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Re: [EM] [CES #16423] Re: Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)

TS
Ted Stern
Mon, Jun 12, 2017 5:41 PM

IMO the 3-2-1 methodology of 3-best, 2-least-worst, 1-most-preferred is not
just a specific method, but a filter that could be applied to other
methods.  In the spirit of the original 3-2-1, the initial method should
satisfy the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC).

I currently like the idea of using the 3-2-1 filter with Majority Judgment
as the initial "3-best" method, since 3-2-1 eliminates (at least
practically) the participation criterion issue with MJ.

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 6:27 AM, 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election
Science electionscience@googlegroups.com wrote:

If the name encapsulated a description of what the voting method is, the
name would change naturally with the method. When the name is the author's
name, or something cute like 3-2-1 or IRV, you'd append a clarification for
minor changes. If Toby came up with a significantly different and clever
variation of 3-2-1, maybe you'd call it Quinn-Pereira Voting.

About ownership... does Warren own Score Voting? Maybe 3-2-1 should be
called Three-Value Score Voting with Three-Step Tally.

On Saturday, June 10, 2017 at 6:28:43 PM UTC+2, Toby Pereira wrote:

Minor changes can be seen as variants of the same method. For example,
someone might define a Condorcet method using margins, and someone else
might prefer the winning votes version. But you wouldn't give it a
different name. You'd call it x with winning votes. But then I suppose that
doesn't answer the question of whether the inventor or anyone else can
change the "canonical" version - the version where you don't have to
specify anything else about it.


From: Jameson Quinn
To: electionsciencefoundation; EM
Sent: Saturday, 10 June 2017, 17:04
Subject: Re: [EM] Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)

This raises a larger question: should the inventor of a voting method be
able to change the rules without changing the name? Once a proposal is
public, who owns it — the inventor or the public?

I don't think the answer is always clear-cut. If I wanted to redefine
3-2-1 to be something totally different, that wouldn't be OK. If somebody
else wanted to use the name 3-2-1 for something substantially the same, but
with minor rule changes, I might talk or argue with them about whether
their rule changes were a good idea, but I think I'd probably still let
them use the name.

But for smaller rule changes, I think it's OK for the inventor of a
method to make adjustments.

2017-06-10 11:14 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn:

Since creating 3-2-1 voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting and GOLD voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting,
I've continued to work on refining the rules. I'm arbitrarily deciding that
it's time to send an update now, because they're getting pretty stable.
Future changes are still possible, but I think that on each system the
chances are better than even that the only changes from here on will be
simplifying the wording, not substantive differences.

On 3-2-1, here are the rules in addition to the basic "3 most good, 2
least bad, 1 more preferred" dynamic:

- Optional delegation: if you vote just one candidate as "good", any
blank ratings you leave will be filled in by that candidate's predeclared
ratings. Predeclarations default to "bad".
- 3rd semifinalist: the third semifinalist must...
   - ...not be of the same party as the first two semifinalists (if
   there are party labels). If this would happen, just skip to the next
   highest "good" as the third semifinalist.
      - This means a party can't win by running 3 clones against a
      divided field. There could still in theory be "clone parties", but it seems
      unlikely that over 1/3 of voters would go along with such naked
      strategizing.
   - ...have at least half as many "good" ratings as the top
   semifinalist. If this would happen, just take the top two as finalists,
   skipping the second "2 least bad" round.
      - This ensures that you can't win just by being a "stealth
      centrist" with little direct support.

On GOLD, here are the changes from the original version:

- Pre-eliminations
   - The top candidate in each riding, based on local votes alone, is
   never eliminated.
   - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only,
   is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the
   top.
   - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local
   votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes
   (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local
   candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those
   of" includes non-local votes.)
- STV elimination order: eliminate in order of who's furthest behind
in their riding
   - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including
   everything: local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the
   top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then
   they are 1000 behind in their riding.

These rule adjustments for GOLD work to ensure that the voters within a
riding have a significant say in who represents them, and out-of-riding
votes matter only at the margin.

I've also been thinking about rule adjustments for 3RD (the nonpartisan
proportional system that's a cross between 321 and GOLD). That was part of
why I started the other thread on proportional summability. But I'm not
really satisfied that that system is "done" at the level of 321 and GOLD,
so I'm not going to talk about the current version of those rules here.


