---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 20:23
Subject: Re: Smith//Borda(=<). GWAGL, Diff or Ratio using lv,wv
To: Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
Borda(=<), even by itself, might have a useful amount of deterrence &
strategy resistance, given its fully-effective equal topranking & its
less-effective equal bottom ranking.
Likewise if Borda(=<) we’re the Borda used in Black.
On Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 20:15 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
We have a lot of promising autodeterent proposals, & that’s important
because the previously best Condorcet, wv, doesn’t get rid of the lesser of
two evils problem (LO2E) as well as I’d like:
Because the candidate-lineups are dichotomous, I’d vote 2-valued,
all-or-nothing, like Approval.
But then might not the lesser/evil voters do the same, & insincerely
toprank their evil, the Democrat?
No good.
Maybe only the new Condorcet-class, the autodeterents, can deliver on the
Condorcet promise.
lv & wv seem the strongest, most direct, most undiluted & most reliable
clues to offensive strategy.
…for use by GWAGLE, Diff, & it’s alternative, Ratio.
I like Black, & it might have some autodeterence, though diluted.
So: Smith//Borda(=<).
Of course there are several Borda versions.
For this purpose, & also for plain Borda, I like Borda(=<):
A ranking gives to each candidate a point for each candidate whom it
doesn’t rank over hir.
Equal topranking is fully-effective. Bottom-ranking is less effective the
more you bottomrank.
Of course all of the following are applied only in the Smith-set:
GWAGL(lv,wv):
Elect the candidate who beats with biggest wv the candidate with lowest lv
in a defeat.
Diff(lv,wv):
Elect the winner in the defeat with largest wv - lv.
Ratio(lv,wv):
Elect the winner in the defeat with largest wv/lv.
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 20:23
Subject: Re: Smith//Borda(=<). GWAGL, Diff or Ratio using lv,wv
To: Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
Borda(=<), even by itself, might have a useful amount of deterrence &
strategy resistance, given its fully-effective equal topranking & its
less-effective equal bottom ranking.
Likewise if Borda(=<) we’re the Borda used in Black.
On Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 20:15 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> We have a lot of promising autodeterent proposals, & that’s important
> because the previously best Condorcet, wv, doesn’t get rid of the lesser of
> two evils problem (LO2E) as well as I’d like:
>
> Because the candidate-lineups are dichotomous, I’d vote 2-valued,
> all-or-nothing, like Approval.
>
> But then might not the lesser/evil voters do the same, & insincerely
> toprank their evil, the Democrat?
>
> No good.
>
> Maybe only the new Condorcet-class, the autodeterents, can deliver on the
> Condorcet promise.
>
> lv & wv seem the strongest, most direct, most undiluted & most reliable
> clues to offensive strategy.
>
> …for use by GWAGLE, Diff, & it’s alternative, Ratio.
>
> I like Black, & it might have some autodeterence, though diluted.
>
> So: Smith//Borda(=<).
>
> Of course there are several Borda versions.
>
> For this purpose, & also for plain Borda, I like Borda(=<):
>
> A ranking gives to each candidate a point for each candidate whom it
> doesn’t rank over hir.
>
> Equal topranking is fully-effective. Bottom-ranking is less effective the
> more you bottomrank.
>
> Of course all of the following are applied only in the Smith-set:
>
> GWAGL(lv,wv):
>
> Elect the candidate who beats with biggest wv the candidate with lowest lv
> in a defeat.
>
> Diff(lv,wv):
>
> Elect the winner in the defeat with largest wv - lv.
>
> Ratio(lv,wv):
>
> Elect the winner in the defeat with largest wv/lv.
>
>
>
>
>