C
C.Benham
Thu, Nov 3, 2016 12:53 PM
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods
that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets
the Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has
the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago
for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods
that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
* Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets
the Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has
the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago
for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Nov 3, 2016 5:17 PM
Pretty good.
It would work with Approval too, wouldn't it?
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, Conditionally
Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if hir
Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could be
called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that then
the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
Pretty good.
It would work with Approval too, wouldn't it?
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
> it desirable to elect from the
> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
>
> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
> meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>
> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
> the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>
> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, Conditionally
> Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>
> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if hir
> Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>
> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>
> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could be
> called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>
> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
> Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>
> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
> Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>
> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>
> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
>
> 35: C
> 33: A>B
> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>
> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
> sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
> Minimal Defense criterion.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
>
> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
> random-fill incentive.
>
> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>
> 48: C
> 27: B
> 25: A>>B
>
> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
> same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
> Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
> and then C wins.
>
> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
> doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
> then
> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that then
> the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>
> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
> and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
> broken compliance with FBC.)
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Nov 3, 2016 6:08 PM
You've mentioned that pushover-incentive spoils FBC. But I don't know of a
way that failure could happen with this method.
If I top-rate Compromise & Favorite, that couldn't be any worse for
Compromise than if I'd not top-rated Favorite...because top-ratings aren't
conditional.
FBC and CD--That's a strong combination.
And the addition of that natural conditional feature to Bucklin is briefer
& simpler to define than 3-Slot ICT. Probably suitable for a first
replacement of Plurality.
With both methods, if you middle-rate Compromise in 3-Slot ICT, or
conditionally approve Compromise in Conditional Bucklin, you aren't fully
protecting Compromise.
Compromise could lose to Worst because you aren't helping hir get a
top-majority in Conditional Bucklin. ...or because you didn't protect hir
from truncation in 3-Slot ICT.
Neither has the amount of protection of a 2nd-rated (or 2nd-ranked)
candidate in MMPO largely because neither has wv-strategy. But, of course
MMPO would have little chance of acceptance....whereas Conditional Bucklin
could be a successful Bucklin proposal, due to the naturalness of the
conditional refinement.
Your objection to MMPO is of course a perfectly valid one. If people don't
bother to ensure that less-liked candidates have maximum possible pairwise
opposition, then Hitler could win because two people support him.
For hauling, a truck has advantages over a car, but there are various
special dangers & precautions for driving a truck, as opposed to a car.
It's a trade-off. I admit that the price for FBC, Weak CD, & wv-strategy is
high.
By the way, if there's a special "favorite-designation" on the ballot,
separate from the ratings, then even a top-rating could be made conditional
(upon the conditionally-top candidate having more favorite-designations
than your favorite-designated candidatge)
And, with that separate favorite-designation on the ballot, there could be
Conditional-Approval.
I notice that there are two e-mail addresses for EM. I'm sending this post
to both addresses. If it posts twice, I'll know that they both work.
.Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, Conditionally
Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if hir
Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could be
called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that then
the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
You've mentioned that pushover-incentive spoils FBC. But I don't know of a
way that failure could happen with this method.
If I top-rate Compromise & Favorite, that couldn't be any worse for
Compromise than if I'd not top-rated Favorite...because top-ratings aren't
conditional.
FBC and CD--That's a strong combination.
And the addition of that natural conditional feature to Bucklin is briefer
& simpler to define than 3-Slot ICT. Probably suitable for a first
replacement of Plurality.
With both methods, if you middle-rate Compromise in 3-Slot ICT, or
conditionally approve Compromise in Conditional Bucklin, you aren't fully
protecting Compromise.
Compromise could lose to Worst because you aren't helping hir get a
top-majority in Conditional Bucklin. ...or because you didn't protect hir
from truncation in 3-Slot ICT.
Neither has the amount of protection of a 2nd-rated (or 2nd-ranked)
candidate in MMPO largely because neither has wv-strategy. But, of course
MMPO would have little chance of acceptance....whereas Conditional Bucklin
could be a successful Bucklin proposal, due to the naturalness of the
conditional refinement.
Your objection to MMPO is of course a perfectly valid one. If people don't
bother to ensure that less-liked candidates have maximum possible pairwise
opposition, then Hitler could win because two people support him.
For hauling, a truck has advantages over a car, but there are various
special dangers & precautions for driving a truck, as opposed to a car.
It's a trade-off. I admit that the price for FBC, Weak CD, & wv-strategy is
high.
By the way, if there's a special "favorite-designation" on the ballot,
separate from the ratings, then even a top-rating could be made conditional
(upon the conditionally-top candidate having more favorite-designations
than your favorite-designated candidatge)
And, with that separate favorite-designation on the ballot, there could be
Conditional-Approval.
I notice that there are two e-mail addresses for EM. I'm sending this post
to both addresses. If it posts twice, I'll know that they both work.
.Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
> it desirable to elect from the
> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
>
> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
> meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>
> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
> the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>
> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, Conditionally
> Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>
> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if hir
> Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>
> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>
> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could be
> called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>
> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
> Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>
> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
> Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>
> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>
> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
>
> 35: C
> 33: A>B
> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>
> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
> sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
> Minimal Defense criterion.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
>
> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
> random-fill incentive.
>
> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>
> 48: C
> 27: B
> 25: A>>B
>
> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
> same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
> Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
> and then C wins.
>
> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
> doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
> then
> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that then
> the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>
> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
> and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
> broken compliance with FBC.)
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
C
C.Benham
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 3:50 AM
On 11/4/2016 4:38 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You've mentioned that pushover-incentive spoils FBC. But I don't know
of a way that failure could happen with this method.
Yes, my earlier generalisation was mistaken. This method both meets FBC
and is vulnerable to Push-over.
Normally Push-over involves promoting some weak candidate into a
(virtual) runoff, and not just switching off an unusual "conditional
approval"
mechanism.
Chris Benham
You've mentioned that pushover-incentive spoils FBC. But I don't know
of a way that failure could happen with this method.
If I top-rate Compromise & Favorite, that couldn't be any worse for
Compromise than if I'd not top-rated Favorite...because top-ratings
aren't conditional.
FBC and CD--That's a strong combination.
And the addition of that natural conditional feature to Bucklin is
briefer & simpler to define than 3-Slot ICT. Probably suitable for a
first replacement of Plurality.
With both methods, if you middle-rate Compromise in 3-Slot ICT, or
conditionally approve Compromise in Conditional Bucklin, you aren't
fully protecting Compromise.
Compromise could lose to Worst because you aren't helping hir get a
top-majority in Conditional Bucklin. ...or because you didn't
protect hir from truncation in 3-Slot ICT.
Neither has the amount of protection of a 2nd-rated (or 2nd-ranked)
candidate in MMPO largely because neither has wv-strategy. But, of
course MMPO would have little chance of acceptance....whereas
Conditional Bucklin could be a successful Bucklin proposal, due to the
naturalness of the conditional refinement.
Your objection to MMPO is of course a perfectly valid one. If people
don't bother to ensure that less-liked candidates have maximum
possible pairwise opposition, then Hitler could win because two people
support him.
For hauling, a truck has advantages over a car, but there are various
special dangers & precautions for driving a truck, as opposed to a car.
It's a trade-off. I admit that the price for FBC, Weak CD, &
wv-strategy is high.
By the way, if there's a special "favorite-designation" on the ballot,
separate from the ratings, then even a top-rating could be made
conditional (upon the conditionally-top candidate having more
favorite-designations than your favorite-designated candidatge)
And, with that separate favorite-designation on the ballot, there
could be Conditional-Approval.
I notice that there are two e-mail addresses for EM. I'm sending this
post to both addresses. If it posts twice, I'll know that they both work.
.Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au
mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond
considering it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze"
effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the
methods that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at
addressing the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
* Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is
approved if hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated"
could be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot
Independent Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default
is Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA>
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if
all (and sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only
"conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it
meets the Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion>
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion>
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that
has the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top
Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then
A's Top Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional"
approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new
result doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really
prefer A to C then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done
that then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while
ago for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would
have broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
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Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
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On 11/4/2016 4:38 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> You've mentioned that pushover-incentive spoils FBC. But I don't know
> of a way that failure could happen with this method.
Yes, my earlier generalisation was mistaken. This method both meets FBC
and is vulnerable to Push-over.
Normally Push-over involves promoting some weak candidate into a
(virtual) runoff, and not just switching off an unusual "conditional
approval"
mechanism.
Chris Benham
> You've mentioned that pushover-incentive spoils FBC. But I don't know
> of a way that failure could happen with this method.
>
> If I top-rate Compromise & Favorite, that couldn't be any worse for
> Compromise than if I'd not top-rated Favorite...because top-ratings
> aren't conditional.
>
> FBC and CD--That's a strong combination.
>
> And the addition of that natural conditional feature to Bucklin is
> briefer & simpler to define than 3-Slot ICT. Probably suitable for a
> first replacement of Plurality.
>
> With both methods, if you middle-rate Compromise in 3-Slot ICT, or
> conditionally approve Compromise in Conditional Bucklin, you aren't
> fully protecting Compromise.
>
> Compromise could lose to Worst because you aren't helping hir get a
> top-majority in Conditional Bucklin. ...or because you didn't
> protect hir from truncation in 3-Slot ICT.
>
> Neither has the amount of protection of a 2nd-rated (or 2nd-ranked)
> candidate in MMPO largely because neither has wv-strategy. But, of
> course MMPO would have little chance of acceptance....whereas
> Conditional Bucklin could be a successful Bucklin proposal, due to the
> naturalness of the conditional refinement.