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info

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IMO the 3-2-1 methodology of 3-best, 2-least-worst, 1-most-preferred is not just a specific method, but a filter that could be applied to other methods. In the spirit of the original 3-2-1, the initial method should satisfy the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC). I currently like the idea of using the 3-2-1 filter with Majority Judgment as the initial "3-best" method, since 3-2-1 eliminates (at least practically) the participation criterion issue with MJ. On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 6:27 AM, 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election Science <electionscience@googlegroups.com> wrote: > If the name encapsulated a description of what the voting method is, the > name would change naturally with the method. When the name is the author's > name, or something cute like 3-2-1 or IRV, you'd append a clarification for > minor changes. If Toby came up with a significantly different and clever > variation of 3-2-1, maybe you'd call it Quinn-Pereira Voting. > > About ownership... does Warren own Score Voting? Maybe 3-2-1 should be > called Three-Value Score Voting with Three-Step Tally. > > On Saturday, June 10, 2017 at 6:28:43 PM UTC+2, Toby Pereira wrote: >> >> Minor changes can be seen as variants of the same method. For example, >> someone might define a Condorcet method using margins, and someone else >> might prefer the winning votes version. But you wouldn't give it a >> different name. You'd call it x with winning votes. But then I suppose that >> doesn't answer the question of whether the inventor or anyone else can >> change the "canonical" version - the version where you don't have to >> specify anything else about it. >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Jameson Quinn >> *To:* electionsciencefoundation; EM >> *Sent:* Saturday, 10 June 2017, 17:04 >> *Subject:* Re: [EM] Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments) >> >> This raises a larger question: should the inventor of a voting method be >> able to change the rules without changing the name? Once a proposal is >> public, who owns it — the inventor or the public? >> >> I don't think the answer is always clear-cut. If I wanted to redefine >> 3-2-1 to be something totally different, that wouldn't be OK. If somebody >> else wanted to use the name 3-2-1 for something substantially the same, but >> with minor rule changes, I might talk or argue with them about whether >> their rule changes were a good idea, but I think I'd probably still let >> them use the name. >> >> But for smaller rule changes, I think it's OK for the inventor of a >> method to make adjustments. >> >> 2017-06-10 11:14 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn: >> >> Since creating 3-2-1 voting >> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting> and GOLD voting >> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>, >> I've continued to work on refining the rules. I'm arbitrarily deciding that >> it's time to send an update now, because they're getting pretty stable. >> Future changes are still possible, but I think that on each system the >> chances are better than even that the only changes from here on will be >> simplifying the wording, not substantive differences. >> >> On 3-2-1, here are the rules in addition to the basic "3 most good, 2 >> least bad, 1 more preferred" dynamic: >> >> - Optional delegation: if you vote just one candidate as "good", any >> blank ratings you leave will be filled in by that candidate's predeclared >> ratings. Predeclarations default to "bad". >> - 3rd semifinalist: the third semifinalist must... >> - ...not be of the same party as the first two semifinalists (if >> there are party labels). If this would happen, just skip to the next >> highest "good" as the third semifinalist. >> - This means a party can't win by running 3 clones against a >> divided field. There could still in theory be "clone parties", but it seems >> unlikely that over 1/3 of voters would go along with such naked >> strategizing. >> - ...have at least half as many "good" ratings as the top >> semifinalist. If this would happen, just take the top two as finalists, >> skipping the second "2 least bad" round. >> - This ensures that you can't win just by being a "stealth >> centrist" with little direct support. >> >> On GOLD, here are the changes from the original version: >> >> - Pre-eliminations >> - The top candidate in each riding, based on local votes alone, is >> never eliminated. >> - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, >> is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the >> top. >> - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local >> votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes >> (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local >> candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those >> of" includes non-local votes.) >> - STV elimination order: eliminate in order of who's furthest behind >> in their riding >> - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including >> everything: local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the >> top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then >> they are 1000 behind in their riding. >> >> These rule adjustments for GOLD work to ensure that the voters within a >> riding have a significant say in who represents them, and out-of-riding >> votes matter only at the margin. >> >> I've also been thinking about rule adjustments for 3RD (the nonpartisan >> proportional system that's a cross between 321 and GOLD). That was part of >> why I started the other thread on proportional summability. But I'm not >> really satisfied that that system is "done" at the level of 321 and GOLD, >> so I'm not going to talk about the current version of those rules here. >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "The Center for Election Science" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Mon, Jun 12, 2017 6:07 PM

I agree that MJ3-2-1 would be a good method. (Minor point: I'd use
graduated majority judgment instead of MJ, because it gives a simple
real-number "graduated median" which can be used for tiebreakers, while the
MJ tiebreaker was optimized for compliance proofs).

Still, as a practical reform proposal, I don't want to pollute 3-2-1's
relative simplicity.

2017-06-12 13:41 GMT-04:00 Ted Stern dodecatheon@gmail.com:

IMO the 3-2-1 methodology of 3-best, 2-least-worst, 1-most-preferred is
not just a specific method, but a filter that could be applied to other
methods.  In the spirit of the original 3-2-1, the initial method should
satisfy the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC).

I currently like the idea of using the 3-2-1 filter with Majority Judgment
as the initial "3-best" method, since 3-2-1 eliminates (at least
practically) the participation criterion issue with MJ.

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 6:27 AM, 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election
Science electionscience@googlegroups.com wrote:

If the name encapsulated a description of what the voting method is, the
name would change naturally with the method. When the name is the author's
name, or something cute like 3-2-1 or IRV, you'd append a clarification for
minor changes. If Toby came up with a significantly different and clever
variation of 3-2-1, maybe you'd call it Quinn-Pereira Voting.

About ownership... does Warren own Score Voting? Maybe 3-2-1 should be
called Three-Value Score Voting with Three-Step Tally.

On Saturday, June 10, 2017 at 6:28:43 PM UTC+2, Toby Pereira wrote:

Minor changes can be seen as variants of the same method. For example,
someone might define a Condorcet method using margins, and someone else
might prefer the winning votes version. But you wouldn't give it a
different name. You'd call it x with winning votes. But then I suppose that
doesn't answer the question of whether the inventor or anyone else can
change the "canonical" version - the version where you don't have to
specify anything else about it.


From: Jameson Quinn
To: electionsciencefoundation; EM
Sent: Saturday, 10 June 2017, 17:04
Subject: Re: [EM] Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)

This raises a larger question: should the inventor of a voting method be
able to change the rules without changing the name? Once a proposal is
public, who owns it — the inventor or the public?

I don't think the answer is always clear-cut. If I wanted to redefine
3-2-1 to be something totally different, that wouldn't be OK. If somebody
else wanted to use the name 3-2-1 for something substantially the same, but
with minor rule changes, I might talk or argue with them about whether
their rule changes were a good idea, but I think I'd probably still let
them use the name.

But for smaller rule changes, I think it's OK for the inventor of a
method to make adjustments.

2017-06-10 11:14 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn:

Since creating 3-2-1 voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting and GOLD voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting,
I've continued to work on refining the rules. I'm arbitrarily deciding that
it's time to send an update now, because they're getting pretty stable.
Future changes are still possible, but I think that on each system the
chances are better than even that the only changes from here on will be
simplifying the wording, not substantive differences.

On 3-2-1, here are the rules in addition to the basic "3 most good, 2
least bad, 1 more preferred" dynamic:

- Optional delegation: if you vote just one candidate as "good", any
blank ratings you leave will be filled in by that candidate's predeclared
ratings. Predeclarations default to "bad".
- 3rd semifinalist: the third semifinalist must...
   - ...not be of the same party as the first two semifinalists (if
   there are party labels). If this would happen, just skip to the next
   highest "good" as the third semifinalist.
      - This means a party can't win by running 3 clones against a
      divided field. There could still in theory be "clone parties", but it seems
      unlikely that over 1/3 of voters would go along with such naked
      strategizing.
   - ...have at least half as many "good" ratings as the top
   semifinalist. If this would happen, just take the top two as finalists,
   skipping the second "2 least bad" round.
      - This ensures that you can't win just by being a "stealth
      centrist" with little direct support.

On GOLD, here are the changes from the original version:

- Pre-eliminations
   - The top candidate in each riding, based on local votes alone,
   is never eliminated.
   - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only,
   is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the
   top.
   - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local
   votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes
   (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local
   candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those
   of" includes non-local votes.)
- STV elimination order: eliminate in order of who's furthest behind
in their riding
   - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including
   everything: local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the
   top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then
   they are 1000 behind in their riding.

These rule adjustments for GOLD work to ensure that the voters within a
riding have a significant say in who represents them, and out-of-riding
votes matter only at the margin.

I've also been thinking about rule adjustments for 3RD (the nonpartisan
proportional system that's a cross between 321 and GOLD). That was part of
why I started the other thread on proportional summability. But I'm not
really satisfied that that system is "done" at the level of 321 and GOLD,
so I'm not going to talk about the current version of those rules here.


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info

--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

I agree that MJ3-2-1 would be a good method. (Minor point: I'd use graduated majority judgment instead of MJ, because it gives a simple real-number "graduated median" which can be used for tiebreakers, while the MJ tiebreaker was optimized for compliance proofs). Still, as a practical reform proposal, I don't want to pollute 3-2-1's relative simplicity. 2017-06-12 13:41 GMT-04:00 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com>: > IMO the 3-2-1 methodology of 3-best, 2-least-worst, 1-most-preferred is > not just a specific method, but a filter that could be applied to other > methods. In the spirit of the original 3-2-1, the initial method should > satisfy the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC). > > I currently like the idea of using the 3-2-1 filter with Majority Judgment > as the initial "3-best" method, since 3-2-1 eliminates (at least > practically) the participation criterion issue with MJ. > > On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 6:27 AM, 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election > Science <electionscience@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> If the name encapsulated a description of what the voting method is, the >> name would change naturally with the method. When the name is the author's >> name, or something cute like 3-2-1 or IRV, you'd append a clarification for >> minor changes. If Toby came up with a significantly different and clever >> variation of 3-2-1, maybe you'd call it Quinn-Pereira Voting. >> >> About ownership... does Warren own Score Voting? Maybe 3-2-1 should be >> called Three-Value Score Voting with Three-Step Tally. >> >> On Saturday, June 10, 2017 at 6:28:43 PM UTC+2, Toby Pereira wrote: >>> >>> Minor changes can be seen as variants of the same method. For example, >>> someone might define a Condorcet method using margins, and someone else >>> might prefer the winning votes version. But you wouldn't give it a >>> different name. You'd call it x with winning votes. But then I suppose that >>> doesn't answer the question of whether the inventor or anyone else can >>> change the "canonical" version - the version where you don't have to >>> specify anything else about it. >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* Jameson Quinn >>> *To:* electionsciencefoundation; EM >>> *Sent:* Saturday, 10 June 2017, 17:04 >>> *Subject:* Re: [EM] Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments) >>> >>> This raises a larger question: should the inventor of a voting method be >>> able to change the rules without changing the name? Once a proposal is >>> public, who owns it — the inventor or the public? >>> >>> I don't think the answer is always clear-cut. If I wanted to redefine >>> 3-2-1 to be something totally different, that wouldn't be OK. If somebody >>> else wanted to use the name 3-2-1 for something substantially the same, but >>> with minor rule changes, I might talk or argue with them about whether >>> their rule changes were a good idea, but I think I'd probably still let >>> them use the name. >>> >>> But for smaller rule changes, I think it's OK for the inventor of a >>> method to make adjustments. >>> >>> 2017-06-10 11:14 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn: >>> >>> Since creating 3-2-1 voting >>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting> and GOLD voting >>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>, >>> I've continued to work on refining the rules. I'm arbitrarily deciding that >>> it's time to send an update now, because they're getting pretty stable. >>> Future changes are still possible, but I think that on each system the >>> chances are better than even that the only changes from here on will be >>> simplifying the wording, not substantive differences. >>> >>> On 3-2-1, here are the rules in addition to the basic "3 most good, 2 >>> least bad, 1 more preferred" dynamic: >>> >>> - Optional delegation: if you vote just one candidate as "good", any >>> blank ratings you leave will be filled in by that candidate's predeclared >>> ratings. Predeclarations default to "bad". >>> - 3rd semifinalist: the third semifinalist must... >>> - ...not be of the same party as the first two semifinalists (if >>> there are party labels). If this would happen, just skip to the next >>> highest "good" as the third semifinalist. >>> - This means a party can't win by running 3 clones against a >>> divided field. There could still in theory be "clone parties", but it seems >>> unlikely that over 1/3 of voters would go along with such naked >>> strategizing. >>> - ...have at least half as many "good" ratings as the top >>> semifinalist. If this would happen, just take the top two as finalists, >>> skipping the second "2 least bad" round. >>> - This ensures that you can't win just by being a "stealth >>> centrist" with little direct support. >>> >>> On GOLD, here are the changes from the original version: >>> >>> - Pre-eliminations >>> - The top candidate in each riding, based on local votes alone, >>> is never eliminated. >>> - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, >>> is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the >>> top. >>> - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local >>> votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes >>> (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local >>> candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those >>> of" includes non-local votes.) >>> - STV elimination order: eliminate in order of who's furthest behind >>> in their riding >>> - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including >>> everything: local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the >>> top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then >>> they are 1000 behind in their riding. >>> >>> These rule adjustments for GOLD work to ensure that the voters within a >>> riding have a significant say in who represents them, and out-of-riding >>> votes matter only at the margin. >>> >>> I've also been thinking about rule adjustments for 3RD (the nonpartisan >>> proportional system that's a cross between 321 and GOLD). That was part of >>> why I started the other thread on proportional summability. But I'm not >>> really satisfied that that system is "done" at the level of 321 and GOLD, >>> so I'm not going to talk about the current version of those rules here. >>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "The Center for Election Science" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > >