On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.

(Jameson wrote):

But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.

(endquote)

In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.

In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.

The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.

Mike,

Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval  (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.

A couple of somewhat relevant questions:

(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?

(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?

And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?

Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.

Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.

But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .

Jameson wrote:

Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:

- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.

I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.

With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.

Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.

Chris Benham

On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:

plurality loser.

So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.

Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.

And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.

But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.

You wrote:

There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:

(endquote)

Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.

No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.

As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.

(You wrote):

under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.

(endquote)

Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.

That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.

If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.

Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.

"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.

(endquote)

Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.

Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.

Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different
result.

But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:

Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial,  if that
were what they want to do.  ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.

CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing among
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.

(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)

If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.

Approve (only) your top-set.

(More about that in my post yesterday)

But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that  could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.

When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.

Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.

What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.

(You wrote):

But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.

(endquote)

In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.

In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.

The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.

(You wrote):

The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.

(endquote)

Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.

But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.

under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.

No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.

With burial, a potentially  successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.

(You wrote):

; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.

Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.

But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.

to counteract SHOS.

Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.

(You wrote):

defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)

(endquote)

That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.

Michael Ossipoff

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info

On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.

(Jameson wrote):

But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.

(endquote)

In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.

In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.

The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.

Mike,

Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval  (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.

A couple of somewhat relevant questions:

(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?

(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?

And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?

Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.

Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.

But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .

Jameson wrote:

Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:

- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.

I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.

With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.

Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.

Chris Benham

On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:

plurality loser.

So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.

Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.

And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.

But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.

You wrote:

There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:

(endquote)

Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.

No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.

As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.

(You wrote):

under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.

(endquote)

Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.

That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.

If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.

Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.

"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.

(endquote)

Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.

Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.

Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different
result.

But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:

Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial,  if that
were what they want to do.  ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.

CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing among
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.

(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)

If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.

Approve (only) your top-set.

(More about that in my post yesterday)

But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that  could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.

When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.

Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.

What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.

(You wrote):

But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.

(endquote)

In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.

In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.

The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.

(You wrote):

The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.

(endquote)

Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.

But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.

under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.

No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.

With burial, a potentially  successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.

(You wrote):

; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.

Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.

But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.

to counteract SHOS.

Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.

(You wrote):

defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)

(endquote)

That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.

Michael Ossipoff

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info

     On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn"
     <jameson.quinn@gmail.com <mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com>> wrote:

     is the plurality loser.

     So it refers to a special case of the problem of the
     defensive strategy needed to protect the CWs's win.

     Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is
     when a middle Cws has the smallest faction.

     And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for
     truncation or burial vulnerability, I use such an example,
     because it seems more favorable to finding vulnerability.

     But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
     distinction about that except that it's part of the
     problem-examples in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.

     You wrote:

     There are different levels of the problem, characterized by
     the level of strategy necessary for the CW to win:

     (endquote)

     Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one
     side can't take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's
     voters can deter burial by mere plumping.

     No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than
     sincerely in methods with wv strategy.

     As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or
     general pairwise-count methods.

     (You wrote):

     win even under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must
     betray their sincere favorite.

     (endquote)

     Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's
     more a matter of which wing candidate is preferred by the
     CWs's voters.

     That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if
     you're majority-favored.

     If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't
     in a mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no
     better than Plurality.

     Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the
     past 30 years or so.

     win under "honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do
     not, they should not.

     (endquote)

     Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently
     from Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.

     Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.

     Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a
     different result.

     But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:

     Approval let's people protect the CWs, without
     favorite-burial,  if that were what they want to do.  ...and
     I suggest that it isn't, because electing from your top-set
     is usually more important than electing the best particular
     individual candidate you can.

     CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about
     choosing _among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular
     candidate you can.

     (But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)

     If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it
     is the important thing.

     Approve (only) your top-set.

     (More about that in my post yesterday)

     But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having
     a majority who'd prefer a different result, then that  could
     be a reason for voters in Approval to slightly modify their
     voting to avoid approving past the expected CWs (CWse).
     ...though that would lower your Pt.

     When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of
     approving past the CWse.

     Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your
     wing-faction having a social agreement to that effect.

     What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.

     (You wrote):

     But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably
     lose under "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which
     the stronger wing truncates the CW to equal-bottom.

     (endquote)

     In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.

     In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at
     all. In Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from
     both sides, as s/he does in general pairwise-count methods.

     The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're
     after the best particular candidate you can get. But you're
     talking about a strategy problem that shouldn't concern
     voters in Approval.

     (You wrote):

     The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to
     give the CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the
     stronger wing near-bottom score.

     (endquote)

     Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can
     get. Then obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs,
     and the CWs's voters should plump.

     But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons
     stated above, & in earlier posts.

     definition. But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the
     wrong answer.

     No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still
     wins. ...the right answer in such a method.

     With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or
     fail, depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either
     way, the CWs doesn't win.

     (You wrote):

     ; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and
     backfires if the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing.
     Note that even a strategy backfire here is not in my opinion
     a "good" result; because the strategy has some chance of
     winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire
     is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad
     thing if it actually occurs.

     Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
     ...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial
     fiasco.

     But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal
     of getting the best individual candidate you can get, wv
     strategy improves on Bucklin, because, even if people
     misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't plump, the
     mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial,
     because the would-be buriers don't have better information
     than the defenders have.

     defensively plump to counteract SHOS.

     Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you
     rank sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then
     that can result in the election of someone in your bottom-set.

     (You wrote):

     not defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough
     support to the CW to protect them from SHOS, without having
     to rate them equal-top. (If the CW is only barely a CW, the
     weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a successful defense
     in this case. However, I think that very tightly-balanced
     situations like this are not a large concern.)

     (endquote)

     That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an
     improvement on Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be
     major, & could outweigh the lack of CD enough to compete with
     the best methods.

     Michael Ossipoff

I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".

Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:

Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:

1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
   - *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
   "reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
   the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
   them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
   hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves
no candidates with over 50 points.*
   - *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
   majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
   at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
   majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
   example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
   - *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*

2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com:

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info

On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 4:07 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:

On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:

A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in
a small disutility.

Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .

I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.

As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.

Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their
top-set. Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.

In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
would be fine for electing a candidate or party.

But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
now.

Could you reword that?

Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
utopian altruism.

There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.

Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
how they vote have any role in public policy..

Michael Ossipoff

(I don't have a way to delete the text below)

's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
important

Michael Ossipoff.

On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
wrote:

A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in
a small disutility.

Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .

I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.

As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.

Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their
top-set. Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.

In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
would be fine for electing a candidate or party.

But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
now.

Could you reword that?

Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
utopian altruism.

There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.

Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
how they vote have any role in public policy..

Michael Ossipoff

(I don't have a way to delete the text below)

's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
important

Michael Ossipoff.