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PJ

FS
Forest Simmons
Sat, Jun 22, 2019 11:23 PM

PJ stands for either Proportional Judgment (as opposed to Majority
Judgment) or Poetic Justice (see if you agree).

Voters submit approval ballots along with a circled favorite and a number R
between zero and one that the voter of the ballot thinks is a good approval
score given the chances for consensus.

Let P (between zero and one) be the average approval of the approval
winner.  Let Q (between zero and one) be the median of the submitted
numbers.

A ballot B is drawn.  Let R be the reasonable number marked on the ballot,
and let F be the indicated favorite.

If R>P, then elect the favorite or the approval winner with probabilities
R and (1-R) respectively.

[Note that if R=P=1, the favorite must be the same as the approval winner.]

Otherwise (If R is no greater than P) ...
... If P is in the closed interval [Q, 1], then elect the approval winner
.... else defer the decision to a second randomly drawn ballot.

I admit there is room for tweaking, but my main idea is to give incentive
for the max possible consensus.

The interesting case is when R is less than both P and Q.  In this case
both according to the voter of the random ballot and the median estimate of
reasonable possible consensus, the approval has fallen short of its
potential, so random favorite, the fall back benchmark, should be invoked.
Hence the second random ballot in this case.

Does the whole process start over again with the second randomly drawn
ballot?  Possibly, but let's keep it simple.  Just take the favorite of the
second ballot.

Why not just use F from the first random ballot in this case, with
probabilitty R, and revert to a second random ballot with probability
(1-R).  That is another possibility.  And I'm sure there are other
acceptable or even better ways to use the values of R, P, Q, and F to
decide what to do.

I appreciate your thoughts.

Forest

PJ stands for either Proportional Judgment (as opposed to Majority Judgment) or Poetic Justice (see if you agree). Voters submit approval ballots along with a circled favorite and a number R between zero and one that the voter of the ballot thinks is a good approval score given the chances for consensus. Let P (between zero and one) be the average approval of the approval winner. Let Q (between zero and one) be the median of the submitted numbers. A ballot B is drawn. Let R be the reasonable number marked on the ballot, and let F be the indicated favorite. If R>P, then elect the favorite or the approval winner with probabilities R and (1-R) respectively. [Note that if R=P=1, the favorite must be the same as the approval winner.] Otherwise (If R is no greater than P) ... ... If P is in the closed interval [Q, 1], then elect the approval winner .... else defer the decision to a second randomly drawn ballot. I admit there is room for tweaking, but my main idea is to give incentive for the max possible consensus. The interesting case is when R is less than both P and Q. In this case both according to the voter of the random ballot and the median estimate of reasonable possible consensus, the approval has fallen short of its potential, so random favorite, the fall back benchmark, should be invoked. Hence the second random ballot in this case. Does the whole process start over again with the second randomly drawn ballot? Possibly, but let's keep it simple. Just take the favorite of the second ballot. Why not just use F from the first random ballot in this case, with probabilitty R, and revert to a second random ballot with probability (1-R). That is another possibility. And I'm sure there are other acceptable or even better ways to use the values of R, P, Q, and F to decide what to do. I appreciate your thoughts. Forest
FS
Forest Simmons
Wed, Jun 26, 2019 6:11 PM

Here's the simplest version of PJ:

Voters submit approval ballots with favorite identified, and with a number
between zero and 100 percent as their estimate of what degree of consensus
is reasonably possible, the consensus potential estimate (CPE)

After the approvals have been tallied, a ballot is drawn at random.

If the approval winner's approval percentage is greater than both the
median of all the consensus potential estimates, as well as the CPE on the
drawn ballot, then the approval winner is elected.

Otherwise the ballot favorite is elected.

On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 4:23 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

PJ stands for either Proportional Judgment (as opposed to Majority
Judgment) or Poetic Justice (see if you agree).

Voters submit approval ballots along with a circled favorite and a number
R between zero and one that the voter of the ballot thinks is a good
approval score given the chances for consensus.

Let P (between zero and one) be the average approval of the approval
winner.  Let Q (between zero and one) be the median of the submitted
numbers.

A ballot B is drawn.  Let R be the reasonable number marked on the ballot,
and let F be the indicated favorite.

If R>P, then elect the favorite or the approval winner with probabilities
R and (1-R) respectively.

[Note that if R=P=1, the favorite must be the same as the approval winner.]

Otherwise (If R is no greater than P) ...
... If P is in the closed interval [Q, 1], then elect the approval winner
.... else defer the decision to a second randomly drawn ballot.

I admit there is room for tweaking, but my main idea is to give incentive
for the max possible consensus.

The interesting case is when R is less than both P and Q.  In this case
both according to the voter of the random ballot and the median estimate of
reasonable possible consensus, the approval has fallen short of its
potential, so random favorite, the fall back benchmark, should be invoked.
Hence the second random ballot in this case.

Does the whole process start over again with the second randomly drawn
ballot?  Possibly, but let's keep it simple.  Just take the favorite of the
second ballot.

Why not just use F from the first random ballot in this case, with
probabilitty R, and revert to a second random ballot with probability
(1-R).  That is another possibility.  And I'm sure there are other
acceptable or even better ways to use the values of R, P, Q, and F to
decide what to do.

I appreciate your thoughts.

Forest

Here's the simplest version of PJ: Voters submit approval ballots with favorite identified, and with a number between zero and 100 percent as their estimate of what degree of consensus is reasonably possible, the consensus potential estimate (CPE) After the approvals have been tallied, a ballot is drawn at random. If the approval winner's approval percentage is greater than both the median of all the consensus potential estimates, as well as the CPE on the drawn ballot, then the approval winner is elected. Otherwise the ballot favorite is elected. On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 4:23 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > PJ stands for either Proportional Judgment (as opposed to Majority > Judgment) or Poetic Justice (see if you agree). > > Voters submit approval ballots along with a circled favorite and a number > R between zero and one that the voter of the ballot thinks is a good > approval score given the chances for consensus. > > Let P (between zero and one) be the average approval of the approval > winner. Let Q (between zero and one) be the median of the submitted > numbers. > > A ballot B is drawn. Let R be the reasonable number marked on the ballot, > and let F be the indicated favorite. > > If R>P, then elect the favorite or the approval winner with probabilities > R and (1-R) respectively. > > [Note that if R=P=1, the favorite must be the same as the approval winner.] > > Otherwise (If R is no greater than P) ... > ... If P is in the closed interval [Q, 1], then elect the approval winner > .... else defer the decision to a second randomly drawn ballot. > > I admit there is room for tweaking, but my main idea is to give incentive > for the max possible consensus. > > The interesting case is when R is less than both P and Q. In this case > both according to the voter of the random ballot and the median estimate of > reasonable possible consensus, the approval has fallen short of its > potential, so random favorite, the fall back benchmark, should be invoked. > Hence the second random ballot in this case. > > Does the whole process start over again with the second randomly drawn > ballot? Possibly, but let's keep it simple. Just take the favorite of the > second ballot. > > Why not just use F from the first random ballot in this case, with > probabilitty R, and revert to a second random ballot with probability > (1-R). That is another possibility. And I'm sure there are other > acceptable or even better ways to use the values of R, P, Q, and F to > decide what to do. > > I appreciate your thoughts. > > Forest >
AW
Arthur Wist
Thu, Jun 27, 2019 5:04 AM

Hi,

This kinda reminds me of the Bayesian Truth Serum:

https://wesselb.github.io/assets/talks/serum.pdf

https://www.dropbox.com/s/dl/k8rdnbql1t0byxy/serum.pdf

Kind regards,

Arthur

On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, 20:11 Forest Simmons, fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

Here's the simplest version of PJ:

Voters submit approval ballots with favorite identified, and with a number
between zero and 100 percent as their estimate of what degree of consensus
is reasonably possible, the consensus potential estimate (CPE)

After the approvals have been tallied, a ballot is drawn at random.

If the approval winner's approval percentage is greater than both the
median of all the consensus potential estimates, as well as the CPE on the
drawn ballot, then the approval winner is elected.

Otherwise the ballot favorite is elected.

On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 4:23 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:

PJ stands for either Proportional Judgment (as opposed to Majority
Judgment) or Poetic Justice (see if you agree).

Voters submit approval ballots along with a circled favorite and a number
R between zero and one that the voter of the ballot thinks is a good
approval score given the chances for consensus.

Let P (between zero and one) be the average approval of the approval
winner.  Let Q (between zero and one) be the median of the submitted
numbers.

A ballot B is drawn.  Let R be the reasonable number marked on the
ballot, and let F be the indicated favorite.

If R>P, then elect the favorite or the approval winner with
probabilities  R and (1-R) respectively.

[Note that if R=P=1, the favorite must be the same as the approval
winner.]

Otherwise (If R is no greater than P) ...
... If P is in the closed interval [Q, 1], then elect the approval winner
.... else defer the decision to a second randomly drawn ballot.

I admit there is room for tweaking, but my main idea is to give incentive
for the max possible consensus.

The interesting case is when R is less than both P and Q.  In this case
both according to the voter of the random ballot and the median estimate of
reasonable possible consensus, the approval has fallen short of its
potential, so random favorite, the fall back benchmark, should be invoked.
Hence the second random ballot in this case.

Does the whole process start over again with the second randomly drawn
ballot?  Possibly, but let's keep it simple.  Just take the favorite of the
second ballot.

Why not just use F from the first random ballot in this case, with
probabilitty R, and revert to a second random ballot with probability
(1-R).  That is another possibility.  And I'm sure there are other
acceptable or even better ways to use the values of R, P, Q, and F to
decide what to do.

I appreciate your thoughts.

Forest


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
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Hi, This kinda reminds me of the Bayesian Truth Serum: https://wesselb.github.io/assets/talks/serum.pdf https://www.dropbox.com/s/dl/k8rdnbql1t0byxy/serum.pdf Kind regards, Arthur On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, 20:11 Forest Simmons, <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > Here's the simplest version of PJ: > > Voters submit approval ballots with favorite identified, and with a number > between zero and 100 percent as their estimate of what degree of consensus > is reasonably possible, the consensus potential estimate (CPE) > > After the approvals have been tallied, a ballot is drawn at random. > > If the approval winner's approval percentage is greater than both the > median of all the consensus potential estimates, as well as the CPE on the > drawn ballot, then the approval winner is elected. > > Otherwise the ballot favorite is elected. > > On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 4:23 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > >> PJ stands for either Proportional Judgment (as opposed to Majority >> Judgment) or Poetic Justice (see if you agree). >> >> Voters submit approval ballots along with a circled favorite and a number >> R between zero and one that the voter of the ballot thinks is a good >> approval score given the chances for consensus. >> >> Let P (between zero and one) be the average approval of the approval >> winner. Let Q (between zero and one) be the median of the submitted >> numbers. >> >> A ballot B is drawn. Let R be the reasonable number marked on the >> ballot, and let F be the indicated favorite. >> >> If R>P, then elect the favorite or the approval winner with >> probabilities R and (1-R) respectively. >> >> [Note that if R=P=1, the favorite must be the same as the approval >> winner.] >> >> Otherwise (If R is no greater than P) ... >> ... If P is in the closed interval [Q, 1], then elect the approval winner >> .... else defer the decision to a second randomly drawn ballot. >> >> I admit there is room for tweaking, but my main idea is to give incentive >> for the max possible consensus. >> >> The interesting case is when R is less than both P and Q. In this case >> both according to the voter of the random ballot and the median estimate of >> reasonable possible consensus, the approval has fallen short of its >> potential, so random favorite, the fall back benchmark, should be invoked. >> Hence the second random ballot in this case. >> >> Does the whole process start over again with the second randomly drawn >> ballot? Possibly, but let's keep it simple. Just take the favorite of the >> second ballot. >> >> Why not just use F from the first random ballot in this case, with >> probabilitty R, and revert to a second random ballot with probability >> (1-R). That is another possibility. And I'm sure there are other >> acceptable or even better ways to use the values of R, P, Q, and F to >> decide what to do. >> >> I appreciate your thoughts. >> >> Forest >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >