FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Dec 24, 2021 12:08 AM
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you know
it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules cobbled
together to patch up an out moded second rate method from yesteryear. The
fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you know
it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules cobbled
together to patch up an out moded second rate method from yesteryear. The
fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Dec 24, 2021 5:44 AM
Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates
beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
EndWhile
That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit approval"
is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which it
is ranked above at least one other candidate before any eliminations have
been executed.
Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead of
Y on more ballots than not.
This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV
Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances are
met!
[But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM list
experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation to
the public ... it is not!
I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this or
any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the
better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a
big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies
Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that is
totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks candidates
have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates, which can be
seen in the context of our method, because in that context every lower L
candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining lower
candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the
counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to
strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential
feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect
the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's) exist
in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly
adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere
rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the
manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
A couple of examples will clarify this point.
45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
30 B>C
25 C>A
The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise
victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward
this A faction gambit with victory for A.
Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about our
Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less
technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain
Climbing".]
The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
C 100
A 70
B 30
L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while loop.
L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the
top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat
relation.
Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it soft
on burial like the other better known methods?
This time the implicit approval order is
B 75
A 70
C 55
L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while loop
leaving B as the winner.
The A faction burial plot backfired!
We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the bottom
of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that automatically gave
C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval candidate has first
chance to take down all of the candidates it beats pairwise.
Here's another common test case...
48 C
28 A>B
24 B (sincere is B>A)
A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A
changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing method
starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
B 52
C 48
A 26
Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the winner.
So B's gambit backfired.
Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv) methods
reward the manipulator B.
Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method, but
it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the method
were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s, the
non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ... but
when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W, insincerely
relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W, that will
backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop this
candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious coincidence.
This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I don't
know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
That's my challenge to you!
Best Wishes for the Holidays!
-FWS
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates
beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
EndWhile
That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit approval"
is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which it
is ranked above at least one other candidate *before* any eliminations have
been executed.
Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead of
Y on more ballots than not.
This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV
Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances are
met!
[But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM list
experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation to
the public ... it is not!
I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this or
any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the
better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a
big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies
Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that is
totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks candidates
have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates, which can be
seen in the context of our method, because in that context every lower L
candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining lower
candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the
counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to
strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential
feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect
the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's) exist
in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly
adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere
rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the
manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
A couple of examples will clarify this point.
45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
30 B>C
25 C>A
The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise
victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward
this A faction gambit with victory for A.
Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about our
Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less
technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain
Climbing".]
The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
C 100
A 70
B 30
L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while loop.
L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the
top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat
relation.
Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it soft
on burial like the other better known methods?
This time the implicit approval order is
B 75
A 70
C 55
L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while loop
leaving B as the winner.
The A faction burial plot backfired!
We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the bottom
of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that automatically gave
C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval candidate has first
chance to take down all of the candidates it beats pairwise.
Here's another common test case...
48 C
28 A>B
24 B (sincere is B>A)
A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A
changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing method
starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
B 52
C 48
A 26
Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the winner.
So B's gambit backfired.
Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv) methods
reward the manipulator B.
Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method, but
it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the method
were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s, the
non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ... but
when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W, insincerely
relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W, that will
backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop this
candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious coincidence.
This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I don't
know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
That's my challenge to you!
Best Wishes for the Holidays!
-FWS
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
> Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
> best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
>
> In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
> of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
> on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
> allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
> coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
> approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
> devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
> well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
>
> But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
> can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
>
> The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
> with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
> like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
>
> Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
> know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
> cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
> yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
>
> Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
> simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
>
> One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
> idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
>
> I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
> not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
> criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
> idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
> germ for an even better method.
>
> I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
> become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
> history of poor attention to civics education.
>
> This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
> remedy that educational deficiency!
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Forest
>
RL
Richard Lung
Fri, Dec 24, 2021 7:29 PM
Dear Forest Simmons and group,
The method does not have to be deterministic. Physics is no longer deterministic. Why has election method to be? (My method isn't.)
