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Re: [EM] help with advocacy

FS
Forest Simmons
Thu, Apr 15, 2021 11:19 PM

Nobody sharper than Steve Eppley in countering IRV propaganda ... for
example see his response in the forwarded link below .. great person to
have in your corner.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thursday, April 15, 2021
Subject: Single-winner election data from the OpenSTV database
To: Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu

https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/8HqX0Gjr/single-winner-
election-data-from-the-openstv-database

Nobody sharper than Steve Eppley in countering IRV propaganda ... for example see his response in the forwarded link below .. great person to have in your corner. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thursday, April 15, 2021 Subject: Single-winner election data from the OpenSTV database To: Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/8HqX0Gjr/single-winner- election-data-from-the-openstv-database
RL
Rob Lanphier
Fri, Apr 16, 2021 1:58 AM

Hi Forest,

You linked to Narkive in a very recent message, referring to Steve
Eppley's rhetoric from long ago:

On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 4:19 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

Your email led me to visit this URL:
https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/

It appears as though Narkive has stopped archiving EM-list since 2018.
I did a little bit of checking the website for more information:

https://narkive.com/legalese

I would love to figure out how to restore that, but I'm not sure how.
Can you (or anyone) find contact information for the maintainer(s) of
Narkive?  I have some ideas, and I'm planning to follow through on
them, but it could be that I'm missing out on an obvious FAQ that
tells me where to go for technical questions, but my hunch is that
it's deliberately vague, since the website is a small-time operation
(much like this mailing list)

Rob

Hi Forest, You linked to Narkive in a very recent message, referring to Steve Eppley's rhetoric from long ago: On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 4:19 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/8HqX0Gjr/single-winner-election-data-from-the-openstv-database Your email led me to visit this URL: https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/ It appears as though Narkive has stopped archiving EM-list since 2018. I did a little bit of checking the website for more information: https://narkive.com/legalese I would love to figure out how to restore that, but I'm not sure how. Can you (or anyone) find contact information for the maintainer(s) of Narkive? I have some ideas, and I'm planning to follow through on them, but it could be that I'm missing out on an obvious FAQ that tells me where to go for technical questions, but my hunch is that it's deliberately vague, since the website is a small-time operation (much like this mailing list) Rob
FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Apr 16, 2021 5:06 AM

Rob,

I was trying to find Eppley's July 2007 article in the Pasadena weekly by
Googling Eppley VPR, and that Narkive result came up.

Besides BTR-IRV some other minimal tweaks to greatly improve IRV (though
not as viable as your idea) are Voting Published Rankings (VPR) and the
Candidate Withdrawal option, ... both thoroughly expounded by Eppley.

Also we could mimic the movement of states pledging their Electoral College
votes to the plurality winner ... by pledges to support the Pairwise Winner
in the context of ranked choice ballots.

That doesn't confer Smith compliance, but the following version would do so
for a small cost ... very small compared to the total cost of IRV:

If the base method is loser elimination like IRV, then as soon as there is
a Pairwise Winner among the remaining candidates, the pledge takes effect.
If there are not enough pledge votes to render further rounds moot, then
the rounds continue until pledged votes are sufficient to give the
(current) pairwise winner (among the remaining candidates) an outright
majority of the votes still in play.

Ideally the technology should accommodate voter pledges as well as
candidate pledges.

Way too much for the current Burlington situation, but a way to respect
voter wishes when the base method is incapable of delivering as advertised:
"... your second choice will be there to take effect should your first
choice be eliminated..."

For that promise to be fulfilled at every stage for some voter, the
candidates would have to be eliminated in the same order as the ranking
order of that voter. If that promise is kept to most voters, then most
ballots would have the same first choice, so nobody's second choice would
matter. So IRV propaganda makes a promise that cannot be kept  to more than
half of the voters except vacuously ... i.e. when the IRV winner is
identical to the Plurality winner, i.e. when IRV does not improve on
Plurality.

So any advantage IRV has over Plurality depends on a disingenuous promise
... it cannot give different results from Plurality without violating that
promise on at least half of the ballots.

It's not that IRV fails to keep that promise once in a while ... pervasive
failure is inevitable!

It sounds to me like grounds for a law suit!

My Best,

Forest

On Thursday, April 15, 2021, Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Forest,

You linked to Narkive in a very recent message, referring to Steve
Eppley's rhetoric from long ago:

On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 4:19 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

election-data-from-the-openstv-database

Your email led me to visit this URL:
https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/

It appears as though Narkive has stopped archiving EM-list since 2018.
I did a little bit of checking the website for more information:

https://narkive.com/legalese

I would love to figure out how to restore that, but I'm not sure how.
Can you (or anyone) find contact information for the maintainer(s) of
Narkive?  I have some ideas, and I'm planning to follow through on
them, but it could be that I'm missing out on an obvious FAQ that
tells me where to go for technical questions, but my hunch is that
it's deliberately vague, since the website is a small-time operation
(much like this mailing list)

Rob

Rob, I was trying to find Eppley's July 2007 article in the Pasadena weekly by Googling Eppley VPR, and that Narkive result came up. Besides BTR-IRV some other minimal tweaks to greatly improve IRV (though not as viable as your idea) are Voting Published Rankings (VPR) and the Candidate Withdrawal option, ... both thoroughly expounded by Eppley. Also we could mimic the movement of states pledging their Electoral College votes to the plurality winner ... by pledges to support the Pairwise Winner in the context of ranked choice ballots. That doesn't confer Smith compliance, but the following version would do so for a small cost ... very small compared to the total cost of IRV: If the base method is loser elimination like IRV, then as soon as there is a Pairwise Winner among the remaining candidates, the pledge takes effect. If there are not enough pledge votes to render further rounds moot, then the rounds continue until pledged votes are sufficient to give the (current) pairwise winner (among the remaining candidates) an outright majority of the votes still in play. Ideally the technology should accommodate voter pledges as well as candidate pledges. Way too much for the current Burlington situation, but a way to respect voter wishes when the base method is incapable of delivering as advertised: "... your second choice will be there to take effect should your first choice be eliminated..." For that promise to be fulfilled at every stage for some voter, the candidates would have to be eliminated in the same order as the ranking order of that voter. If that promise is kept to most voters, then most ballots would have the same first choice, so nobody's second choice would matter. So IRV propaganda makes a promise that cannot be kept to more than half of the voters except vacuously ... i.e. when the IRV winner is identical to the Plurality winner, i.e. when IRV does not improve on Plurality. So any advantage IRV has over Plurality depends on a disingenuous promise ... it cannot give different results from Plurality without violating that promise on at least half of the ballots. It's not that IRV fails to keep that promise once in a while ... pervasive failure is inevitable! It sounds to me like grounds for a law suit! My Best, Forest On Thursday, April 15, 2021, Rob Lanphier <roblan@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Forest, > > You linked to Narkive in a very recent message, referring to Steve > Eppley's rhetoric from long ago: > > On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 4:19 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > > https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/8HqX0Gjr/single-winner- > election-data-from-the-openstv-database > > Your email led me to visit this URL: > https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/ > > It appears as though Narkive has stopped archiving EM-list since 2018. > I did a little bit of checking the website for more information: > > https://narkive.com/legalese > > I would love to figure out how to restore that, but I'm not sure how. > Can you (or anyone) find contact information for the maintainer(s) of > Narkive? I have some ideas, and I'm planning to follow through on > them, but it could be that I'm missing out on an obvious FAQ that > tells me where to go for technical questions, but my hunch is that > it's deliberately vague, since the website is a small-time operation > (much like this mailing list) > > Rob >
FS
Forest Simmons
Fri, Apr 16, 2021 7:08 AM

I agree with VoteFair Richard that voter friendly naming is important.

Round Robin and Head-to-Head are familiar concepts ... good for introducing
Pairwise.

Beats All is another good descriptor.

If we ever need the concept of Smith, ... a Smith candidate has Beat Paths
to all of the other candidates.

Shifting gears ...

IRV false claims should be challenged in court, and court injunctions
issued against false and misleading verbiage...

Three of the most common misleading claims ...

  1. IRV always finds a majority winner. In reality, this is impossible when
    majorities prefer A over B and B over C and C over A. It is true that the
    winner is preferred by a majority of the unexausted ballots over the last
    candidate to be eliminated ... but nothing more can be claimed truthfully.

  2. The optimum strategy is to rank the candidates sincerely. ... This claim
    assumes zero information about preferences of other voters.

  3. If you rank Y immediately after X, then in the event X is eliminated,
    your vote will be transferred to Y.  That holds only if X is eliminated
    before Y is eliminated.

In my previous message I explained why (unless most ballots are exhaustied
before the final round) this promise cannot be kept on more than half of
the ballos if there is no majority first place candidate ... the only case
that justifies ranked choice style ballots in the first place. So this
claim is not just a tiny white lie that hardly ever occurs in practice ...
its pervasive violation is inevitable (except perhaps when rankings are
woefully incomplete).

Try to find even one reasonable scenario with complete rankings where this
claim holds true on most ballots.

On Thursday, April 15, 2021, Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

Rob,

I was trying to find Eppley's July 2007 article in the Pasadena weekly by
Googling Eppley VPR, and that Narkive result came up.

Besides BTR-IRV some other minimal tweaks to greatly improve IRV (though
not as viable as your idea) are Voting Published Rankings (VPR) and the
Candidate Withdrawal option, ... both thoroughly expounded by Eppley.

Also we could mimic the movement of states pledging their Electoral
College votes to the plurality winner ... by pledges to support the
Pairwise Winner in the context of ranked choice ballots.

That doesn't confer Smith compliance, but the following version would do
so for a small cost ... very small compared to the total cost of IRV:

If the base method is loser elimination like IRV, then as soon as there is
a Pairwise Winner among the remaining candidates, the pledge takes effect.
If there are not enough pledge votes to render further rounds moot, then
the rounds continue until pledged votes are sufficient to give the
(current) pairwise winner (among the remaining candidates) an outright
majority of the votes still in play.

Ideally the technology should accommodate voter pledges as well as
candidate pledges.

Way too much for the current Burlington situation, but a way to respect
voter wishes when the base method is incapable of delivering as advertised:
"... your second choice will be there to take effect should your first
choice be eliminated..."

For that promise to be fulfilled at every stage for some voter, the
candidates would have to be eliminated in the same order as the ranking
order of that voter. If that promise is kept to most voters, then most
ballots would have the same first choice, so nobody's second choice would
matter. So IRV propaganda makes a promise that cannot be kept  to more than
half of the voters except vacuously ... i.e. when the IRV winner is
identical to the Plurality winner, i.e. when IRV does not improve on
Plurality.

So any advantage IRV has over Plurality depends on a disingenuous promise
... it cannot give different results from Plurality without violating that
promise on at least half of the ballots.

It's not that IRV fails to keep that promise once in a while ... pervasive
failure is inevitable!

It sounds to me like grounds for a law suit!

My Best,

Forest

On Thursday, April 15, 2021, Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Forest,

You linked to Narkive in a very recent message, referring to Steve
Eppley's rhetoric from long ago:

On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 4:19 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

single-winner-election-data-from-the-openstv-database

Your email led me to visit this URL:
https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/

It appears as though Narkive has stopped archiving EM-list since 2018.
I did a little bit of checking the website for more information:

https://narkive.com/legalese

I would love to figure out how to restore that, but I'm not sure how.
Can you (or anyone) find contact information for the maintainer(s) of
Narkive?  I have some ideas, and I'm planning to follow through on
them, but it could be that I'm missing out on an obvious FAQ that
tells me where to go for technical questions, but my hunch is that
it's deliberately vague, since the website is a small-time operation
(much like this mailing list)

Rob

I agree with VoteFair Richard that voter friendly naming is important. Round Robin and Head-to-Head are familiar concepts ... good for introducing Pairwise. Beats All is another good descriptor. If we ever need the concept of Smith, ... a Smith candidate has Beat Paths to all of the other candidates. Shifting gears ... IRV false claims should be challenged in court, and court injunctions issued against false and misleading verbiage... Three of the most common misleading claims ... 1. IRV always finds a majority winner. In reality, this is impossible when majorities prefer A over B and B over C and C over A. It is true that the winner is preferred by a majority of the unexausted ballots over the last candidate to be eliminated ... but nothing more can be claimed truthfully. 2. The optimum strategy is to rank the candidates sincerely. ... This claim assumes zero information about preferences of other voters. 3. If you rank Y immediately after X, then in the event X is eliminated, your vote will be transferred to Y. That holds only if X is eliminated before Y is eliminated. In my previous message I explained why (unless most ballots are exhaustied before the final round) this promise cannot be kept on more than half of the ballos if there is no majority first place candidate ... the only case that justifies ranked choice style ballots in the first place. So this claim is not just a tiny white lie that hardly ever occurs in practice ... its pervasive violation is inevitable (except perhaps when rankings are woefully incomplete). Try to find even one reasonable scenario with complete rankings where this claim holds true on most ballots. On Thursday, April 15, 2021, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Rob, > > I was trying to find Eppley's July 2007 article in the Pasadena weekly by > Googling Eppley VPR, and that Narkive result came up. > > Besides BTR-IRV some other minimal tweaks to greatly improve IRV (though > not as viable as your idea) are Voting Published Rankings (VPR) and the > Candidate Withdrawal option, ... both thoroughly expounded by Eppley. > > Also we could mimic the movement of states pledging their Electoral > College votes to the plurality winner ... by pledges to support the > Pairwise Winner in the context of ranked choice ballots. > > That doesn't confer Smith compliance, but the following version would do > so for a small cost ... very small compared to the total cost of IRV: > > If the base method is loser elimination like IRV, then as soon as there is > a Pairwise Winner among the remaining candidates, the pledge takes effect. > If there are not enough pledge votes to render further rounds moot, then > the rounds continue until pledged votes are sufficient to give the > (current) pairwise winner (among the remaining candidates) an outright > majority of the votes still in play. > > Ideally the technology should accommodate voter pledges as well as > candidate pledges. > > Way too much for the current Burlington situation, but a way to respect > voter wishes when the base method is incapable of delivering as advertised: > "... your second choice will be there to take effect should your first > choice be eliminated..." > > For that promise to be fulfilled at every stage for some voter, the > candidates would have to be eliminated in the same order as the ranking > order of that voter. If that promise is kept to most voters, then most > ballots would have the same first choice, so nobody's second choice would > matter. So IRV propaganda makes a promise that cannot be kept to more than > half of the voters except vacuously ... i.e. when the IRV winner is > identical to the Plurality winner, i.e. when IRV does not improve on > Plurality. > > So any advantage IRV has over Plurality depends on a disingenuous promise > ... it cannot give different results from Plurality without violating that > promise on at least half of the ballots. > > It's not that IRV fails to keep that promise once in a while ... pervasive > failure is inevitable! > > It sounds to me like grounds for a law suit! > > My Best, > > Forest > > On Thursday, April 15, 2021, Rob Lanphier <roblan@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Hi Forest, >> >> You linked to Narkive in a very recent message, referring to Steve >> Eppley's rhetoric from long ago: >> >> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 4:19 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: >> > https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/8HqX0Gjr/ >> single-winner-election-data-from-the-openstv-database >> >> Your email led me to visit this URL: >> https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/ >> >> It appears as though Narkive has stopped archiving EM-list since 2018. >> I did a little bit of checking the website for more information: >> >> https://narkive.com/legalese >> >> I would love to figure out how to restore that, but I'm not sure how. >> Can you (or anyone) find contact information for the maintainer(s) of >> Narkive? I have some ideas, and I'm planning to follow through on >> them, but it could be that I'm missing out on an obvious FAQ that >> tells me where to go for technical questions, but my hunch is that >> it's deliberately vague, since the website is a small-time operation >> (much like this mailing list) >> >> Rob >> >