Approval-enhanced IRV (take 2)
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier version.
*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish.
Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked candidate they
approve.
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.
Determine the IRV winner.
On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any candidate or
candidates
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified) approval winner
and the IRV
winner.*
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in the example
given to talk
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets (or comes
close enough
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and Minimal Defense
and Chicken Dilemma.
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by approving B avoid
regret for not
Compromising.
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A and B will win.
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B voters steal the
election from
them by possible Defection strategy then they can do that by not
approving B.
49 A>C>>B
48 B>>C>A
03 C>A>>B
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have been
accustomed to using FPP,
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one that the
"Condorcet winner"
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner A.
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should or could be
regretting not
getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by all top voting C.
Well with this system the B and C voters together can "fix" this without
anyone betraying
their favourites or reversing any sincere preferences simply by all of
them approving C and
not A. Then the final pairwise comparison will be between C and A with
C winning.
Chris Benham
On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36 AM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier version.
*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish.
Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked candidate they
approve.
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.
Determine the IRV winner.
On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any candidate or
candidates
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified) approval winner
and the IRV
winner.*
So if a voter was giving out to much approval by approving below one of the
mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
What if the approval cutoff were simply moved adjacent to the IRV winner?
That would probably give the IRV winner's strongest defeater too much help,
and wrest too much control of the approval lever from the sovereign voters.
It looks like you are treating the malady with the minimal effective dose
of the right medicine!
Great!
Who will spread the good news?
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in the example
given to talk
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets (or comes
close enough
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and Minimal Defense
and Chicken Dilemma.
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by approving B avoid
regret for not
Compromising.
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A and B will win.
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B voters steal the
election from
them by possible Defection strategy then they can do that by not
approving B.
49 A>C>>B
48 B>>C>A
03 C>A>>B
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have been
accustomed to using FPP,
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one that the
"Condorcet winner"
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner A.
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should or could be
regretting not
getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by all top voting C.
Well with this system the B and C voters together can "fix" this without
anyone betraying
their favourites or reversing any sincere preferences simply by all of
them approving C and
not A. Then the final pairwise comparison will be between C and A with
C winning.
Chris Benham
Forest,
I'm glad you approve.
So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one
of the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
Also the voter might not be making the innocent "mistake" of risking the
IRV winner being defeated in the final by a candidate they like less, but
could be trying a relatively easy and tempting Push-over strategy.
Chris
On 23/08/2023 8:54 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36 AM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier
version.
*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish.
Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked candidate they
approve.
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.
Determine the IRV winner.
On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any candidate or
candidates
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified) approval winner
and the IRV
winner.*
So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one
of the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
What if the approval cutoff were simply moved adjacent to the IRV winner?
That would probably give the IRV winner's strongest defeater too much
help, and wrest too much control of the approval lever from the
sovereign voters.
It looks like you are treating the malady with the minimal effective
dose of the right medicine!
Great!
Who will spread the good news?
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in the example
given to talk
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets (or comes
close enough
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and
Minimal Defense
and Chicken Dilemma.
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by approving B
avoid
regret for not Compromising.
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A and B
will win.
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B voters
steal the
election from them by possible Defection strategy then they can do
that by not
approving B.
49 A>C>>B
48 B>>C>A
03 C>A>>B
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have been
accustomed to using FPP,
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one that the
"Condorcet winner"
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner A.
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should or could be
regretting no getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by all top
voting C.
Well with this system the B and C voters together can "fix" this
without
anyone betraying their favourites or reversing any sincere
preferences simply by all of
them approving C and not A. Then the final pairwise comparison
will be between C and A
with C winning.
Chris Benham
But of course, as with STAR, any complex add-on to the method is unlikely to ever be adopted, regardless of how much better it is in theory...
Toby
On Wednesday, 23 August 2023 at 06:59:06 BST, C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
Forest,
I'm glad you approve.
So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one of the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
Also the voter might not be making the innocent "mistake" of risking the IRV winner being defeated in the final by a candidate they like less, but
could be trying a relatively easy and tempting Push-over strategy.
Chris
On 23/08/2023 8:54 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36 AM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier version.
*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish.
Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked candidate they
approve.
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.
Determine the IRV winner.
On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any candidate or
candidates
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified) approval winner
and the IRV
winner.*
So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one of the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
What if the approval cutoff were simply moved adjacent to the IRV winner?
That would probably give the IRV winner's strongest defeater too much help, and wrest too much control of the approval lever from the sovereign voters.
It looks like you are treating the malady with the minimal effective dose of the right medicine!
Great!
Who will spread the good news?
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in the example
given to talk
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets (or comes
close enough
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and Minimal Defense
and Chicken Dilemma.
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by approving B avoid
regret for not Compromising.
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A and B will win.
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B voters steal the
election from them by possible Defection strategy then they can do that by not
approving B.
49 A>C>>B
48 B>>C>A
03 C>A>>B
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have been
accustomed to using FPP,
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one that the
"Condorcet winner"
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner A.
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should or could be
regretting no getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by all top voting C.
Well with this system the B and C voters together can "fix" this without
anyone betraying their favourites or reversing any sincere preferences simply by all of
them approving C and not A. Then the final pairwise comparison will be between C and A
with C winning.
Chris Benham
On Wed, Aug 23, 2023, 12:29 AM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
But of course, as with STAR, any complex add-on to the method is unlikely
to ever be adopted, regardless of how much better it is in theory...
When an improvement like this one is suggested along with examples of the
problem it fixes and an explanation of why those examples were not just
lucky flukes ... why am I always surprised at the resistance to any thought
about the possibility of change?
There has to be a better explanation than pure obstinacy ... right?
fws
Toby
On Wednesday, 23 August 2023 at 06:59:06 BST, C.Benham <
cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
Forest,
I'm glad you approve.
So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one of
the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
Also the voter might not be making the innocent "mistake" of risking the
IRV winner being defeated in the final by a candidate they like less, but
could be trying a relatively easy and tempting Push-over strategy.
Chris
On 23/08/2023 8:54 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36 AM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier version.
*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish.
Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked candidate they
approve.
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.
Determine the IRV winner.
On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any candidate or
candidates
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified) approval winner
and the IRV
winner.*
So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one of
the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
What if the approval cutoff were simply moved adjacent to the IRV winner?
That would probably give the IRV winner's strongest defeater too much
help, and wrest too much control of the approval lever from the sovereign
voters.
It looks like you are treating the malady with the minimal effective dose
of the right medicine!
Great!
Who will spread the good news?
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in the example
given to talk
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets (or comes
close enough
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and Minimal Defense
and Chicken Dilemma.
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by approving B avoid
regret for not Compromising.
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A and B will win.
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B voters steal the
election from them by possible Defection strategy then they can do that by
not
approving B.
49 A>C>>B
48 B>>C>A
03 C>A>>B
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have been
accustomed to using FPP,
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one that the
"Condorcet winner"
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner A.
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should or could be
regretting no getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by all top voting C.
Well with this system the B and C voters together can "fix" this without
anyone betraying their favourites or reversing any sincere preferences
simply by all of
them approving C and not A. Then the final pairwise comparison will be
between C and A
with C winning.
Chris Benham
Whether it's obstinacy or not, it was because Chris criticised the idea of a STAR "kludge" before presenting an IRV "kludge" less than two hours later.
In any case, as I suggested with your own STAR improvement previously, I'm not sure the best improvement from a particular method is to first determine the winner of the original method and then devise some add-on.
Toby
On Thursday, 24 August 2023 at 14:56:20 BST, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Aug 23, 2023, 12:29 AM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
But of course, as with STAR, any complex add-on to the method is unlikely to ever be adopted, regardless of how much better it is in theory...
When an improvement like this one is suggested along with examples of the problem it fixes and an explanation of why those examples were not just lucky flukes ... why am I always surprised at the resistance to any thought about the possibility of change?
There has to be a better explanation than pure obstinacy ... right?
fws
Toby,
The Approval-enhanced IRV method I devised and presented is not a
"kludge", and even if it is I reject your insinuation that I have been
inconsistent or hypocritical.
*:*a haphazard or makeshift solution to a problem and especially to a
computer orprogramming
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/programmingproblem
STAR is a garbage method that has never been used and it appeals to some
people purely because it is simple (and because they think IRV is bad
and it's not IRV).
A "kludge" for it is not so bad because it is a kludge, it is bad idea
because it is doing something with STAR other than pointing out its
flaws and rejecting it.
IRV on the other hand is an old established method that is (at least)
quite good. Improving on it is difficult without sacrificing some of the
properties (or criterion
compliances) it has that its many supporters like.
Chris
On 24/08/2023 11:44 pm, Toby Pereira wrote:
Whether it's obstinacy or not, it was because Chris criticised the
idea of a STAR "kludge" before presenting an IRV "kludge" less than
two hours later.
In any case, as I suggested with your own STAR improvement previously,
I'm not sure the best improvement from a particular method is to first
determine the winner of the original method and then devise some add-on.
Toby
On Thursday, 24 August 2023 at 14:56:20 BST, Forest Simmons
forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug 23, 2023, 12:29 AM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
But of course, as with STAR, any complex add-on to the method is
unlikely to ever be adopted, regardless of how much better it is
in theory...
When an improvement like this one is suggested along with examples of
the problem it fixes and an explanation of why those examples were not
just lucky flukes ... why am I always surprised at the resistance to
any thought about the possibility of change?
There has to be a better explanation than pure obstinacy ... right?
fws