Also RCV has forgotten what Hoag and Hallett knew. H & H are a much better base of understanding than RCV. -- Cambridge in particular rather than Massachusetts generally should be our starting point.
RCV are in fashion, I don't decry what they are achieving reform-wise. But research-wise, their movement leaves much to be desired.
Richard Lung.
On 24 Dec 2021, at 12:08 am, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear Forest Simmons and group,
The method does not have to be deterministic. Physics is no longer deterministic. Why has election method to be? (My method isn't.)
Also RCV has forgotten what Hoag and Hallett knew. H & H are a much better base of understanding than RCV. -- Cambridge in particular rather than Massachusetts generally should be our starting point.
RCV are in fashion, I don't decry what they are achieving reform-wise. But research-wise, their movement leaves much to be desired.
Richard Lung.
On 24 Dec 2021, at 12:08 am, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Dec 24, 2021 10:43 PM
Thanks for pointing that out, Richard!
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 11:29 a. m., Richard Lung <
voting@ukscientists.com> escribió:
Dear Forest Simmons and group,
The method does not have to be deterministic. Physics is no longer
deterministic. Why has election method to be? (My method isn't.)
Also RCV has forgotten what Hoag and Hallett knew. H & H are a much better
base of understanding than RCV. -- Cambridge in particular rather than
Massachusetts generally should be our starting point.
RCV are in fashion, I don't decry what they are achieving reform-wise. But
research-wise, their movement leaves much to be desired.
Richard Lung.
On 24 Dec 2021, at 12:08 am, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Thanks for pointing that out, Richard!
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 11:29 a. m., Richard Lung <
voting@ukscientists.com> escribió:
>
> Dear Forest Simmons and group,
>
> The method does not have to be deterministic. Physics is no longer
> deterministic. Why has election method to be? (My method isn't.)
> Also RCV has forgotten what Hoag and Hallett knew. H & H are a much better
> base of understanding than RCV. -- Cambridge in particular rather than
> Massachusetts generally should be our starting point.
> RCV are in fashion, I don't decry what they are achieving reform-wise. But
> research-wise, their movement leaves much to be desired.
>
> Richard Lung.
>
>
>
> On 24 Dec 2021, at 12:08 am, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
> best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
>
> In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
> of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
> on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
> allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
> coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
> approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
> devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
> well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
>
> But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
> can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
>
> The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
> with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
> like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
>
> Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
> know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
> cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
> yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
>
> Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
> simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
>
> One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
> idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
>
> I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
> not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
> criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
> idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
> germ for an even better method.
>
> I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
> become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
> history of poor attention to civics education.
>
> This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
> remedy that educational deficiency!
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Forest
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Dec 24, 2021 11:18 PM
My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie breaker.
For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a recommended tie
breaking order. The order submitted by the highest implicit approval
candidate will be used.
In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break this
tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot set
restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 9:44 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates
beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
EndWhile
That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit
approval" is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which it
is ranked above at least one other candidate before any eliminations have
been executed.
Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead of
Y on more ballots than not.
This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV
Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances
are met!
[But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM list
experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation to
the public ... it is not!
I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this or
any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the
better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a
big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies
Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that
is totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks
candidates have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates,
which can be seen in the context of our method, because in that context
every lower L candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining
lower candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the
counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to
strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential
feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect
the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's) exist
in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly
adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere
rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the
manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
A couple of examples will clarify this point.
45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
30 B>C
25 C>A
The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise
victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward
this A faction gambit with victory for A.
Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about
our Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less
technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain
Climbing".]
The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
C 100
A 70
B 30
L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while loop.
L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the
top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat
relation.
Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it
soft on burial like the other better known methods?
This time the implicit approval order is
B 75
A 70
C 55
L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while loop
leaving B as the winner.
The A faction burial plot backfired!
We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the
bottom of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that
automatically gave C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval
candidate has first chance to take down all of the candidates it beats
pairwise.
Here's another common test case...
48 C
28 A>B
24 B (sincere is B>A)
A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A
changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing method
starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
B 52
C 48
A 26
Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the winner.
So B's gambit backfired.
Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv) methods
reward the manipulator B.
Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method,
but it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the
method were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s,
the non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ... but
when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W, insincerely
relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W, that will
backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop this
candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious coincidence.
This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I
don't know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
That's my challenge to you!
Best Wishes for the Holidays!
-FWS
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can
think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based
purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and
truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such
method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of
explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates,
and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative
importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of
computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie breaker.
For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a recommended tie
breaking order. The order submitted by the highest implicit approval
candidate will be used.
In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break this
tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot set
restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 9:44 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
> Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
>
>
> While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates
> beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
> Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
> EndWhile
>
> That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit
> approval" is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
>
> The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which it
> is ranked above at least one other candidate *before* any eliminations have
> been executed.
>
> Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead of
> Y on more ballots than not.
>
> This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV
> Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances
> are met!
>
> [But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM list
> experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation to
> the public ... it is not!
>
> I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this or
> any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the
> better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a
> big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
>
> And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies
> Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
>
> A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that
> is totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks
> candidates have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates,
> which can be seen in the context of our method, because in that context
> every lower L candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining
> lower candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
>
> In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the
> counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
>
> One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to
> strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential
> feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect
> the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
>
> Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's) exist
> in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly
> adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere
> rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the
> manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
>
> A couple of examples will clarify this point.
>
> 45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
> 30 B>C
> 25 C>A
>
> The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
> C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
>
> But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise
> victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
>
> Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward
> this A faction gambit with victory for A.
>
> Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
>
> So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about
> our Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less
> technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain
> Climbing".]
>
> The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
> C 100
> A 70
> B 30
>
> L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while loop.
> L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
> L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
>
> This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the
> top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat
> relation.
>
> Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it
> soft on burial like the other better known methods?
>
> This time the implicit approval order is
> B 75
> A 70
> C 55
> L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while loop
> leaving B as the winner.
> The A faction burial plot backfired!
>
> We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the
> bottom of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that
> automatically gave C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval
> candidate has first chance to take down all of the candidates it beats
> pairwise.
>
> Here's another common test case...
>
> 48 C
> 28 A>B
> 24 B (sincere is B>A)
>
> A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A
> changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
>
> With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing method
> starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
> B 52
> C 48
> A 26
>
> Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the winner.
> So B's gambit backfired.
>
> Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv) methods
> reward the manipulator B.
>
> Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method,
> but it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the
> method were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s,
> the non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
>
> I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ... but
> when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W, insincerely
> relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W, that will
> backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop this
> candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious coincidence.
>
> This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I
> don't know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
>
> That's my challenge to you!
>
> Best Wishes for the Holidays!
>
> -FWS
>
> El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
>
>> Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
>> best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
>>
>> In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can
>> think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based
>> purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and
>> truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such
>> method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of
>> explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates,
>> and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative
>> importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
>>
>> But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
>> can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
>>
>> The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
>> with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
>> like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
>>
>> Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
>> know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
>> cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
>> yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
>>
>> Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of
>> computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
>>
>> One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
>> idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
>>
>> I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
>> not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
>> criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
>> idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
>> germ for an even better method.
>>
>> I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
>> become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
>> history of poor attention to civics education.
>>
>> This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
>> remedy that educational deficiency!
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>> -Forest
>>
>
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Fri, Dec 24, 2021 11:27 PM
On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
implicit approval candidate will be used.
In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
the possible summability problem.
However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
-km
On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
> My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
> breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
> recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
> implicit approval candidate will be used.
>
> In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
> this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
> set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
>
> Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
the possible summability problem.
However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
-km
FS
Forest Simmons
Sat, Dec 25, 2021 4:00 AM
I'm not sure if there is a strong convention on the precise definition of
implicit approval, but (without any fanfare) I took the liberty of defining
it for my purposes in such a way that equal bottom rank is equivalent to
truncation ... so by my (uncoventional?) definition the IA winner W is the
candidate with the most ballots on which it is ranked strictly above at
least one other candidate... so in this version just being explicitly
ranked last on every ballot is not enough for 100 percent IA ...in fact, in
my version, (given its bottom ranking though not necessarily bottom status)
the only ballots that would contribute anything other than zero to its IA
would be the ballots on which some other extant candidate was totally
unranked ... not even ranked bottom ... i.e. truncated... bottom ranked
candidates are considered to be ranked above unranked candidates... but we
cannot say unranked candidates are ranked below ranked candidates, because
that would be an oxymoron.
Perhaps some article about Coombs method would reveal the standard
definitions of "ranked last", "lowest ranking", "unranked", "truncated",
etc.
In a three candidate Coombs race do the ballots A>B>C count the same as
A>B?
I prefer to distinguish the two ballots in terminology, but not
instrumentally. C is ranked last or bottom on the ballot A>B>C but
truncated or unranked on A>B ... while still enjoying bottom status,
assuming a three candidate race.
In general, all unranked/truncated candidates share (equal) last/bottom
status on a given ballot.
My remark about IA being determined before any eliminations is also
germane to this conversation. Suppose at some point after some elimination
steps a ballot looks like A>B. Does or did this ballot contribute implicit
approval to B? Answer: only if there exists a candidate C that B is now or
once was ranked ahead of. To say that B is ranked ahead of C on the ballot
A>B implies that the unranked C has not yet been eliminated from the race.
As you know, the IA's have to be determined at the beginning without
"renormalizations," in order for the method to be monotone.
So many details to watch out for!
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 3:27 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> escribió:
On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
implicit approval candidate will be used.
In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
the possible summability problem.
However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
-km
I'm not sure if there is a strong convention on the precise definition of
implicit approval, but (without any fanfare) I took the liberty of defining
it for my purposes in such a way that equal bottom rank is equivalent to
truncation ... so by my (uncoventional?) definition the IA winner W is the
candidate with the most ballots on which it is ranked strictly above at
least one other candidate... so in this version just being explicitly
ranked last on every ballot is not enough for 100 percent IA ...in fact, in
my version, (given its bottom ranking though not necessarily bottom status)
the only ballots that would contribute anything other than zero to its IA
would be the ballots on which some other extant candidate was totally
unranked ... not even ranked bottom ... i.e. truncated... bottom ranked
candidates are considered to be ranked above unranked candidates... but we
cannot say unranked candidates are ranked below ranked candidates, because
that would be an oxymoron.
Perhaps some article about Coombs method would reveal the standard
definitions of "ranked last", "lowest ranking", "unranked", "truncated",
etc.
In a three candidate Coombs race do the ballots A>B>C count the same as
A>B?
I prefer to distinguish the two ballots in terminology, but not
instrumentally. C is ranked last or bottom on the ballot A>B>C but
truncated or unranked on A>B ... while still enjoying bottom status,
assuming a three candidate race.
In general, all unranked/truncated candidates share (equal) last/bottom
status on a given ballot.
My remark about IA being determined *before* any eliminations is also
germane to this conversation. Suppose at some point after some elimination
steps a ballot looks like A>B. Does or did this ballot contribute implicit
approval to B? Answer: only if there exists a candidate C that B is now or
once was ranked ahead of. To say that B is ranked ahead of C on the ballot
A>B implies that the unranked C has not yet been eliminated from the race.
As you know, the IA's have to be determined at the beginning without
"renormalizations," in order for the method to be monotone.
So many details to watch out for!
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 3:27 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> escribió:
> On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
> > breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
> > recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
> > implicit approval candidate will be used.
> >
> > In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
> > this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
> > set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
> >
> > Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
>
> I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
> the possible summability problem.
>
> However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
> somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
> candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
>
> -km
>
FS
Forest Simmons
Sat, Dec 25, 2021 4:21 AM
And yes, in the extremely rare event of an exact tie for highest Implicit
Approval, random ballot would be the best resolution ... but it was fun
seeing how it could be done deterministically by applying the method
recursively to the tied set.
However, that works only because each recursion step automatically entails
a renormalization of IA, despite previous remarks against IA
renormalizations after eliminations, that in general cannot apply to proper
recursions.
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 3:27 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> escribió:
On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
implicit approval candidate will be used.
In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
the possible summability problem.
However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
-km
And yes, in the extremely rare event of an exact tie for highest Implicit
Approval, random ballot would be the best resolution ... but it was fun
seeing how it could be done deterministically by applying the method
recursively to the tied set.
However, that works only because each recursion step automatically entails
a renormalization of IA, despite previous remarks against IA
renormalizations after eliminations, that in general cannot apply to proper
recursions.
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 3:27 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> escribió:
> On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
> > breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
> > recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
> > implicit approval candidate will be used.
> >
> > In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
> > this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
> > set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
> >
> > Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
>
> I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
> the possible summability problem.
>
> However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
> somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
> candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
>
> -km
>
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Sat, Dec 25, 2021 6:29 AM
I'm just a Condorcet guy. Everyone's vote counts the same. If a simple majority of voters agree that A is preferred to B, then when at all possible, B is not elected. After that add whatever contingency you think best for the case of a cycle. I, personally, believe that cycles will be very rare and perhaps the simplest process in lieu of a Condorcet winner would be the plurality winner of first-preference votes. I know everyone will say that's the worst, most gameable Condorcet "completion process", but I think in a government election that the rules should be well known and well understood.
(1) The candidate, defined as the Condorcet winner, is elected if the rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate defeats, with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate when compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected candidate defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of ballots marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other candidate exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.
(2) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (1), then the candidate with the plurality of first preferences is elected.
Sorry to be so pedantic.
On 12/24/2021 12:44 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
EndWhile
That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit approval" is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which it is ranked above at least one other candidate before any eliminations have been executed.
Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead of Y on more ballots than not.
This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances are met!
[But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM list experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation to the public ... it is not!
I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this or any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that is totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks candidates have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates, which can be seen in the context of our method, because in that context every lower L candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining lower candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's) exist in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
A couple of examples will clarify this point.
45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
30 B>C
25 C>A
The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward this A faction gambit with victory for A.
Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about our Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain Climbing".]
The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
C 100
A 70
B 30
L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while loop.
L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat relation.
Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it soft on burial like the other better known methods?
This time the implicit approval order is
B 75
A 70
C 55
L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while loop leaving B as the winner.
The A faction burial plot backfired!
We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the bottom of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that automatically gave C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval candidate has first chance to take down all of the candidates it beats pairwise.
Here's another common test case...
48 C
28 A>B
24 B (sincere is B>A)
A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing method starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
B 52
C 48
A 26
Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the winner. So B's gambit backfired.
Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv) methods reward the manipulator B.
Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method, but it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the method were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s, the non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ... but when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W, insincerely relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W, that will backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop this candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious coincidence.
This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I don't know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
That's my challenge to you!
Best Wishes for the Holidays!
-FWS
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com escribió:
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help remedy that educational deficiency!
Thanks!
-Forest
I'm just a Condorcet guy. Everyone's vote counts the same. If a simple majority of voters agree that A is preferred to B, then when at all possible, B is not elected. After that add whatever contingency you think best for the case of a cycle. I, personally, believe that cycles will be very rare and perhaps the simplest process in lieu of a Condorcet winner would be the plurality winner of first-preference votes. I know everyone will say that's the worst, most gameable Condorcet "completion process", but I think in a government election that the rules should be well known and well understood.
(1) The candidate, defined as the Condorcet winner, is elected if the rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate defeats, with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate when compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected candidate defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of ballots marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other candidate exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.
(2) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (1), then the candidate with the plurality of first preferences is elected.
Sorry to be so pedantic.
> On 12/24/2021 12:44 AM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
>
>
> While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
> Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
> EndWhile
>
> That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit approval" is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
>
> The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which it is ranked above at least one other candidate *before* any eliminations have been executed.
>
> Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead of Y on more ballots than not.
>
> This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances are met!
>
> [But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM list experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation to the public ... it is not!
>
> I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this or any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
>
> And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
>
> A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that is totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks candidates have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates, which can be seen in the context of our method, because in that context every lower L candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining lower candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
>
> In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
>
> One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
>
> Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's) exist in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
>
> A couple of examples will clarify this point.
>
> 45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
> 30 B>C
> 25 C>A
>
> The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
> C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
>
> But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
>
> Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward this A faction gambit with victory for A.
>
> Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
>
> So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about our Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain Climbing".]
>
> The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
> C 100
> A 70
> B 30
>
> L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while loop.
> L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
> L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
>
> This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat relation.
>
> Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it soft on burial like the other better known methods?
>
> This time the implicit approval order is
> B 75
> A 70
> C 55
> L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while loop leaving B as the winner.
> The A faction burial plot backfired!
>
> We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the bottom of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that automatically gave C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval candidate has first chance to take down all of the candidates it beats pairwise.
>
> Here's another common test case...
>
> 48 C
> 28 A>B
> 24 B (sincere is B>A)
>
> A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
>
> With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing method starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
> B 52
> C 48
> A 26
>
> Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the winner. So B's gambit backfired.
>
> Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv) methods reward the manipulator B.
>
> Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method, but it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the method were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s, the non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
>
> I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ... but when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W, insincerely relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W, that will backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop this candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious coincidence.
>
> This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I don't know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
>
> That's my challenge to you!
>
> Best Wishes for the Holidays!
>
> -FWS
>
>
> El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
> > Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
> >
> > In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
> >
> > But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
> >
> > The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
> >
> > Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
> >
> > Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
> >
> > One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
> >
> > I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the germ for an even better method.
> >
> > I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a history of poor attention to civics education.
> >
> > This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help remedy that educational deficiency!
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > -Forest
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
FS
Forest Simmons
Sat, Dec 25, 2021 6:49 AM
Definitely simpler than my idea! And great rationale!
Arguably the simplest possible adequate method in this RCV category!
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 10:29 p. m., robert bristow-johnson <
rbj@audioimagination.com> escribió:
I'm just a Condorcet guy. Everyone's vote counts the same. If a simple
majority of voters agree that A is preferred to B, then when at all
possible, B is not elected. After that add whatever contingency you think
best for the case of a cycle. I, personally, believe that cycles will be
very rare and perhaps the simplest process in lieu of a Condorcet winner
would be the plurality winner of first-preference votes. I know everyone
will say that's the worst, most gameable Condorcet "completion process",
but I think in a government election that the rules should be well known
and well understood.
(1) The candidate, defined as the Condorcet winner, is elected if the
rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate defeats,
with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate when
compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected candidate
defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of ballots
marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other candidate
exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.
(2) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (1), then the candidate with the
plurality of first preferences is elected.
Sorry to be so pedantic.
Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates
beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
EndWhile
That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit
approval" is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which
it is ranked above at least one other candidate before any eliminations
have been executed.
Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead
of Y on more ballots than not.
This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV
Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances are
met!
[But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM
list experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation
to the public ... it is not!
I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this
or any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the
better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a
big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies
Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that
is totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks
candidates have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates,
which can be seen in the context of our method, because in that context
every lower L candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining
lower candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the
counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to
strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential
feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect
the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's)
exist in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly
adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere
rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the
manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
A couple of examples will clarify this point.
45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
30 B>C
25 C>A
The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise
victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward
this A faction gambit with victory for A.
Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about
our Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less
technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain
Climbing".]
The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
C 100
A 70
B 30
L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while
L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the
top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat
relation.
Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it
soft on burial like the other better known methods?
This time the implicit approval order is
B 75
A 70
C 55
L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while
loop leaving B as the winner.
The A faction burial plot backfired!
We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the
bottom of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that
automatically gave C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval
candidate has first chance to take down all of the candidates it beats
pairwise.
Here's another common test case...
48 C
28 A>B
24 B (sincere is B>A)
A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A
changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing
method starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
B 52
C 48
A 26
Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the
winner. So B's gambit backfired.
Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv)
methods reward the manipulator B.
Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method,
but it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the
method were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s,
the non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ...
but when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W,
insincerely relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W,
that will backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop
this candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious
coincidence.
This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I
don't know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
That's my challenge to you!
Best Wishes for the Holidays!
-FWS
El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard
the best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can
think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based
purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and
truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such
method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of
explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates,
and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative
importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what
we can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while
complying with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic
criteria like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of
computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
germ for an even better method.
I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
history of poor attention to civics education.
This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to
help remedy that educational deficiency!
Definitely simpler than my idea! And great rationale!
Arguably the simplest possible adequate method in this RCV category!
El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 10:29 p. m., robert bristow-johnson <
rbj@audioimagination.com> escribió:
>
> I'm just a Condorcet guy. Everyone's vote counts the same. If a simple
> majority of voters agree that A is preferred to B, then when at all
> possible, B is not elected. After that add whatever contingency you think
> best for the case of a cycle. I, personally, believe that cycles will be
> very rare and perhaps the simplest process in lieu of a Condorcet winner
> would be the plurality winner of first-preference votes. I know everyone
> will say that's the worst, most gameable Condorcet "completion process",
> but I think in a government election that the rules should be well known
> and well understood.
>
> (1) The candidate, defined as the Condorcet winner, is elected if the
> rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate defeats,
> with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate when
> compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected candidate
> defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of ballots
> marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other candidate
> exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.
>
> (2) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (1), then the candidate with the
> plurality of first preferences is elected.
>
> Sorry to be so pedantic.
>
> > On 12/24/2021 12:44 AM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Here's my simplest adequate public proposal in the RCV category:
> >
> >
> > While no candidate has been elected ... eliminate all of the candidates
> beaten pairwise by the lowest (remaining) implicit approval candidate L.
> > Then if L is the only remaining candidate, elect L, Else eliminate L.
> > EndWhile
> >
> > That's all there is to it except for a reminder of what "implicit
> approval" is, and what "pairwise defeat" means.
> >
> > The implicit approval of a candidate is the number of ballots on which
> it is ranked above at least one other candidate *before* any eliminations
> have been executed.
> >
> > Candidate X beats candidate Y pairwise iff X is ranked (strictly) ahead
> of Y on more ballots than not.
> >
> > This method satisfies all of the criteria that I outlined in the RCV
> Challenge (copied below). Note how seamlessly all of these compliances are
> met!
> >
> > [But just because I am giving all of this advanced information to EM
> list experts doesn't mean that any of it is appropriate for any explanation
> to the public ... it is not!
> >
> > I am warning you that you need to choose carefully how to explain this
> or any other method to members of the public. In general the less said the
> better ... beyond examples of counting ballots. As a general rule it is a
> big mistake to answer a question before they ask it.]
> >
> > And beyond the criteria we talked about last time, this method satisfies
> Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives and is also Banks Efficient!
> >
> > A Banks candidate is one that stands at the head of a maximal chain that
> is totally ordered by the pairwise-beat/defeat relation. All Banks
> candidates have short beatpaths (two or fewer steps) to all candidates,
> which can be seen in the context of our method, because in that context
> every lower L candidate is beaten by the winner, and each of the remaining
> lower candidates is wiped out by one of the lower L's.
> >
> > In our context the totally ordered chain is the sequence of L's in the
> counting procedure that distinguishes the method from other RCV methods.
> >
> > One of the most important features of this method is its resistance to
> strategic attacks against Condorcet candidates. Without this essential
> feature a Condorcet method is "too soft on manipulators" to reliably elect
> the sincere/true Condorcet Winner.
> >
> > Most experts seem to agree that sincere Condorcet Candidates (CC's)
> exist in most public elections. But poorly crafted (and even some fairly
> adequate) methods sometimes allow manipulators to subvert (by insincere
> rankings) the sincere CC''s ballot status with impunity ... all to the
> manipulators' advantage and detriment of the CC.
> >
> > A couple of examples will clarify this point.
> >
> > 45 A>B (sincere is A>C)
> > 30 B>C
> > 25 C>A
> >
> > The sincere ballots show C to be the CW:
> > C beats A, 55 to 45, and C beats B, 70 to 30.
> >
> > But the insincere "burial" of C by the A faction changes C's pairwise
> victory over B into a defeat of C by B, 75 to 25.
> >
> > Most Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs, CSSD, and MinMax, reward
> this A faction gambit with victory for A.
> >
> > Even Benham elects A by eliminating C in its first round.
> >
> > So those methods are "soft on burial," at least in this case. How about
> our Banks efficient method? [We need a good name for it ... something less
> technical and more inspiring than IACC for "Implicit Approval Chain
> Climbing".]
> >
> > The implicit approval order in the sincere case is...
> > C 100
> > A 70
> > B 30
> >
> > L1 is B, which is eliminated during the first pass through the while
> loop.
> > L2 is A which is eliminated upon the second pass.
> > L3 is C, the last candidate standing.
> >
> > This is no surprise because a ballot Condorcet winner will always be the
> top member of any maximal chain totally ordered by the pairwise beat
> relation.
> >
> > Now the test ... how does it perform on the manipulated ballots? Is it
> soft on burial like the other better known methods?
> >
> > This time the implicit approval order is
> > B 75
> > A 70
> > C 55
> > L1 is C which takes out A with it in the first pass through the while
> loop leaving B as the winner.
> > The A faction burial plot backfired!
> >
> > We can plainly see why it back fired ... when C was relegated to the
> bottom of the implicit approval list by the A supporters, that
> automatically gave C an opportunity for revenge since the bottom approval
> candidate has first chance to take down all of the candidates it beats
> pairwise.
> >
> > Here's another common test case...
> >
> > 48 C
> > 28 A>B
> > 24 B (sincere is B>A)
> >
> > A is the sincere Condorcet winner, but the B faction's truncation of A
> changes A's victory over C, 52 to 48, to a defeat by C, 48 to 26.
> >
> > With the sincere Condorcet Candidate subverted, our chain climbing
> method starts with A = L1 at the bottom of the approval list ...
> > B 52
> > C 48
> > A 26
> >
> > Then L1 is A which takes out B with itself, and leaves L2=C as the
> winner. So B's gambit backfired.
> >
> > Meanwhile all of the above mentioned Condorcet winning votes (wv)
> methods reward the manipulator B.
> >
> > Benham, which is not a wv method agrees with our chain climbing method,
> but it has other problems, including non-monotonicity. However, if the
> method were to successfully avoid almost all attacks against sincere CC,s,
> the non-monotonicity would almost never be brought into play.
> >
> > I'm not saying that IACC makes manipulation backfire in every case ...
> but when the X faction beaten by the sincere Condorcet Winner W,
> insincerely relegates W to the bottom of the implicit approval list L1=W,
> that will backfire because in the very first pass through the while loop
> this candidate L1=W will take out X ... it's not just a mysterious
> coincidence.
> >
> > This is a brand new method that needs some serious testing .... but I
> don't know of any simpler RCV method with this much promise.
> >
> > That's my challenge to you!
> >
> > Best Wishes for the Holidays!
> >
> > -FWS
> >
> >
> > El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21@gmail.com> escribió:
> > > Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard
> the best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
> > >
> > > In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can
> think of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based
> purely on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and
> truncations allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such
> method by coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of
> explicit approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates,
> and other devices for stratifying rank relations by relative
> importance/strength, as well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
> > >
> > > But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what
> we can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
> > >
> > > The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while
> complying with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic
> criteria like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
> > >
> > > Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
> know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
> cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
> yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
> > >
> > > Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of
> computation, simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
> > >
> > > One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
> idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
> > >
> > > I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
> not. And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
> criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
> idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
> germ for an even better method.
> > >
> > > I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
> become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
> history of poor attention to civics education.
> > >
> > > This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to
> help remedy that educational deficiency!
> > >
> > > Thanks!
> > >
> > > -Forest
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
