Re: [EM] New Thread: Needless voting disappointments
Needless disappointments result from electing legislative bodies using plurality, STV, or CPO-STV
Structurally, different portions of all the voters fail to help elect their favored candidate for a legislative body. For example, when electing a seven-member city council; about 50% of the voters are disappointed when using plurality voting, and over 10% are disappointed when using STV or CPO-STV. However, all these disappointments are needless because a new and better way of voting guarantees that every voter is most likely to see one of the elected members as representing their hopes and concerns. This system is called evaluative-proportional representation (EPR): https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/algorithm-v3/https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/.
Each EPR ballot invites the voter to grade the suitability for office of at least one of the candidates as either Excellent, Very Good, Good, or Acceptable. Voters can grade as many of the candidates as they want, and give the same grade to more than one candidate.
All these grades are counted to assure each voter that their one vote is add to the total of the elected candidate who received their highest available grade.
What do you think of the arguments detailed in the above link?
From: Election-Methods election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com on behalf of election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 9:40 PM
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Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 24
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Today's Topics:
- Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ: Election-Methods
Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18 (steve bosworth)
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 04:40:16 +0000
From: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
To: "election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ:
Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
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Today's Topics:
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a provisional prime minister
Stephen: The following responds to the two responses from Limelike.curves also copied below, in addition to a copy of my first suggestions, bellow.
Thank you Limelike for the Wikipedia link to the following example and information:
"Highest median rules violate the Archimedean propertyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property (a much weaker form of the majority criterionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion). As shown below, it is possible for Alicehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob to defeat Bobhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob in an election, even if only one voter thinks Bob is better than Alice, and a very large number of voters (up to 100% of them) give Alice a higher rating.
Ballots (Bolded medians)
ballots
Alice
Bob
Charlie
Manyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large
100/100
52/100
0/100
1
50/100
51/100
1/100
Manyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large
49/100
0/100
100/100
In this election, Bob has the highest median score (51) and defeats Alice, even though every voter except for one (perhaps Bob himself) thinks Alice is a better candidate. This is true no matter how many voters there are. As a result, even a single voter's weak preferences can override the strong preferences of the rest of the electorate.
The above example restricted to candidates Alice and Bob also serves as an example of highest median rules failing the majority criterionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion, although highest medians can pass the majority criterion with normalized ballots (i.e. ballots scaled to use the whole 0-100 range). However, normalization still cannot recover the Archimedean criterion.?
Correct me if I?m mistaken: Belinski?s way of breaking ties avoids the use of the infinitesimals as addressed by the Archimedean propertyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property as presented in Wikipedia.
At the same time, Belinski?s use of adding and subtracting whole numbers, alone, to discover the median winner makes it much easier for ordinary votes to understand the MJ count than to understand the details of any Condorcet count. Also, Belinski?s grades are much more expressive than Condorcet?s preferences. In addition, MJ allows voter to give the same grade to more than one candidate.
Secondly, we seem to understand the majority criterionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion differently. Initially, both Alice and Bob (and each candidate) received the same total number of grades (see below). Ordering all the grades received by each candidate from highest to lowest, we initially discover that Alice and Bob have the same median grade. In order to break this tie using Belinski?s method, one grade having the same value as this median grade is temporarily removed from each of their lists of grades repeatedly until one of them is seen to have the highest median grade. This will be Bob in this example. Bob?s majority is determined by a higher median grade than received by Alice, and that is why he is elected. One voter judged him to be more suitable for office.
At the same time, I accept that it would be hard objectively to claim that either Bob or Alice would be most suitable for the office. I also accept that Alice has a higher average. At the same time, I agree with Belinski?s wider argument that averaging all the grades is less informative for an active democracy because averaging is more likely to prompt voters not to vote honestly -- to exaggerate their grades: perhaps, only to give Excellent to the one or several candidates they judge only to be Acceptable, and then, indiscriminately to Reject the rest.
To the extent that such less than truthful voting occurs, both the public and any analysts are deprived of the much richer data-base and education that Belinski?s MJ count otherwise enables its post-election reports to supply. Carefully analyzed, these reports would enable commentators to report on the comprehensive snapshot of the number and intensity of support that every candidate seems to have received, and similarly, the number and intensity with which many of the contentious issues in the relevant society are being supported or opposed. This information would seem to help strength any democracy.
What do you think?
Stephen
From: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 1:13 PM
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
Today's Topics:
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a provisional prime minister
On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise differences in
scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair of candidates.
That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet but still accounts
for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)
Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan political election
where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail politically, and
vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots honestly about
intensity of preference?
"My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles de Borda
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2024 23:54:34 -0700
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: steve bosworth <stevebosworth@hotmail.com
In response to my suggestion that MJ be used to election a provisional prime minister,
Limelike Currves wrote:I
"I think a Condorcet method would be most likely to do that (since it
maximizes the chances that the elected candidate will have majority
support). Majority Judgment can actually do arbitrarily badly at this--a
candidate can win even if only one voter supports them. (It lacks the
Archimedean property.)"
Stephen: At the same time, MJ's grades are more expressive than Condorcet's preferences. Grades allow each voter more informatively to express their different judgments about the suitability for office of as many of the candidates they want.
Also, I think it is MJ that maximizes the chances for the winner to be elected by a majority of all the ballots cast. This majority is discovered by comparing all the grades given to all the candidates by all the ballots cast. The one candidate who is found to continue to have received the highest median grade is supported by this majority.
What do you think?
Stephen
On Sat, Mar 9, 2024 at 12:52?PM steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
wrote:
3/9/2024
From: stevebosworth@hotmail.com
What do you think of using Majority Judgment to elect the provisional
prime minister.
As a result, this winner would have received the largest number of highest
grades regarding their suitability for this office? This number would also
be a majority of all the votes in the elected parliament. Such a winner
would seem to be the one most likely to be able to negotiate the formation
of a unified cabinet that would receive the needed majority vote of
confidence.
From: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 1:13 PM
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
Today's Topics:
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a provisional prime minister
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2024 23:54:34 -0700
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: steve bosworth <stevebosworth@hotmail.com
In response to my suggestion that MJ be used to election a provisional prime minister,
Limelike Currves wrote:I
"I think a Condorcet method would be most likely to do that (since it
maximizes the chances that the elected candidate will have majority
support). Majority Judgment can actually do arbitrarily badly at this--a
candidate can win even if only one voter supports them. (It lacks the
Archimedean property.)"
Stephen: At the same time, MJ's grades are more expressive than Condorcet's preferences. Grades allow each voter more informatively to express their different judgments about the suitability for office of as many of the candidates they want.
Also, I think it is MJ that maximizes the chances for the winner to be elected by a majority of all the ballots cast. This majority is discovered by comparing all the grades given to all the candidates by all the ballots cast. The one candidate who is found to continue to have received the highest median grade is supported by this majority.
What do you think?
Stephen
[https://s-install.avcdn.net/ipm/preview/icons/icon-envelope-tick-round-orange-animated-no-repeat-v1.gif]https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail Virus-free.www.avast.comhttps://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail
Hello Steve,
"about 50% of the voters are disappointed when using plurality voting,
and over 10% are disappointed when using STV or CPO-STV."
This is about right but it would be false of the original Hare system,
making one constituency of the nation. And it did not mean the voters
would have to make 500 or so preferences. There would be enough variety
in the modest number of preferences made by each voter, to ensure
extreme proportionality of the sort envisioned by this writer. The only
qualification, and an important one, is that society has a pluralist
rather than a monolithic media.
(Some reformers tagged Condorcet pairing onto STV. I remember that Dr
Hill used a Condorcet pairing supplement to decide a final run-off
between runners up.)
With regard to grading candidates, in my opinion, this is a step
backward from ordinal voting. From the point of view of scales of
measurement, the classificatory scale is more primitive and less
accurate than the ordinal scale.
Cardinal numbers are more powerful than ordinal numbers. But that is why
the vote also has a count, and is not a reason for abolishing the
ordinal vote, determining the preferential sequence of the count, (as in
the Cumulative vote family of election systems).
Regards,
Richard Lung.
On 19/03/2024 04:49, steve bosworth wrote:
Needless disappointments result from electing legislative bodies
using plurality, STV, or CPO-STV
Structurally, different portions of all the voters fail to help elect
their favored candidate for a legislative body. For example, when
electing a seven-member city council; about 50% of the voters are
disappointed when using plurality voting, and over 10% are
disappointed when using STV or CPO-STV. However, all these
disappointments are needless because a new and better way of voting
guarantees that every voter is most likely to see one of the elected
members as representing their hopes and concerns. This system is
called evaluative-proportional representation (EPR):
/https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-
https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/algorithm-v3/
https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3///./
Each EPR ballot invites the voter to grade the suitability for office
of at least one of the candidates as either Excellent, Very Good,
Good, or Acceptable. Voters can grade as many of the candidates as
they want, and give the same grade to more than one candidate.
All these grades are counted to assure each voter that their one vote
is add to the total of the elected candidate who received their
highest available grade.
What do you think of the arguments detailed in the above link?
From: Election-Methods
election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com on behalf of
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 9:40 PM
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 24
Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
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Today's Topics:
1. Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ: Election-Methods
Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18 (steve bosworth)
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 04:40:16 +0000
From: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
To: "election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ:
Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
Message-ID:
DBAP195MB09225D904967554FD76DB43BB62B2@DBAP195MB0922.EURP195.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
Today's Topics:
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a provisional
prime minister
Stephen: The following responds to the two responses from
Limelike.curves also copied below, in addition to a copy of my first
suggestions, bellow.
Thank you Limelike for the Wikipedia link to the following example and
information:
"Highest median rules violate the Archimedean
property<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property> (a much weaker
form of the majority
criterion<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion>). As shown below,
it is possible for Alice<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob> to defeat
Bob<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob> in an election, even if
only one voter thinks Bob is better than Alice, and a very large
number of voters (up to 100% of them) give Alice a higher rating.
Ballots (Bolded medians)
ballots
Alice
Bob
Charlie
Many<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large>
100/100
52/100
0/100
1
50/100
51/100
1/100
Many<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large>
49/100
0/100
100/100
In this election, Bob has the highest median score (51) and defeats
Alice, even though every voter except for one (perhaps Bob himself)
thinks Alice is a better candidate. This is true no matter how many
voters there are. As a result, even a single voter's weak preferences
can override the strong preferences of the rest of the electorate.
The above example restricted to candidates Alice and Bob also serves
as an example of highest median rules failing the majority
criterion<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion>, although highest
medians can pass the majority criterion with normalized ballots (i.e.
ballots scaled to use the whole 0-100 range). However, normalization
still cannot recover the Archimedean criterion.?
Correct me if I?m mistaken: Belinski?s way of breaking ties avoids the
use of the infinitesimals as addressed by the Archimedean
property<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property> as presented in
Wikipedia.
At the same time, Belinski?s use of adding and subtracting whole
numbers, alone, to discover the median winner makes it much easier for
ordinary votes to understand the MJ count than to understand the
details of any Condorcet count. Also, Belinski?s grades are much more
expressive than Condorcet?s preferences. In addition, MJ allows voter
to give the same grade to more than one candidate.
Secondly, we seem to understand the majority
criterion<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion> differently.
Initially, both Alice and Bob (and each candidate) received the same
total number of grades (see below). Ordering all the grades received
by each candidate from highest to lowest, we initially discover that
Alice and Bob have the same median grade. In order to break this tie
using Belinski?s method, one grade having the same value as this
median grade is temporarily removed from each of their lists of grades
repeatedly until one of them is seen to have the highest median grade.
This will be Bob in this example. Bob?s majority is determined by a
higher median grade than received by Alice, and that is why he is
elected. One voter judged him to be more suitable for office.
At the same time, I accept that it would be hard objectively to claim
that either Bob or Alice would be most suitable for the office. I also
accept that Alice has a higher average. At the same time, I agree with
Belinski?s wider argument that averaging all the grades is less
informative for an active democracy because averaging is more likely
to prompt voters not to vote honestly -- to exaggerate their grades:
perhaps, only to give Excellent to the one or several candidates they
judge only to be Acceptable, and then, indiscriminately to Reject the
rest.
To the extent that such less than truthful voting occurs, both the
public and any analysts are deprived of the much richer data-base and
education that Belinski?s MJ count otherwise enables its post-election
reports to supply. Carefully analyzed, these reports would enable
commentators to report on the comprehensive snapshot of the number and
intensity of support that every candidate seems to have received, and
similarly, the number and intensity with which many of the contentious
issues in the relevant society are being supported or opposed. This
information would seem to help strength any democracy.
What do you think?
Stephen
From: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 1:13 PM
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
Today's Topics:
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a provisional
prime minister
On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise differences in
scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair of
candidates.
That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet but still
accounts
for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)
Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan political election
where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail
politically, and
vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots honestly about
intensity of preference?
"My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles de Borda
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2024 23:54:34 -0700
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: steve bosworth <stevebosworth@hotmail.com
In response to my suggestion that MJ be used to election a provisional
prime minister,
Limelike Currves wrote:I
"I think a Condorcet method would be most likely to do that (since it
maximizes the chances that the elected candidate will have majority
support). Majority Judgment can actually do arbitrarily badly at this--a
candidate can win even if only one voter supports them. (It lacks the
Archimedean property.)"
Stephen: At the same time, MJ's grades are more expressive than
Condorcet's preferences. Grades allow each voter more informatively to
express their different judgments about the suitability for office of
as many of the candidates they want.
Also, I think it is MJ that maximizes the chances for the winner to be
elected by a majority of all the ballots cast. This majority is
discovered by comparing all the grades given to all the candidates by
all the ballots cast. The one candidate who is found to continue to
have received the highest median grade is supported by this majority.
What do you think?
Stephen
On Sat, Mar 9, 2024 at 12:52?PM steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
wrote:
3/9/2024
From: stevebosworth@hotmail.com
What do you think of using Majority Judgment to elect the provisional
prime minister.
As a result, this winner would have received the largest number of
highest
grades regarding their suitability for this office? This number
would also
be a majority of all the votes in the elected parliament. Such a winner
would seem to be the one most likely to be able to negotiate the
formation
of a unified cabinet that would receive the needed majority vote of
confidence.
From: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 1:13 PM
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
Today's Topics:
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a provisional
prime minister
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2024 23:54:34 -0700
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: steve bosworth <stevebosworth@hotmail.com
In response to my suggestion that MJ be used to election a provisional
prime minister,
Limelike Currves wrote:I
"I think a Condorcet method would be most likely to do that (since it
maximizes the chances that the elected candidate will have majority
support). Majority Judgment can actually do arbitrarily badly at this--a
candidate can win even if only one voter supports them. (It lacks the
Archimedean property.)"
Stephen: At the same time, MJ's grades are more expressive than
Condorcet's preferences. Grades allow each voter more informatively to
express their different judgments about the suitability for office of
as many of the candidates they want.
Also, I think it is MJ that maximizes the chances for the winner to be
elected by a majority of all the ballots cast. This majority is
discovered by comparing all the grades given to all the candidates by
all the ballots cast. The one candidate who is found to continue to
have received the highest median grade is supported by this majority.
What do you think?
Stephen
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On 2024-03-19 05:49, steve bosworth wrote:
Needless disappointments result from electing legislative bodies using
plurality, STV, or CPO-STV
Structurally, different portions of all the voters fail to help elect
their favored candidate for a legislative body. For example, when
electing a seven-member city council; about 50% of the voters are
disappointed when using plurality voting, and over 10% are disappointed
when using STV or CPO-STV. However, all these disappointments are
needless because a new and better way of voting guarantees that every
voter is most likely to see one of the elected members as representing
their hopes and concerns. This system is called evaluative-proportional
representation (EPR):
/https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an- https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/algorithm-v3/ https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3///./
Each EPR ballot invites the voter to grade the suitability for office of
at least one of the candidates as either Excellent, Very Good, Good, or
Acceptable. Voters can grade as many of the candidates as they want, and
give the same grade to more than one candidate.
All these grades are counted to assure each voter that their one vote is
add to the total of the elected candidate who received their highest
available grade.
What do you think of the arguments detailed in the above link?
I would imagine that one could design proportional representation
methods that, besides returning an outcome, would also return a weight,
and every voter would have at least one way to change his ballot so that
the weights would change.
Thus, if "no wasted votes" just mean that kind of weight-responsiveness,
the property could probably be incorporated into other multiwinner
systems as well, not just EPR.
Among these, EPR does have the advantage that it actually exists. I'm
just saying that it's not an argument that disqualifies every non-EPR PR
method at a stroke :-)
-km