy requires letting you express, & >> have-counted, relative preference or merit among & across those candidates. >> >> If it forbids that expression, it isn’t democracy. >> >> Approval consists of no change other than dropping the current >> antidemocratic forbidding of expression of merit & preference among & >> across the candidates…dropping the artificial antidemocratic requirement to >> rate all but one at zero, thereby forcing falsification of preferences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>