Here are the manipulability stats that I've checked, for methods cardinal and ordinal. I've also added Approval Sorted Margins (or MSA), as I ran that test last night. As usual, asterisks mark non-poll methods. 0.937 *Range(0-5, absolute scale) 0.928 Approval (absolute scale) 0.710 *Range (0-10, normalized) 0.708 *Range(0-5, normalized) 0.705 Smith//Range(0-5, absolute scale) 0.698 *Borda 0.666 Approval (mean utility cutoff) 0.655 Smith//Range(0-10, absolute scale) 0.645 STAR 0.564 Smith//Range (0-5, normalized) 0.557 Smith//Range (0-10, normalized) 0.545 Condorcet//Borda (Black) 0.514 Smith//Approval (explicit, mean utility cutoff) 0.508 Approval Sorted Margins (mean utility cutoff) 0.490 Smith//Approval (implicit, mean utility cutoff) 0.480 Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin) 0.443 Smith//DAC (mean utility truncation) 0.417 Plurality 0.412 *BTR-IRV 0.350 Baldwin 0.333 Raynaud (Gross Loser Elimination) 0.333 Schulze(wv) 0.332 Minmax(wv) 0.321 Ranked Pairs(wv) 0.075 Woodall, Schwartz-Woodall 0.074 RCIPE 0.074 IRV 0.074 Benham -km

> > I do want to ask though, do you think the rate of manipulable elections > is a good measure of the "general strategy resistance" of an electoral > method? The resistant set certainly seems to reduce that rate, but for all > I know that 7.5% is all turkey-elections. On Fri, May 10, 2024 at 12:29 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm < km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > Here are the manipulability stats that I've checked, for methods > cardinal and ordinal. I've also added Approval Sorted Margins (or MSA), > as I ran that test last night. As usual, asterisks mark non-poll methods. > > 0.937 *Range(0-5, absolute scale) > 0.928 Approval (absolute scale) > > 0.710 *Range (0-10, normalized) > 0.708 *Range(0-5, normalized) > 0.705 Smith//Range(0-5, absolute scale) > > 0.698 *Borda > 0.666 Approval (mean utility cutoff) > 0.655 Smith//Range(0-10, absolute scale) > 0.645 STAR > > 0.564 Smith//Range (0-5, normalized) > 0.557 Smith//Range (0-10, normalized) > 0.545 Condorcet//Borda (Black) > 0.514 Smith//Approval (explicit, mean utility cutoff) > 0.508 Approval Sorted Margins (mean utility cutoff) > 0.490 Smith//Approval (implicit, mean utility cutoff) > > 0.480 Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin) > 0.443 Smith//DAC (mean utility truncation) > > 0.417 Plurality > 0.412 *BTR-IRV > > 0.350 Baldwin > 0.333 Raynaud (Gross Loser Elimination) > 0.333 Schulze(wv) > 0.332 Minmax(wv) > 0.321 Ranked Pairs(wv) > > 0.075 Woodall, Schwartz-Woodall > 0.074 RCIPE > 0.074 IRV > 0.074 Benham > > -km > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

I suspect that Margin Sort Approval doesn't perform as well with mean utility cutoff. Chris Benham's proposal was that by default the cutoff should be one rank below top. In general, this is a good rule of thumb to follow. Strategically, I think the cutoff should be just below the voter's highest ranked candidate who has a chance (who would be in the Smith set if some other faction strategically tries to induce a cycle). I.e., Long-shot-1 > Long-shot-2 > Contender-1 *>>* Contender-2 > etc. On Fri, May 10, 2024 at 3:43 PM Closed Limelike Curves < closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote: > I do want to ask though, do you think the rate of manipulable elections >> is a good measure of the "general strategy resistance" of an electoral >> method? The resistant set certainly seems to reduce that rate, but for all >> I know that 7.5% is all turkey-elections. > > > On Fri, May 10, 2024 at 12:29 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm < > km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > >> Here are the manipulability stats that I've checked, for methods >> cardinal and ordinal. I've also added Approval Sorted Margins (or MSA), >> as I ran that test last night. As usual, asterisks mark non-poll methods. >> >> 0.937 *Range(0-5, absolute scale) >> 0.928 Approval (absolute scale) >> >> 0.710 *Range (0-10, normalized) >> 0.708 *Range(0-5, normalized) >> 0.705 Smith//Range(0-5, absolute scale) >> >> 0.698 *Borda >> 0.666 Approval (mean utility cutoff) >> 0.655 Smith//Range(0-10, absolute scale) >> 0.645 STAR >> >> 0.564 Smith//Range (0-5, normalized) >> 0.557 Smith//Range (0-10, normalized) >> 0.545 Condorcet//Borda (Black) >> 0.514 Smith//Approval (explicit, mean utility cutoff) >> 0.508 Approval Sorted Margins (mean utility cutoff) >> 0.490 Smith//Approval (implicit, mean utility cutoff) >> >> 0.480 Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin) >> 0.443 Smith//DAC (mean utility truncation) >> >> 0.417 Plurality >> 0.412 *BTR-IRV >> >> 0.350 Baldwin >> 0.333 Raynaud (Gross Loser Elimination) >> 0.333 Schulze(wv) >> 0.332 Minmax(wv) >> 0.321 Ranked Pairs(wv) >> >> 0.075 Woodall, Schwartz-Woodall >> 0.074 RCIPE >> 0.074 IRV >> 0.074 Benham >> >> -km >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >