Hi, I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help. I am searching for specific references: 1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe), anyone knows it? 2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods. 3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods. Thanks for any hint... Stéphane Rouillon. Envoyé de mon iPhone

On 02/22/2018 09:00 PM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: > Hi, > > I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help. > I am searching for specific references: > 1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe), RangeVoting's 6-methods-6-answers page http://rangevoting.org/PuzzKjqAns2.html references one Joe Malkevitch. Some more searching leads to http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys/conundrum.html and then to https://www.york.cuny.edu/~malk/tidbits/tidbit-elections.html (note, unusual notation). > 2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods. Here are some, not exhaustive a list: Median: Majority judgement: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhhg1 Approval voting: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/approval-voting/7CE5DEEE235794B0B12F76ADAE621482 Condorcet: the Schulze method: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 or http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze1.pdf Condorcet: Ranked Pairs (margins), also defines independence from clones: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00433944 Condorcet: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (Ranked Pairs/wv): http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/ Condorcet: Kemeny: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026529?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Condorcet: Kemeny is NP-hard: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397505005785 Condorcet: Strategy resistant Condorcet-IRV hybrids: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=12954393981869601543 An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.3 gives short descriptions of Plurality, SNTV, Approval, top-two runoff, STV, Coombs, Borda (based on the pairwise matrix), Copeland, a method called Minimum Violations, Ranked Pairs, Minmax, Kemeny, Keener/Kendall-Wei (eigenvalue/pagerank), and a method called the Jech method. > 3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods. And some of these: The Quota Borda system: https://philpapers.org/rec/DUMVP-2 Lots of STV variants, ends by explaining CPO-STV: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.27 CPO-STV in greater detail: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1005082925477 Phragmén and Thiele methods (multiwinner approval and a ranked version used in Sweden): https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.08826 More on Phragmén and Thiele: https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14757 Includes references to 1890s papers by the two. Minimax approval (consensus multiwinner method): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x or https://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/11/90/26/PDF/AN6LAMSADE_77-104.pdf Schulze STV: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze2.pdf see citations for Schulze's out of journal work at https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wGVUJ7sAAAAJ Schulze's STV-MMP proposal: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze4.pdf (see above for cites) I'm not aware of any published papers generalizing MJ/Bucklin to multiwinner, or any mentioning proportional/reweighted range voting.

Hello, Looked at the 6 single-winner methods, given by Kristofer. It's similar to the 5 methods given in Beyond Numeracy by von Paulos. Except that Approval Voting is added. Most ingenious, except Approval Voting and range Voting (not one of the 6 methods) are inefficient because the votes count against each other and don't specify order of importance.  The other methods more or less inefficient by degree of ranking information the method offers. That is the real issue behind the puzzle. Not a puzzle at all really, just different degrees of information, in different methods producing different results. It mystifies me why intelligent people like von Paulos or the social choice theory industry should believe this puzzle demonstrates an "Impossibility" theorem. The joke of it is that in the von Paulos case, if you weight the Condorcet pairing, this gives accurate enough information to agree with Borda method, the two most informative methods. I presume weighted Condorcet is the Kenemy method. I just followed good statistical practise of weighting data suitably. So much for "Impossibility" theorem! Apologies for sel-advertising but hope shortly to publish a method that works equally for single vacancies and multiple vacancies. I mentioned it in a recent post to Jameson Quin. It is much too information-rich for the usual illogicalities associated with premature exclusion of candidates, the source of the 5 different winners mischief. Thankyou for saying once that you agreed with me. It may have been on this very issue, mentioned in the past. Yours sincerely, Richard Lung. On 22/02/2018 20:00, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: > Hi, > > I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help. > I am searching for specific references: > 1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe), > anyone knows it? > 2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods. > 3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods. > > Thanks for any hint... > Stéphane Rouillon. > > Envoyé de mon iPhone > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- Richard Lung. http://www.voting.ukscientists.com Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf: https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085 E-books in epub format: https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

Thanks a lot for all the pointers... Envoyé de mon iPhone > Le 22 févr. 2018 à 17:05, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit : > >> On 02/22/2018 09:00 PM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: >> Hi, >> I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help. >> I am searching for specific references: >> 1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe), > > RangeVoting's 6-methods-6-answers page http://rangevoting.org/PuzzKjqAns2.html references one Joe Malkevitch. Some more searching leads to http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys/conundrum.html and then to https://www.york.cuny.edu/~malk/tidbits/tidbit-elections.html (note, unusual notation). > >> 2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods. > > Here are some, not exhaustive a list: > > Median: Majority judgement: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhhg1 > > Approval voting: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/approval-voting/7CE5DEEE235794B0B12F76ADAE621482 > > Condorcet: the Schulze method: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 or http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze1.pdf > > Condorcet: Ranked Pairs (margins), also defines independence from clones: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00433944 > > Condorcet: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (Ranked Pairs/wv): http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/ > > Condorcet: Kemeny: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026529?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents > > Condorcet: Kemeny is NP-hard: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397505005785 > > Condorcet: Strategy resistant Condorcet-IRV hybrids: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=12954393981869601543 > > An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.3 > gives short descriptions of Plurality, SNTV, Approval, top-two runoff, STV, Coombs, Borda (based on the pairwise matrix), Copeland, a method called Minimum Violations, Ranked Pairs, Minmax, Kemeny, Keener/Kendall-Wei (eigenvalue/pagerank), and a method called the Jech method. > >> 3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods. > > And some of these: > > The Quota Borda system: https://philpapers.org/rec/DUMVP-2 > > Lots of STV variants, ends by explaining CPO-STV: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.27 > > CPO-STV in greater detail: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1005082925477 > > Phragmén and Thiele methods (multiwinner approval and a ranked version used in Sweden): https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.08826 > > More on Phragmén and Thiele: https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14757 > Includes references to 1890s papers by the two. > > Minimax approval (consensus multiwinner method): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x or https://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/11/90/26/PDF/AN6LAMSADE_77-104.pdf > > Schulze STV: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze2.pdf see citations for Schulze's out of journal work at https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wGVUJ7sAAAAJ > > Schulze's STV-MMP proposal: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze4.pdf (see above for cites) > > I'm not aware of any published papers generalizing MJ/Bucklin to multiwinner, or any mentioning proportional/reweighted range voting. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info