Alright, I guarantee that this will be brief, clear, and final: In fact, of course the "Unfavor" could be an automatic part of the conditional nature of the approval or top-ranking that you give to a candidate. To say it differently, the comparison could be based on how many unconditional approvals the compared candidates have, for the purpose of determining whether the conditional vote will be given. In that way, you aren't denying an approval or a top-ranking to the candidate to whom you give a conditional vote. And yet adding more unconditional approvals or top-rankings has no FBC-spoiling effect. So here's how I'd word the rule for determining whether a conditional vote is to be given: In Conditional Approval, or in Conditional Bucklin at the first rank: The conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving candidate has more unconditional approvals (or unconditional top-rankings) than your unconditionally approved (or unconditionally top-ranked) candidate who is unconditionally approved (or unconditionally top-ranked) by the most ballots. In Conditional Bucklin, for conditional votes at ranks after 1st rank, it's just vote-totals that are compared. Michael Ossipoff On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > For that matter, as I was starting to suggest before, you could just > "Unfavor" the candidate of the distrusted faction (when approving hir). > Then, the determination of whether to give a conditional vote depends on a > comparison of hir "Favor" score* compared with that of your approved > candidate with highest Favor-score. > > .*A ballot increments a candidate's Favor-Score if it approves hir without > giving her an Unfavor. > > That's my best suggestion yet for this conditional Approval & Bucklin. > > In Bucklin, the top-ranking without an "Unfavor" would replace the > "Favoriteness designation" that I earlier today spoke of for Bucklin. > > But, like the Favoriteness designation, that's only for the top rank. For > subsequent ranks, Conditional Bucklin uses vote totals, as of just before > that round, just as I described earlier today. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:08 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Well, if you treat your "Better Group" designations as absolute instead >> of relative, and if you don't demote one candidate when promoting another, >> then FBC won't be violated. >> >> It won't violate FBC for you unless you choose to make it do so. >> >> Spoken of in that way, it doesn't sound bad at all. >> >> Then, approving Favorite, and giving hir the "Better-Group" designation >> won't make Compromise lose, when s/he'd won before you approved and >> "Better-Group"ed Compromise. >> >> Obviously you should "Better-Group" all of your approved candidates >> except for the one that's a defection-threat. >> >> If people do that,then the "Better-Group" designation is a very good >> measure of faction-size. ...just what is needed for the purpose. >> >> So maybe the Conditional Approval and the Conditional Bucklin that I >> defined tonight and t his afternoon would be pretty good after-all. Maybe >> better than comparing top-counts to determine whether to give the >> conditional vote, because of the stronger support that the A voters could >> give to candidate B. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> >> >> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 10:39 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com >> > wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:45 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>> >>> If you are only allowed to designate one candidate as your favourite, I >>> don't see how the method meets FBC. >>> >>> (endquote) >>> >>> By the fact that the favorite-designation has no effect or role in the >>> points sum. >>> >>> The favorite-designation doesn't give a vote or a point. >>> >>> If you approve Compromise, and Compromise wins, and then you decide to >>> approve Favorite too, that will in no way affect the matter of whether or >>> not Compromise outpolls Worst. >>> >>> Say Comprise was going to be your favorite, and you were going to >>> approve hir and designate hir as favorite. S/he would have won. Then >>> Favorite enters the race. So you'll approve hir too, and designate hir as >>> favorite, instead of Compromise. >>> >>> Can that make Compromise lose, if Favorite doesn't win? >>> >>> All you're changing is the standard for whether a particular conditional >>> vote should be given. >>> >>> >>> Well alright, maybe, though you like Favorite better than Compromise >>> (that's why the arrival of Favorite changed your favorite from Favorite to >>> Compromise), maybe few other people do. Maybe Favorite is a favorite to >>> fewer people. That can result in a conditional vote being given, when it >>> wouldn't have when Compromise was your designated favorite. The giving of >>> that other vote could cause Compromise to lose. Maybe Favorite isn't >>> winnable. >>> >>> So yes, you're quite right. I started this posting to tell you why you >>> aren't right, but you are right. >>> >>> And if, instead, you can designate as many favorites as you want to, and >>> you add Favorite to your favorite-designation list, instead of replacing >>> Compromise with Favorite, as favorite, then, the electorate-wide >>> favoriteness of your most electorate-wide favorite candidate will either >>> stay the same, or increase. So the addition of Favorite to that list won't >>> cause a conditional vote to be given that wouldn't have been given before. >>> >>> If your "favorite-designations" are absolute rather than relative, >>> you'll leave Compromise with hir favorite-designation. So maybe "favorite" >>> isn't the best word, because it implies unique best. Maybe "Better". >>> >>> If your "Better" designations are absolute instead of relative, then the >>> arrival of Favorite shouldn't make you un-designate Compromise, and so you >>> won't cause more conditional votes to be given by adding Favorite. >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------- >>> >>> But here's a better possibility: Instead of giving that "Better" >>> designation to some, why not give a "Less good" designation to the >>> distrusted voters' candidate, the standard example's "Candidate B"? . >>> >>> Then, instead of comparing which of the two candidates has more >>> "Favorite" or "Better" designations, compare instead which one has fewer >>> "Less Good" designations throughout the electorate? >>> >>> Adding Favorite won't have any effect on the number of Less-Good >>> designations received by your approved candidate with the fewest Less-Good >>> designations. You could reserve your Less-Good designations for candidates >>> of distrusted voters, like Candidate B. >>> >>> Or maybe it would be better to instead give a negative designation to >>> some candidates. ...a "Worse" designation to some of your unapproved >>> candidates. But then the comparison of the "Worse" totals would have less >>> relevance the matter of which of A or B is the more winnable, with the >>> larger faction. >>> >>> I guess I suspect that these same considerations apply to Conditional >>> Bucklin too. >>> >>> My reason for wanting something different from comparing the two >>> candidates' top-counts was that, by not rating B at top, you're giving hir >>> poorer protection against someone worse. >>> >>> I'd hoped that there was a way to avoid that, with a "Favorite" >>> designation that didn't assign a point or a vote. Evidently that runs into >>> a problem. >>> >>> So maybe, then, as with 3-Slot ICT, it's necessary to settle for poorer >>> protection of B, when you demote hir in order to protect against defection >>> by hir voters. >>> >>> If so, that means that this Conditional Approval can't be. And it means >>> that Conditional Bucklin must give poorer protection to Candidate B, when >>> protecting against defetion by hir voters. >>> >>> Regrettable. I'd hoped that something better was possible. >>> . >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> --------------- >>> >>> Well, recently, maybe last month, I proposed my own "Conditional >>> Approval" and "Conditional Bucklin". it made reciprocity the condition for >>> giving the conditional vote. I described a perfectly feasible >>> implementation for it. >>> >>> The problem was that it invites a strategy that results in another >>> chicken-dilemma--a sort of secondary chicken dilemma. >>> >>> But surely that's better than the original, primary, chicken dilemma. It >>> seemed a bit of a mess, but I don't think it failed FBC. But, then, I just >>> assumed that it didn't. Maybe I didn't look closely enough. >>> >>> By the way, I'd proposed that same conditional Approval & Bucklin some >>> years before too, at EM, and rejected it for the same reason. >>> >>> Maybe it has more promise than the one that I proposed tonight, but >>> maybe it still has too much problem. >>> >>> Maybe the kind of conditional comparison you suggested, the top-count, >>> is the only one that will work well enough. >>> >>> So maybe we have to settle for poorer help for Candidate B against the >>> candidates we like less, such as C. Maybe that demotion of B has to, to >>> some degree, abandon helping hir. >>> >>> That somewhat disappointed and pessimistic likelihood is my take at this >>> time. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff. >>> >>> >>> >>> And with no mechanism for sometimes not counting normal below-top >>> approval the method fails Majority Favourite. >>> >>> So I judge this to be much worse than 3-slot "Conditional" IBIFA or MTA >>> or MCA. >>> >>> Chris Benham >>> >>> >>> On 11/5/2016 7:35 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>>> >>>> Let me completely define Conditional Approval. This definition is brief >>>>> enough to be a proposal for a 1st reform from Plurality: >>>>> >>>>> Conditional Approval: >>>>> >>>>> You can approve as many or as few candidates as you want to, by >>>>> marking their names, on the ballot. >>>>> >>>>> You also have a place on the ballot where you can indicate your >>>>> favorite. >>>>> >>>>> (in a variation of these rules, you could indicate more than one >>>>> favorite if you want to.) >>>>> >>>>> For any approval that you give, you have the option of marking it as >>>>> "conditional". >>>>> >>>>> A conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving candidate is >>>>> designated favorite on more ballots than is your ballot's >>>>> favorite-designated candidate. >>>>> >>>>> (...or (if ballots are allowed to designate more than one favorite) on >>>>> more ballots than is the candidate favorite-designated on your ballot who >>>>> is favorite-designated on the most ballots.) >>>>> >>>>> The winner is the candidate with the most approvals. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If you are only allowed to designate one candidate as your favourite, I >>>> don't see how the method meets FBC. >>>> >>>> And with no mechanism for sometimes not counting normal below-top >>>> approval the method fails Majority Favourite. >>>> >>>> So I judge this to be much worse than 3-slot "Conditional" IBIFA or >>>> MTA or MCA. >>>> >>>> Chris Benham >>>> >>>> >>> >> >

Chris's Conditional Bucklin, and 3-Slot ICT are chicken-dilemma-proof, and, with CD & FBC, they're methods that should be on any proposal-list. But their shortcoming, for me, is that, other than beating C in the chicken-dilemma example, you aren't really giving full general support & protection to a candidate of a distrusted faction, when you protect against defection. 3-Slot ICT leaves the demoted candidate without protection from pairwise-count offensive strategy, or even innocent, nonstrategic truncation, which, admittedly, might not happen. Chris's conditional approval-rating disadvantages the demoted candidate by not giving hir any top-votes. My conditional top-ranking avoids that shortcoming. It gives the demoted candidate a fully-effective top-vote, if s/he qualifies by having more unconditional top-votes than any of the unconditionally top-voted candidates on your ballot. If the demoted candidate, the candidate of the distrusted faction, is in your top-set or strong top-set, then you'd like to support hir as well as possible, while protecting against defection by hir voters. Also, my modified form of unconditional vote allows for a Conditional Approval. I'll call Chris's original Bucklin version "3-Slot Unconditional (top) Bucklin". The "(top)" refers to the comparison of top-counts to determine if a conditional vote is given. I'll likewise refer to Chris's original conditional-vote option as "conditional votes (top) option". My conditional votes option, i'll call "conditional votes (unconditional) option", because it compares unconditional votes. Maybe I'd replace the words "top" and "unconditional" with the letters "t" and "u". My Conditional Approval doesn't need the "(u)", because it's the only Conditional Approval. Then, my Unconditional Bucklin is "Unconditional (u) Bucklin". I should post complete and better wordings: Conditional Approval: Voters can approve as many candidates as they want to, by marking their names on the ballot in a specified manner. If desired, and approval of a candidate can be designated "conditional". By a particular ballot, a conditional approval is given only if the vote-receiving candidate has more uncondtional approvals than any candidate unconditionally approved on that ballot. The candidate with the most approvals wins. Due to time considerations, I'd like to post this now, and then post a complete wording of Unconditional (u) Bucklin in a subsquent post to this thread. Michael Ossipoff On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:54 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Alright, I guarantee that this will be brief, clear, and final: > > In fact, of course the "Unfavor" could be an automatic part of the > conditional nature of the approval or top-ranking that you give to a > candidate. > > To say it differently, the comparison could be based on how many > unconditional approvals the compared candidates have, for the purpose of > determining whether the conditional vote will be given. > > In that way, you aren't denying an approval or a top-ranking to the > candidate to whom you give a conditional vote. > > And yet adding more unconditional approvals or top-rankings has no > FBC-spoiling effect. > > So here's how I'd word the rule for determining whether a conditional vote > is to be given: > > In Conditional Approval, or in Conditional Bucklin at the first rank: > > The conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving candidate has > more unconditional approvals (or unconditional top-rankings) than your > unconditionally approved (or unconditionally top-ranked) candidate who is > unconditionally approved (or unconditionally top-ranked) by the most > ballots. > > In Conditional Bucklin, for conditional votes at ranks after 1st rank, > it's just vote-totals that are compared. > > Michael Ossipoff > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> For that matter, as I was starting to suggest before, you could just >> "Unfavor" the candidate of the distrusted faction (when approving hir). >> Then, the determination of whether to give a conditional vote depends on a >> comparison of hir "Favor" score* compared with that of your approved >> candidate with highest Favor-score. >> >> .*A ballot increments a candidate's Favor-Score if it approves hir >> without giving her an Unfavor. >> >> That's my best suggestion yet for this conditional Approval & Bucklin. >> >> In Bucklin, the top-ranking without an "Unfavor" would replace the >> "Favoriteness designation" that I earlier today spoke of for Bucklin. >> >> But, like the Favoriteness designation, that's only for the top rank. For >> subsequent ranks, Conditional Bucklin uses vote totals, as of just before >> that round, just as I described earlier today. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:08 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com >> > wrote: >> >>> Well, if you treat your "Better Group" designations as absolute instead >>> of relative, and if you don't demote one candidate when promoting another, >>> then FBC won't be violated. >>> >>> It won't violate FBC for you unless you choose to make it do so. >>> >>> Spoken of in that way, it doesn't sound bad at all. >>> >>> Then, approving Favorite, and giving hir the "Better-Group" designation >>> won't make Compromise lose, when s/he'd won before you approved and >>> "Better-Group"ed Compromise. >>> >>> Obviously you should "Better-Group" all of your approved candidates >>> except for the one that's a defection-threat. >>> >>> If people do that,then the "Better-Group" designation is a very good >>> measure of faction-size. ...just what is needed for the purpose. >>> >>> So maybe the Conditional Approval and the Conditional Bucklin that I >>> defined tonight and t his afternoon would be pretty good after-all. Maybe >>> better than comparing top-counts to determine whether to give the >>> conditional vote, because of the stronger support that the A voters could >>> give to candidate B. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 10:39 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:45 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>>> >>>> If you are only allowed to designate one candidate as your favourite, I >>>> don't see how the method meets FBC. >>>> >>>> (endquote) >>>> >>>> By the fact that the favorite-designation has no effect or role in the >>>> points sum. >>>> >>>> The favorite-designation doesn't give a vote or a point. >>>> >>>> If you approve Compromise, and Compromise wins, and then you decide to >>>> approve Favorite too, that will in no way affect the matter of whether or >>>> not Compromise outpolls Worst. >>>> >>>> Say Comprise was going to be your favorite, and you were going to >>>> approve hir and designate hir as favorite. S/he would have won. Then >>>> Favorite enters the race. So you'll approve hir too, and designate hir as >>>> favorite, instead of Compromise. >>>> >>>> Can that make Compromise lose, if Favorite doesn't win? >>>> >>>> All you're changing is the standard for whether a particular >>>> conditional vote should be given. >>>> >>>> >>>> Well alright, maybe, though you like Favorite better than Compromise >>>> (that's why the arrival of Favorite changed your favorite from Favorite to >>>> Compromise), maybe few other people do. Maybe Favorite is a favorite to >>>> fewer people. That can result in a conditional vote being given, when it >>>> wouldn't have when Compromise was your designated favorite. The giving of >>>> that other vote could cause Compromise to lose. Maybe Favorite isn't >>>> winnable. >>>> >>>> So yes, you're quite right. I started this posting to tell you why you >>>> aren't right, but you are right. >>>> >>>> And if, instead, you can designate as many favorites as you want to, >>>> and you add Favorite to your favorite-designation list, instead of >>>> replacing Compromise with Favorite, as favorite, then, the electorate-wide >>>> favoriteness of your most electorate-wide favorite candidate will either >>>> stay the same, or increase. So the addition of Favorite to that list won't >>>> cause a conditional vote to be given that wouldn't have been given before. >>>> >>>> If your "favorite-designations" are absolute rather than relative, >>>> you'll leave Compromise with hir favorite-designation. So maybe "favorite" >>>> isn't the best word, because it implies unique best. Maybe "Better". >>>> >>>> If your "Better" designations are absolute instead of relative, then >>>> the arrival of Favorite shouldn't make you un-designate Compromise, and so >>>> you won't cause more conditional votes to be given by adding Favorite. >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> But here's a better possibility: Instead of giving that "Better" >>>> designation to some, why not give a "Less good" designation to the >>>> distrusted voters' candidate, the standard example's "Candidate B"? . >>>> >>>> Then, instead of comparing which of the two candidates has more >>>> "Favorite" or "Better" designations, compare instead which one has fewer >>>> "Less Good" designations throughout the electorate? >>>> >>>> Adding Favorite won't have any effect on the number of Less-Good >>>> designations received by your approved candidate with the fewest Less-Good >>>> designations. You could reserve your Less-Good designations for candidates >>>> of distrusted voters, like Candidate B. >>>> >>>> Or maybe it would be better to instead give a negative designation to >>>> some candidates. ...a "Worse" designation to some of your unapproved >>>> candidates. But then the comparison of the "Worse" totals would have less >>>> relevance the matter of which of A or B is the more winnable, with the >>>> larger faction. >>>> >>>> I guess I suspect that these same considerations apply to Conditional >>>> Bucklin too. >>>> >>>> My reason for wanting something different from comparing the two >>>> candidates' top-counts was that, by not rating B at top, you're giving hir >>>> poorer protection against someone worse. >>>> >>>> I'd hoped that there was a way to avoid that, with a "Favorite" >>>> designation that didn't assign a point or a vote. Evidently that runs into >>>> a problem. >>>> >>>> So maybe, then, as with 3-Slot ICT, it's necessary to settle for poorer >>>> protection of B, when you demote hir in order to protect against defection >>>> by hir voters. >>>> >>>> If so, that means that this Conditional Approval can't be. And it means >>>> that Conditional Bucklin must give poorer protection to Candidate B, when >>>> protecting against defetion by hir voters. >>>> >>>> Regrettable. I'd hoped that something better was possible. >>>> . >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> --------------- >>>> >>>> Well, recently, maybe last month, I proposed my own "Conditional >>>> Approval" and "Conditional Bucklin". it made reciprocity the condition for >>>> giving the conditional vote. I described a perfectly feasible >>>> implementation for it. >>>> >>>> The problem was that it invites a strategy that results in another >>>> chicken-dilemma--a sort of secondary chicken dilemma. >>>> >>>> But surely that's better than the original, primary, chicken dilemma. >>>> It seemed a bit of a mess, but I don't think it failed FBC. But, then, I >>>> just assumed that it didn't. Maybe I didn't look closely enough. >>>> >>>> By the way, I'd proposed that same conditional Approval & Bucklin some >>>> years before too, at EM, and rejected it for the same reason. >>>> >>>> Maybe it has more promise than the one that I proposed tonight, but >>>> maybe it still has too much problem. >>>> >>>> Maybe the kind of conditional comparison you suggested, the top-count, >>>> is the only one that will work well enough. >>>> >>>> So maybe we have to settle for poorer help for Candidate B against the >>>> candidates we like less, such as C. Maybe that demotion of B has to, to >>>> some degree, abandon helping hir. >>>> >>>> That somewhat disappointed and pessimistic likelihood is my take at >>>> this time. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> And with no mechanism for sometimes not counting normal below-top >>>> approval the method fails Majority Favourite. >>>> >>>> So I judge this to be much worse than 3-slot "Conditional" IBIFA or >>>> MTA or MCA. >>>> >>>> Chris Benham >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/5/2016 7:35 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Let me completely define Conditional Approval. This definition is >>>>>> brief enough to be a proposal for a 1st reform from Plurality: >>>>>> >>>>>> Conditional Approval: >>>>>> >>>>>> You can approve as many or as few candidates as you want to, by >>>>>> marking their names, on the ballot. >>>>>> >>>>>> You also have a place on the ballot where you can indicate your >>>>>> favorite. >>>>>> >>>>>> (in a variation of these rules, you could indicate more than one >>>>>> favorite if you want to.) >>>>>> >>>>>> For any approval that you give, you have the option of marking it as >>>>>> "conditional". >>>>>> >>>>>> A conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving candidate is >>>>>> designated favorite on more ballots than is your ballot's >>>>>> favorite-designated candidate. >>>>>> >>>>>> (...or (if ballots are allowed to designate more than one favorite) >>>>>> on more ballots than is the candidate favorite-designated on your ballot >>>>>> who is favorite-designated on the most ballots.) >>>>>> >>>>>> The winner is the candidate with the most approvals. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you are only allowed to designate one candidate as your favourite, >>>>> I don't see how the method meets FBC. >>>>> >>>>> And with no mechanism for sometimes not counting normal below-top >>>>> approval the method fails Majority Favourite. >>>>> >>>>> So I judge this to be much worse than 3-slot "Conditional" IBIFA or >>>>> MTA or MCA. >>>>> >>>>> Chris Benham >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >

A complete, briefly-worded general definition of Conditional (u) Bucklin: (In my previous posting, when writing the names of Conditional Bucklin or Conditional Approval, I sometimes accidentally wrote "Unonditional" instead of "Conditional".) Conditional(u) Bucklin: First, a general definition of Bucklin. Then a specification of the conditional-vote option: General Bucklin definition: Voters vote a ranking of candidates. Some Bucklin versions allow equal-ranking, with rules differing among those versions. The best versions at least allow equal-top-ranking. This is a general definition of Bucklin with equal top-ranking allowed. Skipping a rank-level, and using a rank-level below it, isn't permitted. In each of a series of successive "rounds", each ranking gives a vote to each candidate ranked at the highest ranking at which it hasn't yet given votes. In other words, in the 1st round, each ranking gives a vote to each candidate in its 1st rank. In the 2nd round, each ranking gives a vote to each candidate in its 2nd rank. ...etc. If, in any round, one or more candidates gets majority (a vote total greater than half the number of voters), then the one with the most votes wins. If, after all rankings have given votes to all of their candidates, no candidate has a majority, then the winner is the candidate with the most votes. ------------------------------------------------- Specification of the conditional-vote option: Any vote given to any candidate(s) at any rank-level, can be designated as "Conditional". The effect of a conditional designation for a vote is as follows: 1. At the 1st (top) rank: A ballot's conditional vote for a candidate is given to the candidate only if the vote-receiving candidate has more unconditional 1st-rank votes than any candidate unconditionally 1st-ranked on that ballot. 2. At any other rank: In a round other than the 1st, a ballot's conditional vote for a candidate is given to the candidate only if the vote-receiving candidate has a higher vote-total (as of just before the current round) than any candidate unconditionally 1st-ranked on that ballot. [end of definition] Michael Ossipoff In each of consecutive "rounds", ea On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 1:09 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Chris's Conditional Bucklin, and 3-Slot ICT are chicken-dilemma-proof, > and, with CD & FBC, they're methods that should be on any proposal-list. > > But their shortcoming, for me, is that, other than beating C in the > chicken-dilemma example, you aren't really giving full general support & > protection to a candidate of a distrusted faction, when you protect against > defection. > > 3-Slot ICT leaves the demoted candidate without protection from > pairwise-count offensive strategy, or even innocent, nonstrategic > truncation, which, admittedly, might not happen. > > Chris's conditional approval-rating disadvantages the demoted candidate by > not giving hir any top-votes. My conditional top-ranking avoids that > shortcoming. > > It gives the demoted candidate a fully-effective top-vote, if s/he > qualifies by having more unconditional top-votes than any of the > unconditionally top-voted candidates on your ballot. > > If the demoted candidate, the candidate of the distrusted faction, is in > your top-set or strong top-set, then you'd like to support hir as well as > possible, while protecting against defection by hir voters. > > Also, my modified form of unconditional vote allows for a Conditional > Approval. > > I'll call Chris's original Bucklin version "3-Slot Unconditional (top) > Bucklin". The "(top)" refers to the comparison of top-counts to determine > if a conditional vote is given. > > I'll likewise refer to Chris's original conditional-vote option as > "conditional votes (top) option". > > My conditional votes option, i'll call "conditional votes (unconditional) > option", because it compares unconditional votes. > > Maybe I'd replace the words "top" and "unconditional" with the letters "t" > and "u". > > My Conditional Approval doesn't need the "(u)", because it's the only > Conditional Approval. > > Then, my Unconditional Bucklin is "Unconditional (u) Bucklin". > > I should post complete and better wordings: > > Conditional Approval: > > Voters can approve as many candidates as they want to, by marking their > names on the ballot in a specified manner. > > If desired, and approval of a candidate can be designated "conditional". > > By a particular ballot, a conditional approval is given only if the > vote-receiving candidate has more uncondtional approvals than any candidate > unconditionally approved on that ballot. > > The candidate with the most approvals wins. > > Due to time considerations, I'd like to post this now, and then post a > complete wording of Unconditional (u) Bucklin in a subsquent post to this > thread. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:54 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Alright, I guarantee that this will be brief, clear, and final: >> >> In fact, of course the "Unfavor" could be an automatic part of the >> conditional nature of the approval or top-ranking that you give to a >> candidate. >> >> To say it differently, the comparison could be based on how many >> unconditional approvals the compared candidates have, for the purpose of >> determining whether the conditional vote will be given. >> >> In that way, you aren't denying an approval or a top-ranking to the >> candidate to whom you give a conditional vote. >> >> And yet adding more unconditional approvals or top-rankings has no >> FBC-spoiling effect. >> >> So here's how I'd word the rule for determining whether a conditional >> vote is to be given: >> >> In Conditional Approval, or in Conditional Bucklin at the first rank: >> >> The conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving candidate has >> more unconditional approvals (or unconditional top-rankings) than your >> unconditionally approved (or unconditionally top-ranked) candidate who is >> unconditionally approved (or unconditionally top-ranked) by the most >> ballots. >> >> In Conditional Bucklin, for conditional votes at ranks after 1st rank, >> it's just vote-totals that are compared. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com >> > wrote: >> >>> For that matter, as I was starting to suggest before, you could just >>> "Unfavor" the candidate of the distrusted faction (when approving hir). >>> Then, the determination of whether to give a conditional vote depends on a >>> comparison of hir "Favor" score* compared with that of your approved >>> candidate with highest Favor-score. >>> >>> .*A ballot increments a candidate's Favor-Score if it approves hir >>> without giving her an Unfavor. >>> >>> That's my best suggestion yet for this conditional Approval & Bucklin. >>> >>> In Bucklin, the top-ranking without an "Unfavor" would replace the >>> "Favoriteness designation" that I earlier today spoke of for Bucklin. >>> >>> But, like the Favoriteness designation, that's only for the top rank. >>> For subsequent ranks, Conditional Bucklin uses vote totals, as of just >>> before that round, just as I described earlier today. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:08 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Well, if you treat your "Better Group" designations as absolute instead >>>> of relative, and if you don't demote one candidate when promoting another, >>>> then FBC won't be violated. >>>> >>>> It won't violate FBC for you unless you choose to make it do so. >>>> >>>> Spoken of in that way, it doesn't sound bad at all. >>>> >>>> Then, approving Favorite, and giving hir the "Better-Group" designation >>>> won't make Compromise lose, when s/he'd won before you approved and >>>> "Better-Group"ed Compromise. >>>> >>>> Obviously you should "Better-Group" all of your approved candidates >>>> except for the one that's a defection-threat. >>>> >>>> If people do that,then the "Better-Group" designation is a very good >>>> measure of faction-size. ...just what is needed for the purpose. >>>> >>>> So maybe the Conditional Approval and the Conditional Bucklin that I >>>> defined tonight and t his afternoon would be pretty good after-all. Maybe >>>> better than comparing top-counts to determine whether to give the >>>> conditional vote, because of the stronger support that the A voters could >>>> give to candidate B. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 10:39 PM, Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:45 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> If you are only allowed to designate one candidate as your favourite, >>>>> I don't see how the method meets FBC. >>>>> >>>>> (endquote) >>>>> >>>>> By the fact that the favorite-designation has no effect or role in the >>>>> points sum. >>>>> >>>>> The favorite-designation doesn't give a vote or a point. >>>>> >>>>> If you approve Compromise, and Compromise wins, and then you decide to >>>>> approve Favorite too, that will in no way affect the matter of whether or >>>>> not Compromise outpolls Worst. >>>>> >>>>> Say Comprise was going to be your favorite, and you were going to >>>>> approve hir and designate hir as favorite. S/he would have won. Then >>>>> Favorite enters the race. So you'll approve hir too, and designate hir as >>>>> favorite, instead of Compromise. >>>>> >>>>> Can that make Compromise lose, if Favorite doesn't win? >>>>> >>>>> All you're changing is the standard for whether a particular >>>>> conditional vote should be given. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well alright, maybe, though you like Favorite better than Compromise >>>>> (that's why the arrival of Favorite changed your favorite from Favorite to >>>>> Compromise), maybe few other people do. Maybe Favorite is a favorite to >>>>> fewer people. That can result in a conditional vote being given, when it >>>>> wouldn't have when Compromise was your designated favorite. The giving of >>>>> that other vote could cause Compromise to lose. Maybe Favorite isn't >>>>> winnable. >>>>> >>>>> So yes, you're quite right. I started this posting to tell you why you >>>>> aren't right, but you are right. >>>>> >>>>> And if, instead, you can designate as many favorites as you want to, >>>>> and you add Favorite to your favorite-designation list, instead of >>>>> replacing Compromise with Favorite, as favorite, then, the electorate-wide >>>>> favoriteness of your most electorate-wide favorite candidate will either >>>>> stay the same, or increase. So the addition of Favorite to that list won't >>>>> cause a conditional vote to be given that wouldn't have been given before. >>>>> >>>>> If your "favorite-designations" are absolute rather than relative, >>>>> you'll leave Compromise with hir favorite-designation. So maybe "favorite" >>>>> isn't the best word, because it implies unique best. Maybe "Better". >>>>> >>>>> If your "Better" designations are absolute instead of relative, then >>>>> the arrival of Favorite shouldn't make you un-designate Compromise, and so >>>>> you won't cause more conditional votes to be given by adding Favorite. >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> But here's a better possibility: Instead of giving that "Better" >>>>> designation to some, why not give a "Less good" designation to the >>>>> distrusted voters' candidate, the standard example's "Candidate B"? . >>>>> >>>>> Then, instead of comparing which of the two candidates has more >>>>> "Favorite" or "Better" designations, compare instead which one has fewer >>>>> "Less Good" designations throughout the electorate? >>>>> >>>>> Adding Favorite won't have any effect on the number of Less-Good >>>>> designations received by your approved candidate with the fewest Less-Good >>>>> designations. You could reserve your Less-Good designations for candidates >>>>> of distrusted voters, like Candidate B. >>>>> >>>>> Or maybe it would be better to instead give a negative designation to >>>>> some candidates. ...a "Worse" designation to some of your unapproved >>>>> candidates. But then the comparison of the "Worse" totals would have less >>>>> relevance the matter of which of A or B is the more winnable, with the >>>>> larger faction. >>>>> >>>>> I guess I suspect that these same considerations apply to Conditional >>>>> Bucklin too. >>>>> >>>>> My reason for wanting something different from comparing the two >>>>> candidates' top-counts was that, by not rating B at top, you're giving hir >>>>> poorer protection against someone worse. >>>>> >>>>> I'd hoped that there was a way to avoid that, with a "Favorite" >>>>> designation that didn't assign a point or a vote. Evidently that runs into >>>>> a problem. >>>>> >>>>> So maybe, then, as with 3-Slot ICT, it's necessary to settle for >>>>> poorer protection of B, when you demote hir in order to protect against >>>>> defection by hir voters. >>>>> >>>>> If so, that means that this Conditional Approval can't be. And it >>>>> means that Conditional Bucklin must give poorer protection to Candidate B, >>>>> when protecting against defetion by hir voters. >>>>> >>>>> Regrettable. I'd hoped that something better was possible. >>>>> . >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> --------------- >>>>> >>>>> Well, recently, maybe last month, I proposed my own "Conditional >>>>> Approval" and "Conditional Bucklin". it made reciprocity the condition for >>>>> giving the conditional vote. I described a perfectly feasible >>>>> implementation for it. >>>>> >>>>> The problem was that it invites a strategy that results in another >>>>> chicken-dilemma--a sort of secondary chicken dilemma. >>>>> >>>>> But surely that's better than the original, primary, chicken dilemma. >>>>> It seemed a bit of a mess, but I don't think it failed FBC. But, then, I >>>>> just assumed that it didn't. Maybe I didn't look closely enough. >>>>> >>>>> By the way, I'd proposed that same conditional Approval & Bucklin some >>>>> years before too, at EM, and rejected it for the same reason. >>>>> >>>>> Maybe it has more promise than the one that I proposed tonight, but >>>>> maybe it still has too much problem. >>>>> >>>>> Maybe the kind of conditional comparison you suggested, the top-count, >>>>> is the only one that will work well enough. >>>>> >>>>> So maybe we have to settle for poorer help for Candidate B against the >>>>> candidates we like less, such as C. Maybe that demotion of B has to, to >>>>> some degree, abandon helping hir. >>>>> >>>>> That somewhat disappointed and pessimistic likelihood is my take at >>>>> this time. >>>>> >>>>> Michael Ossipoff. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> And with no mechanism for sometimes not counting normal below-top >>>>> approval the method fails Majority Favourite. >>>>> >>>>> So I judge this to be much worse than 3-slot "Conditional" IBIFA or >>>>> MTA or MCA. >>>>> >>>>> Chris Benham >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 11/5/2016 7:35 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me completely define Conditional Approval. This definition is >>>>>>> brief enough to be a proposal for a 1st reform from Plurality: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Conditional Approval: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You can approve as many or as few candidates as you want to, by >>>>>>> marking their names, on the ballot. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You also have a place on the ballot where you can indicate your >>>>>>> favorite. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (in a variation of these rules, you could indicate more than one >>>>>>> favorite if you want to.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For any approval that you give, you have the option of marking it as >>>>>>> "conditional". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A conditional vote is given only if the vote-receiving candidate is >>>>>>> designated favorite on more ballots than is your ballot's >>>>>>> favorite-designated candidate. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (...or (if ballots are allowed to designate more than one favorite) >>>>>>> on more ballots than is the candidate favorite-designated on your ballot >>>>>>> who is favorite-designated on the most ballots.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The winner is the candidate with the most approvals. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If you are only allowed to designate one candidate as your favourite, >>>>>> I don't see how the method meets FBC. >>>>>> >>>>>> And with no mechanism for sometimes not counting normal below-top >>>>>> approval the method fails Majority Favourite. >>>>>> >>>>>> So I judge this to be much worse than 3-slot "Conditional" IBIFA or >>>>>> MTA or MCA. >>>>>> >>>>>> Chris Benham >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >

I'm afraid that I am now aware that this method fails FBC, so I withdraw this method suggestion. 20: F=C >> B 07: F > C=B 25: B 48: W We are looking at this from the perspective of the 20 F=C >> B voters who are top-rating F and C and only giving "conditional approval" to B. (The candidates full names could be Favourite, Compromise, Bad, Worst). Top Ratings scores: W48 > F27 > B25 > C20. Because F's TR score is higher than B's, the 20 F=C voters "conditional" approval of B doesn't count, so IBIFA elects W. But if the 20 F=C voters drop F from Top Rating F then the conditional approval of B would count the same as normal approval and so then IBIFA would elect B, a candidate those voters prefer to W, so the method fails FBC. Chris Benham On 11/3/2016 11:23 PM, C.Benham wrote: > I normally don't like explicit strategy devices, and (beyond > considering it desirable to elect from the > voted Smith set) don't care very much about the "center squeeze" effect. > > (I like truncation resistance, so I'm happy with some of the methods > that meet the Chicken Dilemma criterion.) > > Nonetheless here is version of IBIFA with a device aimed at > addressing the Chicken Dilemma scenario. > > * Voters mark each candidate as one of Top-Rated, Approved, > Conditionally Approved, Bottom-Rated. Default is Bottom-Rated. > > A candidate marked "Conditionally Approved" on a ballot is approved if > hir Top Ratings score is higher than the highest > Top Ratings score of any candidate that is Top-Rated on that ballot. > > Based on the thus modified ballots, elect the 3-slot IBIFA winner.* > > ("Top-Rated" could be called 'Most Preferred' and "Bottom-Rated" > could be called 'Unapproved' or 'Rejected'). > > To refresh memories, IBIFA stands for "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent > Fall-back Approval", and the 3-slot version goes thus: > > *Voters rate candidates as one of Top, Middle or Bottom. Default is > Bottom. Top and Middle is interpreted as approval. > > If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X is > approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then the X > with the highest Top-Ratings score wins. > > Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.* > > http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA > > 35: C > 33: A>B > 32: B (sincere might be B>A) > > In the scenario addressed by the Chicken Dilemma criterion, if all > (and sometimes less than all) of A's supporters only "conditionally" > approve B then the method meets the CD criterion. Otherwise it meets > the Minimal Defense criterion. > > http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion > > http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion > > Of course it meets the Plurality criterion and doesn't have any > random-fill incentive. > > The downside is that the use of Conditional Approval can cause a > vulnerability to Push-over strategy. > > 48: C > 27: B > 25: A>>B > > The A supporters are all only conditionally approving B, but that has > the same effect as normal approval because B has a higher Top Ratings > score > than A. But now if 3 to 22 of the C voters change to C=A then A's > Top Ratings score rises above B's so the "conditional" approval is > switched off > and then C wins. > > I dislike this "at the same time"-no-help failure, but the new result > doesn't look terrible and of course if the B voters really prefer A to > C then > they were foolish not to conditionally approve A. If they'd done that > then the attempted Push-over would have just elected A. > > (It crossed my mind to try to make Push-over strategising more > difficult and riskier with the same mechanism I suggested a while ago > for IRV > or Benham that allows above-bottom equal-ranking, but that would have > broken compliance with FBC.) > > Chris Benham > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list > info > > > > >