>
> Your objection to MMPO is of course a perfectly valid one. If people
> don't bother to ensure that less-liked candidates have maximum
> possible pairwise opposition, then Hitler could win because two people
> support him.
>
> For hauling, a truck has advantages over a car, but there are various
> special dangers & precautions for driving a truck, as opposed to a car.
>
> It's a trade-off. I admit that the price for FBC, Weak CD, &
> wv-strategy is high.
>
> By the way, if there's a special "favorite-designation" on the ballot,
> separate from the ratings, then even a top-rating could be made
> conditional (upon the conditionally-top candidate having more
> favorite-designations than your favorite-designated candidatge)
>
> And, with that separate favorite-designation on the ballot, there
> could be Conditional-Approval.
>
> I notice that there are two e-mail addresses for EM. I'm sending this
> post to both addresses. If it posts twice, I'll know that they both work.
>
> .Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au
> <mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au>> wrote:
>
> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond
> considering it desirable to elect from the
> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze"
> effect.
>
> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the
> methods that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>
> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at
> addressing the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>
> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
> Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>
> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is
> approved if hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>
> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>
> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated"
> could be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>
> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot
> Independent Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>
> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default
> is Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>
> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>
> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA>
>
> 35: C
> 33: A>B
> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>
> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if
> all (and sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only
> "conditionally"
> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it
> meets the Minimal Defense criterion.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion>
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion>
>
> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
> random-fill incentive.
>
> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>
> 48: C
> 27: B
> 25: A>>B
>
> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that
> has the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top
> Ratings score
> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then
> A's Top Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional"
> approval is switched off
> and then C wins.
>
> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new
> result doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really
> prefer A to C then
> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done
> that then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>
> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
> difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while
> ago for IRV
> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would
> have broken compliance with FBC.)
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com>
> Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13342 - Release Date: 11/03/16
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 5:06 AM
Couldn't that conditonal-option be available for each stage/round of
Bucklin, so that that vote at that stage would be given only if the
vote-receiver's vote-total, at that stage, exceeds that of the vote-gving
voter's designated favorite?
Maybe a voter could be allowed to designate more than one favorite, but
that designation should never bestow any benefit in the count, other than
the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
...because, if it did, then there would start to be strategic need to
insincerely give favoriteness to a compromise or a candidate of a
distrusted faction.
...But if a voter could designate more than one favorite, that would
complicate the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
So maybe a voter should only be allowed to designate one favorite.
That conditional option gets rid of the chicken-dilemma problem in Bucklin
and Approval, getting rid of their worst problem.
(Well I call the chicken-dilemma a nuisance instead of a problem, but then
let's say it's Approval's & Bucklin's big potential nuisance.)
Michael Ossipoff
.
Couldn't that conditonal-option be available for each stage/round of
Bucklin, so that that vote at that stage would be given only if the
vote-receiver's vote-total, at that stage, exceeds that of the vote-gving
voter's designated favorite?
Maybe a voter could be allowed to designate more than one favorite, but
that designation should never bestow any benefit in the count, other than
the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
...because, if it did, then there would start to be strategic need to
insincerely give favoriteness to a compromise or a candidate of a
distrusted faction.
...But if a voter could designate more than one favorite, that would
complicate the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
So maybe a voter should only be allowed to designate one favorite.
That conditional option gets rid of the chicken-dilemma problem in Bucklin
and Approval, getting rid of their worst problem.
(Well I call the chicken-dilemma a nuisance instead of a problem, but then
let's say it's Approval's & Bucklin's big potential nuisance.)
Michael Ossipoff
.
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 6:15 AM
Couldn't that conditonal-option be available for each stage/round of
Bucklin, so that that vote at that stage would be given only if the
vote-receiver's vote-total, at that stage, exceeds that of the vote-gving
voter's designated favorite?
I refer to the vote-receiver's vote total just before that round's votes
are given.
Michael Ossipoff
Maybe a voter could be allowed to designate more than one favorite, but
that designation should never bestow any benefit in the count, other than
the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
...because, if it did, then there would start to be strategic need to
insincerely give favoriteness to a compromise or a candidate of a
distrusted faction.
...But if a voter could designate more than one favorite, that would
complicate the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
So maybe a voter should only be allowed to designate one favorite.
That conditional option gets rid of the chicken-dilemma problem in Bucklin
and Approval, getting rid of their worst problem.
(Well I call the chicken-dilemma a nuisance instead of a problem, but then
let's say it's Approval's & Bucklin's big potential nuisance.)
Michael Ossipoff
.
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:06 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Couldn't that conditonal-option be available for each stage/round of
> Bucklin, so that that vote at that stage would be given only if the
> vote-receiver's vote-total, at that stage, exceeds that of the vote-gving
> voter's designated favorite?
>
I refer to the vote-receiver's vote total just before that round's votes
are given.
