Condorcet Meeting: Narrowing the Field
Colin,
Condorcet voting works well
under certain assumptions, which include voters sincerely ranking all
candidates in order of preference.
If by "sincerely ranking" you are referring to sincere strict ranking,
without any of
the voters specifying any above-bottom equal preferences, or implicitly
ranking some
candidates equal-bottom by truncating then I strongly disagree.
I'm interested in hearing you expand a bit on what you mean by "works well".
And also what method/s you have in mind that you are counter-posing to
"Condorcet
voting".
Strategic voting turns out to be less of a problem than one might fear,..
There are many quite different methods that meet the Condorcet
criterion. They vary
quite a bit regarding how much of a problem strategic voting is. But on
what do you
base this observation?
...but drastic truncation is fatal.
How and why is it "fatal"?
The merits of Condorcet voting lie partly in its not penalising
minor parties, so you'd expect it to lead to an explosion in the number
of candidates.
It mostly solves the split-vote problem and can give a "minor" centrist
candidate some
chance of winning, but I wouldn't expect a really any bigger such
"explosion" than you
would get by replacing FPP with IRV.
There are no particular constraints or objectives on a first round -
what matters is how well the system as a whole performs.
It may be that Forest is trying to get only centrist candidates
through to the second round. I think this is a bad idea. The second
round cannot elect a bad candidate in his scheme, but non-centrist
voters are likely to feel they have nothing to play for and stay at
home. The result of the second round will therefore be skewed and
delegitimised.
I more-or-less agree with all this.
The problem lies in the questionable performance of ranked voting
with large fields.
What do you find "questionable" about it, and what alternative form of
voting do
you have in mind that you think performs better with large fields?
Chris B.
Colin Championcolin.champion at routemaster.app
mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20Meeting%3A%20Narrowing%20the%20Field&In-Reply-To=%3Cf156f215-2b80-f86e-32a3-ba83f486ee43%40routemaster.app%3E
/Fri Sep 1 08:47:18 PDT 2023/
It seems to me that the position is this. Condorcet voting works well
under certain assumptions, which include voters sincerely ranking all
candidates in order of preference. Strategic voting turns out to be less
of a problem than one might fear, but drastic truncation is fatal.
The merits of Condorcet voting lie partly in its not penalising
minor parties, so you'd expect it to lead to an explosion in the number
of candidates.
So you're organising a presidential election, hoping to take
advantage of the merits of Condorcet voting, and you expect 500
candidates to put themselves forward. What do you do?
One no-brain solution is to run a Condorcet election with 500
candidates. Another is to rely on administrative procedures, eg. only
the 5 candidates with most supporting signatures get onto the ballot.
This isn't a bad idea; something like it is widely practised. I think
the Virginia meeting is intentionally allowing it as an option. Can we
do better?
There are no particular constraints or objectives on a first round -
what matters is how well the system as a whole performs.
It may be that Forest is trying to get only centrist candidates
through to the second round. I think this is a bad idea. The second
round cannot elect a bad candidate in his scheme, but non-centrist
voters are likely to feel they have nothing to play for and stay at
home. The result of the second round will therefore be skewed and
delegitimised.
The problem lies in the questionable performance of ranked voting
with large fields. It seems to me that both Chris and Forest are trying
so hard to get the optimum set of survivors to the second round that
instead of solving the problem they end up shifting it to the first round.
CJC