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"Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)" candidate in poll

CB
Chris Benham
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 8:17 AM

Ted,

I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and
likely there are some other possible
voters who have no idea what any of it means.

This is what I think it all means.

Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation
allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix.

A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and
nothing to B.   A ballot that truncates (or votes
equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison.

But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you
propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to
A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll
assume this is  what you mean.)

An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case
where the ballot votes A and B below no other
candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then
the ballot gives half a vote to each of A and
B in the A-B comparison.

In any case I understand that we  score each candidate according to the
minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise
loss, and order them from highest to lowest.

Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent pairs are
pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a
tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until
there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of
order, then elect the highest-ordered candidate.

I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and
hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue
of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating").

Chris Benham

Ted, I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and likely there are some other possible voters who have no idea what any of it means. This is what I think it all means. Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix. A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and nothing to B.   A ballot that truncates (or votes equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison. But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll assume this is  what you mean.) An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case where the ballot votes A and B below no other candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the ballot gives half a vote to each of A and B in the A-B comparison. In any case I understand that we  score each candidate according to the minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise loss, and order them from highest to lowest. Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent pairs are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the highest-ordered candidate. I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating"). Chris Benham > > *Ted Stern*dodecatheon at gmail.com > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E> > /Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024/ > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > I'd like to nominate > > Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)
TS
Ted Stern
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 11:54 PM

Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as what you
proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no elimination step
iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw).

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html

ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in the
pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one whole vote of
B>A.

The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with MinLV score
in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise opposition in
ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the property we're looking
for, and for margin sort, we want a metric that is analogous to approval,
with descending scores.

If we wanted the exact complement, we would do margin sort on min votes,
to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) possible while still being
Smith compliant. However, minmax (or rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as
can be seen by applying margin sort min votes to the example you posted
last week:

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html

By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with clone)
is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is unchanged by the
addition of the clone.

My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is an
excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a
preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are approved) is an
additional step, requiring either an additional count for implicit
approval, or an extra mental judgment by the voter.

Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited testing, tends
to find a candidate with strong top ratings.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

Ted,

I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and
likely there are some other possible
voters who have no idea what any of it means.

This is what I think it all means.

Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation
allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix.

A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and
nothing to B.  A ballot that truncates (or votes
equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison.

But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you propose
that the ballot give a whole vote each to
A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll
assume this is  what you mean.)

An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case where
the ballot votes A and B below no other
candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the
ballot gives half a vote to each of A and
B in the A-B comparison.

In any case I understand that we  score each candidate according to the
minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise
loss, and order them from highest to lowest.

Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent pairs are
pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a tie
for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until
there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order,
then elect the highest-ordered candidate.

I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and
hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue
of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating").

Chris Benham

Ted Stern dodecatheon at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024


I'd like to nominate

Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)

Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as what you proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no elimination step iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw). http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in the pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one whole vote of B>A. The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with MinLV score in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise opposition in ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the property we're looking for, and for margin sort, we want a metric that is analogous to approval, with descending scores. If we wanted the *exact* complement, we would do margin sort on *min votes*, to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) possible while still being Smith compliant. However, minmax (or rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as can be seen by applying margin sort min votes to the example you posted last week: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with clone) is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is unchanged by the addition of the clone. My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is an excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are approved) is an additional step, requiring either an additional count for implicit approval, or an extra mental judgment by the voter. Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited testing, tends to find a candidate with strong top ratings. On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > Ted, > > I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and > likely there are some other possible > voters who have no idea what any of it means. > > This is what I think it all means. > > Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation > allowed. Then we construct a pairwise matrix. > > A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and > nothing to B. A ballot that truncates (or votes > equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison. > > But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you propose > that the ballot give a whole vote each to > A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll > assume this is what you mean.) > > An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case where > the ballot votes A and B below no other > candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the > ballot gives half a vote to each of A and > B in the A-B comparison. > > In any case I understand that we score each candidate according to the > minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise > loss, and order them from highest to lowest. > > Then candidates are listed in score order and if any adjacent pairs are > pairwise out of order then this is corrected by > flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a tie > for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until > there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order, > then elect the highest-ordered candidate. > > I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and > hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue > of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating"). > > Chris Benham > > > > *Ted Stern* dodecatheon at gmail.com > <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E> > *Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024* > > > ------------------------------ > > I'd like to nominate > > Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole) > > >
TS
Ted Stern
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 11:57 PM

PS to previous:

Since the condorcet winner doesn't have a min lv score, minlv score could
be either 0%, 100%, or 50% by default.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 16:54 Ted Stern dodecatheon@gmail.com wrote:

Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as what you
proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no elimination step
iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw).

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html

ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in the
pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one whole vote of
B>A.

The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with MinLV score
in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise opposition in
ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the property we're looking
for, and for margin sort, we want a metric that is analogous to approval,
with descending scores.

If we wanted the exact complement, we would do margin sort on min
votes
, to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) possible while
still being Smith compliant. However, minmax (or rather maxmin) is not
clone proof, as can be seen by applying margin sort min votes to the
example you posted last week:

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html

By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with clone)
is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is unchanged by the
addition of the clone.

My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is an
excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a
preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are approved) is an
additional step, requiring either an additional count for implicit
approval, or an extra mental judgment by the voter.

Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited testing, tends
to find a candidate with strong top ratings.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

Ted,

I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and
likely there are some other possible
voters who have no idea what any of it means.

This is what I think it all means.

Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation
allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix.

A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and
nothing to B.  A ballot that truncates (or votes
equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison.

But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you
propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to
A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll
assume this is  what you mean.)

An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case
where the ballot votes A and B below no other
candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the
ballot gives half a vote to each of A and
B in the A-B comparison.

In any case I understand that we  score each candidate according to the
minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise
loss, and order them from highest to lowest.

Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent pairs are
pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a
tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until
there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order,
then elect the highest-ordered candidate.

I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and
hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue
of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating").

Chris Benham

Ted Stern dodecatheon at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024


I'd like to nominate

Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)

PS to previous: Since the condorcet winner doesn't have a min lv score, minlv score could be either 0%, 100%, or 50% by default. On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 16:54 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: > Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as what you > proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no elimination step > iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw). > > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html > > ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in the > pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one whole vote of > B>A. > > The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with MinLV score > in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise opposition in > ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the property we're looking > for, and for margin sort, we want a metric that is analogous to approval, > with descending scores. > > If we wanted the *exact* complement, we would do margin sort on *min > votes*, to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) possible while > still being Smith compliant. However, minmax (or rather maxmin) is not > clone proof, as can be seen by applying margin sort min votes to the > example you posted last week: > > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html > > By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with clone) > is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is unchanged by the > addition of the clone. > > My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is an > excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a > preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are approved) is an > additional step, requiring either an additional count for implicit > approval, or an extra mental judgment by the voter. > > Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited testing, tends > to find a candidate with strong top ratings. > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > >> Ted, >> >> I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and >> likely there are some other possible >> voters who have no idea what any of it means. >> >> This is what I think it all means. >> >> Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation >> allowed. Then we construct a pairwise matrix. >> >> A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and >> nothing to B. A ballot that truncates (or votes >> equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison. >> >> But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you >> propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to >> A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll >> assume this is what you mean.) >> >> An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case >> where the ballot votes A and B below no other >> candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the >> ballot gives half a vote to each of A and >> B in the A-B comparison. >> >> In any case I understand that we score each candidate according to the >> minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise >> loss, and order them from highest to lowest. >> >> Then candidates are listed in score order and if any adjacent pairs are >> pairwise out of order then this is corrected by >> flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a >> tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until >> there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order, >> then elect the highest-ordered candidate. >> >> I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and >> hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue >> of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating"). >> >> Chris Benham >> >> >> >> *Ted Stern* dodecatheon at gmail.com >> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E> >> *Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024* >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> I'd like to nominate >> >> Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole) >> >> >>
CB
Chris Benham
Fri, Apr 12, 2024 3:36 AM

Ted,

 Thanks for that explanation.

while margin sorted approval is an excellent method, the approval
cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a preference cutoff, since all
ranked candidates are approved)

I haven't heard that version suggested, and it isn't what I had in mind
when I nominated it in the poll, as  I specified at the time.

MarginsSorted Approval (specified cutoff):

Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can
also specify an approval
cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
no others (i.e. ranked top
or equal-top).

It occurred to to suggest separate  "technical merit" and
"bang-for-buck" polls, but people have different (and/or not clear)
ideas on exactly what is "bang" and what is "buck".

Another idea is to talk about what we consider to be the best and/or
acceptable balloting rules, and those that are or are likely to be
imposed by the "real world".

And then we could have separate polls on methods for the different
ballot rules. Some methods are much more sensitive to these details than
others.

With the poll as it is I top-rank Margins Sorted Approval (specified
cutoff) but other methods (such as this one you nominated) might make it
to equal-top on my final ballot.

A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score
order and if any adjacent pairs
are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
out-of-order pair with the smallest
margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair.
Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs
of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
highest-ordered candidate.

More later.

Chris

On 12/04/2024 9:27 am, Ted Stern wrote:

PS to previous:

Since the condorcet winner doesn't have a min lv score, minlv score
could be either 0%, 100%, or 50% by default.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 16:54 Ted Stern dodecatheon@gmail.com wrote:

 Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as
 what you proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no
 elimination step iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw).

 http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html

 ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in
 the pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one
 whole vote of B>A.

 The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with
 MinLV score in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise
 opposition in ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the
 property we're looking for, and for margin sort, we want a metric
 that is analogous to approval, with descending scores.

 If we wanted the /exact/ complement, we would do margin sort on
 /min votes/, to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv)
 possible while still being Smith compliant. However, minmax (or
 rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as can be seen by applying
 margin sort min votes to the example you posted last week:

 http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html

 By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with
 clone) is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is
 unchanged by the addition of the clone.

 My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is
 an excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think
 of as a preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are
 approved) is an additional step, requiring either an additional
 count for implicit approval, or an extra mental judgment by the
 voter.

 Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited
 testing, tends to find a candidate with strong top ratings.

 On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
 wrote:

     Ted,

     I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part
     means, and likely there are some other possible
     voters who have no idea what any of it means.

     This is what I think it all means.

     Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an
     truncation allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix.

     A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison
     to A and nothing to B.   A ballot that truncates (or votes
     equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B
     comparison.

     But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do
     you propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to
     A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from
     you, I'll assume this is  what you mean.)

     An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only
     the case where the ballot votes A and B below no other
     candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below
     top then the ballot gives half a vote to each of A and
     B in the A-B comparison.

     In any case I understand that we  score each candidate
     according to the minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise
     loss, and order them from highest to lowest.

     Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent
     pairs are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
     flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If
     there is a tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair.
     Repeat until
     there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise
     out of order, then elect the highest-ordered candidate.

     I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some
     clarification (and hopefully some de-confusing justification)
     on the issue
     of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating").

     Chris Benham
     *Ted Stern*dodecatheon at gmail.com
     <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
     /Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024/


     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     I'd like to nominate

     Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)
Ted,  Thanks for that explanation. > while margin sorted approval is an excellent method, the approval > cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a preference cutoff, since all > ranked candidates are approved) I haven't heard that version suggested, and it isn't what I had in mind when I nominated it in the poll, as  I specified at the time. > MarginsSorted Approval (specified cutoff): > > Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can > also specify an approval > cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below > no others (i.e. ranked top > or equal-top). It occurred to to suggest separate  "technical merit" and "bang-for-buck" polls, but people have different (and/or not clear) ideas on exactly what is "bang" and what is "buck". Another idea is to talk about what we consider to be the best and/or acceptable balloting rules, and those that are or are likely to be imposed by the "real world". And then we could have separate polls on methods for the different ballot rules. Some methods are much more sensitive to these details than others. With the poll as it is I top-rank Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff) but other methods (such as this one you nominated) might make it to equal-top on my final ballot. > > A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score > order and if any adjacent pairs > are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the > out-of-order pair with the smallest > margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair. > Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs > of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the > highest-ordered candidate. More later. Chris On 12/04/2024 9:27 am, Ted Stern wrote: > PS to previous: > > Since the condorcet winner doesn't have a min lv score, minlv score > could be either 0%, 100%, or 50% by default. > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 16:54 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: > > Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as > what you proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no > elimination step iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw). > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html > > ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in > the pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one > whole vote of B>A. > > The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with > MinLV score in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise > opposition in ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the > property we're looking for, and for margin sort, we want a metric > that is analogous to approval, with descending scores. > > If we wanted the /exact/ complement, we would do margin sort on > /min votes/, to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) > possible while still being Smith compliant. However, minmax (or > rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as can be seen by applying > margin sort min votes to the example you posted last week: > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html > > By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with > clone) is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is > unchanged by the addition of the clone. > > My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is > an excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think > of as a preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are > approved) is an additional step, requiring either an additional > count for implicit approval, or an extra mental judgment by the > voter. > > Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited > testing, tends to find a candidate with strong top ratings. > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> > wrote: > > Ted, > > I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part > means, and likely there are some other possible > voters who have no idea what any of it means. > > This is what I think it all means. > > Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an > truncation allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix. > > A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison > to A and nothing to B.   A ballot that truncates (or votes > equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B > comparison. > > But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do > you propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to > A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from > you, I'll assume this is  what you mean.) > > An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only > the case where the ballot votes A and B below no other > candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below > top then the ballot gives half a vote to each of A and > B in the A-B comparison. > > In any case I understand that we  score each candidate > according to the minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise > loss, and order them from highest to lowest. > > Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent > pairs are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by > flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If > there is a tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. > Repeat until > there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise > out of order, then elect the highest-ordered candidate. > > I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some > clarification (and hopefully some de-confusing justification) > on the issue > of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating"). > > Chris Benham > > >> >> *Ted Stern*dodecatheon at gmail.com >> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E> >> /Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024/ >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> I'd like to nominate >> >> Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole) >
JB
Joshua Boehme
Fri, Apr 12, 2024 6:58 AM

If I'm understanding this correctly, this method isn't always cloneproof. Consider the following pairwise matrix (entries are row candidate over column candidate)...

 A   B   C   D   E

A 500 525 485 485 485
B 475 500 510 510 510
C 515 490 500 550 350
D 515 490 450 500 600
E 515 490 650 400 500

The initial ordering is:

A  B  D  E  C
485 475 450 400 350

which is pairwise correct so we don't switch any candidates.

If you drop D and E, which are clones of C, you get:

C  A  B
490 485 475

which is also pairwise correct.

On 4/11/24 19:54, Ted Stern wrote:

Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as what you
proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no elimination step
iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw).

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html

ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in the
pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one whole vote of
B>A.

The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with MinLV score
in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise opposition in
ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the property we're looking
for, and for margin sort, we want a metric that is analogous to approval,
with descending scores.

If we wanted the exact complement, we would do margin sort on min votes,
to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) possible while still being
Smith compliant. However, minmax (or rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as
can be seen by applying margin sort min votes to the example you posted
last week:

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html

By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with clone)
is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is unchanged by the
addition of the clone.

My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is an
excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a
preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are approved) is an
additional step, requiring either an additional count for implicit
approval, or an extra mental judgment by the voter.

Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited testing, tends
to find a candidate with strong top ratings.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

Ted,

I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and
likely there are some other possible
voters who have no idea what any of it means.

This is what I think it all means.

Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation
allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix.

A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and
nothing to B.  A ballot that truncates (or votes
equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison.

But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you propose
that the ballot give a whole vote each to
A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll
assume this is  what you mean.)

An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case where
the ballot votes A and B below no other
candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the
ballot gives half a vote to each of A and
B in the A-B comparison.

In any case I understand that we  score each candidate according to the
minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise
loss, and order them from highest to lowest.

Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent pairs are
pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a tie
for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until
there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order,
then elect the highest-ordered candidate.

I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and
hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue
of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating").

Chris Benham

Ted Stern dodecatheon at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024


I'd like to nominate

Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

If I'm understanding this correctly, this method isn't always cloneproof. Consider the following pairwise matrix (entries are row candidate over column candidate)... A B C D E A 500 525 485 485 485 B 475 500 510 510 510 C 515 490 500 550 350 D 515 490 450 500 600 E 515 490 650 400 500 The initial ordering is: A B D E C 485 475 450 400 350 which is pairwise correct so we don't switch any candidates. If you drop D and E, which are clones of C, you get: C A B 490 485 475 which is also pairwise correct. On 4/11/24 19:54, Ted Stern wrote: > Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as what you > proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no elimination step > iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw). > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html > > ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in the > pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one whole vote of > B>A. > > The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with MinLV score > in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise opposition in > ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the property we're looking > for, and for margin sort, we want a metric that is analogous to approval, > with descending scores. > > If we wanted the *exact* complement, we would do margin sort on *min votes*, > to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv) possible while still being > Smith compliant. However, minmax (or rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as > can be seen by applying margin sort min votes to the example you posted > last week: > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html > > By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with clone) > is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is unchanged by the > addition of the clone. > > My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is an > excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a > preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are approved) is an > additional step, requiring either an additional count for implicit > approval, or an extra mental judgment by the voter. > > Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited testing, tends > to find a candidate with strong top ratings. > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > >> Ted, >> >> I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part means, and >> likely there are some other possible >> voters who have no idea what any of it means. >> >> This is what I think it all means. >> >> Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an truncation >> allowed. Then we construct a pairwise matrix. >> >> A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison to A and >> nothing to B. A ballot that truncates (or votes >> equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B comparison. >> >> But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do you propose >> that the ballot give a whole vote each to >> A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from you, I'll >> assume this is what you mean.) >> >> An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only the case where >> the ballot votes A and B below no other >> candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below top then the >> ballot gives half a vote to each of A and >> B in the A-B comparison. >> >> In any case I understand that we score each candidate according to the >> minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise >> loss, and order them from highest to lowest. >> >> Then candidates are listed in score order and if any adjacent pairs are >> pairwise out of order then this is corrected by >> flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If there is a tie >> for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair. Repeat until >> there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise out of order, >> then elect the highest-ordered candidate. >> >> I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some clarification (and >> hopefully some de-confusing justification) on the issue >> of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating"). >> >> Chris Benham >> >> >> >> *Ted Stern* dodecatheon at gmail.com >> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E> >> *Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024* >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> I'd like to nominate >> >> Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole) >> >> >> > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info