Michael Ossipoff
>
> Maybe a voter could be allowed to designate more than one favorite, but
> that designation should never bestow any benefit in the count, other than
> the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
> ...because, if it did, then there would start to be strategic need to
> insincerely give favoriteness to a compromise or a candidate of a
> distrusted faction.
>
> ...But if a voter could designate more than one favorite, that would
> complicate the determination of whether a conditional vote should be given.
> So maybe a voter should only be allowed to designate one favorite.
>
> That conditional option gets rid of the chicken-dilemma problem in Bucklin
> and Approval, getting rid of their worst problem.
>
> (Well I call the chicken-dilemma a nuisance instead of a problem, but then
> let's say it's Approval's & Bucklin's big potential nuisance.)
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> .
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 3:15 PM
I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
distrusted voters' candidate.
So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st comment.
Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way, and
whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval should
be given.
Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with its
1st rank position.
Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
approval will be given.
In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage of
the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin, the
conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
making it easier to propose.
So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is indeed
an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from Plurality.
It would be a good refinement for later.
When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps the
chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
by Chris's conditional vote option.
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, Conditionally
Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if hir
Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could be
called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that then
the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
distrusted voters' candidate.
So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st comment.
Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way, and
whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval should
be given.
Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with its
1st rank position.
Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
approval will be given.
In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage of
the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin, the
conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
making it easier to propose.
So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is indeed
an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from Plurality.
It would be a good refinement for later.
When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps the
chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
by Chris's conditional vote option.
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
> it desirable to elect from the
> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
>
> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
> meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>
> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
> the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>
> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, Conditionally
> Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>
> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if hir
> Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>
> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>
> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could be
> called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>
> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
> Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>
> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
> Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>
> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>
> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
>
> 35: C
> 33: A>B
> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>
> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
> sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
> Minimal Defense criterion.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
>
> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
> random-fill incentive.
>
> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>
> 48: C
> 27: B
> 25: A>>B
>
> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
> same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
> Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
> and then C wins.
>
> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
> doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
> then
> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that then
> the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>
> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
> and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
> broken compliance with FBC.)
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 3:27 PM
Could you state Conditional 3-slot Bucklin as you would define it for
somebody who didn't know what "Bucklin" was?
2016-11-04 11:15 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com:
I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
distrusted voters' candidate.
So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st comment.
Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way, and
whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval should
be given.
Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with
its 1st rank position.
Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
approval will be given.
In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage of
the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin, the
conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
making it easier to propose.
So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is indeed
an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from Plurality.
It would be a good refinement for later.
When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps the
chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
by Chris's conditional vote option.
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
Could you state Conditional 3-slot Bucklin as you would define it for
somebody who didn't know what "Bucklin" was?
2016-11-04 11:15 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>:
> I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
> full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
> that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
>
> But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
> shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
> strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
> distrusted voters' candidate.
>
> So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
> points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
>
> Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st comment.
>
> Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way, and
> whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval should
> be given.
>
> Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with
> its 1st rank position.
>
> Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
> favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
> approval will be given.
>
> In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage of
> the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
> can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
>
> A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
> addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
>
> As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin, the
> conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
> before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
> favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
>
> But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
> favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
> making it easier to propose.
>
> So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
> Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
>
> As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is indeed
> an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from Plurality.
> It would be a good refinement for later.
>
> When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
> when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
> the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
>
> For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
>
> And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
> more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
>
> And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
>
> I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps the
> chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
> dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
> by Chris's conditional vote option.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>
>> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
>> it desirable to elect from the
>> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
>>
>> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods that
>> meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>>
>> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
>> the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>>
>> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
>> Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>>
>> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
>> hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
>> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>>
>> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>>
>> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
>> be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>>
>> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
>> Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>>
>> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
>> Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>>
>> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
>> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
>> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>>
>> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>>
>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
>>
>> 35: C
>> 33: A>B
>> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>>
>> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
>> sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
>> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets the
>> Minimal Defense criterion.
>>
>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>>
>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
>>
>> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
>> random-fill incentive.
>>
>> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
>> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>>
>> 48: C
>> 27: B
>> 25: A>>B
>>
>> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has the
>> same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
>> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
>> Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
>> and then C wins.
>>
>> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
>> doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
>> then
>> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
>> then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>>
>> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more difficult
>> and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for IRV
>> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
>> broken compliance with FBC.)
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 4:16 PM
Sure:
3-Slot Conditional Bucklin:
The ballot allows voters 3 rank positions in which to rank candidates.
The voter can use (rank someone at) as many or as few rank positions as
s/he wants to, but may not skip a rank and then use a rank below the
skipped rank.
A voter can rank any number of candidates at any of the 3 rank positions
that s/he uses.
The bottom, rank 3, is the default.
Additionallly, the ballot has a favorite-designation place, in which the
voter indicates hir favorite. (Or, if preferred, the rules could let the
voter indicate more than one favorite).
