Unfortunately it's top-two vote getters. Each voter has two votes.Powered by Cricket Wireless------ Original message------From: Kristofer MunsterhjelmDate: Tue, Nov 16, 2021 9:49 AMTo: robert bristow-johnson;EM;Cc: Subject:Re: [EM] Single/Multimember districts (was Re: In defence of IRV)On 15.11.2021 23:11, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Certainly at the state representative level, multimember districts are not unconstitutional in Vermont.
So besides IRV vs. Condorcet, my other fight in Vermont is this:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1f3NY4MXgnmVuO1zT_eakWht4HOmmd8Dx/view
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CN1qD-8mkMzqckzC6XDaUC8APAJAJvth/view
They're playing the race card in the whitest, least racially diverse state in the U.S.
What election method would be used to elect the representatives in the
multimember districts?
-km
On 16.11.2021 15:52, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Unfortunately it's top-two vote getters. Each voter has two votes.
That's not a particularly good method, no; but if you succeed getting
BTR-IRV enacted, and you decide to advocate for replacing the top-two
method with STV, you could use the BTR version.
Every STV variant with the same surplus election mechanism passes Droop
proportionality, so modifying the elimination mechanism (like BTR-IRV
does) won't make it fail Droop. So getting BTR-IRV passed shouldn't
hinder future adoption of STV.
I don't know if replacing the top-two method with STV is feasible,
though, as I don't know enough about Vermont politics.
-km
On 11/18/2021 9:12 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 16.11.2021 15:52, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Unfortunately it's top-two vote getters. Each voter has two votes.
That's not a particularly good method, no; but if you succeed getting
BTR-IRV enacted, and you decide to advocate for replacing the top-two
method with STV, you could use the BTR version.
Every STV variant with the same surplus election mechanism passes Droop
proportionality, so modifying the elimination mechanism (like BTR-IRV
does) won't make it fail Droop. So getting BTR-IRV passed shouldn't
hinder future adoption of STV.
I don't know if replacing the top-two method with STV is feasible,
though, as I don't know enough about Vermont politics.
things, regarding RCV, are looking a bit better, but i cannot assume we'll succeed. if we do succeed, it will be another historic first for our "brave little state". we are the first state (and i think the only state) to outright ban billboards from our skies and landscapes. and we were the very first state to give same-sex couples some legal recognition and protection with a legal status called "Civil Union".
if Vermont can learn from the failure of Hare RCV in 2009 and not be in denial of it, and with the push to adopt RCV (that is currently stalled in committee), we can make history. Good history. History befitting a discerning and progressive "brave little state". rather than ignore or deny the problem, we can recognize and understand the problem and act to correct the problem with model legislation that is 200 years in the making.
i got some legislators' attentions, and this single-member district thing got more of their attention (because, if any of my maps are adopted, i will have bailed out some of their asses). with Nicolaus Tideman offering to publish my paper in Constitutional Political Economy (this is still tentative, it's in the works, but i am feeling pretty secure about it), i gain more credibility (in the Vermont legislature) because the Progressive Party and FairVote and VPIRG people are still trying to dismiss me as a crackpot. and they still deny the fact about Hare RCV electing the wrong candidate in 2009 (resulting in an explicit spoiler and punishing non-tactical voting).
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
On 11/18/2021 9:12 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 16.11.2021 15:52, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Unfortunately it's top-two vote getters. Each voter has two votes.
That's not a particularly good method, no; but if you succeed getting
BTR-IRV enacted, and you decide to advocate for replacing the top-two
method with STV, you could use the BTR version.
Every STV variant with the same surplus election mechanism passes Droop
proportionality, so modifying the elimination mechanism (like BTR-IRV
does) won't make it fail Droop. So getting BTR-IRV passed shouldn't
hinder future adoption of STV.
But Kristofer, there is a little bit of a problem using BTR for multimember STV. Consider the 2009 election in Burlington. Suppose we stopped at two candidates (because we have two seats) instead of one. Then the Plurality candidate (Kurt Wright) and the Condorcet candidate (Andy Montroll) would be elected to the two available seats. The Hare IRV winner (Bob Kiss), who was actually preferred by voters over the Plurality candidate (Wright), which is what was demonstrated in the IRV final round in 2009, that IRV winner would not have been elected in multi-winner BTR-STV. Some people might say that Kiss should be in the top two (and elected in a two-winner contest).
And, again, I know this falls on some deaf ears, but I refuse to be constrained in using the label "STV" to mean only multi-winner elections. "STV" is a method of conferring to voters a vote token and then transferring (with the voter's consent) the vote token from the voter's favorite candidate to the second-favorite candidate when the former is defeated. "STV" and "multi-winner" are two orthogonal concepts ad "STV" should not be used to mean solely multi-winner elections in which a ranked ballot is used.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
"Hare RCV" is a corruption of what the Hare system is: at-large STV/PR. As still used in Cambridge, and once used in about 20 US cities.
The trouble with all election systems, including STV, is that the election rules, rather than the voters, decide how and who to exclude.
(My invention of binomial stv gives the voters the power to exclude as well as elect.) The Droop quota is not the unchallengable choice of proportional count for a democratic representation.
The chief drawback of IRV is not the rare Burlington case. It is that its overall majority is minimally democratic. Traditional STV (unlike binomial stv) is not monotonic, because of ad hoc exclusion. But a century of evidence shows this cannot matter too much, practically, because stv delivers the proportional election of first preferences mostly, with a few high preferences elected, as well.
I wouldn't say you are a crackpot. But I can understand reformers impatience with to them a side issue. IRV, however, is itself a side issue, when you compare pioneering campaigning of Hoag and Hallett.
Regards,
Richard Lung.
On 18 Nov 2021, at 8:44 pm, robert bristow-johnson rbj@audioimagination.com wrote:
On 11/18/2021 9:12 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 16.11.2021 15:52, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Unfortunately it's top-two vote getters. Each voter has two votes.
That's not a particularly good method, no; but if you succeed getting
BTR-IRV enacted, and you decide to advocate for replacing the top-two
method with STV, you could use the BTR version.
Every STV variant with the same surplus election mechanism passes Droop
proportionality, so modifying the elimination mechanism (like BTR-IRV
does) won't make it fail Droop. So getting BTR-IRV passed shouldn't
hinder future adoption of STV.
I don't know if replacing the top-two method with STV is feasible,
though, as I don't know enough about Vermont politics.
things, regarding RCV, are looking a bit better, but i cannot assume we'll succeed. if we do succeed, it will be another historic first for our "brave little state". we are the first state (and i think the only state) to outright ban billboards from our skies and landscapes. and we were the very first state to give same-sex couples some legal recognition and protection with a legal status called "Civil Union".
if Vermont can learn from the failure of Hare RCV in 2009 and not be in denial of it, and with the push to adopt RCV (that is currently stalled in committee), we can make history. Good history. History befitting a discerning and progressive "brave little state". rather than ignore or deny the problem, we can recognize and understand the problem and act to correct the problem with model legislation that is 200 years in the making.
i got some legislators' attentions, and this single-member district thing got more of their attention (because, if any of my maps are adopted, i will have bailed out some of their asses). with Nicolaus Tideman offering to publish my paper in Constitutional Political Economy (this is still tentative, it's in the works, but i am feeling pretty secure about it), i gain more credibility (in the Vermont legislature) because the Progressive Party and FairVote and VPIRG people are still trying to dismiss me as a crackpot. and they still deny the fact about Hare RCV electing the wrong candidate in 2009 (resulting in an explicit spoiler and punishing non-tactical voting).
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
On 11/18/21 9:57 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/18/2021 9:12 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 16.11.2021 15:52, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Unfortunately it's top-two vote getters. Each voter has two votes.
That's not a particularly good method, no; but if you succeed getting
BTR-IRV enacted, and you decide to advocate for replacing the top-two
method with STV, you could use the BTR version.
Every STV variant with the same surplus election mechanism passes Droop
proportionality, so modifying the elimination mechanism (like BTR-IRV
does) won't make it fail Droop. So getting BTR-IRV passed shouldn't
hinder future adoption of STV.
But Kristofer, there is a little bit of a problem using BTR for
multimember STV. Consider the 2009 election in Burlington. Suppose we
stopped at two candidates (because we have two seats) instead of one.
Then the Plurality candidate (Kurt Wright) and the Condorcet candidate
(Andy Montroll) would be elected to the two available seats. The Hare
IRV winner (Bob Kiss), who was actually preferred by voters over the
Plurality candidate (Wright), which is what was demonstrated in the IRV
final round in 2009, that IRV winner would not have been elected in
multi-winner BTR-STV. Some people might say that Kiss should be in the
top two (and elected in a two-winner contest).
Fortunately, the multiwinner version has an additional election
component where candidates who exceed a Droop quota of first preferences
are always elected and the surplus redistributed. This avoids the
problem you're referring to.
To show in practice: the Burlington election ballots are
1332: M>K>W
767: M>W>K
455: M
2043: K>M>W
370: K>W>M
568: K
1510: W>M>K
495: W>K>M
1289: W
after every candidate but Montroll, Kiss, and Wright have been
eliminated. The first preference counts are as follows:
Montroll: 2554
Kiss: 2981
Wright: 3294
The Droop quota for two seats is 8829/3 = 2943.
As both Wright and Kiss exceed a Droop quota before any reweighting has
been done, they both win, and so the two-seat outcome consists of Wright
and Kiss (not Montroll).
The more I look, the more the Burlington election looks like the Left,
Center, Right example (https://electowiki.org/wiki/Left,_Center,_Right).
Not only does IRV get both wrong, but they both show that house
monotonicity is incompatible with Condorcet and the DPC.
-km