First, a description of the Bucklin count. Then the conditional-vote option
will be described.
Bucklin is just stepwise Approval, in which the Approval votes are given
one at a time, instead of all at once (and, as they're given we check for
any candidate acquiring a majority).
The Bucklin count consists of several rounds. In each successive round,
each ballot gives a vote to each candidate in the rank position where it
hasn't yet given votes.
In other words, in the 1st round, each ballot gives a vote to the
candidate(s) in its 1st rank position.
And in the 2nd round, each ballot gives a vote to the candidate in its 2nd
rank position.
...etc.
If, in any round, one or more candidates acquire a vote total greater than
half of the number of voters, the one with the highest vote-total wins.
If, after each ballot has given to all of it candidates, no one has a
majority, then the winner is the candidate who has the highest vote total
at that time.
Because this is 3-Slot Bucklin, there are 3 rank positions, and voters can
rank as many candidates as they want at any rank position (But of course
you can only rank a particular candidate at one rank position.).
The conditional-vote option:
A voter can designate any vote, to any candidate, at any rank-position, as
"conditional".
On any particular ballot, a conditional vote in the 1st round is given only
if the vote-receiving candidate is designated as "favorite" by more voters
than the candidate who is designated favorite on that ballot.
(If voters are allowed to designate more than one favorite, then for any
particular ballot, the conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving
candidate is designated favorite on more ballots than is any of the
candidates designated as favorite on that ballot.)
In subsequent rounds, after the 1st round, a conditional vote is given b a
ballot only if the vote-receiving candidate has a higher vote-total (just
before that round) than any candidate who is designated favorite on that
ballot.
[end of method description]
People don't like complicated method-definitions. I'd probably save
conditional votes for a later refinement, and offer only ordinary,
non-conditional Bucklin first.
But Conditional Approval would be simpler and could maybe be offered as a
1st reform.
Michael Ossipoff
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:
Could you state Conditional 3-slot Bucklin as you would define it for
somebody who didn't know what "Bucklin" was?
2016-11-04 11:15 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com:
I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
distrusted voters' candidate.
So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st comment.
Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way, and
whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval should
be given.
Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with
its 1st rank position.
Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
approval will be given.
In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage of
the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin, the
conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
making it easier to propose.
So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is indeed
an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from Plurality.
It would be a good refinement for later.
When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps the
chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
by Chris's conditional vote option.
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods
that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets
the Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has
the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for
IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
Sure:
3-Slot Conditional Bucklin:
The ballot allows voters 3 rank positions in which to rank candidates.
The voter can use (rank someone at) as many or as few rank positions as
s/he wants to, but may not skip a rank and then use a rank below the
skipped rank.
A voter can rank any number of candidates at any of the 3 rank positions
that s/he uses.
The bottom, rank 3, is the default.
Additionallly, the ballot has a favorite-designation place, in which the
voter indicates hir favorite. (Or, if preferred, the rules could let the
voter indicate more than one favorite).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, a description of the Bucklin count. Then the conditional-vote option
will be described.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bucklin is just stepwise Approval, in which the Approval votes are given
one at a time, instead of all at once (and, as they're given we check for
any candidate acquiring a majority).
The Bucklin count consists of several rounds. In each successive round,
each ballot gives a vote to each candidate in the rank position where it
hasn't yet given votes.
In other words, in the 1st round, each ballot gives a vote to the
candidate(s) in its 1st rank position.
And in the 2nd round, each ballot gives a vote to the candidate in its 2nd
rank position.
...etc.
If, in any round, one or more candidates acquire a vote total greater than
half of the number of voters, the one with the highest vote-total wins.
If, after each ballot has given to all of it candidates, no one has a
majority, then the winner is the candidate who has the highest vote total
at that time.
Because this is 3-Slot Bucklin, there are 3 rank positions, and voters can
rank as many candidates as they want at any rank position (But of course
you can only rank a particular candidate at one rank position.).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conditional-vote option:
A voter can designate any vote, to any candidate, at any rank-position, as
"conditional".
On any particular ballot, a conditional vote in the 1st round is given only
if the vote-receiving candidate is designated as "favorite" by more voters
than the candidate who is designated favorite on that ballot.
(If voters are allowed to designate more than one favorite, then for any
particular ballot, the conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving
candidate is designated favorite on more ballots than is any of the
candidates designated as favorite on that ballot.)
In subsequent rounds, after the 1st round, a conditional vote is given b a
ballot only if the vote-receiving candidate has a higher vote-total (just
before that round) than any candidate who is designated favorite on that
ballot.
------------------------------------------------------------
[end of method description]
People don't like complicated method-definitions. I'd probably save
conditional votes for a later refinement, and offer only ordinary,
non-conditional Bucklin first.
But Conditional Approval would be simpler and could maybe be offered as a
1st reform.
Michael Ossipoff
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Could you state Conditional 3-slot Bucklin as you would define it for
> somebody who didn't know what "Bucklin" was?
>
> 2016-11-04 11:15 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>:
>
>> I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
>> full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
>> that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
>>
>> But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
>> shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
>> strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
>> distrusted voters' candidate.
>>
>> So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
>> points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
>>
>> Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st comment.
>>
>> Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way, and
>> whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval should
>> be given.
>>
>> Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with
>> its 1st rank position.
>>
>> Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
>> favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
>> approval will be given.
>>
>> In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage of
>> the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
>> can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
>>
>> A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
>> addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
>>
>> As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin, the
>> conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
>> before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
>> favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
>>
>> But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
>> favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
>> making it easier to propose.
>>
>> So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
>> Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
>>
>> As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is indeed
>> an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from Plurality.
>> It would be a good refinement for later.
>>
>> When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
>> when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
>> the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
>>
>> For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
>>
>> And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
>> more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
>>
>> And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
>>
>> I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps the
>> chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
>> dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
>> by Chris's conditional vote option.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond considering
>>> it desirable to elect from the
>>> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
>>>
>>> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods
>>> that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>>>
>>> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at addressing
>>> the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>>>
>>> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
>>> Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>>>
>>> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
>>> hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
>>> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>>>
>>> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>>>
>>> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
>>> be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>>>
>>> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
>>> Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>>>
>>> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
>>> Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>>>
>>> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
>>> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
>>> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>>>
>>> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>>>
>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
>>>
>>> 35: C
>>> 33: A>B
>>> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>>>
>>> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all (and
>>> sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
>>> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets
>>> the Minimal Defense criterion.
>>>
>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>>>
>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
>>>
>>> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
>>> random-fill incentive.
>>>
>>> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
>>> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>>>
>>> 48: C
>>> 27: B
>>> 25: A>>B
>>>
>>> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has
>>> the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
>>> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's Top
>>> Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched off
>>> and then C wins.
>>>
>>> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
>>> doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
>>> then
>>> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
>>> then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>>>
>>> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
>>> difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for
>>> IRV
>>> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
>>> broken compliance with FBC.)
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Nov 4, 2016 8:20 PM
I suggest that the round at which the giving or not-giving of a conditional
vote is decided by current vote totals (as of just before that round,
rather than by favoritieness-designations, should be the round after the
first round for a rank in which the conditional option is available.
So, if the conditional option is available for Bucklin's 1st round, at the
1st rank position, then the use of current vote-total instead of
favoriteness-designatioin should start in the 2nd round.
And if the conditional option first becomes available for the 2nd rank, the
2nd round, then the use of current vote-total instead of
favoriteness-designation should start in the 3rd rouind, for the 3rd rank
position.
As for whether the conditional option should first be available in in the
1st round, or instead in the 2nd round...I don't know which would be better.
I can't say that I know of a reason why it shouldn't be the 1st round, the
round that gives the votes that are given in the 1st rank.
Michael Ossipoff
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Sure:
3-Slot Conditional Bucklin:
The ballot allows voters 3 rank positions in which to rank candidates.
The voter can use (rank someone at) as many or as few rank positions as
s/he wants to, but may not skip a rank and then use a rank below the
skipped rank.
A voter can rank any number of candidates at any of the 3 rank positions
that s/he uses.
The bottom, rank 3, is the default.
Additionallly, the ballot has a favorite-designation place, in which the
voter indicates hir favorite. (Or, if preferred, the rules could let the
voter indicate more than one favorite).
First, a description of the Bucklin count. Then the conditional-vote
option will be described.
Bucklin is just stepwise Approval, in which the Approval votes are given
one at a time, instead of all at once (and, as they're given we check for
any candidate acquiring a majority).
The Bucklin count consists of several rounds. In each successive round,
each ballot gives a vote to each candidate in the rank position where it
hasn't yet given votes.
In other words, in the 1st round, each ballot gives a vote to the
candidate(s) in its 1st rank position.
And in the 2nd round, each ballot gives a vote to the candidate in its 2nd
rank position.
...etc.
If, in any round, one or more candidates acquire a vote total greater than
half of the number of voters, the one with the highest vote-total wins.
If, after each ballot has given to all of it candidates, no one has a
majority, then the winner is the candidate who has the highest vote total
at that time.
Because this is 3-Slot Bucklin, there are 3 rank positions, and voters can
rank as many candidates as they want at any rank position (But of course
you can only rank a particular candidate at one rank position.).
The conditional-vote option:
A voter can designate any vote, to any candidate, at any rank-position, as
"conditional".
On any particular ballot, a conditional vote in the 1st round is given
only if the vote-receiving candidate is designated as "favorite" by more
voters than the candidate who is designated favorite on that ballot.
(If voters are allowed to designate more than one favorite, then for any
particular ballot, the conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving
candidate is designated favorite on more ballots than is any of the
candidates designated as favorite on that ballot.)
In subsequent rounds, after the 1st round, a conditional vote is given b a
ballot only if the vote-receiving candidate has a higher vote-total (just
before that round) than any candidate who is designated favorite on that
ballot.
[end of method description]
People don't like complicated method-definitions. I'd probably save
conditional votes for a later refinement, and offer only ordinary,
non-conditional Bucklin first.
But Conditional Approval would be simpler and could maybe be offered as a
1st reform.
Michael Ossipoff
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:
Could you state Conditional 3-slot Bucklin as you would define it for
somebody who didn't know what "Bucklin" was?
2016-11-04 11:15 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com:
I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
distrusted voters' candidate.
So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st
comment.
Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way,
and whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval
should be given.
Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with
its 1st rank position.
Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
approval will be given.
In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage
of the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin,
the conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
making it easier to propose.
So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is
indeed an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from
Plurality. It would be a good refinement for later.
When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps
the chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
by Chris's conditional vote option.
Michael Ossipoff
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond
considering it desirable to elect from the
voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
(I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods
that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at
addressing the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
- Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
*Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
35: C
33: A>B
32: B (sincere might be B>A)
In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all
(and sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets
the Minimal Defense criterion.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
random-fill incentive.
The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
48: C
27: B
25: A>>B
The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has
the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's
Top Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched
off
and then C wins.
I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
then
they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
(It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for
IRV
or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
broken compliance with FBC.)
Chris Benham
I suggest that the round at which the giving or not-giving of a conditional
vote is decided by current vote totals (as of just before that round,
rather than by favoritieness-designations, should be the round _after_ the
first round for a rank in which the conditional option is available.
So, if the conditional option is available for Bucklin's 1st round, at the
1st rank position, then the use of current vote-total instead of
favoriteness-designatioin should start in the 2nd round.
And if the conditional option first becomes available for the 2nd rank, the
2nd round, then the use of current vote-total instead of
favoriteness-designation should start in the 3rd rouind, for the 3rd rank
position.
As for whether the conditional option should first be available in in the
1st round, or instead in the 2nd round...I don't know which would be better.
I can't say that I know of a reason why it shouldn't be the 1st round, the
round that gives the votes that are given in the 1st rank.
Michael Ossipoff
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Sure:
>
> 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin:
>
> The ballot allows voters 3 rank positions in which to rank candidates.
>
> The voter can use (rank someone at) as many or as few rank positions as
> s/he wants to, but may not skip a rank and then use a rank below the
> skipped rank.
>
> A voter can rank any number of candidates at any of the 3 rank positions
> that s/he uses.
>
> The bottom, rank 3, is the default.
>
> Additionallly, the ballot has a favorite-designation place, in which the
> voter indicates hir favorite. (Or, if preferred, the rules could let the
> voter indicate more than one favorite).
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> ----------------
> First, a description of the Bucklin count. Then the conditional-vote
> option will be described.
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> ----------------
> Bucklin is just stepwise Approval, in which the Approval votes are given
> one at a time, instead of all at once (and, as they're given we check for
> any candidate acquiring a majority).
>
> The Bucklin count consists of several rounds. In each successive round,
> each ballot gives a vote to each candidate in the rank position where it
> hasn't yet given votes.
>
> In other words, in the 1st round, each ballot gives a vote to the
> candidate(s) in its 1st rank position.
>
> And in the 2nd round, each ballot gives a vote to the candidate in its 2nd
> rank position.
>
> ...etc.
>
> If, in any round, one or more candidates acquire a vote total greater than
> half of the number of voters, the one with the highest vote-total wins.
>
> If, after each ballot has given to all of it candidates, no one has a
> majority, then the winner is the candidate who has the highest vote total
> at that time.
>
> Because this is 3-Slot Bucklin, there are 3 rank positions, and voters can
> rank as many candidates as they want at any rank position (But of course
> you can only rank a particular candidate at one rank position.).
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> -----------------------
>
> The conditional-vote option:
>
> A voter can designate any vote, to any candidate, at any rank-position, as
> "conditional".
>
>
> On any particular ballot, a conditional vote in the 1st round is given
> only if the vote-receiving candidate is designated as "favorite" by more
> voters than the candidate who is designated favorite on that ballot.
>
> (If voters are allowed to designate more than one favorite, then for any
> particular ballot, the conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving
> candidate is designated favorite on more ballots than is any of the
> candidates designated as favorite on that ballot.)
>
> In subsequent rounds, after the 1st round, a conditional vote is given b a
> ballot only if the vote-receiving candidate has a higher vote-total (just
> before that round) than any candidate who is designated favorite on that
> ballot.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
>
> [end of method description]
>
> People don't like complicated method-definitions. I'd probably save
> conditional votes for a later refinement, and offer only ordinary,
> non-conditional Bucklin first.
>
> But Conditional Approval would be simpler and could maybe be offered as a
> 1st reform.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Could you state Conditional 3-slot Bucklin as you would define it for
>> somebody who didn't know what "Bucklin" was?
>>
>> 2016-11-04 11:15 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>:
>>
>>> I'd said that, like 3-Slot ICT, Conditional Bucklin doesn't let you give
>>> full protection to the distrusted voters candidate, or to any candidate
>>> that you merely approve, because you aren't helping hir get a majority.
>>>
>>> But then, in a later posting, i said that the favorite-designation
>>> shouldn't give anything in the points-count, because that would create a
>>> strategic need to give that favorite designation to a compromise, or to the
>>> distrusted voters' candidate.
>>>
>>> So the favorite designation would be distinct from the ratings that give
>>> points, such as an Approval ballot, or the 1st rank of a Bucklin ballot.
>>>
>>> Well, my 2nd comment fixes the problem that I mentioned in my 1st
>>> comment.
>>>
>>> Have a favorite-designation that doesn't count for points in any way,
>>> and whose only use is for determining whether the conditional approval
>>> should be given.
>>>
>>> Below that is the Approval ballot, or the Bucklin ballot, starting with
>>> its 1st rank position.
>>>
>>> Then, the method is Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin, with a
>>> favorite-designation used only for determining whether the conditional
>>> approval will be given.
>>>
>>> In Conditional Buckllin, every vote given by a ballot, at every stage
>>> of the count (or every vote other than the the one given in the 1st round),
>>> can be conditional, if the voter so marks it.
>>>
>>> A special case of that would be 3-Slot Conditional Bucklin, in which, in
>>> addition to the favorite-designation, the ballot has a 3-Slot Bucklin ballot
>>>
>>> As I said last night, at any particular round of Conditional Bucklin,
>>> the conditional vote would be given if the vote-receiver's vote total, just
>>> before that round is greater than that of the giving ballot's designated
>>> favorite with the highest vote total at that time.
>>>
>>> But maybe it would be better to only allow a ballot to designate one
>>> favorite, partly to simplify the count rule, shortening the definition,
>>> making it easier to propose.
>>>
>>> So: Conditional Approval, or Conditional Bucklin--which would include
>>> Conditional 3-Slot Bucklin.
>>>
>>> As I said, no doubt Chris's improved interpretation of majority is
>>> indeed an improvement, but it's too complicated for a first reform from
>>> Plurality. It would be a good refinement for later.
>>>
>>> When there are two or more candidates getting a majority in a round, or
>>> when there are no majorities at the end of the count, I prefer declaring
>>> the winner based on vote-total, rather than top-count.
>>>
>>> For one thing it results in a briefer definition.
>>>
>>> And it makes the votes given at the various non-top stages of the count
>>> more effective, which seems more in keeping with Bucklin's purpose..
>>>
>>> And it chose D in Forest's example that I was discussing last week.
>>>
>>> I understand that using the top-count instead of the vote-total helps
>>> the chicken dilemma situation some, but it doesn't eliminate the chicken
>>> dilemma..That's especially ok if the chicken dilemma problem is eliminated
>>> by Chris's conditional vote option.
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:53 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond
>>>> considering it desirable to elect from the
>>>> voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect.
>>>>
>>>> (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods
>>>> that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.)
>>>>
>>>> Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at
>>>> addressing the Chicken Dilemma scenario.
>>>>
>>>> * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved,
>>>> Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated.
>>>>
>>>> A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if
>>>> hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest
>>>> Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot.
>>>>
>>>> Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.*
>>>>
>>>> ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" could
>>>> be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected').
>>>>
>>>> To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
>>>> Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus:
>>>>
>>>> *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is
>>>> Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval.
>>>>
>>>> If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is
>>>> approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X
>>>> with the highest Top-Ratings score wins.
>>>>
>>>> Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
>>>>
>>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA
>>>>
>>>> 35: C
>>>> 33: A>B
>>>> 32: B (sincere might be B>A)
>>>>
>>>> In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all
>>>> (and sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally"
>>>> approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets
>>>> the Minimal Defense criterion.
>>>>
>>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>>>>
>>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion
>>>>
>>>> Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any
>>>> random-fill incentive.
>>>>
>>>> The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a
>>>> vulnerability to Push-over strategy.
>>>>
>>>> 48: C
>>>> 27: B
>>>> 25: A>>B
>>>>
>>>> The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has
>>>> the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings score
>>>> than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's
>>>> Top Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is switched
>>>> off
>>>> and then C wins.
>>>>
>>>> I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result
>>>> doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to C
>>>> then
>>>> they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that
>>>> then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A.
>>>>
>>>> (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more
>>>> difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago for
>>>> IRV
>>>> or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have
>>>> broken compliance with FBC.)
>>>>
>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>>
>>
>
